John Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline And Linda Acevedo, in Her Official Capacity as the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas
Opinion
ACCEPTED 03-15-00007-CV 5478951 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 5/29/2015 4:41:03 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK NO. 03-15-00007-CV
__________________________________
FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 5/29/2015 4:41:03 PM _________________________________ JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk JOHN DOE Appellant
V.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE; AND LINDA ACEVEDO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS Appellees
______________________________
On Appeal from the 126th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Cause No. D-1-GN-14-001635
______________________________
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
______________________________
WEST, WEBB, ALLBRITTON & GENTRY, GAINES WEST P.C. State Bar No. 21197500 1515 Emerald Plaza gaines.west@westwebblaw.com College Station, Texas 77845 Telephone ~ (979) 694-7000 JENNIFER D. JASPER Facsimile ~ (979) 694-8000 State Bar No. 24027026 jennifer.jasper@westwebblaw.com
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii
I. Rule 2.16 ................................................................................................................. 1
II. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Doe’s Claims ................................................ 2
A. Appellees cannot validly apply Rule 2.16 to Doe ...................................... 2
B. Doe properly asserts an ultra vires claim against the CDC ........................ 5
III. Statutory Immunity Does Not Bar Doe’s Claims ................................................ 3
IV. Doe’s Claims are Justiciable................................................................................ 4
A. The trial court has the authority to grant the relief Doe Seeks ................... 4
B. Doe does not seek an advisory opinion ...................................................... 6
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 7
Prayer ......................................................................................................................... 7
Certificate of Compliance .......................................................................................... 8
Certificate of Service ................................................................................................. 9
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals v. McFall, 888 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1994) ......................................................................5, 6
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009) ..........................................................................3
Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet).................................4
In re State Bar of Tex., 440 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2014) ..................................................................................5
Love v. State Bar of Tex., 982 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) .................5
State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 244—45, 246 (Tex. 1994)) .....................................................4, 5
State Bar of Tex. v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex. 1997) ..........................................................................5
State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1972) ..................................................................................5
RULES AND CODES
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06L ..............................................................................2, 3
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.13. ...................................................................................6
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.16 .......................................................................... passim
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF iii
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 15.09 ..............................................................................3, 4
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble ¶ 8. ...........................................7
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072(b)(10) ...............................................................1, 3
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF iv
TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant, John Doe, files the following Reply Brief to respond to matters
raised by Appellees in their Amended Brief.
I. RULE 2.16
The underlying question in this case is whether Rule 2.16 requires
“Disciplinary Proceedings” to be kept confidential from complainants. It does not,
and because it does not, there is no authority for the CDC to deny Doe’s request for
a copy of its recommendation to the SDP.
The express language of Rule 2.16 does not contemplate excluding
complainants. In relevant part, Rule 2.16 states, “[a]ll members and staff of the
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Board of Disciplinary Appeals, Committees,
and Commission shall maintain as confidential all Disciplinary Proceedings and
associated records . . . .” TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.16. Rule 2.16 omits any
language requiring Disciplinary Proceedings to be kept confidential from the
complainant, the very person who started the proceedings in the first place.
Furthermore, the Texas Government Code expressly allows the complainant
to be physically present at some “Disciplinary Proceedings,” including Evidentiary
Panel proceedings. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072(b)(10); see TEX. R.
DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06L (defining “Disciplinary Proceedings” to include the
proceeding before an Evidentiary Panel); see also TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.16.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 1
The CDC’s interpretation of Rule 2.16, as requiring “Disciplinary
Proceedings” to remain confidential from the complainant, cannot stand. This is
particularly evident because Disciplinary Proceedings include Evidentiary Panel
proceedings, before which the complainant has an express right to appear.
Because Rule 2.16 does not apply to complainants, this Court should reverse the
trial court’s dismissal and remand this case for rulings on the substantive issues
presented in Doe’s pleadings.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR DOE’S CLAIMS
Appellees assert that neither exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity
applies. See APPELLEE’S BRIEF at **20–24. First, Appellees claim that Doe did
not challenge Rule 2.16’s validity. Id. at **20–22. Then, appellees claim that the
ultra vires exception does not apply because Doe seeks to compel a government
official to affirmatively perform a discretionary act. Id. at **22–24.
A. Appellees cannot validly apply Rule 2.16 to Doe
Despite Appellees’ characterizations of Doe’s arguments, the issue Doe
raises is whether Rule 2.16 can be applied to him, not how Rule 2.16 is applied.
See APPELLEES’ BRIEF at **20–21. In his live pleading, and on appeal, Doe
contends that Rule 2.16 does not apply to complainants, including himself. See,
e.g., infra I. As the complainant, Doe is a participant in the proceedings, not
merely an uninvolved member of the public, so Rule 2.16 does not apply to him.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 2
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072(b)(10); TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06L, 2.16.
Because Rule 2.16 does not apply to Doe, the trial court erred in dismissing the
case on this ground.
B. Doe properly asserts an ultra vires claim against the CDC
Doe’s claim is a proper ultra vires claim. He alleges that Linda Acevedo,
the CDC, denied him a copy of the CDC’s recommendation to the SDP, without
legal authority to do so. That is the very nature of an ultra vires claim: a
governmental official takes an action that it lacked authority to take. See, e.g., City
of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). Because Rule 2.16 did
not authorize Linda Acevedo to take the action she did (withhold from Doe a copy
of the CDC’s recommendation to the SDP), she acted ultra vires, and the trial court
erred in dismissing the case on this ground.
III. STATUTORY IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR DOE’S CLAIMS
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
ACCEPTED 03-15-00007-CV 5478951 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 5/29/2015 4:41:03 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK NO. 03-15-00007-CV
__________________________________
FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 5/29/2015 4:41:03 PM _________________________________ JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk JOHN DOE Appellant
V.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE; AND LINDA ACEVEDO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS Appellees
______________________________
On Appeal from the 126th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Cause No. D-1-GN-14-001635
______________________________
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
______________________________
WEST, WEBB, ALLBRITTON & GENTRY, GAINES WEST P.C. State Bar No. 21197500 1515 Emerald Plaza gaines.west@westwebblaw.com College Station, Texas 77845 Telephone ~ (979) 694-7000 JENNIFER D. JASPER Facsimile ~ (979) 694-8000 State Bar No. 24027026 jennifer.jasper@westwebblaw.com
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii
I. Rule 2.16 ................................................................................................................. 1
II. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Doe’s Claims ................................................ 2
A. Appellees cannot validly apply Rule 2.16 to Doe ...................................... 2
B. Doe properly asserts an ultra vires claim against the CDC ........................ 5
III. Statutory Immunity Does Not Bar Doe’s Claims ................................................ 3
IV. Doe’s Claims are Justiciable................................................................................ 4
A. The trial court has the authority to grant the relief Doe Seeks ................... 4
B. Doe does not seek an advisory opinion ...................................................... 6
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 7
Prayer ......................................................................................................................... 7
Certificate of Compliance .......................................................................................... 8
Certificate of Service ................................................................................................. 9
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals v. McFall, 888 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1994) ......................................................................5, 6
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009) ..........................................................................3
Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet).................................4
In re State Bar of Tex., 440 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2014) ..................................................................................5
Love v. State Bar of Tex., 982 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) .................5
State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 244—45, 246 (Tex. 1994)) .....................................................4, 5
State Bar of Tex. v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex. 1997) ..........................................................................5
State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1972) ..................................................................................5
RULES AND CODES
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06L ..............................................................................2, 3
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.13. ...................................................................................6
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.16 .......................................................................... passim
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF iii
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 15.09 ..............................................................................3, 4
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble ¶ 8. ...........................................7
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072(b)(10) ...............................................................1, 3
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF iv
TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant, John Doe, files the following Reply Brief to respond to matters
raised by Appellees in their Amended Brief.
I. RULE 2.16
The underlying question in this case is whether Rule 2.16 requires
“Disciplinary Proceedings” to be kept confidential from complainants. It does not,
and because it does not, there is no authority for the CDC to deny Doe’s request for
a copy of its recommendation to the SDP.
The express language of Rule 2.16 does not contemplate excluding
complainants. In relevant part, Rule 2.16 states, “[a]ll members and staff of the
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Board of Disciplinary Appeals, Committees,
and Commission shall maintain as confidential all Disciplinary Proceedings and
associated records . . . .” TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.16. Rule 2.16 omits any
language requiring Disciplinary Proceedings to be kept confidential from the
complainant, the very person who started the proceedings in the first place.
Furthermore, the Texas Government Code expressly allows the complainant
to be physically present at some “Disciplinary Proceedings,” including Evidentiary
Panel proceedings. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072(b)(10); see TEX. R.
DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06L (defining “Disciplinary Proceedings” to include the
proceeding before an Evidentiary Panel); see also TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.16.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 1
The CDC’s interpretation of Rule 2.16, as requiring “Disciplinary
Proceedings” to remain confidential from the complainant, cannot stand. This is
particularly evident because Disciplinary Proceedings include Evidentiary Panel
proceedings, before which the complainant has an express right to appear.
Because Rule 2.16 does not apply to complainants, this Court should reverse the
trial court’s dismissal and remand this case for rulings on the substantive issues
presented in Doe’s pleadings.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR DOE’S CLAIMS
Appellees assert that neither exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity
applies. See APPELLEE’S BRIEF at **20–24. First, Appellees claim that Doe did
not challenge Rule 2.16’s validity. Id. at **20–22. Then, appellees claim that the
ultra vires exception does not apply because Doe seeks to compel a government
official to affirmatively perform a discretionary act. Id. at **22–24.
A. Appellees cannot validly apply Rule 2.16 to Doe
Despite Appellees’ characterizations of Doe’s arguments, the issue Doe
raises is whether Rule 2.16 can be applied to him, not how Rule 2.16 is applied.
See APPELLEES’ BRIEF at **20–21. In his live pleading, and on appeal, Doe
contends that Rule 2.16 does not apply to complainants, including himself. See,
e.g., infra I. As the complainant, Doe is a participant in the proceedings, not
merely an uninvolved member of the public, so Rule 2.16 does not apply to him.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 2
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072(b)(10); TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06L, 2.16.
Because Rule 2.16 does not apply to Doe, the trial court erred in dismissing the
case on this ground.
B. Doe properly asserts an ultra vires claim against the CDC
Doe’s claim is a proper ultra vires claim. He alleges that Linda Acevedo,
the CDC, denied him a copy of the CDC’s recommendation to the SDP, without
legal authority to do so. That is the very nature of an ultra vires claim: a
governmental official takes an action that it lacked authority to take. See, e.g., City
of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). Because Rule 2.16 did
not authorize Linda Acevedo to take the action she did (withhold from Doe a copy
of the CDC’s recommendation to the SDP), she acted ultra vires, and the trial court
erred in dismissing the case on this ground.
III. STATUTORY IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR DOE’S CLAIMS
Appellees argue that Rule 15.09 blankets them with immunity. APPELLEES’
BRIEF at **24–26. However, Rule 15.09 applies only to (1) individuals who are
(2) acting in the course of their official duties. TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 15.09.
Because Appellees are not individuals, Rule 15.09 does not apply. Further, Doe
sued the CDC in her official capacity, which is not a lawsuit against her as an
individual. See, e.g., Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2003, no pet) (noting that an official-capacity suit against a
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 3 governmental employee is not a suit against the employee but against the
governmental-unit employer). But even if it were a lawsuit against her
individually, Doe alleged that she acted without legal authority, which means that
she was not acting in the course of her official duties, as is required for Rule 15.09
to provide immunity in this case. TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 15.09. Thus, the trial
court erred in dismissing the case on this ground.
IV. DOE’S CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE
Appellees argue that Doe’s claims are not justiciable because he asks the
trial court to exercise authority it does not have, and because a declaratory
judgment in this matter would be advisory because the SDP has already dismissed
his complaint. APPELLEES’ BRIEF at ** 26-31.
A. The trial court has the authority to grant the relief Doe seeks
Citing the plurality in Gomez, Appellees argue that granting Doe’s requested
declarations in this case would cause the trial court to usurp the Texas Supreme
Court’s authority. APPELLEE’S BRIEF at *27 (citing State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez,
891 S.W.2d 243, 244—45, 246 (Tex. 1994)). Appellees further allege that lower
courts lack authority to interfere in disciplinary proceedings at any point in the
process. Id. at *28 (citations omitted). However, none of the cases Appellees cite
apply here because in each case, the plaintiff asked the court to either create a new
rule or obligation, or to enjoin the disciplinary proceedings. Id. at **27–28 (citing
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 4
In re State Bar of Tex., 440 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (finding
trial court cannot order Commission for Lawyer Discipline to turn over
investigative records); Gomez, 891 S.W.2d at 244–45, 246 (holding trial court
cannot order state bar to create a new program); State Bar of Tex. v. Jefferson, 942
S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (concluding trial court cannot
enjoin disciplinary investigative proceedings); Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals v.
McFall, 888 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (finding
that trial court cannot enjoin a disciplinary suspension); State v. Sewell, 487
S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1972) (orig. proceeding) (holding trial court cannot enjoin
disciplinary investigative proceedings).
In the present case, Doe is not asking the court to create a new rule, institute
a new program, insert a new requirement, promulgate a new policy or regulation,
or enjoin disciplinary proceedings. Doe is merely asking the court to declare that
Rule 2.16 does not require the CDC to withhold from Doe its recommendation to
the SDP. Appellees did not cite any case holding that a trial court cannot review a
rule of disciplinary procedure. And in fact, a trial court is well within its authority
in reviewing a rule of disciplinary procedure. See, e.g., Love v. State Bar of Tex.,
982 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (noting that
disciplinary rules have the force and effect of a statute and should be construed in
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 5 accordance with rules of statutory construction). Thus, the trial court erred in
dismissing the case on this ground.
B. Doe does not seek an advisory opinion
Appellees argue that because the SDP has already dismissed Doe’s
complaint, any opinion in this matter would be advisory, thus, this issue is moot.
APPELLEES’ BRIEF at **29–31. However, as discussed in Doe’s opening brief, this
case satisfies the “public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine. See
APPELLANT’S BRIEF at **9–11.
Appellees attempt to hide behind the SDP, asserting that any future
grievance Doe may file will not be “handicapped” by the CDC’s refusal to provide
a copy of its recommendation to the SDP. This is so because, Appellees contend,
the SDP, not the CDC, decides to dismiss complaints. Therefore, Appellees argue,
Doe will receive no benefit from reviewing the CDC’s recommendation.
However, it is the CDC who determines whether “just cause” exists to further
investigate a complaint, and it is the CDC who recommends dismissal to the SDP.
See TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.13.
Reviewing the CDC’s recommendation in this matter will provide Doe, the
complainant, with information as to why his sixteen-page complaint failed, in the
CDC’s eyes, to provide “just cause.” Such information will play a critical role in
aiding a member of the public, aggrieved by the behavior of an attorney, in
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 6 adequately presenting the issues to the CDC. Therefore, an opinion in this matter
will not be advisory, and the trial court erred in dismissing the case on this ground.
CONCLUSION
“The legal profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulation is
undertaken in the public interest rather than in furtherance of parochial or self-
interested concerns of the bar . . . [n]eglect of these responsibilities compromises
the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.” TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble ¶ 8. Allowing the CDC to hide its
recommendation to the SDP from the complainant violates the principles espoused
in the Preamble mentioned above. Rule 2.16 does not require such secrecy. The
trial court erred in dismissing this case on the procedural grounds raised by
Appellees.
PRAYER
Appellant John Doe prays that this Court reverse the trial court’s dismissal
and remand this case for further proceedings.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 7
Respectfully submitted,
WEST, WEBB, ALLBRITTON & GENTRY, P.C. 1515 Emerald Plaza College Station, Texas 77845-1515 Telephone: (979) 694-7000 Facsimile: (979) 694-8000
By: /s Gaines West GAINES WEST State Bar No. 21197500 gaines.west@westwebblaw.com JENNIFER D. JASPER State Bar No. 24027026 jennifer.jasper@westwebblaw.com
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT JOHN DOE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF complies with the typeface and word-count requirement set forth in the Rules of Appellate Procedure. This motion has been prepared, using Microsoft Word, in 14-point Times New Roman font for the text and 12-point Times New Roman font for any footnotes. This motion contains 1,549 words, as determined by the word count feature of the word processing program used to prepare this document, excluding those portions of the notice exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
/s Gaines West Gaines West
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On May 29, 2015, the undersigned certifies that he served a copy of this Brief of Appellee on the following in the manner listed below, in compliance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.5 and 25.1(e):
PAUL HOMBURG, III Via email: phomburg@texasbar.com Disciplinary Counsel and Certified Mail, RRR Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel State Bar of Texas 711 Navarro, Suite 750 San Antonio, Texas 78205
Rebecca Stevens Via email: bstevens@texasbar.com Disciplinary Counsel and Certified Mail, RRR Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel State Bar of Texas P. O. Box 12487 Austin, Texas 78711-2487
Cynthia Canfield Hamilton Via email: chamilton@texasbar.com Office of the Chief Disciplinary counsel and Certified Mail, RRR State Bar of Texas P. O. Box 12487 Austin, Texas 78711-2487
/s Gaines West Gaines West
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 9
Board of Disciplinary Appeals v. McFall, 888 S.W.2d 471 (1994) 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 110
compliance with a supervision agreement, which required Smith to “remain abstinent from all alcohol and other mind Original Image of 888 S.W.2d 471 (PDF) altering drugs.”
888 S.W.2d 471 Supreme Court of Texas. In March of 1994, a member of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals observed Smith drinking alcohol in a hotel bar.
BOARD OF DISCIPLINARY APPEALS, Relator The State Bar subsequently filed a motion to revoke Smith's v.
probation. At an evidentiary hearing, Smith admitted to The Honorable John R. having used alcohol while on probation. The Board of McFALL, Judge, Respondent. Disciplinary Appeals revoked the probation and suspended Smith from the practice of law. Smith filed a Notice of Appeal No. 94–0960. | Dec. 1, 1994.
with this Court but did not request a stay of his suspension.
Board of Disciplinary Appeals sought writ of mandamus The decision of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals was to vacate district court's injunction against suspension of affirmed on October 6, 1994. attorney and writ of prohibition barring further proceedings in district court. The Supreme Court held that district court The day after filing his appeal, Smith petitioned for a lacks jurisdiction to enjoin suspension of attorney. Temporary Restraining Order from the 237th District Court in Lubbock. Judge McFall granted the Temporary Restraining Relief granted. Order and scheduled a hearing on a temporary injunction.
After the hearing, Judge McFall took the matter under advisement and extended the restraining order pending Attorneys and Law Firms further hearings. The Board of Disciplinary Appeals then petitioned for a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition.
*472 Christine E. McKeeman and Thomas H. Watkins, Austin, for relator. [2] A writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition are appropriate when a district court issues an order beyond John R. McFall and Mark S. Smith, Lubbock, for respondent.
its jurisdiction. Crouch v. Craik, 369 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Tex.1963). The district court lacked jurisdiction under the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure to enjoin Smith's suspension.
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF Section 81.071 of the Texas Government Code provides MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION that each attorney practicing in Texas is “subject to the disciplinary and disability jurisdiction of the supreme court PER CURIAM.
and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, a committee [1] The Board of Disciplinary Appeals requests a writ of of the state bar.” Pursuant to this authority, this court has mandamus to vacate the district court's injunction against the established a comprehensive system of lawyer discipline suspension of an attorney and a writ of prohibition barring governed by the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. further proceedings in that court. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin these disciplinary proceedings, The rules provide for appeals directly to this Court. we grant the requested relief. TEX.R.DISCIPLINARY P. 7.11. If the appeal is unsuccessful, Smith may seek reinstatement in district court, In 1992, the State Bar initiated a disability disciplinary with a jury trial if he desires one. TEX.R.DISCIPLINARY action against Mark S. Smith in accordance with P. 12.06. The rules do not, however, provide for interim TEX.R.DISCIPLINARY P. 12.01 (1992). At a hearing equitable relief, and the district court did not have the power before the District Disability Committee, Smith stipulated to to enjoin Smith's suspension. his disability and the Committee recommended a probated suspension. The Board of Disciplinary Appeals accepted the In State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.1972), we recommendation and issued a Judgment Probating Disability granted mandamus to vacate an injunction barring Grievance Suspension, setting out the terms and conditions of Smith's Committee proceedings, holding that an injunction by a probation. One of the terms of Smith's probation was district court “is an interference with the grievance procedures
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Board of Disciplinary Appeals v. McFall, 888 S.W.2d 471 (1994) 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 110
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, without hearing oral authorized by ... the State Bar Act and constitutes a clear argument, a majority of the court grants the writ of mandamus abuse of discretion.” Id. at 719. We did not even reach and the writ of prohibition.
the question of whether an adequate remedy at law existed because the case was one “affecting the state as a whole and in which the orderly processes of government have been Parallel Citations disturbed.” Id. (quoting *473 State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272, 274 (1939)). Pursuant to Rule 122 of 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 110
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (2009) 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 689
Stewart W. Forbes, Forbes & Forbes, El Paso, for Original Image of 284 S.W.3d 366 (PDF) Respondent.
284 S.W.3d 366 Supreme Court of Texas. Philip Durst, Deats Durst Owen & Levy, P.L.L.C., Austin, for Amicus Curiae Texas State Association of Fire Fighters.
The CITY OF EL PASO, et al., Petitioners, Kristofer S. Monson, Asst. Solicitor Gen., Austin, for Amicus v.
Curiae State of Texas.
Lilli M. HEINRICH, Respondent.
Opinion No. 06–0778. | Argued Nov.
13, 2007. | Decided May 1, 2009. Chief Justice JEFFERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Synopsis [1] [2] [3] “Sovereign immunity protects the State from Background: Police officer's widow brought action against lawsuits for money damages.” Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation city, public employee's pension fund, board of trustees of Comm'n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex.2002). But pension fund, and named individuals, alleging that board “an action to determine or protect a private party's rights breached its fiduciary duty by reducing her pension benefits against a state official who has acted without legal or by one-third, and seeking total pension benefits allegedly statutory authority is not a suit against the State that sovereign owed to her plus cost of living allowances. The 346th District immunity bars.” Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, Court, El Paso County, 2005 WL 4926502, Angie Barill, 405 (Tex.1997). Today we examine the intersection of these J., denied defendants' plea to the jurisdiction. Defendants two rules. We conclude that while governmental immunity appealed. The Court of Appeals, 8th District, El Paso, 198 *369 generally bars suits for retrospective monetary relief, it S.W.3d 400, Richard Barajas, C.J., affirmed, and defendants does not preclude prospective injunctive remedies in officialappealed . capacity suits against government actors who violate statutory or constitutional provisions. We affirm in part and reverse in part the court of appeals' judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Jefferson, C.J., held that:
[1] widow's declaratory judgment and injunction action regarding pension was not barred by sovereign immunity; I
[2] widow's lawsuit regarding reduction of pension did Background not implicate constitutional prohibition of bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing Lilli M. Heinrich is the widow of Charles D. Heinrich, a obligation of contracts; and member of the El Paso Police Department who died in August 1985 from wounds received in the line of duty. Shortly after [3] fact questions precluded grant of plea to the jurisdiction. Charles died, the El Paso Firemen & Policemen's Pension Fund began paying Heinrich monthly survivor benefits equal
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. to 100% of the monthly pension her husband had earned. 1 The parties contest how those payments were apportioned. The City of El Paso, the El Paso Firemen & Policemen's Attorneys and Law Firms Pension Fund (“the Fund”), the Fund's Board of Trustees (“the Board”), and the individual board members contend that *368 Jennifer F. Callan, Laura P. Gordon, Asst. City Attys., the Fund's bylaws assigned only two-thirds of this payment Michele Little Locke, John Lomax Anderson, El Paso, Eric to Heinrich, the other third being paid to her on behalf of G. Calhoun, Richard J. Pradarits Jr., Travis & Calhoun, P.C., her then-minor child. Heinrich, on the other hand, contends Dallas, Robert D. Klausner, Stuart A. Kaufman, Klausner & that, notwithstanding the bylaws, the Board voted to award Kaufman, P.A., Plantation, FL, for Petitioners.
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her 100% of Charles' pension benefits in her own right, as repeatedly that the Legislature is in the best position to waive more fully explained below. or abrogate immunity, “because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.” IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d at Accordingly, when in 2002 the Board reduced the monthly 854 (citations omitted) (collecting cases). payments to Heinrich by one-third after Heinrich's son turned 23, Heinrich filed this lawsuit, alleging that petitioners Heinrich concedes that the City, Fund, and Board enjoy violated the statute governing the Fund by reducing her governmental immunity from suit, but argues that because her benefits retroactively. Heinrich sought both declaratory relief claim alleges a reduction in her benefits that was unauthorized and an injunction restoring Heinrich to the “status quo from by law, it is not barred. This is so, she says, because “[p]rivate [the] date of the illegal act.” Petitioners filed pleas to the parties may seek declaratory relief against state officials who jurisdiction asserting that governmental immunity shielded allegedly act without legal or statutory authority.” Id. at the governmental entities from suit and that the individual 855 (citing Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 board members enjoyed official immunity. The trial court (Tex.1994) (suit challenging state officials' construction of denied the pleas, and petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal. compulsory school-attendance law)); see also Fed. Sign., 951 S.W.2d at 404 (“A private litigant does not need legislative The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “a party may permission to sue the State for a state official's violations of bring a suit seeking declaratory relief against state officials state law.”) (citations omitted). We explained the rationale who allegedly act without legal or statutory authority and behind this exception to governmental immunity in Federal such suit is not a ‘suit against the state.’ ” 198 S.W.3d 400, Sign: 406. The court acknowledged that, if successful, Heinrich would be entitled to past and future benefits, but held that A state official's illegal or Heinrich's suit made a valid claim for her vested right to unauthorized actions are not acts of pension benefits rather than money damages. Id. at 407. We the State. Accordingly, an action to granted the petition for review in order to clarify the types determine or protect a private party's rights against a state official who of relief that may be sought without legislative consent. 2 50 has acted without legal or statutory Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 910 (June 22, 2007).
authority is not a suit against the State that sovereign immunity bars. In other words, we distinguish suits II to determine a party's rights against the State from suits seeking damages. A party can maintain a suit to Discussion determine its rights without legislative permission.
A
Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 404 (citations omitted).
Ultra Vires Claims [4] [5] On this basis, Heinrich argues that rather than Petitioners contend that although Heinrich requests money damages, she seeks only equitable and injunctive declaratory and equitable relief, her claim is essentially for relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. That past and future money damages, and that governmental Act is a remedial statute designed “to settle and to afford immunity therefore bars her suit. As we said in Reata relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas, “ ‘[s]overeign immunity status, and other legal relations.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & protects the State from lawsuits for money damages.’ Political REM.CODE § 37.002(b). It provides: “A person ... whose subdivisions of the state ... are entitled to such immunity rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a — *370 referred to as governmental immunity—unless it statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have has been waived.” Reata, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex.2006) determined any question of construction or validity arising (citations omitted); see also Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. under the ... statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n. 3 (Tex.2003). We have said obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Id. § 37.004(a). The Act, however, does not
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enlarge a trial court's jurisdiction, and a litigant's request for leaving no room for discretion, a suit alleging a government 3 official's violation of that law is not barred, even though it declaratory relief does not alter a suit's underlying nature. *371 IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855; State v. Morales, 869 necessarily involves a contract. We explained this distinction S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex.1994). It is well settled that “private in W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen: parties cannot circumvent the State's sovereign immunity [A]lthough [Epperson ] ar[ose] out from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages ... as of [ ] contract transaction ... [it]
a declaratory-judgment claim.” IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 appears to fall into the class of cases (citing W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d projected by United States v. Lee, [106 838, 842 (1958)).
U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171
[6] Heinrich relies on State v. Epperson, 121 Tex. 80, 42 (1882) ]. 4 In that class of cases it is S.W.2d 228, 231 (1931), in which we held that a suit against held that suits for property alleged to a tax collector for the recovery of money (alleged to be due be unlawfully or wrongfully withheld under a contract and withheld unlawfully) was not barred from the rightful owner by officers by immunity. There, we noted that the tax collector had of the state are not suits against the no discretion under the governing law to deny payment on sovereign itself and may be maintained Epperson's contract: without permission of the sovereign.
By legislative act the state has 158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838, 841 (1958). In other constituted the tax collector of the words, where statutory or constitutional provisions create an county its agent to receive delinquent entitlement to payment, suits seeking to require state officers taxes collected under such contract, to comply with the law are not barred by immunity merely and it is the duty of such officer because they compel the state to make those payments. to pay all fees and commissions This rule is generally consistent with the letter and spirit of lawfully incurred in the collection our later caselaw. In IT–Davy, we distinguished permissible thereof to the various parties who declaratory-judgment suits against state officials *372 may be entitled thereto. Under such “allegedly act[ing] without legal or statutory authority” circumstances, the tax collector's duty from those barred by immunity: “In contrast [to suits not with reference to money belonging to implicating sovereign immunity], declaratory-judgment suits persons who are entitled under valid against state officials seeking to establish a contract's validity, contracts to receive the same from him to enforce performance under a contract, or to impose is purely ministerial. If he withholds contractual liabilities are suits against the State. That is the payment of such funds when a because such suits attempt to control state action by imposing person is lawfully entitled to receive liability on the State.” 74 S.W.3d at 855–56 (citations same, he has failed to discharge a duty omitted) (emphasis added). imposed upon him by law and his act is a wrongful one. [7] From this rationale, it is clear that suits to require state officials to comply with statutory or constitutional Epperson, 42 S.W.2d at 231. We therefore concluded that provisions are not prohibited by sovereign immunity, even if although the trial court would “not possess jurisdiction to a declaration to that effect compels the payment of money.
enforce the specific performance of the contract relied upon To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not by Epperson or to award damages for any breach of said complain of a government officer's exercise of discretion, contract,” Epperson's suit was “simply an action to compel an but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer officer, as agent of the state, to pay over funds to a party who acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely claims to be lawfully entitled thereto.” Id.
ministerial act. Compare Epperson, 42 S.W.2d at 231 (“the tax collector's duty ... is purely ministerial”) with Catalina Thus, the rule arising out of Epperson is that while suits for Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704, 706 contract damages against the state are generally barred by (Tex.2003) (newly elected commissioners court immune immunity, where a statute or the constitution requires that from suit where it “acted within its discretion to protect government contracts be made or performed in a certain way,
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the perceived interests of the public” in rejecting contract Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 404 (“A private litigant does not need approved by predecessor), and Dodgen, 308 S.W.2d at legislative permission to sue the State for a state official's 842 (suit seeking “enforcement of contract rights” barred violations of state law.”) (citations omitted), with IT–Davy, by immunity in the absence of any “statutory provision 74 S.W.3d at 855 (“Private parties may seek declaratory governing or limiting the manner of sale”). Thus, ultra vires relief against state officials who allegedly act without legal suits do not attempt to exert control over the state—they or statutory authority.”) (citations omitted). It seems to us, attempt to reassert the control of the state. 5 Stated another however, that because the rule that ultra vires suits are not way, these suits do not seek to alter government policy but “suit[s] against the State within the rule of immunity of the rather to enforce existing policy. State from suit” derives from the premise that the “acts of officials which are not lawfully authorized are not acts of the Further, while “[a] lack of immunity may hamper State,” Cobb, 190 S.W.2d at 712, it follows that these suits governmental functions by requiring tax resources to be used cannot be brought against the state, which retains immunity, for defending lawsuits ... rather than using those resources for but must be brought against the state actors in their official their intended purposes,” Reata Constr. Corp., 197 S.W.3d capacity. 7 This is true even though the suit is, for all practical at 375, this reasoning has not been extended to ultra vires purposes, against the state. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. suits, see Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 404 (citing Dir. of the 464, 471–72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985) (“[A] Dep't of Agric. & Env't v. Printing Indus. Ass'n of Tex., judgment against a public servant ‘in his official capacity’ 600 S.W.2d 264, 265–66 (Tex.1980) (legislative consent not imposes liability on the entity that he represents provided, of required for suit for injunctive relief against state agency to course, the public entity received notice and an opportunity to halt unauthorized printing equipment and printing activities), respond.”); Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d Tex. Highway Comm'n v. Tex. Ass'n of Steel Imps., Inc., 372 835, 844 (Tex.2007) (“It is fundamental that a suit against S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex.1963) (legislative consent not required a state official is merely ‘another way of pleading an action for declaratory judgment suit against Highway Commission against the entity of which [the official] is an agent.’ ”) to determine the parties' rights), and Cobb v. Harrington, (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1945) (legislative 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). consent not required for declaratory judgment suit against State Comptroller to determine parties' rights under tax statute)). Further, extending immunity to officials using state
C
resources in violation of the law would not be an efficient way of ensuring those resources are spent as intended. This is particularly true since, as discussed below, suits that lack Permissible Relief merit may be speedily disposed of by a plea to the jurisdiction.
[11] But the ultra vires rule is subject to important See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d qualifications. Even if such a claim may be brought, the 217, 226 (Tex.2004).
remedy may implicate immunity. Cf. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3524.3 (under federal *374 immunity B law, an ultra vires suit may be brought but “if the defendant is a state officer, sovereign immunity bars the recovery of Proper Parties damages from the state treasury in a private suit”). This is a curious situation: the basis for the ultra vires rule is that a [8] [9] [10] Nonetheless, as a technical matter, the government official is not following the law, so that immunity governmental entities themselves—as opposed to their is not implicated, but because the suit is, for all practical officers in *373 their official capacity—remain immune purposes, against the state, its remedies must be limited. Cf. from suit. We have been less than clear regarding the Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, permissible use of a declaratory remedy in this type of ultra 685, 102 S.Ct. 3304, 73 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1982) (“There is a 6 well-recognized irony in Ex parte Young; unconstitutional vires suit. Must it be brought directly against the state or its subdivisions? Or must it be brought against the relevant conduct by a state officer may be ‘state action’ for purposes government actors in their official capacity? Compare Fed. of the Fourteenth Amendment yet not attributable to the
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State for purposes of the Eleventh.”). We recently held action to restrain a government official from unconstitutional that retired firefighters could not pursue a declaratory conduct was not barred by immunity. Later, in Edelman, the judgment action against the City to recover amounts allegedly Court recognized that the distinction between prospective previously withheld from lump-sum termination payments in and retrospective relief “will not in many instances be that violation of the Local Government Code. City of Houston between day and night” and cautioned that a fiscal impact on v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828 (Tex.2007). Without the *375 State did not necessarily implicate immunity: discussing Epperson, we applied the rule from IT–Davy and Dodgen that the declaratory judgment act cannot be The injunction issued in Ex parte used to circumvent immunity, noting that “[t]he only injury Young was not totally without effect the retired firefighters allege has already occurred, leaving on the State's revenues, since the them with only one plausible remedy—an award of money state law which the Attorney General damages.” Id. at 829. Williams stands for the proposition, was enjoined from enforcing provided then, that retrospective monetary claims are generally barred substantial monetary penalties against by immunity. railroads which did not conform to its provisions. Later cases from We also stated that “in every suit against a governmental this Court have authorized equitable entity for money damages, a court must first determine the relief which has probably had greater parties' contract or statutory rights; if the sole purpose of impact on state treasuries than did such a declaration is to obtain a money judgment, immunity that awarded in Ex parte Young. is not waived.” Id. This does not mean, however, that a In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. judgment that involves the payment of money necessarily 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 implicates immunity. Drawing the line at monetary relief (1971), Arizona and Pennsylvania is itself problematic, as “[i]t does not take much lawyerly welfare officials were prohibited from inventiveness to convert a claim for payment of a past due denying welfare benefits to otherwise sum (damages) into a prayer for an injunction against refusing qualified recipients who were aliens. to pay the sum, or for a declaration that the sum must be In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. paid, or for an order reversing the agency's decision not to 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d pay.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 915–16, 108 287 (1970), New York City welfare S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) officials were enjoined from following (discussing section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, New York State procedures which which waives sovereign immunity in actions against federal authorized the termination of benefits agencies as long as the plaintiff seeks “relief other than money paid to welfare recipients without prior damages”) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 702 (2000)). hearing. But the fiscal consequences to state treasuries in these cases were Parsing categories of permissible relief in cases the necessary result of compliance implicating immunity inevitably involves compromise. See, with decrees which by their terms e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN were prospective in nature. State REMEDIES 482 (3d ed. 2002) (“The law of remedies against officials, in order to shape their governments and government officials is a vast and complex official conduct to the mandate of the body of doctrine, full of technical distinctions, fictional Court's decrees, would more likely explanations, and contested compromises.”). The United have to spend money from the state States Supreme Court has held that, under federal immunity treasury than if they had been left law, claims for prospective injunctive relief are permissible, free to pursue their previous course while claims for retroactive relief are not, as such an award of conduct. Such an ancillary effect is “in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from on the state treasury is a permissible an award of damages against the State.” Edelman v. Jordan, and often an inevitable consequence of 415 U.S. 651, 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). the principle announced in Ex parte This rule originated in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. Young, supra. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), in which the Court held that an
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Williams, dichotomy between declaratory and injunctive Id. at 667–68, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (footnote omitted). The claims regarding past statutory violations and those seeking retroactive portion of the Edelman district court's decree only to compel the city to follow the law in the future; was different, however, as “[i]t require[d] payment of state the government was immune from the former but not the funds, not as a necessary consequence of compliance in latter); Bell v. City of Grand Prairie, 221 S.W.3d 317, the future with a substantive federal-question determination, 325 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding that, under but as a form of compensation to those whose applications Williams, firefighters' requested declaration regarding past were processed on the slower time schedule at a time when statutory violation was barred, but to the extent the requested petitioner was under no court-imposed obligation to conform declaration concerned future violations, the claim was not to a different standard.” Id. at 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347. barred, providing the firefighters did not seek an award of money damages). And finally, it ensures that statutes While “[t]he line between prospective and retrospective specifically directing payment, like any other statute, can be remedies is neither self-evident nor self-executing,” judicially enforced going forward. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES at 483, the Supreme Court shed further light on the issue in Milliken [12] This approach is inconsistent with Epperson, however, v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 269, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d in which we held that, if successful, Epperson would be 745 (1977), a case involving desegregation of the Detroit entitled to “the sum of $93,000 which belonged to him school system. The Supreme Court upheld a trial court's order as his commission for services rendered.” Epperson, 42 requiring state officials to spend $6 million on education to S.W.2d at 229. In that respect, Epperson conflicts with remedy effects of segregation. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 290, 97 Williams, in which we implied that prospective remedies S.Ct. 2749. The Court held that this relief was permissible might not be barred even though retrospective monetary ones under Edelman: “That the programs are also ‘compensatory’ were. Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 829 (noting that “[t]he only in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a plan injury the retired firefighters allege has already occurred, that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits leaving them with only one plausible remedy—an award of of a unitary school system.” Id.; see also 13 CHARLES money damages” and that “they assert no right to payments ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL from the City in the future”). The best way to resolve this PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3524.3 (noting that, under conflict is to follow the rule, outlined above, that a claimant Edelman, “[i]njunctions requiring expenditure of state funds who successfully proves an ultra vires claim is entitled to are acceptable, so long as the order is prospective” but prospective injunctive relief, as measured from the date of “[r]etroactive relief, including compensatory damages from injunction. Cf. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 669, 94 S.Ct. 1347 state funds are barred”). (using entry of injunction to distinguish retrospective from prospective relief). Thus, while the ultra vires rule remains This compromise between prospective and retroactive relief, the law, see Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 404, Epperson's while imperfect, best balances the government's immunity retrospective remedy does not. with the public's right to redress in cases involving ultra vires actions, and this distinction “appear[s] in the immunity of the [13] But this rule is not absolute. For example, a claimant United States, and in the law of most states' immunity from who successfully proves a takings claim would be entitled state-law claims.” LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN to compensation, and the claim would not be barred by REMEDIES at 482. It also comports with the modern immunity even though the judgment would require the justification for immunity: protecting the public fisc. *376 government to pay money for property previously taken. Gen. Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 331–32 (Tex.2006) Servs. Comm'n v. Little–Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, (observing that immunity “shield[s] the public from the 598 (Tex.2001) (noting that governmental immunity “does costs and consequences of improvident actions of their not shield the State from an action for compensation under governments”); Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 417 (Enoch, J., the takings clause”); cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL dissenting) (noting that suits against the state would deplete PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3524.3 (“If the state cannot treasury resources and tax funds necessary to operate the invoke its immunity, retroactive relief against it is allowed.”). government). Moreover, it is generally consistent with the way our courts of appeals have interpreted Williams. See, [14] Heinrich has not alleged a takings claim. In the trial e.g., City of Round Rock v. Whiteaker, 241 S.W.3d 609, 633– court, Heinrich alleged only that “a suit for equitable relief 34 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied) (approving, under
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against a governmental entity for violation of a provision Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (citations of the Texas Bill of Rights is excepted from ... sovereign omitted). Here, the injunctive relief Heinrich seeks would immunity under Texas Constitution article [I], section 29” necessarily come from the Board, rather than the individual without specifying which provision of the Bill of Rights members. Considering “the nature of the liability sought to be had been violated. In the court of appeals, however, she imposed,” id., and construing Heinrich's pleadings liberally, clarified that her constitutional complaint was a “violation Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226, we conclude that she has sued of Article 1, section 16.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“No the Board members in their official capacities, and her claims bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any are therefore not automatically barred by immunity. 10 To the law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.”). extent that the court of appeals held that the suit is against the Petitioners contend that she waived this argument by failing to Board members in their individual capacities, we reverse that *377 raise it in the trial court. See Tex. Dep't of Protective & portion of its judgment. Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.2001) (“ ‘[A]s a rule, a claim, including a constitutional claim, must have been asserted in the trial court in order to be raised on appeal.’ ”') (citations omitted). Even if Heinrich's D constitutional argument was properly presented, however, it has no merit. Heinrich does not challenge the governing Evidence That Petitioners Acted Ultra Vires statute or bylaws, but rather the Board's actions under those provisions. Indeed, Heinrich argues that “[t]he Pension Board [15] In their second issue, petitioners argue that and its individual members acted outside their authority and governmental immunity prohibits *378 Heinrich's suit in violation of the Texas Constitution when they reduced because Heinrich has offered no evidence that the reduction [Heinrich's] benefits.” Because Heinrich does not allege that in her benefits was illegal or unauthorized. We conclude, any law sanctioned the retroactive reduction in her benefits, however, that Heinrich has presented evidence raising a fact her constitutional argument fails. 8 question on this issue.
As we have repeatedly noted, the Legislature is best [16] “When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the positioned to waive immunity, and it can authorize pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that retrospective relief if appropriate. See, e.g., TEX. LOCAL affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the GOV'T CODE § 180.006 (enacted after Williams and waiving cause. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the immunity for firefighter and police officer claims for back plaintiffs and look to the pleaders' intent.” Miranda, 133 pay and civil penalties). There are cases in which prospective S.W.3d at 226 (citations omitted). Here, Heinrich alleges that relief is inadequate to make the plaintiff whole, but the petitioners violated article 6243b, section 10A(b) of the Texas contours of the appropriate remedy must be determined by Revised Civil Statutes when they reduced her benefits. Thus, the Legislature. if Heinrich's allegations are true, her suit would fall within the ultra vires exception to governmental immunity as described Thus, Heinrich's claims for prospective relief may be brought above. only against the appropriate officials in their official capacity, and her statutory claims for future benefits against the City, [17] [18] This is not the end of our analysis, however:
“if a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of Fund, and Board must be dismissed. 9 Heinrich's pleadings jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted are unclear as to the capacity or capacities in which she by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional has sued the individual Board members. The United States issues raised, as the trial court is required to do.” Id. at 227.
Supreme Court has observed that, “[i]n many cases, the If there is no question of fact as to the jurisdictional issue, the complaint will not clearly specify whether officials are sued trial court must rule on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter personally, in their official capacity, or both.” Kentucky v.
of law. Id. at 228. If, however, the jurisdictional evidence Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d creates a fact question, then the trial court cannot grant the 114 (1985); see also United States ex rel. Adrian v. Regents plea to the jurisdiction, and the issue must be resolved by the of Univ. of Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir.2004). In these fact finder. Id. at 227–28. This standard mirrors our review cases, “ ‘[t]he course of proceedings' in such cases typically of summary judgments, and we therefore take as true all will indicate the nature of the liability sought to be imposed.”
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evidence favorable to Heinrich, indulging every reasonable place in every station or substation of a department to inference and resolving any doubts in her favor. Id. at 228. which the change would directly apply and in the city hall;
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the governing TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. art. 6243b, § 10A (emphasis added). bylaws, the payments to Heinrich were reduced when her son Under this statute, while benefits may be increased if certain ceased to be eligible to receive them, and asserts that the procedures are followed, the Board has no discretion to statutory provisions Heinrich relies upon are “inapplicable.” retroactively lower pensions. Petitioners, however, cite the Conversely, Heinrich alleges that she was awarded 100% of provisions of the 1980 bylaws, under which the reduction her husband's pension in accordance with these provisions, would be proper due to Heinrich's son's age. They therefore and that petitioners' subsequent retroactive reduction of her suggest that Heinrich erroneously relies on 1985 changes to benefits violated, among others, article 6243b, section 10A(a) the bylaws that increased the surviving spouse's share but (1) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. The relevant portions were prospective only in nature and do not apply to Heinrich. of article 6243b, section 10A provide:
Heinrich submitted an affidavit from John Batoon, former (a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in other parts Assistant City Attorney for El Paso. 11 Batoon's affidavit of this Act and subject to Subsections (b) and (c) of this provided: section, the Board of Trustees may, by majority vote of the whole board, make from time to time one or more of the following changes, or modifications: I was serving as an Assistant City Attorney for the City of El Paso in 1985. I reviewed and approved the (1) modify or change prospectively or retroactively in any award to Ms. Lilli M. Heinrich of 100% of her deceased manner whatsoever any of the benefits provided by this husband's, Charles D. Heinrich, benefits from The El Paso Act, except that any retroactive change or modification Firemen & Policemen's Pension Fund. All procedures were shall only increase pensions or benefits; followed according to the Plan and according to law. The membership voted and approved of the benefits awarded
***
Ms. Heinrich as was required by the Plan. Because Mr.
(b) None of the changes made under Subsection (a) of this Heinrich had been an outstanding police officer for the City section may be made unless all of the following conditions of El Paso and because he was killed in the line of duty, the are sequentially complied with: Board of Trustees and the membership voted to award Ms.
Heinrich 100% of Mr. Heinrich's benefits.
(1) the change must be approved by a qualified actuary selected by a four-fifths vote of the Board; the actuary's Consideration of the amount of benefits awarded Ms. approval must be based on an actuarial finding that Heinrich was not based, in any way, on the fact that she the change is supported by the existing funding status had a minor child at that time. Ms. Heinrich was awarded of the fund; the actuary, if an individual, must be a 100% of the benefits because Mr. Heinrich had been a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries or a Fellow of the well-loved officer and his death was a terrible loss for the Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice or a Member police department. It was the Board of Trustees and the of the American Academy of Actuaries; the actuary, membership's way of paying tribute to a fallen officer. if an actuarial consulting firm, must be established in Along with this sworn testimony, the evidence included a the business of providing actuarial consulting services pair of October 16, 1985 letters from the chief of police, to pension plans and have experienced personnel able one signed by the then-Board members, stating that “Mrs. to provide the requested *379 services; the findings Heinrich will receive 100% of her husband's final pension upon which the properly selected and qualified actuary's amount,” and one unsigned, stating that 100% would go to approval are based are not subject to judicial review; “Mrs. Heinrich and her dependent children.” The minutes of the November 20, 1985 Board meeting also indicate that (2) the change must be approved by a majority of the membership had previously voted to change benefits so all persons then making contributions to the fund as that surviving spouses' benefits would increase from 66 2/3 employees of a department to which the change would to 100% of the pension amount. The Board contends that directly apply, voting by secret ballot at an election held these bylaw changes do not apply to Heinrich, but even if after ten (10) days' notice given by posting at a prominent they do not, Batoon's affidavit and the letters raise a fact
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City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (2009) 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 689
hold that Heinrich has not sued the Board members in question as to whether Heinrich's individual benefits were their individual capacities, official immunity is inapplicable increased to 100% of her husband's pension payments under the provisions of article 6243b and subsequently reduced in here. 12 violation thereof. We conclude that the trial court correctly denied that portion of the plea to the jurisdiction *380 challenging Heinrich's claims against the individuals in their III official capacities. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28.
Conclusion
E In sum, because there is a question of fact as to whether Heinrich's pension payments have been reduced in violation of state law, her claims for prospective declaratory and The Individuals' Immunity injunctive relief against the Board members and the mayor In their final issue, petitioners assert that the trial court in their official capacities may go forward, but we dismiss erred in denying the individual board members' plea to the her retrospective claims against them. All of her claims jurisdiction based on governmental and official immunity. against the City, Fund, and Board, however, are barred by With the limited ultra vires exception discussed above, governmental immunity, and we dismiss them. Finally, we governmental immunity protects government officers sued hold that the Board members have not been sued in their in their official capacities to the extent that it protects their individual capacities, and to the extent the court of appeals employers. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. Hohman, held otherwise, we reverse its judgment. We affirm in part and 6 S.W.3d 767, 776 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, reverse in part the court of appeals' judgment and remand this pet. dism'd w.o.j.). Because of this exception, however, case to the trial court for further proceedings. TEX.R.APP. governmental immunity does not bar Heinrich's claims P. 60.2(a),(d). against the individuals in their official capacities. Official immunity, by contrast, is an affirmative defense protecting Parallel Citations public officials from individual liability. See Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 459–60 (Tex.2002). Because we 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 689
Footnotes 1 The City withheld a percentage of Charles's compensation (and that of other officers) to fund the plan. 2 The State of Texas and the Texas State Association of Fire Fighters submitted amicus curiae briefs. 3 We recently dismissed a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Houston Municipal Employees Pension System in which the “plaintiffs ... requested that the trial court issue an injunction directing the pension board to comply with the trial court's interpretation of Article 6243h,” the governing statute. Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 158–59 (Tex.2007). Under Article 6243h, the Houston board's “interpretation of [the] Act [is] final and binding on any interested party,” TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. art. 6243h § 2(y), and we held that this language precluded judicial review. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d at 158 (“There is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute explicitly provides that right or the order violates a constitutional right.”) (citations omitted). Here, however, Article 6243b contains no language similar to that in 6243h granting the Board exclusive authority to interpret the act, see TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. art. 6243b, and, in any case, Heinrich does not challenge petitioners' interpretation of 6243b, but rather alleges that they have violated that statute under an undisputed reading thereof. See Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d at 160 (Brister, J., concurring) (“A different case might be presented if the plaintiffs alleged the board was clearly violating some provision of the statute. Article 6243h gives the pension board complete discretion to interpret the statute, but not to violate it.”).
4 The Dodgen Court expressly declined to limit Epperson based on changes in federal immunity jurisprudence. Dodgen, 308 S.W.2d at 843.
5 Because the policy embodied in the law extends only as far the amount wrongfully withheld, claims for amounts beyond those alleged to be due under the relevant law, such as consequential damages, remain barred by immunity.
6 For claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes, however, the Declaratory Judgment Act requires that the relevant governmental entities be made parties, and thereby waives immunity. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE §
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City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (2009) 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 689
37.006(b) (“In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality must be made a party and is entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance, or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state must also be served with a copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be heard.”); see Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697–698 (Tex.2003) (“[I]f the Legislature requires that the State be joined in a lawsuit for which immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature has intentionally waived the State's sovereign immunity.”); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex.1994) (“The DJA expressly provides that persons may challenge ordinances or statutes, and that governmental entities must be joined or notified. Governmental entities joined as parties may be bound by a court's declaration on their ordinances or statutes. The Act thus contemplates that governmental entities may be—indeed, must be—joined in suits to construe their legislative pronouncements.”). Here, Heinrich is not challenging the validity of the bylaws or the governing statute, but rather petitioners' actions under them.
7 State officials may, of course, be sued in both their official and individual capacities. Judgments against state officials in their individual capacities will not bind the state. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (“Even a suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not from the state treasury but from the officer personally.”).
8 Further, although the parties do not address it, we note that the reduction in Heinrich's survivor payments occurred before the effective date of article XVI, section 66 of the Texas Constitution (“Protected Benefits Under Certain Public Retirement Systems”), and we do not consider whether it would otherwise apply in this case.
9 While this case was pending on interlocutory appeal, the Legislature enacted 271.151–.160 of the Local Government Code, waiving immunity from suit for certain claims against cities and other governmental entities. Heinrich does not argue that her claims fall within these provisions, and we express no opinion on that subject.
10 Because the mayor of El Paso, who is also a Board member, was named as a defendant in his official capacity, Heinrich may seek liability from the City through that officer, although her claims against the City itself must be dismissed.
11 The Fund, the Board, and the Board members objected to this evidence. The trial court did not explicitly rule on the objections, and the petitioners do not raise any evidentiary issues on appeal.
12 The court of appeals failed to draw this distinction, instead discussing the protections available to officials from governmental immunity. 198 S.W.3d at 407. This conflict gives us jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.225(c), (e).
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Terrell ex rel. Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274 (2003)
jurisdiction filed by Rains County and Robert M. Sisk, the county judge of Rains County, and dismissing the Terrell 111 S.W.3d 274 family's lawsuit. We affirm.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.
The lawsuit stemmed from an automobile accident resulting Odell TERRELL, on Behalf of the ESTATE in serious personal injuries to, and ultimately the deaths of, OF J.R. TERRELL, Jr., and on Behalf of J.R. Terrell, Jr., and his wife, Virginia. The accident was the Estate of Virginia Terrell, David Elkins, caused by June Goble, Judge Sisk's secretary, while on her way to a doctor's appointment. The Terrell family alleged that and Jimmy Wayne Terrell, Appellants, Goble was in a drug-induced stupor, that Judge Sisk knew v.
she had been misusing prescription drugs but made no effort Robert M. SISK and Rains County, Texas, Appellees.
to control the situation through her employment, and that her medical visit on the date of the accident was “in furtherance of No. 06–02–00174–CV. | Submitted County business.” The lawsuit was filed against Rains County June 19, 2003. | Decided July 16, 2003.
and Judge Sisk. 2 The County and Judge Sisk raised sovereign Survivors of motorists killed in collision with county immunity and official immunity as defenses. employee brought action against county and county judge alleging failure to supervise, failure to train, failure to control, In the sole issue presented for review, the Terrell family negligent implementation of policy, and negligent hiring. The challenges the trial court's order granting the plea to the 402nd Judicial District Court, Wood County, G. Timothy jurisdiction. The Terrell family has presented a number of Boswell, J., dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. arguments in an effort to support that contention. We will Survivors appealed. The Court of Appeals, Ross, J., held address those as necessary, but recognize that the main thrust that: (1) county employee driving her own car to doctor's of their contentions is that, as to the County and Judge appointment was not acting within scope of her employment; Sisk, sovereign immunity has been waived by the Texas Tort (2) joint enterprise did not exist between employee, judge, Claims Act. 3 They contend there is a cause of action for and county; (3) judge did not act in bad faith by failing failure to supervise, for failure to train, for failure to control, to request drug test of employee; and (4) official immunity for negligent implementation of policy, negligent hiring (or barred negligence claims against judge. retention), and that “joint enterprise” applies.
Affirmed. [1] As to the claims against Rains County, the only question is whether sovereign immunity has been waived. If not, then no claim against the County can prevail. Under the doctrine of Attorneys and Law Firms sovereign immunity, a governmental unit is not liable for the *276 Christopher A. Kalis, Law Offices of Christopher A. torts of its officers or agents in the absence of a constitutional Kalis, Dallas, for appellants. or statutory provision creating such liability. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d Robert T. Bass, Allison, Bass & Associates, LLP, Austin, for 339, 341 (Tex.1998). In the absence of the state's consent to appellees. suit, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss. The Tort Claims Act creates that limited waiver of Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
sovereign immunity. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997).
OPINION As a governmental unit, Rains County is immune from both suit and liability unless the Tort Claims Act has waived Opinion by Justice ROSS.
that immunity. *277 Section 101.021 of the Tort Claims Odell Terrell, on behalf of the estates of J.R. Terrell, Jr., and Act has been interpreted as waiving sovereign immunity in Virginia Terrell, David Elkins, and Jimmy Wayne Terrell (the three general areas: “use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or Terrell family) 1 appeal from an order granting a plea to the use of property.” Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d
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Terrell ex rel. Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274 (2003)
608, 611 (Tex.2000), quoting Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976). Pursuant to Section 101.021, a The facts alleged by the Terrell family are that the damage governmental unit in the state is liable for: was caused by the private vehicle of the driver (Judge Sisk's secretary) while that driver was on her way to a doctor's (1) property damage, personal injury, and death appointment. There is no allegation of an express waiver of proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or immunity. Thus, in order to fall under the Tort Claims Act the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of exception, the Terrell family must show that the use of the employment if: vehicle was part of the scope of the driver's employment by the County. “Scope of employment” is defined as “the (A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises performance for a governmental unit of the duties of an from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or employee's office or employment *278 and includes being motor-driven equipment; and in or about the performance of a task lawfully assigned to (B) the employee would be personally liable to the an employee by competent authority.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & claimant according to Texas law; and REM.CODE ANN. § 101.001(5) (Vernon Supp.2003).
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition There are no allegations in the Terrell family's pleadings that or use of tangible personal or real property if the can reasonably be interpreted as showing that the driver was governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable acting within the scope of her employment at the time of to the claimant according to Texas law. the accident. She was not traveling at the direction of her employer. There is nothing to suggest this trip to the doctor TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 101.021. was any part of the performance of her duties as an employee;
rather, the pleadings show conclusively it was a personal The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is properly raised by activity away from the workplace. a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999) (correcting a number of The Terrell family also alleged, however, that Goble's trip to misunderstandings on that point). 4 The plaintiff has the the doctor was a part of her employment—and thus her use burden to show that jurisdiction exists by alleging facts that of her car was actionable under the vehicle exception to the affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has subject Tort Claims Act. They argue that this theory applies because matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Judge Sisk had, on an earlier occasion, directed Goble to go Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993); City of Midland v. home, and because he permitted her to leave on this occasion. Sullivan, 33 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). In the context of suit against a governmental unit, The underlying principle is that an employee is generally the plaintiff must allege consent to suit either by reference to not in the course and scope of employment while driving statute or express legislative permission. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at his or her own vehicle to or from his or her place of 638; Sullivan, 33 S.W.3d at 6. employment. Mata v. Andrews Transp., Inc., 900 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
In our analysis, the question of subject matter jurisdiction is a This rule is based on the premise that an injury occurring legal question which we review de novo. Sullivan, 33 S.W.3d while traveling to or from work has nothing to do with the at 6. We examine the pleadings, taking as true the facts pled, risks associated with a place of employment. Smith v. Tex. and we determine whether those allegations of fact support Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d 192, 193 jurisdiction in the trial court. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d (1937). at 446. In so doing, we construe the pleadings in favor of the pleader. Id. If necessary, we may review the entire record There is an exception to this rule that applies when an to determine if there is jurisdiction. Id. If the petition does employee undertakes a special mission for his or her not allege jurisdictional facts, the plaintiff's suit is subject to employer. Direkly v. ARA Devcon, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 652, dismissal only when it is impossible to amend the pleadings 654 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.). to confer jurisdiction. See id. In this case, special exceptions A special mission is a specific errand that an employee directed at this matter were raised, and the Terrell family had undertakes at the specific request of the employer. Wilie the opportunity to amend their pleadings. v. Signature Geophysical Servs., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 355, 359
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Terrell ex rel. Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274 (2003)
(Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); Upton v. Arguably, there was an agreement, and a common purpose, Gensco, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 620, 621–22 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth between Goble and the County, as the Terrell family alleges. 1997, pet. denied). However, the Terrell family's counsel has However, neither the “pecuniary interest” nor the “equal right explicitly stated in a post-submission letter to this Court that to control” elements make any sense in the context of a the “special mission” concept does not apply to the facts of benefit provided for an employee by an employer. There is no this case. We will therefore not further address that theory. real pecuniary interest involved as a profit-making business arrangement between the parties. The County provided health There is no allegation of fact to show that, on the occasion of insurance as a benefit. That was arguably a pecuniary benefit this accident, the employee went to the doctor at the specific to Goble. The health benefits are provided by doctors, who request of Judge Sisk. There is also no allegation of fact to presumably receive a pecuniary benefit from their use. In support the Terrell family's theory that Rains County had a return, the County receives—not money—but a worker who duty to keep Goble from leaving her workplace. There is is more satisfied with his or her employment and is thus more nothing in the Terrell family's pleadings that can be read to likely to remain employed by the County. support the application of the Tort Claims Act to allow them to pursue a cause of action against Rains County. The plea to Further, the mere fact that an employee has the ability to the jurisdiction was therefore properly granted. choose the doctor whom he or she will visit does not indicate such employee has “control” over a joint enterprise. It simply [2] The Terrell family also contends the County has waived shows that the employee has the ability under the provided its sovereign immunity because it was in a joint enterprise insurance contract to choose which doctor he or she will visit. with Goble. They so contend because Judge Sisk allowed Goble to use her personal vehicle to occasionally run errands In light of the fact the Texas Supreme Court has held that for the County and because the County's health insurance even business relationships such as a franchisor, wholesaler, plan provided the drugs Goble was taking, and Judge Sisk or supplier do not have a “community of pecuniary interest” allowed her to go to the doctor to obtain those drugs and did adequate to show the existence of a joint enterprise, neither not attempt to stop her. can we find any indication a joint enterprise exists in this situation. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 528 In Able, the Texas Supreme Court held that “a governmental (Tex.2002). unit that enters into a joint enterprise can be liable under the waiver of sovereign immunity found in the Tort Claims Act.” [4] The Terrell family then takes a different direction in Able, 35 S.W.3d at 610. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged a their pleadings concerning Judge Sisk. They allege that Judge premises defect involving a state highway. See id. at 612. The Sisk was the negligent party and that his negligence was the plaintiffs also alleged that a joint enterprise existed between proximate cause of the deaths because of his failure to enforce the Texas *279 Department of Transportation (TxDOT) the County's drug-testing policy. The policy, as stated in the and the Houston Metropolitan Transit Authority (Metro) with Terrell family's brief, provided that an “employee suspected respect to the highway. See id. at 610. As a party to a joint of drug/alcohol abuse may be requested to take a test. If an enterprise with Metro, the plaintiffs contended TxDOT was employee refuses to take this test or fails a test, they are equally responsible for the premises defect. See id. at 613. subject to immediate dismissal.”
[3] A plaintiff must show four elements to prove the The initial question is whether this alters the analysis set existence of a joint enterprise: (1) an agreement, express or out above for Judge Sisk in his official capacity as the implied, among the members of the group; (2) a common county judge. Article IX, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community of provides that counties are legal subdivisions of the state. TEX. pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and CONST. art. IX, § 1. A suit against a government official in (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, his or her official capacity seeks to impose liability only on the which gives an equal right of control. Id.; Tex. Dep't of governmental entity the official represents, and any judgment Transp. v. City of Floresville Elec. Power & Light Sys., 53 in this type of suit is collectible only against the governmental S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.). entity, not against the official's personal assets. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Herring v. Houston Nat'l Exch. Bank, 113 Tex.
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Terrell ex rel. Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274 (2003)
264, 253 S.W. 813 (1923); Harris County v. Walsweer, 930 would be personally liable under Texas law. A government S.W.2d 659, 665 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ employee is entitled to official immunity for (1) the denied); Winograd v. Clear Lake City Water *280 Auth., performance of discretionary duties (2) that are within the 811 S.W.2d 147, 162 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, scope of the employee's authority, (3) provided the employee writ denied); see also Bowles v. Reed, 913 S.W.2d 652, acts in good faith. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, writ denied) (suit against county 650, 653 (Tex.1994); see also DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 official is a suit solely against the county); Bowles v. Wade, S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex.1995). 913 S.W.2d 644, 649, 649 n. 13 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) (suits against public officials are suits against the In deciding whether the facts alleged fall outside the scope entities for whom they work and official-capacity judgments of official immunity, we recognize that the basis for alleged impose liability on the entity). liability is the County's policy, which explicitly provides that requiring a drug test of an employee is absolutely [5] As a public official sued in his official capacity, Judge discretionary, and that the Terrell family has alleged the Sisk is protected by the same sovereign immunity enjoyed accident was caused by Judge Sisk while acting within the by the state agency he represents. Tex. Dep't of Health scope of his official duties. The sole disputed question then v. Rocha, 102 S.W.3d 348, 353 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, becomes whether he acted in good faith. 2003, no pet.); Denson v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., 63 S.W.3d 454, 460 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1999, pet. denied); Morris v. Copeland, If Judge Sisk was performing a discretionary function, then 944 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, he is protected by official immunity, regardless of whether he no writ). Because a suit against a state officer in his or was negligent in the exercise of his public duties. See City of her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the Wichita Falls v. Norman, 963 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Tex.App.- state, employees acting in their official capacity share their Fort Worth 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). The Terrell family employer's sovereign immunity. Rocha, 102 S.W.3d at 353; cannot breach the immunity wall merely because Judge Sisk Denson, 63 S.W.3d at 460; Morris, 944 S.W.2d at 698– was negligent—they can only do so if Judge Sisk exercised 99; see also Sykes v. Harris County, 89 S.W.3d 661, 669 his discretionary authority in *281 bad faith. See Harless v. (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. filed); Univ. of Niles, 100 S.W.3d 390 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dism'd The Terrell family must do more than show that a reasonably w.o.j.) (holding employee sued in her official capacity was prudent supervisor could have acted differently; they must shielded by sovereign immunity). Accordingly, a plea to the show that no reasonable person in Judge Sisk's position could jurisdiction is procedurally the proper method of contesting have thought the facts were such that they justified his acts. the propriety of the lawsuit against him or her as a public See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657. Good faith is not defeated official. simply by a showing of negligence. Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 467 n. 1 (Tex.1997).
The Terrell family alleges Judge Sisk is liable to them for two main reasons: 1) the judge knew his secretary at least Good faith is established when it is proved that a reasonably occasionally had problems (i.e., sleeping on the job) caused prudent government official, under the same or similar by her use of prescription medications, but had negligently circumstances, could have believed that his actions were failed to exercise the County's policy to require her to undergo justified. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. A government drug testing; and 2) the judge knew on that particular occasion employee acts in bad faith only if that employee could not that his secretary was in no condition to drive her automobile have reasonably reached the decision in question. Univ. of and was thus negligent in allowing her to drive to her Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tex.2000). Good doctor's appointment. We will first analyze these allegations faith can be established as a matter of law when the factual as viewed through the window of sovereign/official immunity recitation by the governmental unit's employee is otherwise of a public servant. supported by the evidence. Dovalina v. Nuno, 48 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Alamo Workforce [6] In determining whether a waiver of the application Dev., Inc. v. Vann, 21 S.W.3d 428, 434–35 (Tex.App.-San of sovereign immunity is shown in this context, a critical Antonio 2000, no pet.). The Terrell family alleged negligence. question is whether the employee of a governmental unit Although they also used the term “good faith” throughout
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Terrell ex rel. Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274 (2003)
official is an agent. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 their pleadings, the allegations involving that language are the U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); City same ones used in their allegations of negligence. 5 of Hempstead v. Kmiec, 902 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). The suit is therefore the The facts concerning the accident alleged by the Terrell same as one brought directly against the state. Will, 491 U.S.
family do not support a finding that Judge Sisk acted in bad at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304; Kmiec, 902 S.W.2d at 122. The United faith, either for failing to require Goble to undergo a drug States Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its test, or in connection with her driving to her doctor's office officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under in her own vehicle. Requiring a drug test was discretionary § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304; see Harrison v.
on the part of the county judge, and there are no facts alleged Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice–Institutional Div., 915 S.W.2d showing any directive by Judge Sisk to Goble to drive her 882, 889–90 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
automobile. Taking the allegations at their most extreme The Court went on to explain that, “As such, it is no different possible meaning, with maximal inferences applied, they at from a suit against the State itself.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 most show questionable judgment, and thus possibly show S.Ct. 2304.
negligence. They do not show the absence of good faith, which is necessary to avoid the sovereign immunity bar.
Therefore, as a government official in his official capacity, Accordingly, the trial court did not err by concluding Judge Judge Sisk is not a “person” under Section 1983. Section 1983 Sisk, riding on the coattails of sovereign immunity of his of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
county, is not amenable to suit in his official capacity.
Every person who, under color of [7] [8] We next consider whether claims were raised any statute, ordinance, regulation, against Judge Sisk in his individual capacity. State employees custom, or usage, of any State or sued in their individual capacities may be liable for their Territory or the District of Columbia, negligence if they do not have official immunity. Sykes, 89 subjects, or causes to be subjected, S.W.3d at 669; Denson, 63 S.W.3d at 460. any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction We have reviewed the pleadings in detail. Although there thereof to the deprivation of any rights, are places where the Terrell family referred to claims against privileges, or immunities secured by Judge Sisk in his personal capacity, there were no claims the Constitution and laws, shall be raised involving any act by the judge outside of his public liable to the party injured in an action servant persona. This is not a situation where there is a at law, suit in equity, or other proper mixture of allegations, some of which are directed at actions proceeding for redress. taken outside a public capacity. In this case, all allegations were of claimed wrongdoing or negligence by Judge Sisk in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.2003). actions he was able to take only because of his position as a public servant. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Section 1983 was not designed to override sovereign a fair reading of the Terrell family's pleadings is that there immunity. Will, 491 U.S. at 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Accordingly, *282 was no effective pleading against Judge Sisk in his the Section 1983 claim made against Judge Sisk in his official individual capacity. capacity could not serve to avoid the application of sovereign immunity and the claim was properly the subject of the plea [9] [10] The Terrell family has also raised a federal Section to the jurisdiction. 1983 claim against Judge Sisk. A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official, We affirm the judgment. but against the official's office and the state for which the
Footnotes 1 Odell Terrell is a surviving brother of J.R. Terrell, Jr. David Elkins is the surviving son of Virginia Terrell, and Jimmy Wayne Terrell is the surviving son of J.R. Terrell, Jr.
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Terrell ex rel. Estate of Terrell v. Sisk, 111 S.W.3d 274 (2003)
2 The style of the lawsuit in the Terrell family's pleadings does not specify whether Judge Sisk was sued in his personal capacity or in his capacity as county judge (and the supervisor of his secretary). We will therefore review the pleadings to determine the nature of the Terrell family's claims.
3 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 101.021(1)(A), (B) (Vernon 1997). 4 Since as early as 1847, the law in Texas has been that, absent the state's consent to suit, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). A party may contest a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction by filing a plea to the jurisdiction. Id.
5 “When a petition fails to specify the capacity in which a person is sued, we will look at the ‘course of the proceedings' to determine the nature of the liability the plaintiff seeks to impose.” Harless v. Niles, 100 S.W.3d 390 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.), quoting Nueces County v. Ferguson, 97 S.W.3d 205, 215 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
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In re State Bar of Texas, 440 S.W.3d 621 (2014) 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1253
Opinion Original Image of 440 S.W.3d 621 (PDF)
440 S.W.3d 621 Justice DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court, in Supreme Court of Texas. which Chief Justice HECHT, Justice GREEN, Justice JOHNSON, Justice GUZMAN, Justice LEHRMANN, and In re The STATE BAR OF TEXAS. Justice BROWN joined.
No. 13–0161. | Argued Feb. 6, A person wrongfully arrested for a crime “is entitled to have 2014. | Decided Aug. 22, 2014. all records and files relating to the arrest” expunged, if certain conditions are met. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 55.01(a).
Synopsis One such condition is an acquittal. Id. art. 55.01(a)(1)(A). The Background: Commission for Lawyer Discipline petitioned statute thus serves to protect wrongfully-accused people by for a writ of mandamus to the district court regarding its ruling eradicating their arrest records. that expunction order in case underlying alleged prosecutorial misconduct precluded the Commission from relying on any In this original mandamus proceeding, the Commission expunged records. for Lawyer Discipline complains that a former prosecutor, facing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, has used an expunction order to block the Commission's prosecution. A district court has refused the Commission access to expunged [Holding:] The Supreme Court, Devine, J., held that order criminal records for use in the disciplinary proceeding against denying request by Commission to use expunged records was the former prosecutor and has ordered the Commission to an abuse of discretion.
turn over investigative records. The grievance panel in the collateral disciplinary proceeding has construed the district Writ conditionally granted. court's actions as a bar to the disciplinary proceeding and granted the former prosecutor's summary judgment motion.
Boyd, J., concurred in the judgment and filed opinion in Because we conclude that the expungement order does not bar which Willett, J., joined. the Commission from using records from the criminal trial in the grievance proceeding, we conditionally grant the writ.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*622 Gregory Max Hasley, Jennifer A. Hasley, Hasley I Scarano, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Other interested party Jon This mandamus relates to a disciplinary proceeding against L. Hall.
former prosecutor Jon L. Hall, who allegedly suppressed Barry C. Willey, Donald S. Glywasky, Jack Duane Roady, exculpatory evidence in an aggravated robbery prosecution. Galveston County Crim. Dist., Galveston, TX, for Other The Commission's involvement began in November 2011, Interested Party Jack Roady. when it received a news article about the aggravated robbery trial. The article reported that *623 Joshua Bledsoe was Christopher L. Tritico, Lloyd James Krell, Ron S. Rainey, acquitted because the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory Tritico Rainey PLLC, Houston, TX, for Other interested party evidence. Vikram Vu.
The Commission began by interviewing, among others Taft Foley, The Foley Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Real Party familiar with the case, the judge who presided over the in Interest Joshua Bledsoe.
trial and the attorney who represented Bledsoe. Shortly Cynthia Canfield Hamilton, Senior Appellate Disciplinary thereafter, the Commission anonymously received a partial Counsel, Laura Kathryn Bayouth, Linda A. Acevedo, Office trial transcript that included discussions between the trial of the Chief Disciplinary Council, Austin, TX, for Relator judge and counsel regarding the prosecution's suppression of State Bar of Texas. evidence, including a 911 tape.
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In re State Bar of Texas, 440 S.W.3d 621 (2014) 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1253
In that tape, the robbery victim made statements that she the Commission's stay request and, based on the trial court's later contradicted during trial. At trial, the victim identified order, granted Hall's summary judgment motion. Bledsoe as one of the robbers based partially on his race, but in the 911 call, the same witness claimed that she could The Commission has appealed the panel's summary judgment not provide any description of the robbers, including race, to the Board of Disciplinary Appeals and has sought review of because they wore masks. the trial court's order in the court of appeals. The Commission advises that both reviews have been stayed, pending our Following its investigation, the Commission commenced review of the Commission's petition for writ of mandamus. a disciplinary action against Hall, the lead prosecutor in the aggravated robbery case, and Vikram Vij, an assistant The Commission submits that mandamus relief in this Court prosecutor. The Commission subsequently dismissed the is appropriate because the court of appeals cannot redress action against Vij. Hall elected to have his disciplinary action the ultimate consequence of the trial *624 court's order— proceed before a grievance panel rather than in district court. the dismissal of the Commission's disciplinary action. That dismissal can only be challenged in a separate appeal to the In answer to the Commission's evidentiary petition, Hall Board of Disciplinary Appeals. The Commission submits complained that he did not have access to records necessary to that the attendant risk of conflicting appellate decisions that his defense because all records from the aggravated robbery can only be reconciled in this Court suggests the present case had been expunged. After receiving Hall's answer, the mandamus as the appropriate remedy. See, e.g., In re State Commission, with Bledsoe's consent, filed a motion in the Bar of Texas, 113 S.W.3d 730, 732 (Tex.2003) (concluding trial court that had presided over the criminal prosecution and that mandamus was the appropriate remedy to correct district signed the expunction order. The motion sought access to the court's interference in the regulation of the legal practice). We expunged records for use in the pending disciplinary action. turn then to that review. Although Hall had complained about not having access to the criminal-case records, he nevertheless responded to the Commission's motion by urging the trial court to deny access
II
to the expunged records.
[1] [2] [3] Expunction is not a right; it is a statutory The Commission's motion was assigned to a visiting judge, privilege. T.C.R. v. Bell Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Office, sitting by assignment for the trial court. Following a hearing, 305 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, no pet.). the visiting judge concluded that the underlying expunction The expunction statute is an exception to the established order precluded the Commission from relying on any of the principle that court proceedings and records should be open expunged records and ordered the Commission to turn over to the public. See, e.g., Express–News Corp. v. MacRae, all information in its possession related to Bledsoe's arrest, 787 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, orig. including the partial trial transcript. The order also barred for proceeding) (recognizing constitutional right to public trials any purpose “any document or other evidence derived from and presumptively open court records); TEX.CODE CRIM. the underlying criminal case and subject to the District Court's PROC. art. 1.24 (requiring public trials). The statute is expunction order or derived from the arrest of J.B. and subject designed to protect wrongfully-accused people from inquiries to the District Court's expunction order.” about their arrests. See Ex parte S.C., 305 S.W.3d 258, 263– 64 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (stating Meanwhile, in response to Hall's requests, the grievance panel “statute was enacted to prevent the record of a wrongful arrest chair ordered restrictions on the Commission's discovery in from negatively impacting a person for the remainder of his the disciplinary action. The order recited that the Commission life”). could not acquire or use any documents or other evidence related to the underlying criminal case and expungement The statute provides for a truncated expunction procedure that order until the trial court amended the expungement, if it did. requires neither filing a petition nor a hearing. TEX.CODE Hall subsequently moved to strike the evidentiary petition, CRIM. PROC. art. 55.02 § 1. The truncated procedure to dismiss the disciplinary proceeding, and for summary commences with a defendant's request for expunction, such judgment. The Commission sought a stay so that it could seek as a request made orally on the record by defense counsel. relief from the trial court's order. The grievance panel denied Id. The acquitted defendant must provide the trial court
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In re State Bar of Texas, 440 S.W.3d 621 (2014) 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1253
with certain information, including a list of all officials and order did not name the Commission as a respondent in agencies to be named in the expunction order and notified possession of records to be expunged. Nor did the order make of the expunction proceedings. Id. art. 55.02 §§ 1, 2(b). an exception for the Commission to use expunged records in Within thirty days of acquittal, the trial court is to enter the its prosecution. expunction order, which is prepared and filed by defense counsel or by the prosecutor, if the acquitted defendant is not The Commission filed its Original Evidentiary Petition in represented by counsel. Id. art. 55.02 § 1. The court clerk the disciplinary proceeding in July 2012. Hall answered in then sends a certified copy of the expunction order to the August, complaining that the expunction order handicapped Department of Public Safety and to each of the officials and his ability to defend himself. In response, the Commission agencies named in the order. Id. art. 55.02 § 3(c). moved to modify the expunction order in the criminal trial court. The motion recited that the Commission had recently “On receipt of the order, each official or agency or other learned of the order's possible existence but that it had not governmental entity named in the order” is required to return been served with a certified copy of the order nor been given to the court all records and files that are subject to the order notice of an expunction hearing. See TEX.CODE OF CRIM. or, if their return is impracticable, to obliterate all information PROC. art. 55.02 § 3(c). The Commission requested access identifying the acquitted defendant. Id. art. 55.02 § 5(a)(1). to records and files in the underlying criminal case for the Any of the entities named in the order may appeal the order purpose of prosecuting disciplinary proceedings against third as in civil cases generally. Id. art. 55.02 § 3(a). The clerk parties. is directed to destroy the collected files and records in some cases, but the files and records are not destroyed in the case of The trial court denied the request. It further ordered the an acquittal. Id. art. 55.02 § 5(d). In acquittal cases, the clerk Commission to turn over any material in its investigation maintains the expunged records and files but generally only file related to Bledsoe's arrest and broadly ordered the the acquitted defendant has access to them. Id. art. 55.02 § Commission not to use any evidence derived from the 5(c). underlying criminal case in any manner. This order, signed by the visiting judge on December 11, 2012, is the subject of Expunction, however, is not absolute. The statute provides the Commission's request for mandamus relief. for exceptions, permitting the retention of records and files, if they may be needed in future criminal or civil proceedings. The Commission argues that the court's order perverts the Id. art. 55.02 § 4. Article 55.02 provides two exceptions for expunction statute's purpose. It submits that a statute designed acquittal cases which apply if “(1) the records and files are to protect an acquitted defendant's reputation has been necessary [to investigate and prosecute] a person other than applied to impede the disciplinary prosecution of the person the person who is the subject of the expunction order; or (2) accused of violating the acquitted defendant's rights. The the state establishes that the records and files are necessary Commission further notes that the acquitted defendant fully for use in (A) another criminal case ...; or (B) a *625 civil supports the Commission's use of the expunged records in the case, including a civil suit or suit for possession of or access disciplinary case against the former prosecutor. In fact, the to a child.” Id. art. 55.02 § 4(a–2)(1), (2). acquitted defendant filed a brief supporting the Commission's mandamus petition in this Court, and his lawyer appeared at oral argument. The Commission concludes that the court's application of the expunction statute is a clear abuse of
III
discretion because it ignores the acquitted defendant's wishes, Bledsoe was acquitted in the underlying criminal prosecution contravenes the statute's primary purpose, and interferes with on June 17, 2011. Despite the statute's directive that the the Commission's ability to prosecute the disciplinary action court enter the expunction order “not later than the 30th before the grievance panel. day after the acquittal,” the expunction order was not signed until December 28, 2011. By that time, the Commission's [4] [5] We agree that the court's December 11 order, preliminary investigation into prosecutorial misconduct was denying the Commission's request to use expunged records in virtually complete. The Commission, of course, had no the disciplinary action, is an abuse of discretion. A person can, direct connection to the criminal prosecution and no apparent in effect, “unexpunge” his records by putting those records knowledge of the expunction proceedings. The expunction at issue in another proceeding. See, e.g., W.V. v. State, 669
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In re State Bar of Texas, 440 S.W.3d 621 (2014) 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1253
S.W.2d 376, 378–79 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (concluding that civil service (holding that retention of files was not necessary to afford commission did not rely on expunged records or files but protection from potential civil action because expunged on officers' testimony about their personal observations). The records would be held by district clerk and could be retrieved statute thus cannot reasonably be construed to apply to all if needed for subsequent proceedings); see also Thomas v. investigative files and records generated by a state agency, City of Selma, 2006 WL 2854405, *3 (W.D.Tex. Oct. 4, like the Commission in this case. 2006) (holding that district clerk must produce arrest records for use in suit based on arrest). Bledsoe has done precisely The grievance panel, however, interpreted the visiting judge's *626 that, making his arrest and prosecution a matter of order as precluding the Commission from proceeding in public record, by filing a federal lawsuit against Hall and the disciplinary action. The Commission argued against other defendants based on his arrest and prosecution. The that construction and presented evidence independent of the Commission advises that Hall filed the full transcript of expunged records, including the affidavit from the judge Bledsoe's trial as a summary judgment exhibit in federal court who presided over the criminal trial, but to no avail. The and that it is publicly available on the Internet. See Bledsoe v. panel chair concluded that there was “no way we can get Galveston Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 4:13–CV–00469, the evidence” and that “as [the trial court's] order stands, Document 52–2 (S.D. Tex. filed Feb. 21, 2013) (available at then we have to grant the no-evidence motion for summary https:// www.pacer.gov). judgment.”
The Commission argues that if an acquitted defendant can In barring the Commission's use of any document or other make expunged records public by filing a lawsuit based on evidence derived from the underlying criminal case, the court his wrongful prosecution, he should likewise be able to make construes the expunction statute at odds with the acquitted the records public by participating in a grievance proceeding defendant's interests. A process intended to protect acquitted based on the wrongful prosecution. Thus, if Hall can use the defendants has been used as a shield against charges of expunged records to defend himself in federal court, he can prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, the court's order fails to also use them to defend himself in the disciplinary action. consider that an expunction order may except records needed And, if Hall has the right to use the expunged records, they for future investigations and proceedings by a prosecutor or should also be available to the Commission. The acquitted a law enforcement agency. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. defendant supports the Commission's use of the expunged 55.02 § 4(a–2). The exception extends not only to criminal records in the disciplinary case, and we conclude that he has matters, but *627 to civil cases as well. Id. art. 55.02 § 4(a– the right to voluntarily waive his expunction rights for this 2)(2)(B). And, as already mentioned, an acquitted defendant purpose. In re Expunction of Jones, 311 S.W.3d 502, 505 who obtains an expunction may subsequently waive the (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, no pet.) (citing TEX.CODE CRIM. statute's protection. Given the waiver expressed by the PROC. art. 1.14(a)). We conclude further that the court acquitted defendant, the relevance of the expunged records to abused its discretion in disregarding the acquitted defendant's the disciplinary proceeding, and the Commission's expressed voluntary waiver, particularly in light of the Commission's need for those records, the trial court abused its discretion expressed need for the records to prosecute the disciplinary by extending the expungement order to the Commission and proceeding. thereby interfering in the disciplinary proceeding.
[6] The expunction statute's purpose is not to eradicate An order that directly interferes with the Commission's ability all evidence of wrongful conduct. See Gomez v. Tex. Educ. to collect and present evidence is as much a direct interference Agency, 354 S.W.3d 905, 917–18 (Tex.App.-San Antonio in the disciplinary process as an order directed to a grievance 2011, pet. denied) (holding that a police officer's eyewitness panel itself. See State Bar of Tex. v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d testimony in a contested case administrative hearing was not 575 (Tex.1997) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief barred by an expunction order issued before the hearing, against district court that enjoined disciplinary proceedings but after the administrative petition); Ex parte S.C., 305 before a grievance panel); State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 S.W.3d at 266 (holding an expunction order overbroad (Tex.1972) (orig.proceeding) (same). Because the court's because it included state securities board's investigation order interferes with the disciplinary process, disrupting the records mentioning S.C.); Bustamante v. Bexar Cnty. Sheriff's regulatory scheme promulgated by this Court to govern cases Civil Serv. Comm'n, 27 S.W.3d 50, 53–54 (Tex.App.-San of attorney discipline, we conditionally grant relief and direct
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In re State Bar of Texas, 440 S.W.3d 621 (2014) 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1253
the trial court to vacate its order of December 11, 2012. We Article 1.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure affirms are confident the district court will comply, and the writ will that a defendant in a criminal prosecution “may waive issue only if it does not.
any rights secured him by law.” TEX.CRIM. PROC.CODE art. 1.14(a). Article 55.01 provides a defendant a right to expunction that may be waived. See, e.g., In re Expunction Justice BOYD filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice of Jones, 311 S.W.3d 502 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, no pet.) WILLETT joined. (holding that a defendant knowingly waived his rights to expunction under article 1.14). The defendant in this case Justice BOYD, joined by Justice WILLETT, concurring in consented to the Commission's motion for access to the the judgment.
expunged records for use in the pending disciplinary action The Court concludes in this case “that [an] expungement and has filed a brief in support of the Commission's petition order does not bar the Commission [for Lawyer Discipline]
in this Court. Article 55.01 grants a right to the defendant, not from using records from [a] criminal trial in [a subsequent]
the prosecutor, and I agree that in this case the defendant has grievance proceeding.” Ante at 622. The Court reaches waived that right.
this conclusion because (1) the defendant in the criminal case “has the right to voluntarily waive his expunction There is no need in this case for the Court to consider whether rights” and has done so here, ante at 626; (2) the trial the trial court's order “contravenes” the expunction statute's court's construction of the expunction statute “contravenes the unexpressed purpose or “interferes with the disciplinary statute's primary purpose” and is “at odds with the acquitted process.” Because the defendant has waived his rights under defendant's interests,” ante at 626; and (3) the trial court's the expunction statute, I agree that the trial court abused its order “interferes with the disciplinary process, disrupting the discretion by denying *628 the Commission access to the regulatory scheme promulgated by this Court to govern cases criminal trial record.
of attorney discipline,” ante at 627. In my view, the latter two reasons, even if true, provide an inadequate basis to ignore the unambiguous language of the expunction statute. But I Parallel Citations agree with the Court's first reason and therefore concur in the judgment. 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1253
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Love v. State Bar of Texas, 982 S.W.2d 939 (1998)
Love was brought under article X of the former State Bar Rules or the current Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
Original Image of 982 S.W.2d 939 (PDF) We hold that the State Bar Rules apply, and affirm the 982 S.W.2d 939 judgment of the trial court.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Jack Edward LOVE, Appellant, Facts and Procedural History v.
On June 21, 1990, Love appeared as counsel for a criminal THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Appellee.
defendant in Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 10.
No. 01–95–01340–CV. | Dec. 17, After arriving an hour late for a 9:00 a.m. hearing, Love attempted to obtain a trial setting, but was directed by the 1998. | Rehearing Overruled Dec. 17, 1998.
court to confer with the prosecution before attempting to set State Bar filed disciplinary petition against attorney. The a trial date. While court was still in session, Love left the 270th District Court, Harris County, J.F. Clawson, J., entered courtroom without resetting or otherwise disposing of his post-answer default judgment and disbarred attorney. He client's case and without conferring with the prosecution as appealed. On denial of motion for rehearing en banc, the instructed by trial judge. Love did not return for two hours. Court of Appeals, Schneider, C.J., held that: (1) allegations in petition were sufficient to support application of prior State The court concluded all other matters, and, along with Love's Bar rules rather than the new Texas Rules of Disciplinary client, awaited his return. The court eventually reset the cause Procedure; (2) evidence was sufficient to show attorney and directed Love's client to return the following day. After violated former State Bar disciplinary rules; and (3) trial court the trial judge retired to chambers, Love returned to the did not abuse its discretion in disbarring attorney. courtroom. The court coordinator explained to Love that the court had reset the cause for the next day. Love became angry Judgment affirmed. and in the presence of court personnel, made antisemitic remarks regarding the trial judge.
Attorneys and Law Firms On August 14, 1990, Love was found guilty of three counts of misdemeanor contempt. For each count, Love was assessed *941 Jack E. Love, Houston, for Appellant.
punishment of six months in jail and a fine of $500. Love Linda A. Acevedo, Mary Klapperich, Houston, Austin, for filed a writ of habeas corpus to the Texas Court of Criminal Appellee. Appeals. The Court, en banc, upheld the first two findings of contempt and set aside the third. Love then filed a writ Before Chief Justice SCHNEIDER and Justices WILSON of habeas corpus in federal district court. This writ was and HEDGES. dismissed.
On July 29, 1994, the State Bar filed its first disciplinary OPINION petition against Love. The petition was based on the first two contempt findings and violations of Texas Disciplinary Rules MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER, Chief Justice. of Professional Conduct 3.02, 3.04(c)(5), 8.04(a)(2) and (4).
TEX DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.02, 3.04, The Court considered the appellee's motion for rehearing en 8.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit, G banc. A majority of the justices of the Court voted to deny the app. A (Vernon Supp.1997) (TEXAS STATE BAR R. art. X, motion. However, the panel withdraws its prior opinion, and § 9). Although Love was properly notified and had an answer issue this opinion in its place. on file, he did not appear at trial. Thus, the trial court entered a post-answer default judgment against Love, and, based on the This is an attorney disciplinary action that resulted in the evidence presented by the State Bar, disbarred Love. Love's disbarment of appellant, Jack Edward Love. The controlling motion for new trial was denied, and this appeal followed. issue in this case is whether the disciplinary action against
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Love v. State Bar of Texas, 982 S.W.2d 939 (1998)
pleading requirements on the State Bar to prosecute claims under the old State Bar Rules. Therefore, we must presume The Applicable Rules of Professional Conduct that the absence of such language was intentional. See Martin, The disposition of the case ultimately hinges on which set 102 S.W.2d at 1039. of disciplinary rules applies to the disciplinary action against Love. To make that determination, we must determine what Moreover, Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 1.03 requires us to broadly construe the new rules “to ensure effect the Texas Rules of Disciplinary *942 Procedure, 1 the operation, effectiveness, integrity, and continuation of which became effective on May 1, 1992, had on then pending the professional disciplinary and disability system.” TEX.
disciplinary matters involving attorney conduct that occurred R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.033. If we were to accept Love's prior to May 1, 1992. Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure contention that the State Bar was required to plead and prove 1.04 provides in pertinent part:
a pending disciplinary investigation, we would essentially be reading Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 1.04 to do away These rules apply prospectively to all attorney professional with an entire class of disciplinary matters that were based disciplinary and disability proceedings commenced on on conduct that occurred prior to May 1, 1992, but that were and after [May 1, 1992] ... [T]he State Bar Rules ... are not commenced until after the Texas Rules of Disciplinary repealed except to the extent that they apply to then pending Procedure became effective. We decline to accept Love's disciplinary matters. reading of rule 1.04. Such a construction would not only TEX.R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.04 (emphasis added). hamper the State Bar's efforts to control attorney conduct, but Love argues that the disciplinary rules in effect at the time would engraft additional requirements on the State Bar not of trial apply, absent the State Bar pleading and proving that expressly imposed by the Texas Supreme Court. See Sharp v. the disciplinary investigation against him was pending prior House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991) (noting to May 1, 1992. Love contends the language in rule 1.04 that court construing a statute should consider consequences implementing the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure effectively of construction). engrafts additional pleading and proof requirements on the State Bar in disciplinary matters prosecuted under the former Therefore, we hold that the State Bar was not required to plead State Bar Rules. We disagree. and prove that there was a pending disciplinary investigation against Love prior to May 1, 1992, to prosecute Love under [1] [2] Promulgated rules have the same force and effect the State Bar rules. To invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court, as statutes. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868, all that was required of the State Bar was that they plead 872 (Tex.1973). Consequently, rules should be interpreted in sufficient facts to show that the trial court had jurisdiction. accordance with the rules of statutory construction. Knight Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, v. Intern. Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 446 (Tex.1993). (Tex.1982). The primary goal of interpretation is to determine what the enacting body intended. Id. Here, our goal is [5] In its First Amended Disciplinary Petition, the State Bar to determine what the Texas Supreme Court intended by referred to the applicable rules in pertinent part as follows: enacting Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 1.04 and the *943 Petitioner brings this resulting effect on disciplinary investigations commenced disciplinary action pursuant to the before May 1, 1992. We must interpret rule 1.04, and, in State Bar Act, Tex. Gov't.Code Ann.
the process, harmonize and give effect to the entire set of § 81.000, et seq. (Vernon 1988) and disciplinary rules. See Martin v. Sheppard, 129 Tex. 110, 102 the State Bar rules. The complaints S.W.2d 1036, 1039 (Tex.1937).
which forms (sic) the basis of the First Amended Disciplinary Petition [3] [4] A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that were filed prior to May 1, 1992.
every word used must be presumed to have been used for The acts and conduct of Respondent, a purpose. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d as hereinafter described, constitute 535, 540 (Tex.1981). It is also presumed that words excluded professional misconduct under the were left out for a purpose. Id. The language of rule 1.04 State Bar Rules. Art. X, § 57.
is absolutely silent regarding the existence of any additional
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Love v. State Bar of Texas, 982 S.W.2d 939 (1998)
of the truth of their allegations. Stanley, Harris, Rice & The State Bar's petition specifically stated they were bringing Assoc. v. Lewis, 410 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas “this disciplinary action pursuant to the State Bar Act, TEX. 1966, no writ); Kroger Co. v. Warren, 410 S.W.2d 194, 196 GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 81.000, et seq. (Vernon 1988) and (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1966, no writ). Moreover, a defendant the State Bar rules.” They specifically referred to complaints with an affirmative defense who fails to appear at trial, and that had been filed against Love prior to the effective date of offers no evidence to support that defense, effectively waives the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. that affirmative defense. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tex.1979); RE/MAX of Texas, Inc. v. Katar Corp., [6] [7] We find this language sufficient to support the 961 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, application of the State Bar Rules. See State Bar of Texas no writ); TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. v. Dolenz, 893 S.W.2d 113, 114–15 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied) (holding that disciplinary action based Here, there is no evidence in the record proving or disproving on conduct occurring before effective date of Texas Rules Love's statute of limitations claims. Therefore, we overrule of Disciplinary Procedure governed by State Bar Rules). Love's first point of error. Where pleadings do not affirmatively show an absence of jurisdiction, a presumption exists in favor of jurisdiction. See Peek v. Equipment Servc. Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.1989). Here, the State Bar's pleadings do not Violation of Disciplinary Rules affirmatively show that the State Bar Rules do not apply.
Love also contends the State Bar did not meet its burden of Therefore, it was incumbent on Love to show the trial court proving a violation of disciplinary rules. We disagree.
why the State Bar Rules should not apply. 2 Having failed to show up for trial, Love did not meet this burden.
In conclusion, we decline Love's invitation to impose Standard of Review additional pleading requirements on the State Bar absent [13] An appellant, who did not have the burden of proof some legislative directive. The State Bar's petition did on an issue at trial, and who attacks the legal sufficiency of not affirmatively show the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
an adverse *944 finding on that issue, must demonstrate Therefore, we presume the action against Love was properly that there is no evidence to support the finding. Croucher v.
before the trial court, and hold the trial court did not err in Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex.1983); Stephanz v. Laird, applying the State Bar Rules rather than the new Texas Rules 846 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, of Disciplinary Procedure.
writ denied). In reviewing a no evidence point, we consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding. Weirich v. Weirich, 833 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex.1992).
Statute of Limitations If there is any evidence to support the finding, then the finding will be upheld. Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774 [8] Love argues the trial court erred in entering a post- S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.1989). answer default judgment against him because the disciplinary action was barred by the statute of limitations. Love did not [14] [15] [16] Additionally, when a party, like Love in the appear at trial or offer any evidence. However, he argues the present case, fails to request findings of fact and conclusions State Bar did not controvert his verified answer that asserted of law, the appellate court presumes the trial court made all the action was barred by limitations. necessary findings to support its judgment. See Worford v.
Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990); Magill v. Magill, [9] [10] [11] [12] A statute of limitations plea is an816 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, affirmative defense. TEX.R. CIV. P. 94. The defendant bears writ denied). In determining whether some evidence supports the initial burden of proving an affirmative defense. See the judgment, we consider only the evidence most favorable Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 to the judgment and disregard all evidence that is opposed (Tex.1988). A defendant relying on an affirmative defense to it or contrary in nature. See Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109; must plead, prove, and secure findings to sustain the defense. Ulrich v. Ulrich, 652 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex.App.—Houston Id. Pleadings, even those that are verified, are not evidence [1st Dist] 1983, no writ). The judgment of the trial court must
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Love v. State Bar of Texas, 982 S.W.2d 939 (1998)
be affirmed if the judgment is supported by any evidence in sanction, the trial court must consider the relevant factors set the record. See In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex.1984). forth in Rule 3.10, including: (1) the nature and degree of the misconduct; (2) loss or damage to clients; (3) damage to the profession, assurance that others will be insulated from the type of misconduct found; (4) profit to the attorney; (5)
Discussion avoidance of repetition; (6) deterrent effect on others; (7)
[17] Here, when Love returned to the courtroom after a two maintenance of respect for the legal profession; (8) conduct hour absence, and without conferring with the prosecution, of the attorney during Committee action; (9) trial of the the court coordinator explained to him that the trial judge had cause; and (10) other relevant evidence concerning attorney's reset his case for the following day. Love, to say the least, was personal and professional background. Id. We will only not pleased. In the presence of court personnel, Love became reverse the trial court's decision if an abuse of discretion is angry, abusive, and then proceeded to personally attack the shown. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without trial judge. Love stated: reference to any guiding rules and principles and the test is whether the trial court's act was arbitrary and unreasonable.
“There was a time that Jews could not serve on the bench. Downer *945 v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d That little Jew will never call me a liar again.” He further 238, 241 (Tex.1986). However, the mere fact that a trial court stated: “Do you remember or understand what happened in may decide a matter differently than an appellate court does France to the Jews? The Jews were dug up from the grave not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Id. and hung. That little Jew is not going to get away with this. That little Jew doesn't know this but I will have a cross burned in his front yard tonight. The Klu Klux Klan will Discussion not put up with this. That little Jew is not going to call me a liar ever again. I will see to it that that judge is impeached [20] The trial court found that Love had violated just like that drunk Don Hendrix.” Rules 3.04(a)(5), 8.04(a)(2), and 8.04(a)(4) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, We find this evidence more than sufficient to support the the court took notice of Love's two prior criminal trial court's finding that Love violated the disciplinary rules. contempt convictions for professional misconduct. Love's Therefore, we overrule his second point of error. punishment for these prior convictions consisted of a twoyear suspension, one year active and one year probated, and a 24–day active suspension, respectively. Taking into Excessive Punishment consideration the nature of Love's misconduct, the bad light in which he cast the legal profession, the potential damage to Finally, Love argues that disbarment was excessive his client, the desire to deter similar conduct in the future, and punishment, disproportionate to the conduct alleged, and Love's prior professional misconduct, we find the trial court amounted to an abuse of discretion. We find his contention did not abuse its discretion. without merit.
We overrule Love's third point of error.
Standard of Review Conclusion [18] [19] A trial court has broad discretion to determine the consequences of professional misconduct. State Bar of Texas The rules governing lawyer conduct serve many purposes. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.1994). However, the However, in their most basic form, the rules are designed judgment of a trial court in a disciplinary proceeding may be to insure integrity for the legal system and those who work so light or heavy as to amount to an abuse of discretion. Id. within that system. “[T]he right to practice law is a very The guiding rules and principles to determine the appropriate great privilege. With this privilege comes an equal dose of sanction for an attorney guilty of professional misconduct are responsibility.” State Bar of Texas v. Moore, 932 S.W.2d set out in Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 3.10. TEX.R. 132, 138 n. 4 (Tex.App.—El Paso), vacated, 938 S.W.2d DISCIPLINARY P. 3.10. To determine the appropriate 717 (Tex.1997). As an officer of the court, Love had a
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
responsibility and “duty to protect its integrity.” Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2745, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991). We hold Love breached this duty by his conduct. A majority of the justices of the Court voted to deny appellee's motion for rehearing en banc. TEX.R.APP. P. 49.7.
Footnotes 1 The Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure superceded article X of the State Bar Rules. Amended Order for Implementation of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, 833–834 S.W.2d (Texas Cases) XXXVII (Tex.1991).
2 Additionally, we note that the State Bar's pleading provided fair and adequate notice to Love that the disciplinary action against him was being brought under the former State Bar Rules. If Love believed the State Bar's petition was vague, ambiguous, or misleading, he had an opportunity to complain by special exception. He failed to do so and, therefore, waived his objection. Hitt v. Mabry, 687 S.W.2d 791, 795–96 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ).
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The State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243 (1994) 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140
Opinion Original Image of 891 S.W.2d 243 (PDF)
891 S.W.2d 243 CORNYN, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in Supreme Court of Texas. which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, and HECHT and ENOCH, Justices, join.
THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, James Parsons, III, The sole question presented for our determination is whether in his capacity as President of the State Bar of Texas the district court below has jurisdiction of this suit, which and Karen Johnson, in her capacity as Executive complains of the failure of the State Bar of Texas to compel Director of the State Bar of Texas, Petitioners, member lawyers to provide free legal services to Texans who v. cannot pay for those services. We conclude that the district Maria GOMEZ, Alicia Naveja, and Leonardo court correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Chavez, on Behalf of Themselves and Thus, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and Others Similarly Situated, Respondents. remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss. 1 No. D–4218. | Argued Jan. 20, 1994. | Decided Dec. 22, 1994.
After being refused free legal services, Maria Gomez, Alicia Indigents brought action for declaratory and injunctive Naveja, and Leonardo Chaves, on behalf of themselves relief to require State Bar or Supreme Court to implement and others similarly situated (collectively, Gomez), filed mandatory pro bono program for state lawyers. The 353rd suit in a Travis County district court against the State Judicial District Court, Travis County, Joseph H. Hart, J., Bar of Texas and two of its officials at that time, James dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and indigents Parsons III, President, and Karen Johnson, Executive Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, J. Woodfin Jones, J., 856 (collectively, State Bar). Gomez contends that the State Bar, S.W.2d 804, reversed and remanded. On application for writ by not effectively encouraging attorneys to volunteer free of error, the Supreme Court, Cornyn, J., held that indigents' legal services, has illegally failed to meet the legal needs of action to compel State Bar or Supreme Court to implement indigent Texans. Specifically, Gomez alleges violations of the mandatory pro bono program did not present justiciable following provisions of the Texas Constitution: (1) Article controversy and, therefore, district court lacked jurisdiction I, Section 13 (open courts); (2) Article I, Section 3 (equal over action. protection); (3) Article I, Section 3a (equal rights); (4) Article I, Section 19 (due course of law); and (5) Article I, Section 29 Reversed and remanded. (inviolate nature of the Bill of Rights). Gomez further asserts violations of the Texas antidiscrimination statute, 2 the Texas Gonzalez, J., concurred and filed opinion. Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 and the Texas Lawyer's Creed. 4 Hightower, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Gammage and Spector, JJ., joined.
The district court dismissed the case, concluding it lacked jurisdiction under Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Doggett, J., noted his dissent.
Constitution. 5 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide the merits of Gomez's Attorneys and Law Firms claims, but because of this Court's exclusive authority to regulate the legal profession in Texas, it held that the district *244 Lynn Liberato, Houston, Linda A. Acevedo, Austin, court could levy only a prohibitory, and not a mandatory Alene Ross Levy, Jeffrey T. Nobles, Houston, Broadus A. injunction against the State Bar. 856 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.1993). Spivey, Eric R. Galton, James M. McCormack, Austin, for The court of appeals explained: petitioners.
Virginia Agnew, Charles Herring, Jr., James C. Harrington, We conclude that a district court does not have authority Austin, for respondents. to grant relief that would *245 unreasonably usurp the
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supervisory control vested exclusively in the supreme of powers dictated by Article II, Section 1 of the Texas court. By vesting the supreme court with supervisory Constitution). Those duties include our obligation, as the head control of the practice of law, the constitution and the of the judicial department, to regulate judicial affairs. Because State Bar Act grant the supreme court discretion to decide the admission and practice of Texas attorneys is inextricably issues concerning the State Bar and the practice of law. intertwined with the administration of justice, the Court must Whether a district court has authority to grant a particular have the power to regulate these activities in order to fulfill form of injunctive relief depends, we believe, on whether its constitutional role. See generally JIM R. CARRIGAN, granting such relief would effectively exercise the kind INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 2 (1973) (defining of supervisory discretion that is vested exclusively in the inherent powers as those “reasonably required to enable a supreme court. court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect 856 S.W.2d at 815. We agree with the court of appeals' its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful identification of the issue but not its conclusion. actions effective”). The Court's inherent powers, such as the [1] [2] The jurisdictional question presented is complex power to regulate the practice of law, are not jurisdictional and in some ways unique. As a general proposition, before powers. See Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 399. These powers a court may address the merits of any case, the court must are administrative powers, necessary to the preservation of have jurisdiction over the party or the property subject to the judiciary's independence and integrity. the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, and capacity to act as a court. [5] [6] Because the Court's power to regulate the practice See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d of law is an administrative one, the exercise of that power 878, 881 (Tex.1973). Subject matter jurisdiction requires that does not in and of itself deprive lower courts of general the party bringing the suit have standing, that there be a subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to that governance. live controversy between the parties, and that the case be They do not, however, have jurisdiction over all such justiciable. See Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control challenges because in every individual case, jurisdiction Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–46 (Tex.1993). If the district court also depends on justiciability. And, as the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction, in any of these senses, then its decision acknowledged, for a controversy to be justiciable, there must would not bind the parties. See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 be a real controversy between the parties that will be actually S.W.2d at 881 (noting that collateral attacks on a judgment resolved by the judicial relief sought. 856 S.W.2d 804, 811 are allowed when the district court lacked jurisdiction). And, (citing Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 446 and *246 a decision that does not bind the parties is, by definition, anBoard of Water Eng'rs v. City of San Antonio, 155 Tex. advisory opinion prohibited by Texas law. See Texas Ass'n of 111, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (1955)). While we do not find it Business, 852 S.W.2d at 444 (citing Article II, Section 1, of necessary to set the precise boundaries of the district court's the Texas Constitution as prohibiting advisory opinions). jurisdiction under these circumstances, we hold that these facts do not present a justiciable controversy and that the [3] [4] The unique aspect of this jurisdictional inquiry, district court therefore has no jurisdiction. as the court of appeals recognized, arises out of this Court's power to regulate the practice of law in the State of Texas. [7] Gomez seeks to compel either the State Bar or this This power is derived from both statutory and inherent Court to implement a mandatory pro bono program for Texas powers. The primary statutory grant of power is found in lawyers. To the extent a remedy is sought against the State the State Bar Act, which gives the Court administrative Bar, Gomez seeks relief from an entity that is powerless, control over the State Bar and provides a statutory mechanism acting alone, to implement that remedy. The State Bar's for promulgating regulations governing the practice of law. authority is limited to proposing regulations to this Court, See TEX.GOV'T CODE § 81.011(c). The other source of which may accept or reject any recommendation, in whole or this court's power to regulate the practice of law in this in part. See TEX.GOV'T CODE § 81.024(a). For example, state, its inherent power, is not secured by any legislative when the latest amendment to the rules governing lawyer grant or specific constitutional provision, but is necessarily advertising was recommended by the State Bar, we modified implied to enable the Court to discharge its constitutionally the proposed amendment before promulgation. See Amended imposed duties. See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 Order of Promulgation and Adoption of Disciplinary Rules, S.W.2d 395, 398–99 (Tex.1979) (noting that doctrine of West's Texas Cases Advance Sheet 884–885 issue 49, pp. inherent power is derived, in part, from the separation LXIX–LXXXI. Thus, the relief sought against the State Bar,
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even if granted by the trial court, could not resolve the dispute a justiciable controversy. Once again, acknowledging the between these litigants. limitations on the district court's authority in this area, the dissenting justices nevertheless contend, “The district [8] Moreover, to the extent the remedies are sought against court does, however, have jurisdiction to issue a mandatory the Supreme Court, they would clearly impinge on the injunction which requires the State Bar to implement a more Court's exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. effective voluntary pro bono program calculated to meet The Legislature itself implicitly acknowledged the Court's constitutional and statutory demands which may exist.” Infra, fundamental authority in this area when it enacted the State 891 S.W.2d at 252 (emphasis added). We are at a loss to Bar Act as an aid to the Court in carrying out this function. understand, and the dissenting justices do not explain, how a See TEX.GOV'T CODE § 81.011(b). No subordinate court in mandatory injunction to enforce a voluntary program could Texas has the power to usurp our authority or responsibility in ever be enforced by any court. By limiting the district court's this area. The dissenting justices acknowledge this limitation jurisdiction to such illusory relief, the dissenting justices when they say, “An injunction mandating this court or the have, in effect, conceded that the *247 trial court cannot State Bar to implement a mandatory pro bono program would grant plaintiffs the real relief they seek. be improper. It would inappropriately involve the district court in the regulation of the practice of law.” Infra, 891 Our decision that the district court lacks jurisdiction does not, S.W.2d at 252 (citations omitted). however, leave the parties without a forum in which to seek redress of their grievances. This Court, in the exercise of its This is not to say that all remedies bearing upon the regulation constitutional responsibilities, wants and needs input from of the legal profession would be unacceptable infringements interested persons concerning its supervisory responsibility on the inherent powers of the Court. Had this Court actually over Texas lawyers. Ordinarily, interested parties would be promulgated rules establishing a pro bono program and had free to informally petition this Court in its administrative Gomez challenged the constitutionality of such rules, the capacity, to urge reconsideration of the proper constitutional district court would have jurisdiction to decide, in the first mandates for this Court's regulation of attorney conduct. instance, whether such rules met constitutional standards. See However, given the potentially far-reaching effects of this O'Quinn v. State Bar, 763 S.W.2d 397 (Tex.1988) (upholding particular challenge to our scheme of regulation, we direct the trial court's decision on a constitutional challenge to the that this matter be placed on the Court's administrative rules of disciplinary conduct promulgated by the Court). agenda for further consideration. All interested parties have In due course, we would review any adverse determination until April 14, 1995, to submit their written arguments on in our adjudicative capacity. See Cameron v. Greenhill, the merits of the underlying claims. Cf. Barger v. Brock, 582 S.W.2d 775, 777 & n. 3 (Tex.1979) (holding that 535 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tenn.1976) (ordering a lower court the Court could both promulgate a rule and determine its to dismiss a challenge to the Supreme Court's rules but constitutionality). The important distinction between such a directing the lower court to forward the petitions for further case and the one at hand is that in the former case, the consideration as a direct motion in the Supreme Court). district court would not be cast in the impermissible role of effectively promulgating policies and regulations governing Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals Texas lawyers. Such a case would be justiciable because and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the district court would be capable of rendering a judgment for want of jurisdiction. that accords the parties complete relief, subject of course to appellate review.
DOGGETT, J., dissents.
But when, as here, the essence of a complaint is that this Court has failed to establish rules governing some GONZALEZ, Justice, concurring. aspect of lawyer conduct, a district court has no authority This case presents significant issues of public policy. to assume this Court's authority to regulate the legal Respondents seek a court declaration that indigent citizens profession. This prohibition includes the rendition of orders of our State are entitled to free legal services in civil cases. that would, as a practical matter, preempt this Court's They also seek an injunction that would require the State Bar authority. Because the district court cannot effect a remedy of Texas to implement a program mandating pro bono legal that would resolve this dispute, this case does not present services from all attorneys licensed to practice law in Texas. 1
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For the reasons stated in the majority opinion, I agree with 1988, we signed an order that made the IOLTA program the trial court and this Court that this case does not present mandatory. Id. (amended December 13, 1988). We took this a justiciable controversy within the trial court's jurisdiction. I action under our authority to regulate the practice of law. thus concur in the judgment.
Realistically, the Court has progressed as far as it can to I write separately because I disagree with the Court extend legal services to the poor. A mandatory pro bono prolonging resolution of the mandatory pro bono issue by program is quite different from the IOLTA program. This placing the matter “on the Court's administrative agenda for Court lacks the resources and/or the political will to attempt further consideration.” 891 S.W.2d at 247. This procedure further resolution of the profound problem of providing is unnecessary, and it gives Respondents false hope that a legal services for indigent citizens. I would tell Respondents majority of the Court is seriously considering implementing frankly that we are not going to order mandatory pro bono. such a sweeping change in the practice of law in Texas. As The Legislature is better suited to tackle this social problem. for the invitation for interested parties to submit more briefs to the Court, I think that any information which anyone gives the Court will merely duplicate what we already have for HIGHTOWER, Justice, joined by GAMMAGE and determining the merits of Respondents' request. The issue of SPECTOR, Justices, dissenting. how to provide legal services for the indigent is a problem in Because I believe that the district court has jurisdiction of this our society that has been widely debated and studied. More suit and that the Court would effectively deny the Plaintiffs' hearings, briefs, or argument before us will be of little utility. access to a meaningful forum in which to seek redress of their grievances, I respectfully dissent.
Mandating any program for legal services to the poor is a political question, over which this Court in its administrative capacity and the Legislature would have I. jurisdiction. However, in my opinion, any attempt to draft and implement such a program would unnecessarily divert The jurisdictional inquiry begins with Article V, Section 8 of the Court from its primary business of adjudicating disputes. the Texas Constitution which provides in part: The Legislature is better suited to undertake the activities District Court jurisdiction consists necessary for drafting and implementing a program to provide of exclusive, appellate, and original indigents legal services. Different program options, as well jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings as their legal and constitutional ramifications, will need to be and remedies, except in cases where considered. Since the problem of access to legal services faces exclusive, appellate, or original society as a whole, the burden of resolving it does not solely jurisdiction may be conferred by this rest on the legal profession.
Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal or administrative I acknowledge that a very real problem exists for individuals body.
who seek legal representation but lack the financial resources to retain counsel. Studies clearly document that our poor Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (emphasis added). The district citizens need greater access to legal services. See, e.g., court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the legislature COMMITTEE ON LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR IN had conferred jurisdiction over matters concerning the CIVIL MATTERS, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, REPORT administration of the State Bar upon this Court in the State ON MANDATORY PRO BONO (1991); STATE BAR Bar Act. See Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 81.011(c) (West 1988). OF TEXAS ET AL., LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR I disagree. ASSESSMENT PROJECT (1991). This need led the Court to create the Texas Equal Access to Justice foundation in What the legislature conferred upon this Court was 1984 to administer the voluntary *248 IOLTA (Interest on “administrative control over the state bar.” Tex.Gov't Lawyers' Trust Accounts) program. 2 See TEXAS EQUAL Code Ann. § 81.011(c) (West 1988) (emphasis added). ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROGRAM §§ 1–9 (effective May “Jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article V, Section 8 19, 1994), reprinted in TEX.GOV'T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G includes only the judicial powers of the courts. These judicial app. (STATE BAR RULESS art. XI, §§ 1–9). In December, powers are typically the only ones at issue when the Court
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makes statements such as: “[J]udicial power is divided among to regulate the practice of law.” Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § the various named courts by means of express grants of 81.011(b) (West 1988). ‘jurisdiction.’ ” Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex.1979) (citing Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. The State Bar's actual power in this regard is limited to 553, 62 S.W.2d 641 (1933)). But Texas courts have duties in proposing regulations to this Court, which could reject or addition to their judicial responsibilities. amend any such recommendation. Under a strict concept of justiciability, one could argue that there is no justiciable I do not disagree that this Court's inherent power to regulate controversy between the State Bar and the Plaintiffs. See the practice of law is more expansive than the administrative Board of Water Eng'rs v. City of San Antonio, 155 Tex. authority that the legislature has “granted” to us. See Daves v. 111, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (1955) (defining “justiciable State Bar, 691 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1985, writ controversy” as the requirement that there shall be a ref'd n.r.e.) (noting the Court's inherent power to adopt rules real controversy between the parties that will actually be governing the practice of law by extra-statutory means); see determined by the judicial declaration sought). On the also Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 81.011(b) (West 1988) (stating other hand, more modern notions of justiciability would that the State Bar was a legislative creation passed to aid acknowledge that the State Bar is an acceptable “surrogate the Court in exercising its judicial power). See State Bar v. defendant” for the Court in this matter. In fact, the State Bar Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex.1980). Even so, it does has served as such a surrogate in several recent cases. See, not necessarily follow that this inherent power is so great e.g., O'Quinn v. State Bar, 763 S.W.2d 397 (Tex.1988); State that it deprives the state's courts of general jurisdiction of the Bar v. Tinning, 875 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi authority to hear a challenge pertaining to the governance of 1994, writ denied); Musslewhite v. State Bar, 786 S.W.2d 437 the legal profession. (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Daves v. State Bar, 691 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1985, The proper question to determine whether the district court writ ref'd n.r.e.). 2 For these reasons, I conclude that the has jurisdiction over this case is not whether this Court, in district court's jurisdiction is not suspect on this basis. its administrative capacity, could act in a manner that would decide or moot the issues raised. Rather, three questions must be asked: (1) *249 whether the State Bar and its officers are the proper parties in this case; (2) if so, whether the II. district court is an appropriate forum to hear a matter over Next we must decide whether the district court has subject which this Court exercises such extensive authority; and (3)
matter jurisdiction over a challenge to an administrative whether the failure to act, as opposed to an affirmative action, decision of this Court. I believe the answer is yes.
nevertheless presents an issue over which the district court Promulgating court rules in our administrative capacity does may exercise authority. I would answer all three questions in not and cannot imply a concomitant determination by this the affirmative.
Court in its judicial capacity that such rules are constitutional in every respect. Hopefully, this Court does not abandon its However couched, the Plaintiffs' claims are actually directed collective knowledge of the Constitution when it exercises not so much at the State Bar 1 as at an alleged deficiency its rulemaking authority, and surely it would not knowingly in the current system of lawyer regulation established by promulgate any rule it regarded as violating the United States this Court and the legislature. This Court, both by legislative or Texas Constitutions. However, we are not omniscient. It is grant and its inherent powers, possesses authority to regulate simply beyond the capacity of this or *250 any other court to the practice of law and exercises control over the State envision every possible constitutional ramification or factual Bar. See Tex.Gov't Code Ann. §§ 81.011, 81.024(a) (West application of its orders or rules, particularly before it has 1988) (clarifying this Court's supervisory role over the State the benefit of a case and controversy that vigorously explores Bar); State Bar v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d at 831 (“The State both sides of the issues. See Order of the Supreme Court of Bar Act was passed in aid of this court's exercise of its February 28, 1966, Transmitting Amendments to Rules of inherent power to regulate the practice of law.”) (footnotes Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1029, 1032 (Black, J., dissenting) omitted). The legislature recognized the Court's fundamental (stating that “the Court's transmittal does not carry with it a responsibility in this area when it passed the State Bar Act “in decision that the amended rules are all constitutional” because aid of the judicial department's powers under the constitution “such a decision would be the equivalent of an advisory
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The State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243 (1994) 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140
opinion which, I assume the Court would unanimously is doubtful that the Legislature has the power to impose a agree, we are without constitutional power to give.”); Grand mandatory pro bono system upon the State Bar. Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, 450 F.Supp. 447, 450 (W.D.Wash.1978) (holding that the district Some state supreme courts have expressly provided for the court had jurisdiction to consider a constitutional challenge filing of petitions challenging their orders and rules directly to a federal rule of civil procedure, noting that “[w]hile with that court. See, e.g., Aldridge v. Watling Ladder Co., the [United States Supreme] Court certainly considers the 275 Ark. 225, 628 S.W.2d 322, 323 (1982) (holding that constitutionality of a rule recommended by a committee, it is a case involving construction of supreme court rule should not possible for its members to anticipate every constitutional have been certified to supreme court under Supreme Court objection.”). This is especially true when, as here, it is the Rule 29(1)(c)); *251 Goetz v. Harrison, 153 Mont. 403, 457 failure to provide for some constitutionally mandated system P.2d 911, 912 (1969) (stating that questions involving the that is alleged. constitutionality of a supreme court rule should be presented to the supreme court in an “appropriate original proceeding.”)
Nor would the mere determination by the district court that the current system is constitutionally deficient invade this This Court has, with narrow exceptions, never provided such Court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law. We a procedure. 4 Because supreme court rules must comport have no inherent power to create a system that violates the with the Constitution and because the judicial branch is Constitution, just as the legislature has no power to pass entrusted with interpreting the Constitution, jurisdiction to unconstitutional statutes. See Reese v. State, 772 S.W.2d 288, consider challenges to rules must exist at the district court 290 (Tex.App.—Waco 1989, pet. ref'd) (reasoning that a level. This view comports with the general understanding of court may not enact a procedural rule that conflicts with a Texas law, and with what is probably the majority rule in most provision of the constitution); Picard v. State, 631 S.W.2d of the states that have been confronted with the issue. See, 761, 763 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1981, no writ) (holding that e.g., Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 the rule-making authority of any court may not conflict with S.E.2d 694, 695 (1987) (holding that a “direct challenge of the constitutional provisions and that any unconstitutional rule constitutionality of an order of this Court ... must be litigated is inoperative). For example, the Constitution provides that as an original action in the General Court of Justice.”); this Court may not appoint to the State Commission on Berberian v. Kane, 425 A.2d 527, 528 n. 2 (R.I.1981) Judicial Conduct more than one judge from the same Supreme (holding that a rule may be challenged in a case seeking Judicial District. Tex. Const. art. V, § 1–a(2). If the Court declaratory judgment that the rule was unconstitutional). breached this restriction, surely it would be answerable to the legal system. If this be conceded, there can be only two possible mechanisms to enforce constitutional restrictions on the Court acting in its administrative capacity: a suit against III. the Court in a lower court or an original proceeding in the The question remains whether this case is nonjusticiable Court itself. Either of these courses is permissible, but at least because the district court does not have jurisdiction to grant one is necessary. Under the Court's analysis, however, there the relief sought. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment is no mechanism to enforce constitutional restrictions on the that the State Bar is violating their constitutional and Court acting in its administrative capacity. In this case, the statutory rights. Among other things, Plaintiffs requested Plaintiffs are left without a meaningful forum in which to that the district court “[d]eclare that the official policies, seek redress of their grievances. The Court has directed “that actions, and failure to act alleged herein, which involve the this matter be placed on the Court's administrative agenda refusal to Defendants to adequately provide for the legal for further consideration.” In essence, the Court suggests that services needed by Plaintiffs and the class, violate the Texas the Plaintiffs directly petition the Court for redress of their Constitution and Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 106.001.”
“complaint.” However, the Court is not required to consider Plaintiffs also seek an injunction prohibiting the State Bar or take any action on the “petition”—ever! Obviously this from continuing to violate the rights of indigent citizens does not constitute a meaningful forum. 3 It is also unclear and an injunction mandating the State Bar to implement whether the Plaintiffs could seek redress of their grievances in an adequate and more effective pro bono program. First, the Legislature. Based upon the Court's expansive description declaratory relief is proper whether or not further relief is of its inherent powers to regulate the practice of law, it or could be claimed. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann.
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The State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243 (1994) 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140
§ 37.003(a). The district court has the authority to render a do not now instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the judgment declaring the constitutional and statutory rights of legislation it should enact....” Plaintiffs and, also, to declare whether such rights have been violated. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.003. I fail Moreover, a court should not overstep the line between to see the distinction between the district court's jurisdiction adjudication and regulation. Regulation of the practice of to determine the constitutionality of the official policies, law is within the exclusive control of this Court. Tex.Gov't actions, and failure to act caused by the refusal of the State Code Ann. § 81.011(c) (Vernon 1986); Daves v. State Bar, Bar to adequately provide for the legal services needed by 691 S.W.2d 784, 788–89 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1985, writ Plaintiffs and the district court's jurisdiction to determine ref'd n.r.e.). An injunction mandating this Court or the State the constitutionality of rules proposed by the State Bar Bar to implement a mandatory pro bono program would be and promulgated by this Court. In both cases, the district improper. It would inappropriately involve the district court court's determination could be reviewed by this Court in its in the regulation of the practice of law. See Edgewood Indep. adjudicative capacity. Contrary to the Court's assertion, the Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 399; Edgewood Indep. Sch. determination of the constitutionality of the refusal to the Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 493–94. The district court does, State Bar to adequately provide for the legal services needed however, have jurisdiction to issue a mandatory injunction by Plaintiffs would not cast the district court in the role of which requires the State Bar to propose and implement a effectively promulgating policies and regulations governing more effective voluntary pro bono program calculated to meet Texas lawyers. constitutional and statutory demands which may exist. Id. In addition, the district court would have jurisdiction to issue a Concerning injunctive relief, a prohibitory injunction, one mandatory injunction which requires the State Bar to propose prohibiting the State Bar from continuing to violate Plaintiffs' regulations creating a mandatory pro bono program to this rights, would be proper in the event the district court holds Court. such rights are being violated. It is axiomatic that a court has the power to enforce its orders determining the legal Finally the question remains whether this case is rights of the parties. Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 nonjusticiable because it alleges constitutional sins of S.W.2d 641, 644–45 (1933). “Reason and experience argue omission. I believe that the Plaintiffs' complaint that that courts empowered ... [to decide] constitutional mandates the State Bar has failed to act as required by various cannot be left without the means to order appropriate relief.” constitutional and statutory provisions does not affect the Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex.1991). justiciability of their claims. Distinctions between an act and Furthermore, a mandatory injunction could also be proper. an omission in this context are not helpful. See generally See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, Lisa E. Heinzerling, Note, Actionable Inaction: Section 399 (Tex.1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U.CHI.L.REV. 1048, S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex.1991); Terrazas, 829 S.W.2d at 717– 1057–63 (1986) (criticizing the entire act/omission analysis 20. However, courts should tread lightly when dealing with in the context of governmental responsibilities under the powers traditionally reserved to other areas of government. Constitution, primarily because its tort-based reasoning is ill- For example, in Terrazas, although we held that the courts suited to explain existing doctrine). If this Court concluded could order apportionment, we were careful to state, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs'
claims because they allege an omission rather than an act, *252 [T]hat power ought to be used the Plaintiffs could simply recast their allegations. Thus, only after investigation and careful the difference between acts and omissions in this highly consideration of the many, diverse unusual context seems semantic. See David A. Fischer, interests affected, after due deference Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L.REV. to the Legislature to rectify its own 1335, 1339 (“[A]s a matter of semantics, any omission statutes, and after due regard for the can be characterized as part of a larger encompassing effect of the court's order on the act.”). The mere fact that the Plaintiffs have alleged an election process. unconstitutional omission cannot deprive the district court of jurisdiction when it clearly would have jurisdiction to review 829 S.W.2d at 718. Likewise, in Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
an unconstitutional act.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 399, we stated, “Although we have ruled the school financing system to be unconstitutional, we
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The State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243 (1994) 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Parallel Citations
38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140
Footnotes 1 This disposition of the limited issue before us means that we do not, as Justice Gonzalez's concurring opinion does, comment on the merits of the underlying claims.
2 TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 106.001. This statute generally prohibits the state or its agents from discriminating against persons because of race, religion, color, sex, or national origin. Remedies available to a successful litigant include injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and court costs. Id. § 106.002. A person who knowingly violates this statute is subject to a fine and confinement in the county jail. Id. § 106.003.
3 TEX.DISCIPLINARY R.PROF.CONDUCT, pmbl. ¶ 6, reprinted in TEX.GOV'T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G app. (West Supp.1992) (STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9) (“The provision of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees is a moral obligation of each lawyer as well as the profession generally.”).
4 Texas Lawyer's Creed—A Mandate for Professionalism (adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Nov. 7, 1989), reprinted in TEXAS RULES OF COURT 487 (West 1994). In the Creed, lawyers are urged to commit themselves “to an adequate and effective pro bono program.” Id.
5 Section 8 defines the district courts' jurisdiction, but excepts those cases where jurisdiction has been conferred on some other court. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. The district court held that this Court's power to regulate the practice of law was sufficient to bring this case within Section 8's exception.
1 Respondents deny that they are seeking a mandatory pro bono program, but they do not suggest any other method of providing legal services to the indigent.
2 The IOLTA foundation administers a program wherein lawyers convert their non-interest bearing trust accounts to interest bearing accounts. Financial institutions remit all interest earned on IOLTA accounts to the IOLTA foundation. The foundation in turn channels money to organizations that deliver civil legal services to the poor. Since inception of the mandatory IOLTA program, the foundation has distributed approximately $42 million to assist people unable to afford an attorney in civil actions.
1 The current pro bono policy was adopted by the State Bar of Texas Board of Directors in May 1992. The policy includes an aspirational goal of fifty (50) hours per year and an annual voluntary pro bono reporting system.
2 We need not decide in this case whether Plaintiffs could have proceeded against this Court itself. Like other state courts of last resort, we have been named defendants in district court at least once before. Cameron v. Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775 (Tex.1979); see also CWA Local 1044 v. Chief Justice of the Sup. Ct., 118 N.J. 495, 572 A.2d 613 (1990) (challenging a New Jersey Supreme Court decision made in the course of labor negotiations with its judicial employees); American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974) (challenging a New Jersey Supreme Court order limiting contingent attorney's fees in certain tort cases); Vermont Sup. Ct. Admin. Directive No. 17 v. Vermont Sup. Ct., 154 Vt. 217, 576 A.2d 127 (1990) (challenging a Vermont Supreme Court order postponing civil jury trials due to budgetary shortfalls). But some jurisdictions expressly proscribe suing the state's highest court. See, e.g., Goetz v. Harrison, 153 Mont. 403, 457 P.2d 911 (1969) (holding that a lower court has no supervisory control over the Supreme Court and thus cannot entertain a challenge to a Supreme Court rule relating to bar admissions).
3 It is unclear whether the Court is creating a “parallel administrative docket” in which interested persons could petition the Court for various forms of relief. Are these “petitioners” entitled to timely consideration of their petition and oral argument? See Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tenn.1976) (“[I]n order that the parties may have their insistences considered, we direct that all pleadings in this cause be delivered to the Clerk of this Court at Nashville forthwith. This Court will treat the pleadings as constituting a motion to vacate or modify Rule 42. This matter will be docketed for oral argument, in Knoxville, at the heel of the calendar on 7 May 1976. Briefs will be filed with the Clerk in Nashville by 23 April 1976. The sole issue before the Court is the constitutionality of Rule 42.”).
4 Our lack of an original proceeding may actually be salutary. This Court's resolution of complex questions concerning the constitutionality of our rules would most likely be enhanced by the fuller development of issues and arguments that usually attend the appellate process.
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State Bar of Texas v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575 (1997) 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 463, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 717
including the State Bar's use of special assistant disciplinary counsel to prosecute the case, the investigatory panel's refusal Original Image of 942 S.W.2d 575 (PDF) to attempt to negotiate a sanction with the lawyers, the 942 S.W.2d 575 panel's failure to make findings specifying what rules of Supreme Court of Texas. professional conduct were violated, and the Bar's alleged dissemination of confidential information concerning this The STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Relator, case. The two lawyers have made the same complaints in v.
an original proceeding in this Court, In re Hearing before a The Honorable Dwight JEFFERSON, Respondent. Panel of the District 4–C Disciplinary Committee, No. 97– 0243 (Tex. filed March 18, 1997). Proceedings in the district No. 97–0276. | April 2, 1997.
court have been sealed under Rule 76a(5), TEX.R.CIV.P.
State bar petitioned for writs of mandamus and prohibition directing district court not to interfere in pending attorney [1] In Board of Disciplinary Appeals v. McFall, 888 grievance proceedings. Supreme Court, held that: (1) district S.W.2d 471 (Tex.1994), we issued writs of mandamus and court had no authority to issue temporary restraining order prohibition to prevent a district court's enjoining the Board (TRO) enjoining attorney discipline proceedings; (2) district of Disciplinary Appeals from revoking an attorney's *576 court had jurisdiction to address attorneys' claims to the extent probation and suspending him from practice. We held: resolution of issues did not interfere with specific grievance A writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition are appropriate proceeding; and (3) mandamus was unavailable to unseal when a district court issues an order beyond its jurisdiction.
papers in district court action.
Crouch v. Craik, 369 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Tex.1963). The district court lacked jurisdiction under the Rules Leave to file petition granted; partial relief conditionally of Disciplinary Procedure to enjoin Smith's suspension.
granted.
Section 81.071 of the Texas Government Code provides that each attorney practicing in Texas is “subject to the Attorneys and Law Firms disciplinary and disability jurisdiction of the supreme court and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, a committee *575 Steven Wayne Young, Linda A. Acevedo, Austin, of the state bar.” Pursuant to this authority, this court has Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, Rusty Hardin, Houston, Lonny established a comprehensive system of lawyer discipline Morrison, Wichita Falls, Broadus A. Spivey, Austin, for governed by the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. relator.
The rules provide for appeals directly to this Thomas R. McDade, Houston, Luther H. Soules, III, Brad Court. TEX.R.DISCIPLINARY P. 7.11. If the appeal L. Sklencar, Robinson C. Ramsey, San Antonio, T. Gerald is unsuccessful, Smith may seek reinstatement in Treece, Richard P. Keeton, James R. Leahy, Houston, for district court, with a jury trial if he desires one. respondent. TEX.R.DISCIPLINARY P. 12.06. The rules do not, however, provide for interim equitable relief, and the Opinion district court did not have the power to enjoin Smith's suspension.
PER CURIAM.
In State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.1972), we granted In this original proceeding, the State Bar of Texas petitions for mandamus to vacate an injunction barring Grievance writs of mandamus and prohibition to direct the district court Committee proceedings, holding that an injunction by not to interfere in pending attorney grievance proceedings.
a district court “is an interference with the grievance Two of the four lawyers subject to grievance proceedings procedures authorized by ... the State Bar Act and in State Bar File No. HO119614117 successfully petitioned constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 719. We the district court to issue a temporary restraining order did not even reach the question of whether an adequate staying proceedings before an investigatory panel of the remedy at law existed because the case was one “affecting District 4–C Disciplinary Committee and preserving the the state as a whole and in which the orderly processes jurisdiction of that panel. The two lawyers complain of numerous irregularities in the conduct of the proceeding,
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State Bar of Texas v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575 (1997) 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 463, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 717
Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.1994). We of government have been disturbed.” Id. (quoting State v.
therefore decline to grant such broad relief.
Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272, 274 (1939)).
Id. at 472–473. [3] Finally, the Bar requests that all papers filed in the district court case be unsealed. The district court ordered the The two lawyers in this case contend that, unlike the lawyer papers temporarily sealed under Rule 76a(5), TEX.R.CIV.P. in McFall who had other remedies besides an injunction The order provides for further proceedings as required by —namely, an appeal and an action for reinstatement—they Rule 76a. The Bar may yet obtain from the district court the have no other recourse for redress of their complaints. That relief it seeks, and if it does not, it may appeal under Rule contention simply overlooks the fact that the two lawyers 76a(8). Mandamus is therefore unavailable. in this case have requested the same relief from this Court in another proceeding, No. 97–0243. Given that avenue of Accordingly, we grant leave to file the petition for writs of review, there is no more authority for the district court to grant mandamus and prohibition and without hearing oral argument injunctive relief in this case than there was in McFall. The conditionally grant partial relief. We direct the district court Bar is therefore entitled to the same relief granted in McFall. to vacate immediately its temporary restraining order issued March 19, 1997, and to directly interfere no further in the [2] The Bar also requests that the district court be directed proceedings in State Bar File No. HO119614117. We deny to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all further relief. We are confident that the district court will or alternatively, to proceed no further in the case. The two comply without delay. Writs will issue only if it does not. lawyers raise a number of complaints in the case, including the contention that the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure are unconstitutional. To the extent that resolution of these Parallel Citations issues does not interfere with a specific grievance proceeding, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 463, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 717 the district court has jurisdiction to address them. See State
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State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (1972)
Most of the relevant facts are included in the recitals of the Original Image of 487 S.W.2d 716 (PDF) injunctive order which is under attack. Frank B. McGregor is 487 S.W.2d 716 a practicing attorney in Hillsboro and is the District Attorney Supreme Court of Texas. Elect for the 66th Judicial District. The Grievance Committee in late November, 1971, gave written notice to McGregor of The STATE of Texas et al., Relators, a hearing set for December 9, 1971, concerning complaints v. of his alleged mishandling of funds during the time that he James C. SEWELL, Judge, Respondent. had previously served as District Attorney. At the December 9 meeting the Grievance Committee determined to file a No. B—3685. | Nov. 29, 1972. formal complaint seeking McGregor's disbarment. That suit was filed on March 1, 1972, in the District Court of Hill The Grievance Committee of the Bar Association brought County.
action for writ of mandamus commanding vacation of order of the 13th Judicial District Court enjoining the Committee The Grievance Committee later gave notice to McGregor of a from conducting hearing on matters considered by Committee hearing on May 30, 1972, concerning an additional complaint at earlier hearings. The Supreme Court, Pope, J., held that arising out of his representation of a client in a court case where Grievance Committee's decisions at prior hearings in Hill County. After conducting that hearing, the Grievance upon two complaints were not final determinations of merits Committee decided that it did not then have sufficient basis of complaints, injunction preventing Grievance Committee upon which to institute any disciplinary action. from conducting a hearing on matters which were considered by Committee at two earlier hearings was an interference with On June 2, 1972, McGregor sought a temporary injunction the grievance procedures authorized by the State Bar Act and in the disbarment suit pending in Hill County seeking to granting thereof constituted a clear abuse of discretion. enjoin the Grievance Committee from pursuing any further investigation procedures following the institution of the Injunction vacated. disbarment suit. McGregor urged that, upon the filing of the disbarment suit, discovery procedures were then governed by the usual Rules of Civil Procedure, Article XII, State Attorneys and Law Firms Bar Rules, 1A Vern.Tex.Civ.Stats., p. 221. He alleged that the Committee was exercising its inquisitorial powers after *717 Davis Grant, Gen. Counsel, State Bar of Texas, Austin, suit was filed. The trial court denied McGregor's prayer for relator.
for injunction, but the court of civil appeals reversed that Beard & Kultgen, Pat Beard, Waco, Charles B. McGregor, order and directed the trial court to enjoin the Grievance Houston, Reynolds, White, Allen & Cook, Joe H. Reynolds, Committee from holding any further hearings or making Houston, for respondent. any further investigation without complying with the Rules of Civil Procedure. McGregor v. State, 483 S.W.2d 559 Opinion (Tex.Civ.App., writ pending).
POPE, Justice. On November 1, 1972, the Grievance Committee took a non-
suit on the disbarment case in Hill County. Its alleged purpose The members of the Grievance Committee District No. 6, in doing so was to begin anew and to satisfy strictly the State Bar of Texas, acting in their official and individual objections which McGregor had lodged to the procedures capacities, ask that this court issue its writ of mandamus leading to the institution of that suit. The order for non-suit commanding the Honorable James C. Sewell, Judge of the was without prejudice to the rights of the Committee to refile 13th Judicial District Court of Navarro County, to vacate an the disbarment suit. order which temporarily enjoins the Grievance Committee from conducting ‘A hearing on matters before the Committee’ On November 1, 1972, the day the Grievance Committee which were considered by the Committee at two earlier took its non-suit in the Hill County disbarment suit, Steve hearings. It is our opinion that the injunctive decree should Latham, the Judge of the 66th Judicial District, lodged be vacated. a new complaint with the Grievance Committee, and the Committee set a hearing date for November 16, 1972, and
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State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (1972)
so notified McGregor. McGregor then filed a petition for that one who seeks an original mandamus to command a trial injunction in the 13th Judicial District in a neighboring court to vacate an order has a heavy burden. He must establish county. The respondent, Judge James Sewell, first granted that the issuance of the questioned order was a clear abuse of a restraining order without notice and *718 then upon discretion. In Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 hearing on November 13, 1972, temporarily enjoined the (1959), we also wrote: Grievance Committee from conducting any hearing which While it is the general rule that a would reconsider any of the matters which were before the mandamus will not issue to control the Committee at its hearing either on December 9, 1971, or action of an inferior court . . . in a matter May 31, 1972. The order excepted from the injunction two involving discretion, the writ may issue complaints which appeared to be entirely new and which in a proper case to correct a clear abuse of were not previously considered by the Committee. It is this discretion. Southern Bag & Burlap Co. v. injunction order which is now before us. Boyd, supra; (120 Tex. 418, 38 S.W.2d 565 (1931)) Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex.
Judge Sewell states the basis for his injunctive decree by 44, 291 S.W.2d 677, 682 (1956).
recitals in the decree. It says that the Grievance Committee was barred by res judicata since it had already met and reached a decision at its December 9, 1971, meeting to institute a disbarment suit and it had also met and decided In measuring the abuse of discretion, this court has looked on May 30, 1972, that it would not institute any disciplinary with disfavor upon injunctive encroachments upon delegated action grounded upon the other complaint. administrative and executive powers which affect the state as [1] [2] [3] The order dismissing the formal complaint to a whole. In State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272, disbar McGregor was without prejudice to the Committee's 274 (1939), the members of The Public Safety Commission of right to refile the suit. Such an order is not a bar to the Texas asked for a writ of mandamus commanding a trial judge institution of the same suit. The Grievance Committee asserts to set aside a temporary restraining order which interfered that there are other evidences of misconduct which need with the peace officers of Texas in the enforcement of certain investigation, but the breadth of the injunctive order is provisions of the penal code. The court acknowledged that such that even the calling of a meeting may subject the an adequate remedy in another court ordinarily is sufficient members to contempt procedures. It says there is an urgent reason for the denial of a writ of mandamus. Smith v. Conner, need to discover and preserve documentary evidence which 98 Tex. 434, 84 S.W. 815 (1905); Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. otherwise may be lost. The Grievance Committee's prior 375, 60 S.W. 665 (1901). The court went *719 on to say, investigations and its decision to take disciplinary action however, that the rule ‘will not be followed in a case affecting or to forego such action have been inquisitorial in nature, the state as a whole and in which the orderly processes of but they have not been decisions upon the merits of the government have been disturbed.’ The court then declared complaints. The preliminary investigation of an attorney for that the state's peace officers could proceed in the discharge alleged misconduct has been compared to an inquisition by of their official duties freed of the restraints of the writs issued a grand jury. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487, by trial judges. 60 A.L.R. 851, 859 (1928). Surely the further investigation of [6] Ours is a society which lives under law, and lawyers, other misconduct would not be barred by the prior hearings by as well as the courts, are its chief protectors. This court the Grievance Committee. The Committee's prior decisions is charged with the duty of making rules and regulations did not ever rise to the level of a final determination of the for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys after merits of the complaints before them, and they are not res appropriate investigation and trial. Section 4, Article 320a judicata. —1. This distasteful task is the work of the Grievance Committee, and restraints against the performance of its [4] [5] Relief, ordinarily, by way of the writ of mandamus functions run afoul the purposes of Article XII, State Bar is granted with respect to orders which are void and for which Rules, 1A Vern.Tex.Civ.Stats. The Grievance Committee is there is no ordinary adequate remedy such as an appeal. an administrative agency of the judicial department and is the Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823 (1961). The arm of the Supreme Court in the discharge of its professional writ may, however, be granted in some instances when there policing duties. In a different context, but concerning the has been a gross abuse of discretion. In Lutheran Social frustration of the functions of administrative agencies, we Service, Inc. v. Meyers, 460 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.1970), we said
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State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (1972)
determination has been made.’ See also Texas Aeronautics said in Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, Commission v. Betts, 469 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tex.1971).
162 Tex. 1, 343 S.W.2d 242 (1961): ‘(a) board or commission created by the Legislature with authority and responsibility [7] The injunction granted by the judge of the 13th Judicial for determining in the first instance whether certain action District is an interference with the grievance procedures shall be taken is not subject to restraint by the courts whenever authorized by Article XII of the State Bar Act and constitutes it appears that an erroneous conclusion has been reached a clear abuse of discretion. The injunction decree granted on some preliminary or procedural question. Any other rule on November 13, 1972, in cause 383—72, styled Frank B.
would afford an opportunity for constant delays in the course McGregor v. Gladney, et al., is vacated. No motion for of administrative proceedings, and there is no real need for rehearing will be allowed.
equitable relief in the ordinary case until a final administrative
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1.06. Definitions, TX ST RULES DISC P 1.06
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Government Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Judicial Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle G. Attorneys Title 2, Subtitle G--Appendix a-1. Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part I. General Rules
V.T.C.A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A-1, Disc. Proc., 1.06
1.06. Definitions
Currentness
A. “Address” means the registered address provided by the attorney who is the subject of the Grievance, as that address is shown on the membership rolls maintained by the State Bar on behalf of the Clerk of the Supreme Court at the time of receipt of the Grievance by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
B. “Board” means the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas.
C. “Chief Disciplinary Counsel” means the person serving as Chief Disciplinary Counsel and any and all of his or her assistants.
D. “Commission” means the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, a permanent committee of the State Bar of Texas.
E. “Committee” means any of the grievance committees within a single District.
F. “Complainant” means the person, firm, corporation, or other entity, including the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, initiating a Complaint or Inquiry.
G. “Complaint” means those written matters received by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel that, either on the face thereof or upon screening or preliminary investigation, allege Professional Misconduct or attorney Disability, or both, cognizable under these rules or the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
H. “Director” means a member of the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas.
I. “Disability” means any physical, mental, or emotional condition that, with or without a substantive rule violation, results in the attorney's inability to practice law, provide client services, complete contracts of employment, or otherwise carry out his or her professional responsibilities to clients, courts, the profession, or the public.
J. “Disciplinary Action” means a proceeding brought by or against an attorney in a district court or any judicial proceeding covered by these rules other than an Evidentiary Hearing.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
1.06. Definitions, TX ST RULES DISC P 1.06
K. “Disciplinary Petition” means a pleading that satisfies the requirements of Rule 3.01.
L. “Disciplinary Proceedings” includes the processing of a Grievance, the investigation and processing of an Inquiry or Complaint, presentation of a Complaint before a Summary Disposition Panel, and the proceeding before an Evidentiary Panel.
M. “District” means disciplinary district.
N. “Evidentiary Hearing” means an adjudicatory proceeding before a panel of a grievance committee.
O. “Evidentiary Panel” means a panel of the District Grievance Committee performing an adjudicatory function other than that of a Summary Disposition Panel with regard to a Disciplinary Proceeding pending before the District Grievance Committee of which the Evidentiary Panel is a subcommittee.
P. “Evidentiary Petition” means a pleading that satisfies the requirements of Rule 2.17.
Q. “General Counsel” means the General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas and any and all of his or her assistants.
R. “Grievance” means a written statement, from whatever source, apparently intended to allege Professional Misconduct by a lawyer, or lawyer Disability, or both, received by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
S. “Inquiry” means any written matter concerning attorney conduct received by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel that, even if true, does not allege Professional Misconduct or Disability.
T. “Intentional Crime” means (1) any Serious Crime that requires proof of knowledge or intent as an essential element or (2) any crime involving misapplication of money or other property held as a fiduciary.
U. “Just Cause” means such cause as is found to exist upon a reasonable inquiry that would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that an attorney either has committed an act or acts of Professional Misconduct requiring that a Sanction be imposed, or suffers from a Disability that requires either suspension as an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas or probation.
V. “Penal Institution” has the meaning assigned by Article 62.001, Code of Criminal Procedure.
W. “Professional Misconduct” includes:
1. Acts or omissions by an attorney, individually or in concert with another person or persons, that violate one or more of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
1.06. Definitions, TX ST RULES DISC P 1.06
2. Attorney conduct that occurs in another state or in the District of Columbia and results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction, if the conduct is Professional Misconduct under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
3. Violation of any disciplinary or disability order or judgment.
4. Engaging in conduct that constitutes barratry as defined by the law of this state.
5. Failure to comply with Rule 13.01 of these rules relating to notification of an attorney's cessation of practice.
6. Engaging in the practice of law either during a period of suspension or when on inactive status.
7. Conviction of a Serious Crime, or being placed on probation for a Serious Crime with or without an adjudication of guilt.
8. Conviction of an Intentional Crime, or being placed on probation for an Intentional Crime with or without an adjudication of guilt.
X. “Reasonable Attorneys' Fees,” for purposes of these rules only, means a reasonable fee for a competent private attorney, under the circumstances. Relevant factors that may be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include but are not limited to the following:
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
2. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
3. The amount involved and the results obtained;
4. The time limitations imposed by the circumstances; and
5. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
Y. “Respondent” means any attorney who is the subject of a Grievance, Complaint, Disciplinary Proceeding, or Disciplinary Action.
Z. “Sanction” means any of the following:
1. Disbarment.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
1.06. Definitions, TX ST RULES DISC P 1.06
2. Resignation in lieu of discipline.
3. Indefinite Disability Suspension.
4. Suspension for a term certain.
5. Probation of suspension, which probation may be concurrent with the period of suspension, upon such reasonable terms as are appropriate under the circumstances.
6. Interim suspension.
7. Public reprimand.
8. Private reprimand.
The term “Sanction” may include the following additional ancillary requirements.
a. Restitution (which may include repayment to the Client Security Fund of the State Bar of any payments made by reason of Respondent's Professional Misconduct); and
b. Payment of Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and all direct expenses associated with the proceedings.
AA. “Serious Crime” means barratry; and felony involving moral turpitude; any misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless misappropriation of money or other property; or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit any of the foregoing crimes.
BB. “State Bar” means the State Bar of Texas.
CC. “Summary Disposition Panel” means a panel of the Committee that determines whether a Complaint should proceed or should be dismissed based upon the absence of evidence to support a finding of Just Cause after a reasonable investigation by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the allegations in the Grievance.
DD. “Wrongfully Imprisoned Person” has the meaning assigned by Section 501.101, Government Code.
Credits Adopted by orders of Feb. 26, 1991, and Oct. 9, 1991, eff. May 1, 1992. Amended by orders of Dec. 29, 2003, eff. Jan. 1, 2004; May 14, 2008, Aug. 20, 2008, eff. Sept. 1, 2008; Oct. 14, 2013, eff. Nov. 1, 2013.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
1.06. Definitions, TX ST RULES DISC P 1.06
<An order of the Supreme Court dated Feb. 26, 1991, as amended by an order of the Supreme Court dated Oct. 9, 1991, adopted the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, eff. May 1, 1992.>
Notes of Decisions (26)
V. T. C. A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A-1, Disc. Proc., 1.06, TX ST RULES DISC P 1.06 Current with amendments received through 3/15/2015
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
2.13. Summary Disposition Setting, TX ST RULES DISC P 2.13
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Government Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Judicial Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle G. Attorneys Title 2, Subtitle G--Appendix a-1. Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part II. The District Grievance Committees
V.T.C.A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A-1, Disc. Proc., 2.13
2.13. Summary Disposition Setting
Currentness
Upon investigation, if the Chief Disciplinary Counsel determines that Just Cause does not exist to proceed on the Complaint, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall place the Complaint on a Summary Disposition Panel docket. At the Summary Disposition Panel docket, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel will present the Complaint together with any information, documents, evidence, and argument deemed necessary and appropriate by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, without the presence of the Complainant or Respondent. The Summary Disposition Panel shall determine whether the Complaint should be dismissed or should proceed. If the Summary Disposition Panel dismisses the Complaint, both the Complainant and Respondent will be so notified. There is no appeal from a determination by the Summary Disposition Panel that the Complaint should be dismissed or should proceed. All Complaints presented to the Summary Disposition Panel and not dismissed shall be placed on the Hearing Docket. The fact that a Complaint was placed on the Summary Disposition Panel Docket and not dismissed is wholly inadmissible for any purpose in the instant or any subsequent Disciplinary Proceeding or Disciplinary Action. Files of dismissed Disciplinary Proceedings will be retained for one hundred eighty days, after which time the files may be destroyed. No permanent record will be kept of Complaints dismissed except to the extent necessary for statistical reporting purposes. In all instances where a Complaint is dismissed by a Summary Disposition Panel other than where the attorney is deceased or is not licensed to practice law in the State of Texas, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall refer the Inquiry to a voluntary mediation and dispute resolution procedure.
Credits Adopted by orders of Feb. 26, 1991, and Oct. 9, 1991, eff. May 1, 1992. Renumbered from Rule 2.12 and amended by order of Dec. 29, 2003, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.
<An order of the Supreme Court dated Feb. 26, 1991, as amended by an order of the Supreme Court dated Oct. 9, 1991, adopted the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, eff. May 1, 1992.>
V. T. C. A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A-1, Disc. Proc., 2.13, TX ST RULES DISC P 2.13 Current with amendments received through 3/15/2015
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2.16. Confidentiality, TX ST RULES DISC P 2.16
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Government Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Judicial Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle G. Attorneys Title 2, Subtitle G--Appendix a-1. Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part II. The District Grievance Committees
V.T.C.A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A-1, Disc. Proc., 2.16
2.16. Confidentiality
Currentness
A. All members and staff of the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Board of Disciplinary Appeals. Committees, and Commission shall maintain as confidential all Disciplinary Proceedings and associated records, except that:
1. the pendency, subject matter, status of an investigation, and final disposition, if any, may be disclosed by the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel or Board of Disciplinary Appeals if the Respondent has waived confidentiality, the Disciplinary Proceeding is based on conviction of a serious crime, or disclosure is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
2. if the Evidentiary Panel finds that professional misconduct occurred and imposes any sanction other than a private reprimand.
a. the Evidentiary Panel's final judgment is a public record from the date the judgment is signed; and
b. once all appeals, if any, have been exhausted and the judgment is final, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall, upon request, disclose all documents, statements, and other information relating to the Disciplinary Proceeding that came to the attention of the Evidentiary Panel during the Disciplinary Proceeding;
3. the record in any appeal to the Board of Disciplinary Appeals from an Evidentiary Panel's final judgment, other than an appeal from a judgment of private reprimand, is a public record; and
4. facts and evidence that are discoverable elsewhere are not made confidential merely because they are discussed or introduced in the course of a Disciplinary Proceeding.
B. The deliberations and voting of an Evidentiary Panel are strictly confidential and not subject to discovery. No person is competent to testify as to such deliberations and voting.
C. Rule 6.08 governs the provision of confidential information to authorized agencies investigating qualifications for admission to practice, attorney discipline enforcement agencies, law enforcement agencies, the State Bar's Client Security Fund, the State
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2.16. Confidentiality, TX ST RULES DISC P 2.16
Bar's Lawyer Assistance Program, the Supreme Court's Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee and its subcommittees, and the Commission on Judicial Conduct.
Credits Adopted by orders of Feb. 26, 1991, and Oct. 9, 1991, eff. May 1, 1992. Renumbered from Rule 2.15 and amended by orders of Dec. 29, 2003, eff. Jan. 1, 2004. Amended by order of Dec. 7, 2009, eff. Jan. 1, 2010.
<An order of the Supreme Court dated Feb. 26, 1991, as amended by an order of the Supreme Court dated Oct. 9, 1991, adopted the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, eff. May 1, 1992.>
Notes of Decisions (1)
V. T. C. A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A-1, Disc. Proc., 2.16, TX ST RULES DISC P 2.16 Current with amendments received through 3/15/2015
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
15.09. Immunity, TX ST RULES DISC P 15.09
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Government Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Judicial Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle G. Attorneys Title 2, Subtitle G--Appendix a-1. Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part XV. Miscellaneous Provisions
V.T.C.A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A-1, Disc. Proc., 15.09
15.09. Immunity
Currentness
No lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or witness predicated upon the filing of a Grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and disability system. All members of the Commission, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (including Special Assistant Disciplinary Counsel appointed by the Commission and attorneys employed on a contract basis by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel), all members of Committees, all members of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, all members of the District Disability Committees, all officers and Directors of the State Bar, and the staff members of the aforementioned entities are immune from suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties. The immunity is absolute and unqualified and extends to all actions at law or in equity.
Credits Adopted by orders of Feb. 26, 1991, and Oct. 9, 1991, eff. May 1, 1992. Amended by order of June 15, 1994, as corrected by order of Sept. 12, 1994, eff. Oct. 1, 1994. Renumbered from Rule 15.11 and amended by order of Dec. 29, 2003, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.
<An order of the Supreme Court dated Feb. 26, 1991, as amended by an order of the Supreme Court dated Oct. 9, 1991, adopted the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, eff. May 1, 1992.>
V. T. C. A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A-1, Disc. Proc., 15.09, TX ST RULES DISC P 15.09 Current with amendments received through 3/15/2015
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, TX ST RPC Preamble
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Government Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Judicial Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle G. Attorneys Title 2, Subtitle G--Appendix A. State Bar Rules Article X. Discipline and Suspension of Members Section 9. Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos)
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities
V.T.C.A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A, Art. 10, § 9, Preamble
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities
Currentness
1. A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.
2. As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.
3. In all professional functions, a lawyer should zealously pursue clients' interests within the bounds of the law. In doing so, a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
4. A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
5. As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.
6. A lawyer should render public interest legal service. The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, TX ST RPC Preamble
of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in or otherwise support the provision of legal services to the disadvantaged. The provision of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees is a moral obligation of each lawyer as well as the profession generally. A lawyer may discharge this basic responsibility by providing public interest legal services without fee, or at a substantially reduced fee, in one or more of the following areas: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable organization representation, the administration of justice, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.
7. In the nature of law practice, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from apparent conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interests. The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such tensions. They do so by stating minimum standards of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework of these Rules many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. The Rules and their Comments constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in resolving such issues through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment. In applying these rules, lawyers may find interpretive guidance in the principles developed in the Comments.
8. The legal profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulation is undertaken in the public interest rather than in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar, and to insist that every lawyer both comply with its minimum disciplinary standards and aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.
9. Each lawyer's own conscience is the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions may rise above the disciplinary standards prescribed by these rules. The desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the profession and of the society which it serves provides the lawyer the incentive to attain the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.
Credits Adopted by order of Oct. 17, 1989, eff. Jan. 1, 1990.
<The original Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas, consisting of former articles 1 to 13, were approved by the Supreme Court February 22, 1940.>
<Articles 1 through 9 of the State Bar Rules were adopted and former articles 1 through 11 of the Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas were repealed by Order of the Texas Supreme Court dated March 14, 1983.>
<Article 10 of the State Bar Rules was adopted and article 12, §§ 1 to 7 and 9 to 36, as well as article 13, of the Rules Governing the State Bar were repealed by Order of the Texas Supreme Court dated February 29, 1984, effective March 1, 1984. That same order also restated and continued article 12, § 8, of the Rules Governing the State Bar (the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility) and promulgated such art. 12, § 8 as article 10, § 9, of the State Bar Rules.>
<Article 11 of the State Bar Rules was adopted by order of the Texas Supreme Court dated May 9, 1984.>
<Article 12 of the State Bar Rules, effective June 1, 1986, was adopted by order of the Texas Supreme Court dated December 19, 1985.>
<Article 13 of the State Bar Rules, effective May 15, 1988, was adopted by order of the Texas Supreme Court dated March 14, 1988.>
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, TX ST RPC Preamble
V. T. C. A., Govt. Code T. 2, Subt. G App. A, Art. 10, § 9 Preamble, TX ST RPC Preamble Current with amendments received through 3/15/2015
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
§ 81.072. General Disciplinary and Disability Procedures, TX GOVT § 81.072
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Government Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Judicial Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle G. Attorneys Chapter 81. State Bar (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter E. Discipline (Refs & Annos)
V.T.C.A., Government Code § 81.072
§ 81.072. General Disciplinary and Disability Procedures
Effective: September 1, 2013 Currentness
(a) In furtherance of the supreme court's powers to supervise the conduct of attorneys, the court shall establish disciplinary and disability procedures in addition to the procedures provided by this subchapter.
(b) The supreme court shall establish minimum standards and procedures for the attorney disciplinary and disability system. The standards and procedures for processing grievances against attorneys must provide for:
(1) classification of all grievances and investigation of all complaints;
(2) a full explanation to each complainant on dismissal of an inquiry or a complaint;
(3) periodic preparation of abstracts of inquiries and complaints filed that, even if true, do or do not constitute misconduct;
(4) an information file for each grievance filed;
(5) a grievance tracking system to monitor processing of grievances by category, method of resolution, and length of time required for resolution;
(6) notice by the state bar to the parties of a written grievance filed with the state bar that the state bar has the authority to resolve of the status of the grievance, at least quarterly and until final disposition, unless the notice would jeopardize an undercover investigation;
(7) an option for a trial in a district court on a complaint and an administrative system for attorney disciplinary and disability findings in lieu of trials in district court, including an appeal procedure to the Board of Disciplinary Appeals and the supreme court under the substantial evidence rule;
(8) an administrative system for reciprocal and compulsory discipline;
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 81.072. General Disciplinary and Disability Procedures, TX GOVT § 81.072
(9) interim suspension of an attorney posing a threat of immediate irreparable harm to a client;
(10) authorizing all parties to an attorney disciplinary hearing, including the complainant, to be present at all hearings at which testimony is taken and requiring notice of those hearings to be given to the complainant not later than the seventh day before the date of the hearing;
(11) the commission adopting rules that govern the use of private reprimands by grievance committees and that prohibit a committee:
(A) giving an attorney more than one private reprimand within a five-year period for a violation of the same disciplinary rule; or
(B) giving a private reprimand for a violation:
(i) that involves a failure to return an unearned fee, a theft, or a misapplication of fiduciary property; or
(ii) of a disciplinary rule that requires a prosecutor to disclose to the defense all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, including Rule 3.09(d), Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct; and
(12) distribution of a voluntary survey to all complainants urging views on grievance system experiences.
(b-1) In establishing minimum standards and procedures for the attorney disciplinary and disability system under Subsection (b), the supreme court must ensure that the statute of limitations applicable to a grievance filed against a prosecutor that alleges a violation of the disclosure rule does not begin to run until the date on which a wrongfully imprisoned person is released from a penal institution.
(b-2) For purposes of Subsection (b-1):
(1) “Disclosure rule” means the disciplinary rule that requires a prosecutor to disclose to the defense all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, including Rule 3.09(d), Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
(2) “Penal institution” has the meaning assigned by Article 62.001, Code of Criminal Procedure.
(3) “Wrongfully imprisoned person” has the meaning assigned by Section 501.101.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
§ 81.072. General Disciplinary and Disability Procedures, TX GOVT § 81.072
(c) In addition to the minimum standards and procedures provided by this chapter, the supreme court, under Section 81.024 shall prepare, propose, and adopt rules it considers necessary for disciplining, suspending, disbarring, and accepting resignations of attorneys.
(d) Each attorney is subject to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
(e) The state bar shall establish a voluntary mediation and dispute resolution procedure to:
(1) attempt to resolve each allegation of attorney misconduct that is:
(A) classified as an inquiry under Section 81.073(a)(2)(A) because it does not constitute an offense cognizable under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct; or
(B) classified as a complaint and subsequently dismissed; and
(2) facilitate coordination with other programs administered by the state bar to address and attempt to resolve inquiries and complaints referred to the voluntary mediation and dispute resolution procedure.
(e-1) All types of information, proceedings, hearing transcripts, and statements presented during the voluntary mediation and dispute resolution procedure established under Subsection (e) are confidential to the same extent the information, proceedings, transcripts, or statements would be confidential if presented to a panel of a district grievance committee.
(f) Responses to the survey provided for in Subsection (b)(12) may not identify either the complainant or attorney and shall be open to the public. The topics must include:
(1) treatment by the grievance system staff and volunteers;
(2) the fairness of grievance procedures;
(3) the length of time for grievance processing;
(4) disposition of the grievance; and
(5) suggestions for improvement of the grievance system.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
§ 81.072. General Disciplinary and Disability Procedures, TX GOVT § 81.072
(g) A person may not maintain an action against a complainant or witness in a disciplinary proceeding based on a communication made by the complainant or witness to the commission, a grievance committee, or the chief disciplinary counsel. The immunity granted by this subsection is absolute and unqualified.
(h) The state bar or a court may not require an attorney against whom a disciplinary action has been brought to disclose information protected by the attorney-client privilege if the client did not initiate the grievance that is the subject of the action.
(i) A panel of a district grievance committee of the state bar that votes on a grievance matter shall disclose to the complainant and the respondent in the matter the number of members of the panel:
(1) voting for a finding of just cause;
(2) voting against a finding of just cause; and
(3) abstaining from voting on the matter.
(j) A quorum of a panel of a district grievance committee of the state bar must include one public member for each two attorney members.
(k) A member of a panel of a district grievance committee of the state bar may vote on a grievance matter to which the panel was assigned only if the member is present at the hearing at which the vote takes place.
(l) A person may be appointed to serve on a panel of a district grievance committee of the state bar only if the person is a member of the district grievance committee from which the panel was assigned and the person was appointed to serve on the committee in strict accordance with the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
(m) A panel of a district grievance committee of the state bar may not be changed in size for the purpose of obtaining a quorum on the panel without the approval of the complainant and the respondent in the grievance matter to which the panel was assigned.
(n) A member of a panel of a district grievance committee of the state bar may not be substituted with another member of the district grievance committee on the day of the hearing for which the panel was assigned without the approval of the complainant and the respondent in the grievance matter.
(o) Whenever a grievance is either dismissed as an inquiry or dismissed as a complaint in accordance with the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and that dismissal has become final, the respondent attorney may thereafter deny that a grievance was pursued and may file a motion with the tribunal seeking expunction of all records on the matter, other than statistical or identifying information maintained by the chief disciplinary counsel pertaining to the grievance.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
§ 81.072. General Disciplinary and Disability Procedures, TX GOVT § 81.072
Credits Added by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 148, § 3.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1987. Amended by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 795, § 20, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1436, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 227, §§ 15, 16, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 450 (S.B. 825), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2013.
Notes of Decisions (20)
V. T. C. A., Government Code § 81.072, TX GOVT § 81.072 Current through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
John Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline And Linda Acevedo, in Her Official Capacity as the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas (John Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline And Linda Acevedo, in Her Official Capacity as the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.