John Doe v. Tonya Andrews, Facility Administrator of Golden State Annex Detention Facility

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00333
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN DOE, Case No. 1:25-cv-00333-JLT-HBK (HC) 12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS2 14 TONYA ANDREWS, Facility (Doc. No. 10) Administrator of Golden State Annex 15 Detention Facility,1 FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner John Doe, an immigration detainee in U.S. Immigration Customs and 19 Enforcement (ICE) custody at the Golden State Annex Detention Facility in McFarland, 20 California, initiated this action by filing, with counsel, a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 21 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1, “Petition”). The Petition raises the following claim for relief: 22 1 Respondent moves to strike and dismiss all unlawfully named officials under § 2241. (Doc. No. 10 at 1 23 n.2). The proper respondent in habeas cases is the “warden of the facility where the prisoner is held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 24 (2004). As recently held by the Ninth Circuit, in § 2241 cases filed by immigrant detainees, the proper respondent is the warden of the private detention facility. Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 25 2024). The undersigned will recommend the district court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss all unlawfully named officials and recognize the proper respondent as the Facility Administrator of 26 Petitioner’s detention facility, the Golden State Annex Detention Facility. 2 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 27 (E.D. Cal. 2022).

28 1 Petitioner’s continued detention in ICE custody without a bond hearing violates his Fifth 2 Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 17-25). As relief, Petitioner asks the Court to issue a 3 declaration that his “ongoing prolonged detention” violates his due process rights; issue a writ of 4 habeas corpus and order Respondent to schedule a bond hearing before an immigration judge 5 (“IJ”) where the Government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner 6 presents a risk of flight or danger; and award reasonable attorney fees under the Equal Access to 7 Justice Act (EAJA). (Id. at 25-26). 8 In response, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) arguing the Petitioner is 9 subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); thus, “both 10 constitutionally and as a matter of law,” because his detention “continues to serve legitimate 11 congressionally mandated goals with a definite end in sight.” (Doc. No. 10 (citing Demore v. 12 Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Keo v. Warden of the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Ctr., 2025 WL 13 1029392, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2025), appeal dismissed sub nom. Keo v. Warden, 2025 WL 14 2528945 (9th Cir. June 27, 2025)). Petitioner filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 15 arguing neither Demore nor Keo preclude his as-applied challenge to his “prolonged detention,” 16 and restating his argument in the Petition that after applying the factors in Mathews v. Eldridge,3 17 his continued detention without a bond hearing violates his procedural due process rights under 18 the Fifth Amendment. 19 On June 12, 2025, the Court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing 20 addressing whether Petitioner’s due process rights, including any right to a bond hearing, as an 21 “arriving alien” detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), extend beyond the rights 22 provided by statute. (Doc. No. 16 (citing Supreme Court cases Shaughnessy v. United States ex 23 rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953) and Dept. of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 24 103 (2020)). Petitioner responds Thuraissigiam and Mezei “do not limit Petitioner’s right to 25 challenge his detention to INA procedures” and separately argued that “nothing in the statute 26 entitles Petitioner to any procedure to seek independent review of the reasonableness of his 27

28 3 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 1 detention.” (Doc. No. 17 at 4, 10). Respondent generally responds, “the legislative text 2 underlying § 1225(b) is fully sufficient to address due process concerns for prolonged detention.” 3 (Doc. No. 18 at 3 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (noting the Secretary of Homeland Security 4 may temporarily parole into the United States “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent 5 humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United 6 States”); 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017)). 7 Significant is Petitioner’s status and detention under § 1225(b)(1) as an “arriving alien” 8 who has not yet been admitted to the United States and because he was denied discretionary 9 parole pending final adjudication of his asylum application. Given his status the undersigned 10 recommends the district court grant Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and dismiss the Petition for 11 the reasons set forth below. 12 I. BACKGROUND 13 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Belize. (Doc. No. 10-1, Exh. 1). He entered the 14 United States without inspection, and July 1, 2024, and was encountered by Customs and Border 15 Protection (“CBP”) officers approximately 10 miles east of Tecate, Mexico and 75 yards north of 16 the United States Border. (Id. at 2-3, Exh. 1). Petitioner indicated that he did not possess any 17 legal documents allowing him to legally enter or remain in the United States. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 18 Exh. 1). On July 2, 2024, CBP officers placed Petitioner in expedited removal proceedings 19 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and referred him to an asylum officer for a credible fear 20 interview after he claimed fear of returning to Belize. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 3; Doc. No. 1 at 8). 21 After credible fear interviews with an asylum officer on August 1 and August 7, 2024, the asylum 22 officer found Petitioner to have a “credible fear of torture” if he was returned to Belize. (Doc. 23 No. 1-1 at 2 ¶ 4). On August 14, 2024, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 24 issued a Notice to Appear that (1) vacated the Order of Expedited Removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 25 208.30, (2) charged Petitioner with removability under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 26 § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (alien without valid entry documents) and § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (alien entry 27 without inspection), and (3) ordered Petitioner to appear before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). 28 (Doc. No. 10-1 at 3, Exh. 3; Doc. No. 1 at 8-9; Doc. No. 1-1 at 2-3 ¶ 5). Petitioner claims he 1 asked the IJ during a master calendar on August 26, 2024 if he was eligible for a bond hearing, 2 and his request was denied “on the basis that she lacked statutory authority to hold a bond hearing 3 for him.”4 (Doc. No. 1-1 at 3 ¶ 6 (also noting Petitioner was advised to submit a request for 4 discretionary parole to ICE)). In November 2024, Petitioner submitted a request for parole to the 5 ICE deportation officer assigned to his case, and on January 15, 2025, he received an Interim 6 Notice Declining Parole “at [the] time” because Petitioner did not establish, he was not a flight 7 risk, and did not establish he was not a security risk or a danger to the community. (Doc. No. 1-1 8 at 3 ¶ 8-9; see also Doc. No. 10-1 at 4 ¶ 15, Exhs. 9, 10). 9 Respondent attests that Petitioner appeared at master calendar hearings, sometimes with 10 his attorney, and requested extensions of time “to prepare his applications for relief” on August 11 26, 2024, October 16, 2024, December 11, 2024, and January 22, 2025. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 3, 12 Exhs. 4-7). On February 26, 2025, the IJ set the matter for a merits hearing on Petitioner’s 13 requests for relief on April 22, 2025. (Id. at 3 ¶ 14, Exh. 8). 5 14 Petitioner is currently detained in ICE custody under the mandatory detention provisions 15 in § 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and 8 U.S.C. 8 U.S.C. § 16 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), and he is being held at the Golden State Annex ICE Processing Facility in 17 MacFarland, California. (See id. at 3 ¶ 9; Doc. No. 1 at 4 ¶ 8). 18 II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 19 Under Rule 4, if a petition is not dismissed at screening, the judge “must order the 20 respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response” to the petition. R. Governing 2254 Cases 21 4. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 state that “the judge may want to authorize the 22 respondent to make a motion to dismiss based upon information furnished by respondent.” A 23 motion to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus is construed as a request for the court to 24

25 4 In Matter of M-S-, the AG interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) to require mandatory detention without bond hearings for asylum seekers who were initially subject to expedited removal but later 26 transferred to full removal proceedings after establishing a credible fear. Id. at 515–17. Under Matter of M-S-, the only possibility for release available to noncitizens in this category is a discretionary grant of 27 parole by DHS for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Id. at 516–17. Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (AG 2019). 28 5 No where in the supplemental briefing has either party indicated that Petitioner’s status has changed. 1 dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 2 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 4, a district court must dismiss a habeas petition if it 3 “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 4 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019); Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). 5 A. Jurisdiction 6 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in 7 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). As 8 pertinent here, “district courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas 9 challenges to immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal 10 order.” Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 11 F.3d 1196, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 538 U.S. 281, 294 (2018). 12 B. Mandatory Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) 13 Title 8 U.S.C. § 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” – noncitizens who “arrive[] in 14 the United States,” or are “present” in the United States but have “not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 15 1225(a)(1). “Arriving alien means an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into 16 the United States at a port-of-entry, or … an alien interdicted … and brought in to the United 17 States by any means.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2; see also 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004) (authorizing 18 the application of expedited removal to those “encountered within 14 days of entry without 19 inspection and within 100 air miles of any U.S. international land border.”). “Applicants for 20 admission must ‘be inspected by immigration officers’ to ensure that they may be admitted into 21 the country consistent with U.S. immigration law.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting § 22 1225(a)(3)). Once “an immigration officer determines” that an arriving alien “is inadmissible,” 23 “the officer [must] order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or 24 review.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). 25 However, if an applicant “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum … or a fear of 26 persecution,” the immigration officer “shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer.” 27 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). If the asylum officer finds the applicant has a credible fear of 28 persecution, the applicant “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for 1 asylum;” and if the officer determines there is no credible fear of persecution, the officer “shall 2 order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 3 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(I), (IV) (“alien subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained 4 pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found to not have such a fear, 5 until removed.”). “[A]pplicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole ‘for urgent 6 humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. 7 § 1182(d)(5)(A) and citing 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) 8 (parole requests are considered by designated officials including ICE “directors of field 9 operations”). Thus, as explained by the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 10 [r]ead most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) … mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded. 11 Section 1225(b)(1) aliens are detained for “further consideration of the application for asylum,” and § 1225(b)(2) aliens are in turn 12 detained for “[removal] proceeding[s].” Once those proceedings end, detention under § 1225(b) must end as well. Until that point, 13 however, nothing in the statutory text imposes any limit on the length of detention. And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says 14 anything whatsoever about bond hearings. 15 583 U.S. at 297; see also Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1168 16 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The Attorney General [has] interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) to 17 require mandatory detention without bond hearings for asylum seekers who were initially subject 18 to expedited removal but later transferred to full removal proceedings after establishing a credible 19 fear.”) (citing Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 515-17 (2019)).6 20 At the time the instant Petition was filed in March 2025, Petitioner had been detained for 21 more than 8 months. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). It is undisputed that Petitioner entered the United States 22 between ports of entry, without inspection, and was “issued an Expedited Removal Order 23 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), which applies to noncitizens who cross a land border 24 without inspection and are arrested within 100 miles of the border within two weeks of their 25 arrival.” (Doc. No. 1 at 8). It is further undisputed that Petitioner was found to have a credible 26 fear of persecution and is therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

27 6 There is ongoing class action litigation asserting a due process right to a bond hearing for individuals who enter without inspection and then demonstrate a credible fear of deportation. See Padilla v. ICE, No. 2:18-cv-00928-MJP 28 (W.D. Wash.), appeal pending Case No. 24-2801 (9th Cir.) (argument in May 2025). 1 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) for further consideration of his application for asylum. See Jennings, 583 U.S. 2 at 297. Thus, Petitioner is not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing. Id. However, Petitioner does 3 not dispute the grounds for his mandatory detention; rather, he contends that his prolonged 4 detention without a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 5 15-25). 6 C. Due Process for “Arriving Aliens” Detained under § 1225(b)(1) 7 The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be ... 8 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Further, it is “well-established 9 that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno 10 v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001) (“this Court 11 has held that the Due Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final order of deportation”). 12 However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored that “[d]etention during removal 13 proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 513 (“In 14 the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes 15 rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 16 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The liberty rights of the aliens before us here are subject to 17 limitations and conditions not applicable to citizens.”); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 18 (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens arrested for 19 deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation 20 proceedings.”). 21 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that “the nature of 22 protection [under the Due Process clause] may vary depending on [immigration] status and 23 circumstance.” Zadvydas, 522 U.S. at 694 (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an 24 entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”); 25 Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (“our immigration laws have long made a 26 distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those 27 who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance, 28 the Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former 1 category who are merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’”); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 2 32 (1982) (collecting cases) (“[A]n alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a 3 privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application ... [H]owever, once an alien 4 gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, 5 his constitutional status changes accordingly.”); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 6 660 (1892) (“As to [those who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or 7 residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law], the 8 decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by 9 congress, are due process of law.”). For example, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 10 the arriving alien petitioner lived lawfully in the United States for over twenty years, at which 11 point he left the United States for 19 months. 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953). Upon his return, he was 12 “permanently excluded from the United States on security grounds but stranded [] on Ellis Island 13 because other countries will not take him back. The issue is whether the Attorney General’s 14 continued exclusion of respondent without a hearing amounts to an unlawful detention, so that 15 courts may admit him temporarily to the United States on bond until arrangements are made for 16 his departure.” Id. at 207. The Supreme Court found Mezei’s continued exclusion did not 17 deprive him of any statutory or constitutional right, emphasizing that “aliens who have once 18 passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to 19 traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law. But an alien on the threshold 20 of initial entry stands on a different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure is authorized by Congress 21 is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.’” 345 U.S. at 212 (citing Knauff 22 v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)). 23 In Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, the arriving alien petitioner attempted to 24 enter the country illegally and was apprehended 25 yards from the border. 591 U.S. 103, 106 25 (2020). He was detained for expedited removal proceedings pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) and was 26 never released from custody. Id. at 114. After his request for asylum was denied, he filed a 27 federal habeas petition, requesting “a writ of habeas corpus, an injunction, or a writ of mandamus 28 directing [the Department] to provide [him] a new opportunity to apply for asylum and other 1 applicable forms of relief.” Id. at 115 (alterations in original). The Supreme Court found the Due 2 Process Clause did not require a review of the decision denying him asylum and reaffirmed that 3 “an alien in [Thuraissigiam’s] position has only those rights regarding admission that Congress 4 has provided by statute.” Id. at 140; see also Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1146, 1148 5 (9th Cir. 2022) ( “arriving immigrant caught at the border” had no constitutional rights regarding 6 his application for asylum, as “any rights [petitioner] may have in regard to removal or admission 7 are purely statutory in nature and are not derived from, or protected by, the Constitution’s Due 8 Process Clause.”). 9 Following this decision, selected United States district courts have relied on 10 Thuraissigiam, Mezei, and the preceding line of Supreme Court cases to find noncitizens subject 11 to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) are not statutorily entitled to bond hearings, and lack any 12 due process rights beyond those authorized by the statute. See, e.g., Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, 13 2024 WL 3316306, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2024) (finding “Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 14 precedents are clear that Petitioner [detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)] lacks any rights 15 beyond those conferred by statute, and no statute entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing.”); Petgrave 16 v. Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 669 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“When a noncitizen attempts to 17 unlawfully cross the border as Petitioner did, his constitutional right to due process does not 18 extend beyond the rights provided by statute.”); Gonzales Garcia v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 19 336 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Petitioner is on the threshold of initial entry into the United States and [] 20 he accordingly is not entitled to procedural protections beyond those provided by statute.”); 21 Bataineh v. Lundren, 2020 WL 3572597, at *9 (D. Kan. July 1, 2020) (“if Petitioner is an 22 ‘arriving alien’ detained under § 1225(b) he is not entitled to a bond hearing”); Gonzalez Aguilar 23 v. Wolf, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1202 (D. N.M. Mar. 24, 2020) (“Petitioner’s detention will end either 24 when the government grants her asylum or when it removes her, and Petitioner identifies no [] 25 Supreme Court case holding that such detention violates the Due Process Clause”); de la Rosa 26 Espinoza v. Guadian, 2020 WL 3452967, at *8 (D. Kan. June 24, 2020); D.A.V.V. v. Warden, 27 Irwin County Detention Ctr., 2020 WL 13240240, at *5-6 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2020) (noting 28 “pronouncements [in Thuraissigiam] as to arriving aliens’ due process rights, [] are broad and 1 would appear to extend to the detention context” and finding “because the INA does not provide 2 arriving aliens the right to bond, Petitioner has no independent procedural due process right to a 3 bond hearing.”); Romero v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2490659, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2025) (finding 4 Petitioner failed to state a claim for relief because § 1225(b)(1) mandates detention until an 5 immigration officer finishes considering the application for asylum); Poonjani v. Shanahan, 319 6 F. Supp. 3d 644, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Accordingly, because the statutory language makes clear 7 that aliens detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(1)(A) have no statutory entitlement to bond 8 hearings, and because Mezei instructs that, for aliens on the threshold of initial entry, the 9 Constitution extends no farther than statutory language itself, Mezei compels the conclusion that 10 Petitioner's due process rights have not been infringed.”). 11 Petitioner acknowledges in his supplemental briefing that the “Court has long interpreted 12 ‘the Constitution [to] give[] ‘the political department of the government’ plenary authority to 13 decide which [noncitizens] to admit … and a concomitant of that power is the power to set the 14 procedures to be followed in determining whether a[] [noncitizen] should be admitted.” (Doc. 15 No. 17 at 3-4 (internal citations omitted)). However, Petitioner argues Thuraissigiam is 16 distinguishable from the instant case because the petitioner challenged his negative credible fear 17 determination and the remedy sought was a “new opportunity to apply for asylum,” and Mezei is 18 distinguishable because the petitioner was challenging a final order of exclusion from the United 19 States as threat to national security; whereas here, the Petitioner is claiming his due process rights 20 are violated by unreasonably prolonged detention without a bond hearing. (Id. at 4-6). Thus, 21 Petitioner asks that the Court ascribe to the “majority position” of district courts in the Ninth 22 Circuit that “interpret Thuraissigiam as circumscribing an arriving alien’s due process rights to 23 admission, rather than limiting that person’s ability to challenge detention.” Gao v. Larose, 2025 24 WL 2770633, at (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases); see also 25 Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1171–72 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The holding in 26 Thuraissigiam does not foreclose Plaintiffs' due process claims which seek to vindicate a right to 27 a bond hearing with certain procedural protections.”); Jatta v. Clark, 2020 WL 7138006, at *2 28 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2020) (holding “there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in 1 Thuraissigiam that suggests the writ cannot apply to [petitioner’s] challenge to what he claims is 2 an unlawful detention”); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020) 3 (distinguishing Mezei and “join[ing] the majority of courts across the country in concluding that 4 an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an individualized bond 5 hearing violates due process.”); Hernandez v. Wofford, 2025 WL 2420390, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6 21, 2025); A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (“Nowhere in 7 [Thuraissigiam] did the Supreme Court suggest that arriving aliens being held under § 1225(b) 8 may be held indefinitely and unreasonably with no due process implications, nor that such aliens 9 have no due process rights whatsoever.”). 10 Petitioner also attempts to analogize the Supreme Court’s finding in Zadvydas v. Davis 11 that “that the plenary power ‘is subject to important constitutional limitations’” and “does not 12 apply where a noncitizen challenges ‘an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United 13 States,’” to the instant case, ”where Petitioner alleges that Respondents have unlawfully detained 14 him without a hearing, and that his detention will continue for months or years.” (Doc. No. 17 at 15 6 (citing 533 U.S. at 695)). 16 This argument is unavailing. As discussed below, Zadvydas addressed the “potentially 17 permanent” confinement under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) of noncitizens who had been admitted to 18 the United States and were later ordered removed, but their removal could not be effectuated, for 19 example, because their country refused to accept them. 533 U.S. at 691 (“[T]he issue we face is 20 whether aliens that the [g]overnment finds itself unable to remove are to be condemned to an 21 indefinite term of imprisonment within the United States.”). In Jennings, the Supreme Court 22 methodically distinguished “the provision in question in Zadvydas, § 1231(a)(6), [as it] differs 23 materially from those that in issue here, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)” because (1) §§ 1225(b)(1) and 24 (b)(2) mandate detention for a specified period of time, while Congress “left the permissible 25 length of detention under § 1231(a)(6) unclear,” (2) in Zadvydas the Court saw ambiguity in the 26 use of “may” in § 1231(a)(6), as opposed to §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)’s “unequivocal[] mandate 27 that aliens falling within their scope ‘shall’ be detained,” and (3) “there is a specific provision 28 authorizing release from § 1225(b) detention whereas no similar release provision applies to § 1 1231(a)(6).” 583 U.S. at 299-300. Moreover, in Zadvydas the Court distinguished Mezei, finding 2 a “critical” distinction between noncitizens admitted to the United States and subsequently 3 ordered removed pursuant to § 1231(a)(6), and those, as Petitioner here, on the threshold of entry 4 as an arriving alien detained under § 1225(b)(1). See 533 U.S. at 692-93 (explaining that an 5 alien’s treatment “as if stopped at the border” has historically been held sufficient to justify 6 potentially indefinite detention). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Zadvydas is of limited 7 relevance in considering whether Petitioner has due process rights to a bond hearing as that right 8 is not explicitly conferred by § 1225(b)(1). See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297 (“neither § 1225(b)(1) 9 nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond hearings”). 10 After thorough review of the unequivocal statutory text of § 1225(b)(1) and relevant 11 Supreme Court precedents, the Court is inclined to agree with district courts finding that pursuant 12 to Thuraissigiam and preceding Supreme Court precedent, Petitioner’s rights as an arriving alien 13 apprehended shortly after his unlawful entry into this country and now held under mandatory 14 detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) is limited to those rights authorized by statute, and as 15 such, Petitioner has no separate due process right to a bond hearing. In considering this issue the 16 Court emphasizes that “Mezei and its progeny do not hold that Petitioner has no due-process 17 rights; rather, the applicable statutory process shapes [his] procedural due-process rights. 18 Because Petitioner has no statutory right to release or a bond hearing, [he] has no due process 19 right to the relief requested.” Gonzalez Aguilar, 448 F. Supp. At 1212 (citing Jennings, 583 at 20 297 (“nothing in the statutory text imposes any limit on the length of detention. And neither § 21 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.”)). 22 Regardless, in light of district courts’ split on this issue, and the lack of binding authority 23 from the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit specifically as to whether Thuraissigiam and Mezei 24 foreclose a claim that “prolonged” detention of an arriving alien under § 1225(b)(1) without an 25 individualized bond hearing violates due process because it is not a right authorized by the 26 statute, the Court proceeds to consider whether Petitioner’s arguably “less robust due-process 27 protection” as an arriving alien has been violated as-applied in this instance. Jamal A. v. 28 Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2019) (“The Court is inclined to agree with the 1 government that arriving aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) receive less robust due- 2 process protection than criminal aliens detained under § 1226(c).”) (collecting cases). 3 D. Detention under § 1225(b)(1) without a Bond Hearing 4 As relevant here, “[i]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the Supreme Court and [the Ninth 5 Circuit] have grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether the various detention statutes may 6 authorize indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a 7 bond hearing.’” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rodriguez 8 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2022) (observing that “it remains 9 undetermined whether the Due Process Clause requires additional bond procedures under any 10 immigration detention statute,” and noting that both the Ninth Circuit “and the Supreme Court 11 have repeatedly declined to decide constitutional challenges to bond hearing procedures in the 12 immigration detention context, whether the claims were brought by an alien under § 1226(a) or 13 another provision.”). As discussed above, the pertinent line of authority starts with Zadvydas v. 14 Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), wherein the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to prolonged 15 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been ordered removed by the 16 government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, but their removal could not 17 be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to accept them or the United 18 States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 19 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-86). The Court held that detention under § 1231(a)(6) is 20 limited to a presumptively reasonable period of six months, after which a noncitizen was entitled 21 to release if “it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 22 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. However, as relevant here, the Supreme Court in 23 Jennings later distinguished “Zadvydas’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(6)” from detention under § 24 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) because “while Zadvydas found § 1231(a)(6) to be ambiguous, the same 25 cannot be said of §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2): Both provisions mandate detention until a certain 26 point and authorize release prior to that point only under limited circumstances.” Jennings, 583 27 U.S. 301 (emphasis added). 28 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial due process 1 challenge to mandatory detention of a lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and 2 distinguished Zadvydas because mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) has a “definite 3 termination point” when a decision is made regarding the alien’s removability. Id. at 529. Justice 4 Kennedy concurred with the decision, thereby creating the majority, but noted “since the Due 5 Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such 6 as respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and 7 dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” (Id. at 532) 8 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 9 In 2015, the Ninth Circuit applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to hold that for 10 noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. §§§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must 11 provide periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their 12 continued detention.” Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). However, in 13 Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court found the Ninth Circuit misapplied the canon of 14 constitutional avoidance and the “implicit 6-month time limit on the length of mandatory 15 detention” under § 1225(b) and § 1226(c) “falls far short of a ‘plausible statutory construction.’” 16 583 U.S. at 296-97, 303-04. As noted supra, the Court interpreted § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) to 17 “provide for detention for a specified period of time” – to wit – “until certain proceedings have 18 concluded. Section 1225(b)(1) aliens are detained for ‘further consideration of the application for 19 asylum,’ and § 1225(b)(2) aliens are in turn detained for ‘[removal] proceeding[s].’ Once those 20 proceedings end, detention under § 1225(b) must end as well.” Id. at 297, 302. Of particular 21 relevance here, the Court explicitly noted that neither § 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2) say “anything 22 whatsoever about bond hearings.” Id. at 297. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the Ninth 23 Circuit “erroneously concluded that periodic bond hearings are required under the immigration 24 provisions at issue,” and remanded to the Ninth Circuit to “consider the constitutional arguments 25 on their merits.” Id. at 312. Thus, while Jennings concluded that § 1225(b)(1) authorized 26 detention without a bond hearing on its face, it did not provide specific guidance as to whether an 27 alien could assert an as-applied challenge to prolonged detention without a bond hearing under 28 the Fifth Amendment due process clause. 1 Despite the lack of specific guidance from the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit on 2 whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens subject to mandatory detention for 3 further consideration of an application for asylum under § 1225(b)(1)(b)(ii), multiple United 4 States district courts have found “unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1225(b) without a 5 bond hearing violates due process.” See, e.g., Banda v. MacAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 6 (W.D. Wash. 2019). A survey of these decisions reveals a myriad of overlapping balancing tests, 7 often initially conceived and applied in the context of a lawful permanent resident detained under 8 § 1226(c), to determine whether detention of an arriving alien under a § 1225(b) without a bond 9 hearing has become so prolonged that it violates petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth 10 Amendment.7 See id. (finding 17-month detention of asylum seeker without bond hearing was 11 “unreasonably prolonged” after conceiving and applying a multi-factor test that considers (1) the 12 total length of detention to date, (2) the likely duration of future detention, (3) the conditions of 13 detention, (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by detainee, (5) delays in the removal 14 proceedings caused by the government, and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will 15 result in a final order of removal); Hong v. Myorkas, 2022 WL 1078627, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 16 (applying Banda factors and Mathews v. Eldridge to find detention for nearly 30 months without 17 a bond hearing violated due process, and noting “district courts around the country have agreed 18 that mandatory detention pending completion of removal proceedings ‘without a bond hearing, 19 will – at some point – violate the right to due process.’”) (internal quotations omitted) (collecting 20 cases) (citing Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022), vacated on other grounds, 21 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024)); Abdul-Samed, 2025 WL 2099343 (applying Lopez test previously 22 directed at noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c) and determining detention for 16 months 23

24 7 Detention under both § 1225(b) and § 1225(c) is mandatory. However, conflating the analysis of noncitizens held under these two distinct statutory frameworks arguably does not account for Supreme 25 Court precedent, discussed in detail supra, distinguishing the rights of a aliens already present in the United States from an applicant for admission. See, e.g., Otis V. v. Green, 2018 WL 3302997, at *7 26 (D.N.J. July 5, 2018) (“aliens subject to detention as applicants for admission are entitled to Due Process Protections, albeit to a lesser extent than those which would apply to aliens subject to mandatory detention 27 under § 1226(c) who are already considered to have entered the country”); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. As such, the court limits its consideration here to district court cases evaluating whether prolonged 28 detention of a petitioner under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing violates due process. 1 without a bond hearing violated due process); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772–73 2 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (applying Banda factors and finding detention for over 20 months without bond 3 hearing violated due process); Leke v. Holt, 521 F. Supp. 3d 597, 605 (E.D. Va. 2021) (applying 4 no balancing test and determining detention for 24 months without bond hearing violated due 5 process); Djelassi v. ICE Field Office Dir., 434 F. Supp. 3d 917, 930 (W.D. Wash. 2020) 6 (applying Banda factors and finding detention for 18 months without bond hearing violated due 7 process); Pierre v. Doll, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (applying no balancing test and 8 finding detention for two years pending resolution of asylum application without a bond hearing 9 was unreasonable); Perez v. Decker, 2018 WL 3991497 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018) (applying 3- 10 factor test and finding detention for nine months without a bond hearing was unreasonable); 11 Rodriguez-Figueroa v. Barr, 442 F. Supp. 3d 549, (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (applying Mathews v. 12 Eldridge and 7-factor test previously directed at noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c) to 13 determine the length of detention without a bond hearing was unreasonable); da Silva v. Nielsen, 14 2019 WL 13218461 (S.D. Tx. Mar. 29, 2019) (applying 3-factor test and finding detention 15 without a bond hearing for “just over a year” was unreasonably prolonged in violation of due 16 process rights); Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2019) (applying 6- 17 factor test and finding continuing to detain noncitizen for 19 months without a bond hearing 18 would violate his due process rights). 19 In contrast, a number of United States district courts have determined on a case-by-case 20 basis that mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) without an individualized bond hearing was 21 not a violation of due process. Navarrete-Leiva v. Current or Acting U.S. Att’y Gen., 2024 WL 22 5111780, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2024) (finding due process considerations are “not at issue” 23 because petitioner was provided two parole reviews, and “petitioner’s detention is not indefinite; 24 there is a clear termination point at the conclusion of petitioner’s various legal challenges”); 25 Lopez v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2021 WL 2079840, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2021) 26 (finding petitioner’s continued detention is constitutional as “it does not appear from the record 27 … that petitioner’s removal or release is not “reasonably foreseeable”); Fatule-Roque v. Lowe, 28 2018 WL 3584696, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (finding detention for 15 months “[had] not 1 become arbitrary or unreasonable” and was therefore not “an unconstitutional application of the 2 statute,” and noting the length of detention can be “attributed, in large part, to the multiple 3 motions to reset [petitioner] submitted before the Immigration Court”); Ford v. Ducote, 2020 WL 4 8642257 (W.D. La Nov. 2, 2020) (finding no due process violation as detention not indefinite or 5 “potentially permanent,” in contrast to Zadvydas, rather, it “ends when the removal proceedings 6 end”); D.A.F. v. Warden, Stewart Detention Center, 2020 WL 9460467, at *10-11 (M.D. Ga. 7 May 8, 2020) (collecting cases) (finding fifteen months of detention “failed to rise to the level of 8 unreasonably prolonged detention” and noting his immigration case “has not simply sat idle”); 9 Otis V. v. Green, 2018 WL 3302997, at *8 (D.N.J. July 5, 2018) (relying on prior intra-district 10 cases to find petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b) for just over a year, “given the lesser Due 11 Process protections applicable to applicants for admission, insufficient to render continued 12 detention so suspect as to require a bond hearing); Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2490657, at 13 *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025) (finding detention for two months does not reach the “threshold” of 14 becoming “unreasonable and constitutionally infirm”); Serrano-Ramirez v. Doll, 2020 WL 15 2735358, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 26, 2020) (finding petitioner detained for a little over one year was 16 not entitled to a bond hearing because “detention had not yet reached the point of being arbitrary 17 or unreasonable”). 18 Here, to the extent Petitioner maintains his detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) exceeds six 19 months without a bond hearing is unconstitutional on its face, such an argument is inapposite. 20 (Doc. No. 1 at 17-18). As discussed above, the Supreme Court soundly rejected this facial 21 challenge in Jennings. (Doc. No. 10 at 4); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 304 (an “implicit 6-month time 22 limit on the length of mandatory detention” falls “far short of a ‘plausible statutory 23 construction.’”); see also Abdul-Samed, 2025 WL 2099343, at *5 (citing Black v. Decker, 103 24 F.4th 133, 150 (2d Cir. 2024) (noting three circuit courts of appeals that have “rejected a bright- 25 line constitutional rule requiring a bond hearing after six months of detention” and declining to 26 “adopt a presumption of reasonableness or unreasonableness of any duration of detention”). 27 Next, Petitioner argues his 8-month detention has become unreasonably prolonged; thus, 28 “under Mathews v. Eldridge, Petitioner is constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing.” (Doc. No. 1 1 at 18-23 (arguing Petitioner (1) has significant liberty interest in freedom from confinement, (2) 2 the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a bond hearing favors granting the 3 petition, and (3) the government has a negligible interest in detaining him without a bond 4 hearing)), 25). In response, Respondent argues that Petitioner is properly detained as mandated 5 under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) “pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if 6 found to not have such a fear, until removed” (8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV)); moreover, 7 his detention is constitutionally permissible because deportation proceedings are ongoing and 8 have a definite termination point, and “there is no evidence his detention during civil removal 9 proceedings is motivated for punitive reasons or that his detention otherwise fails to serve 10 immigration purposes.” (Doc. No. 10 at 6 (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 513; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 11 304)). Respondent also notes that the Supreme Court has not adopted a multi-factor balancing 12 test, like Mathews v. Eldridge, for constitutional challenges to civil detention in removal 13 proceedings, and encourages the Court to “follow its own precedent rejecting utilization of a 14 multi-factor balancing (Mathews) test to assess so-called as-applied due process violation 15 claims.” (Id. at 5 (citing Keo v. Warden of the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Ctr., 2025 WL 16 1029392 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2025)). In his opposition, Petitioner argues that Respondent’s 17 reliance on Keo is misplaced because (1) Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1), while 18 petitioner in Keo was detained under § 1226(c), and (2) Keo “does not properly apply Ninth 19 Circuit law.” (Doc. No. 12 at 7-14). 20 As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Petitioner that Keo is easily distinguishable 21 from the instant case. While both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1226(c) require mandatory detention of the 22 respective noncitizen, as detailed above, “aliens subject to detention as applicants for admission 23 are entitled … to a lesser extent [of Due Process protections] than those which would apply to 24 aliens subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) who are already considered to have entered 25 the country.” Otis V. v. Green, 2018 WL 3302997, at *7; see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 547 26 (noting Supreme Court law has “accorded [legal permanent residents] greater protections than 27 other aliens under the Due Process Clause.”). The Court also acknowledges supra that United 28 States district courts, including those in the Ninth Circuit, have ordered bond hearings for 1 noncitizens detained more than six months, and in some of those cases the court applied a 2 Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine whether prolonged detention without a bond 3 hearing violated a noncitizen’s due process rights. 4 However, the Court draws the line at Petitioner’s suggestion that the Court “must apply 5 existing Ninth Circuit law holding that prolonged detention raises grave due process concerns” 6 and “follow the Ninth Circuit’s due process holdings that as duration grows, detention without a 7 bond hearing raises serious concerns.” (Doc. No. 12 at 12). Specifically, Petitioner argues that 8 Respondent’s briefing and the Keo decision fail to “grapple with Ninth Circuit case law 9 describing six months of detention without a bond hearing as ‘prolonged’ and ‘raising serious 10 constitutional concerns.” (Doc. No. 12 at 10-12). In an abundance of caution, the Court will do 11 so here. The Court agrees with Petitioner that Jennings was a statutory-interpretation decision, 12 that left open an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of detention without a bond hearing. 13 See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312. However, none of the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Petitioner rise 14 to the level of “binding” precedent instructing district courts that mandatory detention without a 15 bond hearing under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) offends due process at the six-month mark per se. 16 First, Petitioner cites Diouf v. Napolitano, where the court noted as part of a Mathews v. 17 Eldridge balancing test analysis that “[w]hen detention crosses the six-month threshold and 18 release or removal is not imminent, the private interests at stake are profound,” and ultimately 19 held that “an alien facing prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) is entitled to a bond hearing 20 before an immigration judge.” 634 F.3d 1081, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2011) (“individuals detained 21 under § 1231(a)(6) are entitled to the same procedural safeguards against prolonged detention as 22 individuals detained under § 1226(a)”), abrogated as recognized by Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 23 53 F.4th 1190, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, not only does the holding in Diouf not explicitly 24 define a bright-line rule that detention is constitutionally infirm at “when it crosses the six-month 25 mark,” it is also distinguishable from the instant case as Petitioner here is under mandatory 26 detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) as opposed to detention pending completion of removal 27 proceedings under § 1231(a)(6). 28 Second, in Rodriguez v. Robbins the court held that “the government must provide 1 periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued 2 detention.” 804 F.3d 1060, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1091). However, in 3 Jennings the Supreme Court unambiguously found that Rodriguez “erroneously concluded that 4 [6-month] periodic bond hearings are required under” § 1225(b), and remanded the case to the 5 Ninth Circuit to consider whether the class could continue based on Petitioner’s constitutional 6 claims. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312. 7 Third, in Rodriguez v. Marin, while the Ninth Circuit expressed “grave doubts that any 8 statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional,” the 9 court made no additional findings and remanded in part for a “reassessment and reconsideration” 10 “of the six-month bond hearing requirement.” 909 F.3d 252, 256-57 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, while 11 arguably relevant to evaluating an as-applied challenge to whether a detention under § 1225(b) 12 without a bond hearing violates due process, these Ninth Circuit cases do not, as Petitioner 13 claims, “demonstrat[e] that due process requires a bond hearing once immigration detention lasts 14 longer than six months.” (Doc. No. 12 at 10-12). 15 Moreover, Petitioner does not cite, nor does the Court discern, binding case law from the 16 Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit outlining a specific balancing test that must be used to 17 determine when or if detention under § 1225(b)(1) without a bond hearing violates due process, 18 much less explicit direction as to how a district court could “apply” a finding that a court has 19 “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is 20 constitutional.” (Doc. No. 12 at 13-14; see Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 256-57). As recognized supra, 21 United States district courts have applied a variety of balancing tests, and no balancing test at all, 22 to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) without a 23 bond hearing violates due process. However, “[a] decision of a federal district court judge is not 24 binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the 25 same judge in a different case.” See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). 26 In the absence of binding authority on this issue, and after thorough review of the 27 statutory text of § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), relevant Supreme Court precedents, and the various district 28 court cases identified above, this Court finds the threshold question in considering Petitioner’s 1 claims of unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing is whether 2 Petitioner’s continued detention serves the purported immigration purpose and has a definite 3 termination point, as opposed to any “balancing test” to determine whether procedural due 4 process is due. 8 The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its “longstanding view that the 5 government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for 6 their removal proceedings.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 526; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; Jennings, 583 7 U.S. 304. Here, as proceedings are still actively “pending a final determination of credible fear of 8 persecution,” detention of Petitioner is mandatory under the statutory text of § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 9 However, “[u]nlike aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 whose detention could be ‘indefinite’ 10 and ‘potentially permanent,’ aliens detained under § 1225(b) face a definite termination point.” 11 Navarrete-Leiva, 2024 WL 5111780, at *4 (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 528-29); Jennings, 583 12 U.S. at 297 (“Once those proceedings end, detention under § 1225(b) must end as well.”). 13 Despite Petitioner’s “plausible allegation” that his detention is “likely to continue for many more 14 months, if not years” (Doc. No. 1 at 19, ¶ 61, Doc. No. 1-1 at 4, ¶ 11-12 (Petitioner’s counsel 15 attesting that based on his experience Petitioner will remain detained for months and “possibly 16 years”); Doc. No. 12 at 14-15), Petitioner offers no evidence that his detention is indefinite or 17 potentially permanent. 18 Moreover, Petitioner does not argue, nor does the Court discern, that the ongoing 19 proceedings regarding his application for asylum are intended to “incarcerate [him] for other 20 reasons,” nor does Petitioner argue that his detention does not serve “its purported immigration 21 purpose” or that he is being detained indefinitely. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 533 (Kennedy, J., 22 concurring). Petitioner also does not point to any “unreasonableness” in the length of removal 23 proceedings that is directly attributable to the government; rather, the delay appears to be a direct 24 result of Petitioner taking full advantage of his opportunity to seek asylum. He has been afforded 25 due process in the form of parole review by ERO officers and review of his application for 26

27 8 As the Court declines to apply a balancing test in this case, it is unnecessary to consider Petitioner’s argument that Petitioner is constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing based on the Mathews v. Eldridge 28 factors. (Doc. No. 1 at 18-23; Doc. No. 12 at 13-20). 1 asylum. See Navarrette-Leiva, 2024 WL 5111780, at *3 (noting petitioner was “twice reviewed 2 for consideration of parole release” and therefore his “contention that his procedural due process 3 rights have been violated by failure to provide opportunity to challenge continued detention is not 4 well-taken.”); Demore, 538 U.S. at 530-31 (“Respondent was detained for somewhat longer than 5 the average … but respondent himself had requested a continuance of his removal hearing.”); 6 Fatule-Roque, 2018 WL 3584696, at *6 (noting the length of detention can be “attributed, in 7 large part, to the multiple motions to reset [petitioner] submitted before the Immigration Court”). 8 “While [Petitioner] certainly has the right to pursue all available avenues to combat his removal, 9 post-Jennings, he does not have the right to parlay the resulting delay into a bond hearing.” 10 Oladipupo, 2023 WL 3568498, at *5 (noting there was “no indication proceedings were 11 unreasonably delayed for any reason attributable to the government,” rather, the length of 12 petitioner’s detention “is primarily attributable to the avenues for relief that he has pursued and 13 his requests for extensions of time.”). 14 To find Petitioner—an arriving asylum seeker who had not yet been admitted to the 15 United States and has an asylum application pending—is entitled to a bond hearing solely based 16 on the length of his detention would render § 1225(b)(1) meaningless. To be clear, this common- 17 sense reasoning does not foreclose the possibility of a due process violation and bond hearing for 18 a § 1225(b)(1) detainee where circumstances evince that detention is indefinite or for some other 19 non-immigration purpose. In Demore, the Court acknowledged that “detention … d[oes] not 20 serve its purported immigration purpose” when removal is “no longer practically attainable.” 538 21 U.S. at 527 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690) (where “detention’s goal is no longer practically 22 attainable, detention no longer bears a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual 23 was committed”); see also id. at 532-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were there to be an 24 unreasonable delay by INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become 25 necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect 26 against the flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.”); Wong Wing v. United 27 States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896) (finding civil detention of a removeable noncitizen violates 28 the Constitution if it is punitive). Moreover, while not cognizable on habeas review, nothing in 1 these Findings and Recommendations prevents Petitioner from asserting a separate condition of 2 confinement claim to the extent he submits the conditions versus the fact of his detention violate 3 the Constitution. See Mendoza-Linares, 2024 WL 3316306, at *2 n.1 (citing Nettles v. Grounds, 4 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016)); Lopez, 2021 WL 2079840, at *5 (collecting cases). 5 Here, however, it is undisputed that Petitioner’s detention as an arriving alien for 6 consideration of his application for asylum is mandated under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). See Jennings. 7 583 U.S. at 303-04. As discussed in detail above, Petitioner’s detention is not indefinite; there is 8 a definite termination point after a decision on Petitioner’s application for asylum, and if 9 warranted, at the conclusion of his right to pursue all avenues for relief from removal. There is 10 no indication that the ongoing asylum proceedings do not serve their intended purpose or are 11 intended to “incarcerate him for other reasons.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 527, 538. Therefore, the 12 Court finds no due process violation in Petitioner’s continued detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) 13 without a bond hearing at this time. See Romero-Romero, 2025 WL 391861, at *9 (“Should 14 circumstances change and continued detention appear to be indefinite in nature, due process may 15 require a different outcome.”). 16 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: 17 1. The district court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss all improperly named officials 18 as Respondents and find the sole proper respondent is Tonya Andrews, Facility 19 Administrator of Golden State Annex Detention Facility. 20 2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 10) be GRANTED to the extent the 21 Petition is denied on the merits. 22 NOTICE TO PARTIES 23 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 24 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 25 after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 26 objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 27 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen 28 (15) pages. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party 1 | wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its 2 | CM/ECEF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with 3 | specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by 4 | the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 5 | 636(b)()(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the 6 | waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 7 8 Dated: _ November 25, 2025 Kobo Zh foareh Hack 9 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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