Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 15-13982 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00822-ODE
JENNA THURMOND,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(May 23, 2016)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this products liability action, Plaintiff-Appellant Jenna Thurmond appeals
from the district court’s final order granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendant-Appellee Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Bayer”). Her Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 2 of 8
complaint brought various state-law claims arising out of Bayer’s manufacture and
distribution of the Mirena intrauterine contraception system (“Mirena IUS”), which
allegedly caused her injuries. On appeal, Thurmond argues that the district court:
(1) abused its discretion by denying her motions to extend fact discovery and
expert disclosure deadlines; (2) abused its discretion by denying her motion to
amend her complaint; and (3) improperly granted summary judgment in favor of
Bayer. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s rulings on discovery motions for abuse of
discretion. See Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997).
Likewise, we “will only reverse a district court’s denial of a motion to amend in
instances in which the district court has clearly abused its discretion.” Oravec v.
Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1231 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quotation omitted). The abuse-of-discretion standard of review is “extremely
limited and highly deferential.” In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quotation omitted). “Discretion means the district court has a range of choice, and
that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not
influenced by any mistake of law.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432
F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). We review a district court’s
grant of summary judgment de novo. See Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
Fortune Constr. Co., 320 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2003).
2 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 3 of 8
The essential facts are these. On March 20, 2014, Thurmond filed a
complaint in federal district court alleging that her use of the Mirena IUS, a
contraceptive device manufactured and designed by Bayer, caused her to develop
pseudotumer cerebri (“PTC”), also known as idiopathic intracranial hypertension
(“IIH”). Her symptoms included severe migraines, changes to her vision and
hearing, vertigo, and head and neck pain. Thurmond asserted claims for
negligence, design defect, failure to warn, strict liability, breach of implied
warranty, breach of express warranty, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and fraud by suppression and concealment.
On May 23, 2014, the parties filed a Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery
Plan. Thurmond proposed a scheduling order that set a fact discovery deadline of
October 23, 2015, and Bayer sought a discovery schedule with fact discovery
ending on November 28, 2014. The district court adopted Bayer’s proposal on
June 11, 2014. On November 7, 2014, the district court granted the parties’ joint
request to extend the deadline for fact discovery to January 31, 2015. On January
31, Thurmond filed a motion to extend discovery until October 23, 2015. The
court denied this request. It found that Thurmond had not shown what new fact
discovery was needed or why it was needed, and determined that Thurmond’s
counsel had not been diligent in reviewing documents.
3 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 4 of 8
On March 30, 2015, Thurmond filed a motion to extend the expert
disclosure deadline, and on April 30 she filed a motion to amend her complaint to
add foreign entities Bayer Oy and Bayer Pharma AG as defendants. Bayer moved
for summary judgment on May 11, 2015. On August 4, 2015, the district court
issued an order denying Thurmond’s motions to extend discovery and to amend
her complaint, and granting Bayer’s motion for summary judgment on all counts.
This appeal follows.
First, we find no merit to Thurmond’s argument that the district court abused
its discretion by denying her motions to extend fact discovery and expert
disclosure deadlines. The scheduling order set by the district court “may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4). “[W]e have often held that a district court’s decision to hold litigants to
the clear terms of its scheduling orders is not an abuse of discretion.” Josendis v.
Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011).
Thurmond submitted her first request for production on October 21, 2014, four
months after the discovery schedule was entered. She did not initiate any
depositions, or name any expert witnesses. Thurmond explained that further
discovery would be necessary if additional defendants were added. But because
the court was within its discretion to deny leave to amend her complaint, as
4 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 5 of 8
discussed below, this request was properly denied. The district court granted one
discovery deadline extension. It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a second.
We are also unconvinced by Thurmond’s claim that the district court abused
its discretion by denying her motion to amend her complaint to add two Bayer
foreign entities. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within
21 days after serving it, or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or certain
Rule 12 motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may amend
its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.
The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). “Nevertheless, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds,
such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the
amendment.” Carruthers v. BSA Advert., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.
2004) (quotation omitted). “Prejudice and undue delay are inherent in an
amendment asserted after the close of discovery and after dispositive motions have
been filed, briefed, and decided.” Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162
(11th Cir. 1999).
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Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 15-13982 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00822-ODE
JENNA THURMOND,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(May 23, 2016)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this products liability action, Plaintiff-Appellant Jenna Thurmond appeals
from the district court’s final order granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendant-Appellee Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Bayer”). Her Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 2 of 8
complaint brought various state-law claims arising out of Bayer’s manufacture and
distribution of the Mirena intrauterine contraception system (“Mirena IUS”), which
allegedly caused her injuries. On appeal, Thurmond argues that the district court:
(1) abused its discretion by denying her motions to extend fact discovery and
expert disclosure deadlines; (2) abused its discretion by denying her motion to
amend her complaint; and (3) improperly granted summary judgment in favor of
Bayer. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s rulings on discovery motions for abuse of
discretion. See Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997).
Likewise, we “will only reverse a district court’s denial of a motion to amend in
instances in which the district court has clearly abused its discretion.” Oravec v.
Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1231 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quotation omitted). The abuse-of-discretion standard of review is “extremely
limited and highly deferential.” In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quotation omitted). “Discretion means the district court has a range of choice, and
that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not
influenced by any mistake of law.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432
F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). We review a district court’s
grant of summary judgment de novo. See Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
Fortune Constr. Co., 320 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2003).
2 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 3 of 8
The essential facts are these. On March 20, 2014, Thurmond filed a
complaint in federal district court alleging that her use of the Mirena IUS, a
contraceptive device manufactured and designed by Bayer, caused her to develop
pseudotumer cerebri (“PTC”), also known as idiopathic intracranial hypertension
(“IIH”). Her symptoms included severe migraines, changes to her vision and
hearing, vertigo, and head and neck pain. Thurmond asserted claims for
negligence, design defect, failure to warn, strict liability, breach of implied
warranty, breach of express warranty, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and fraud by suppression and concealment.
On May 23, 2014, the parties filed a Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery
Plan. Thurmond proposed a scheduling order that set a fact discovery deadline of
October 23, 2015, and Bayer sought a discovery schedule with fact discovery
ending on November 28, 2014. The district court adopted Bayer’s proposal on
June 11, 2014. On November 7, 2014, the district court granted the parties’ joint
request to extend the deadline for fact discovery to January 31, 2015. On January
31, Thurmond filed a motion to extend discovery until October 23, 2015. The
court denied this request. It found that Thurmond had not shown what new fact
discovery was needed or why it was needed, and determined that Thurmond’s
counsel had not been diligent in reviewing documents.
3 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 4 of 8
On March 30, 2015, Thurmond filed a motion to extend the expert
disclosure deadline, and on April 30 she filed a motion to amend her complaint to
add foreign entities Bayer Oy and Bayer Pharma AG as defendants. Bayer moved
for summary judgment on May 11, 2015. On August 4, 2015, the district court
issued an order denying Thurmond’s motions to extend discovery and to amend
her complaint, and granting Bayer’s motion for summary judgment on all counts.
This appeal follows.
First, we find no merit to Thurmond’s argument that the district court abused
its discretion by denying her motions to extend fact discovery and expert
disclosure deadlines. The scheduling order set by the district court “may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4). “[W]e have often held that a district court’s decision to hold litigants to
the clear terms of its scheduling orders is not an abuse of discretion.” Josendis v.
Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011).
Thurmond submitted her first request for production on October 21, 2014, four
months after the discovery schedule was entered. She did not initiate any
depositions, or name any expert witnesses. Thurmond explained that further
discovery would be necessary if additional defendants were added. But because
the court was within its discretion to deny leave to amend her complaint, as
4 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 5 of 8
discussed below, this request was properly denied. The district court granted one
discovery deadline extension. It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a second.
We are also unconvinced by Thurmond’s claim that the district court abused
its discretion by denying her motion to amend her complaint to add two Bayer
foreign entities. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within
21 days after serving it, or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or certain
Rule 12 motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may amend
its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.
The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). “Nevertheless, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds,
such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the
amendment.” Carruthers v. BSA Advert., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.
2004) (quotation omitted). “Prejudice and undue delay are inherent in an
amendment asserted after the close of discovery and after dispositive motions have
been filed, briefed, and decided.” Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162
(11th Cir. 1999). “[I]t is not an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a
motion for leave to amend following the close of discovery, past the deadline for
amendments and past the deadline for filing dispositive motions.” Lowe’s Home
Centers, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 313 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002).
5 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 6 of 8
Here, Thurmond sought to amend her complaint on April 30, 2015, ten
months after the deadline to amend pleadings, and three months after the close of
fact discovery. But as early as the filing of the parties’ joint discovery plan on
May 23, 2014, Thurmond expressly recognized that foreign defendants were
necessary to the case. See D.E. 8 at 13 (providing, as plaintiff’s position, that
“Defendant out-sourced many of its Mirena-related tasks to related entities in
foreign countries, necessitating the addition of foreign defendants and foreign
discovery.”). In addition, Thurmond’s counsel represents plaintiffs in multidistrict
litigation (“MDL”) involving an unrelated alleged defect in the Mirena IUS, and
Bayer Oy and Bayer Pharma AG are both defendants. In re: Mirena IUD Products
Liability Litigation, 938 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (J.P.M.L. 2013). Thurmond’s counsel
admits that the firm had access to the MDL database as of October 2, 2014, and
was aware of the foreign parties’ role in developing the Mirena IUS -- long before
Thurmond moved for leave to amend. On this record, Thurmond cannot show
good cause to add the foreign defendants now after having waited for so long. The
district court acknowledged that some delay may have been warranted given the
obstacles to joining foreign entities. But as we see it, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend this late in the process.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Thurmond’s argument that the district court
improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Bayer. Summary judgment is
6 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 7 of 8
appropriate where the pleadings and supporting materials establish that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “We draw all factual inferences in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party.” Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008).
As relevant here, when the summary judgment movant does not bear the burden of
proof at trial, the movant may show “that there is an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party’s case.” Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 603-
04 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1168 (2016). “If
the movant shows that there is an absence of evidence, the non-moving party who
bears the burden of proof at trial must contradict this showing by demonstrating
that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a
directed verdict motion.” Id. at 604 (quotation omitted). “In the alternative, the
non-movant may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a
directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
In this appeal, Thurmond has conceded that she has “not attempted to argue
the merits of the lower court’s ruling on granting summary judgment.” Reply Br.
at 17. Thus, she has abandoned this issue, and it is not before us. See Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“the law is
7 Case: 15-13982 Date Filed: 05/23/2016 Page: 8 of 8
by now well settled in this Circuit that a legal claim or argument that has not been
briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be
addressed.”).1
AFFIRMED.
1 In any event, even if we were to consider it, we could not conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Bayer. As the record reveals, Thurmond did not put forth evidence in the district court to establish the elements of her claims. For example, “[t]o prevail in a Georgia products liability action, whether based on negligence or strict liability, a plaintiff must show that the proximate cause of the injury was a defect which existed when the product was sold.” Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., a Subsidiary of Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490, 494 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Ga. Code § 51-1-11(b)(1)). Under Georgia law, medical expert testimony is essential in products liability actions when the theory of causation is not a natural inference that a juror could make through human experience. See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, it is undisputed that jurors cannot naturally infer a causal link between the Mirena IUS and PTC/IIH, and that Thurmond has offered no expert testimony on causation. For much the same reason, her non-products liability claims fail as well. As a result, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Bayer on Thurmond’s claims. 8