Lewis v. Fenty

Opinion

Supervisor for over a year, was licensed as a Master Electrician in the District of Columbia and Virginia, had taught a course at a community college, had received an associate’s degree and was pursuing a bachelor’s degree in business administration and was the only candidate who qualified for the District of Columbia’s residency preference.2 Id. at 4, 8-9.

After participating in five application cycles within thirteen months, all resulting in her non-selections, and after allegedly being subjected to “wrongful, psychological torment and interference with her ability to work” through “open recalcitrance, discourtesy and insubordination by her subordinates” and “lack of support from her Superiors,” the plaintiff resigned from the DCRA on July 7, 2006. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 33-34.

The plaintiff first filed a complaint with the DCRA on January 3, 2006, alleging discrimination in connection with her third-non selection. Id. ¶ 16. On March 16, 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming “disparate treatment in the denial of a promotion and a hostile work environment on the basis of . . . race, gender, and matriculation.” Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1. The plaintiff did not include allegations of retaliation or constructive discharge in her EEOC complaint. Id. On December 4, 2006, after more than 180 days had passed since the plaintiff filed her complaint, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter stating that it had terminated its processing of the complaint. Am. Compl., Ex. 1.

B. Procedural History

The plaintiff filed a complaint in this court on March 5, 2007, see generally Compl., and shortly thereafter, filed an amended complaint outlining six counts of gender discrimination, one count of discrimination in violation of the District of Columbia Personnel Rules, one count of

retaliation, one count of hostile work environment and one count of constructive discharge, 2 D.C. CODE § 1-608.01(e) provides that bona fide residents of the District of Columbia shall be given a preference when applying for positions within the District of Columbia government.

7

Finally, the D.C. Circuit has directed that because it is difficult for a plaintiff to establish proof of discrimination, the court should view summary-judgment motions in such cases with special caution. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1997), overturned on other grounds, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); see also Johnson v. Digital Equip. Corp., 836 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D.D.C. 1993).

B. The Court Denies the Defendant’s Motion and Grants the Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s Non-Selection Claims

1. Legal Standard for Gender Discrimination Generally, to prevail on a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must follow a three-part burden-shifting analysis generally known as the McDonnell Douglas framework. Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court explained the framework as follows:

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection” . . . . Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination . . . .

The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (internal citations omitted) (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the context of a non-selection claim, the plaintiff must show “(i) that [s]he belongs to a [protected class]; (ii) that [s]he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite h[er] qualifications, [s]he was rejected; and (iv) that after h[er] rejection, the position remained open

26

satisfied this standard, the court grants the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and grants in part and denies in part the plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 14th day of September, 2009.

RICARDO M. URBINA

United States District Judge