Jenn-Ching Luo v. Owen J Roberts School District

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-1030 __________

JENN-CHING LUO, Appellant

v.

OWEN J. ROBERTS SCHOOL DISTRICT; GEOFFREY BALL; SHARON W. MONTANYE; SWEET STEVENS KATZ WILLIAMS LLP; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-06568) District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) September 9, 2024

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 16, 2024) ___________

OPINION * ___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant Jenn-Ching Luo appeals from orders of the District Court dismissing the

claims in his civil suit and denying his motion for reconsideration. For the following

reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment in part, affirm in part, and remand

for further proceedings.

Luo is the parent of B.L., a special needs student in the Owen J. Roberts School

District. In December 2016, Luo filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that he

filed an administrative due process complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities in

Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1411, which was denied by a hearing officer. He

sought the District Court’s review of the hearing officer’s decision pursuant to the IDEA.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (providing a party aggrieved by a hearing officer’s decision

under the IDEA the right to bring a civil action in a district court). The complaint also

alleged civil claims against the School District and its Special Education Supervisor,

Geoffrey Ball (“the District defendants”); the School District’s counsel during the

administrative hearings, Sharon Montanye, and her law firm, Sweet Stevens Katz

Williams LLP (“the attorney defendants”); and the Pennsylvania Department of

Education (PDE).

In May 2021, the District Court consolidated the matter (Luo IV), for

administrative purposes only, with four other matters (Luo I, Luo II, Luo V, and Luo VI)

in which Luo had filed complaints against the School District and various defendants.

The District Court entered an order on October 30, 2023, addressing outstanding motions

and claims in Luo I, Luo IV, Luo V, and Luo VI. As relevant here, the District Court

dismissed with prejudice “[a]ll claims in Luo IV.” ECF No. 40 at 2. Luo filed a motion

2 for reconsideration arguing, inter alia, that the District Court failed to address his

“appeal[ ] of hearing officer’s decision[ ]” (i.e., his § 1415(i)(2) claim), as well as a

number of his civil claims, in Luo IV, and therefore that it was “premature” “to dismiss

the [c]omplaint entirely and close the case.” ECF No. 41 at 2, 22. The District Court

granted the reconsideration motion in Luo IV only as to the civil claims it overlooked; it

then addressed the outstanding claims, and dismissed them with prejudice in an order

entered December 8, 2023. Luo appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over

the District Court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and will

affirm if the complaint fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Jonathan H. v.

The Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 2009) (observing that an

IDEA action pursuant to § 1415(i)(2) “is an original civil action rather than an appeal,”

and thus is “governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).

We reject Luo’s primary argument on appeal that the District defendants’ motions

to dismiss were “void,” and that he was entitled to default judgment against all

defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (providing that a default judgment is warranted

where a party “failed to plead or otherwise defend” the claims against him or her). He

claims that the deadline for the defendants to answer the complaint expired on January

26, 2017, 21 days after summonses were issued, and more than four years before motions

to dismiss were filed. Not so. The matter was stayed on January 4, 2017, pending an

appeal to this Court in another of Luo’s cases, see E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 15-cv-04248 (Luo

3 III). And, as the District Court explained in denying Luo’s motions for default judgment,

Luo’s cases have a complicated procedural history which further delayed the

proceedings. 1 See ECF No. 39. The defendants were not required to respond to the

complaint until after the stay was lifted, and, under the circumstances, the District Court

did not abuse its discretion in deeming the motions to dismiss as timely filed, and

determining that there was no basis for default judgment against any defendant. 2 See

generally In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that

“matters of docket control . . . are committed to the sound discretion of the district

court”). Moreover, we note that Luo responded to the motions to dismiss and took every

available opportunity to argue his case.

1 After this Court’s mandate issued in the appeal in Luo III, in July 2018, Luo immediately filed motions for default judgment. In November 2020, he filed a motion to lift the stay. In an order entered February 9, 2021, the District Court lifted the stay, and directed Luo “to consolidate his claims as per [the November 29, 2016 order] by filing a second amended consolidated complaint in [Luo I] so that litigation can proceed.” ECF No. 17 (emphasis added). Luo filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which sought clarification as to whether he was required to replead his claims in Luo I, Luo IV, and Luo V in one amended consolidated complaint case, and, if so, arguing that it was improper, and asserting that he would stand on his initial complaint. See ECF No. 18 at 2. In May 2021, the District Court denied that motion and consolidated the matters for administrative purposes only, obviating the need for an amended complaint. See ECF Nos. 24 & 26. Luo sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then an appeal. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See C.A. No. 21-2569, 09/07/22 Order (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction). 2 The PDE did not file a motion to dismiss the claim against it, which was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, in its response in opposition to Luo’s motion for default judgment, PDE noted that, given the procedural posture of the case at that point, it was unclear whether a responsive pleading was required, and indicating “[i]f it is, PDE will promptly provide one.” ECF No. 37 at 2. Moreover, PDE argued in that response that it was entitled to absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the District Court could raise the issue sua sponte, which the Court subsequently did. 4 Luo next argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his claim against the

PDE (Claim 15) on immunity grounds. He notes, correctly, that Congress abolished

sovereign immunity for violations of the IDEA. See M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated

Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 351 (3d Cir. 2003). But his claim was

grounded in § 1983, 3 not the IDEA, and as an “arm of the state,” the PDE is immune

from such a claim. See Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658

(3d Cir. 1989) (noting that a state agency or department is an “arm of the state” when a

judgment against it “would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a

judgment against the State itself” (citation omitted)); see also Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of

Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that Pennsylvania has not waived the

immunity defense and Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity under

§ 1983). The District Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider it.

Luo’s remaining claims largely stem from the following events, as alleged in the

complaint. First, defendant Ball terminated B.L.’s bus aide. Luo filed an administrative

due process complaint under the IDEA, seeking the bus aide’s reinstatement. The bus

aide was restored, which Luo alleged “mooted” the proceeding. ECF No. 1 at 9, ⁋44. On

Montanye’s motion, however, the hearing officer (HO), Charles W. Jelley, continued the

proceeding to determine whether a bus aide was “necessary for the delivery of [a] FAPE

3 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

5 to the child.” Id. at 9, ⁋49 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, HO Jelley “denied

Montanye’s collateral issue,” citing Montanye’s lack of evidence, and directed the parties

to address the issue at an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) meeting. Id. at 13, ⁋65.

Second, at an IEP meeting in 2016, which was scheduled to discuss B.L.’s

Individualized Education Evaluation (IEE), defendant Ball allowed an evaluator to

participate by phone conference, without giving Luo notice. The parties did not reach an

agreement about a revised IEP at the meeting, but, afterwards, Ball arbitrarily revised it

and falsely claimed that Luo agreed with the revisions. Luo filed another due process

complaint, challenging the IEP meeting and the revised IEP. The HO, Jake McElligott,

ruled in favor of the School District.

Luo brought numerous claims under § 1983 against the various defendants. His

claim against the attorney defendants for abuse of process (Claim 6) fails because they

are not liable as state actors for performing their functions as attorneys for the School

District. See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir.1999)

(holding that “[a]ttorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered

state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court”). A person acts

under color of state law “only when exercising power possessed by virtue of state law

and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”

Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981). Their representation of the School

District was not by virtue of state law. 4

4 The District Court properly dismissed the only other claim against the attorney defendants, which was for “Malicious Prosecution (The Dragonetti Act)” (Claim 9) for 6 The District Court properly determined that Luo failed to state a claim for relief

against the District defendants, and that leave to amend would be futile. Luo did not

adequately plead a substantive due process claim (Claim 1) because none of the District

defendants’ alleged conduct regarding the bus aide, the IEP meeting, or the IEP revisions,

would “shock the conscience” and thereby rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

See Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 374-75 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that

to state a substantive due process claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege conduct by

a government actor that “shocks the conscience”).

Nor did Luo state a viable procedural due process claim, which required alleging

that the District defendants deprived him of an individual interest that is “encompassed

within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property,” and that the

available procedures did not provide due process of law. In re Energy Future Holdings

Corp., 949 F.3d 806, 822 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d

225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006). First, Luo failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutionally

protected interest stemming the first administrative hearing (Claims 2, 7 & 8), where he

maintains that the administrative due process complaint was “mooted,” and HO Jelley

denied Montanye’s “collateral issue.” See ECF No. 1 at 14 (stating that “the matter

restored back to the original state, e.g., before Defendant Ball terminated bus aide”).

“maintaining the mooted hearing [before HO Jelley] to prosecute the collateral issue.” ECF No. 1 at 32, ⁋241. Luo cannot prevail on this claim because, according to the complaint, the attorney defendants neither initiated the administrative proceeding nor prevailed in it. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 394 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 8351. 7 Second, Luo claimed that the District defendants violated his due process rights by

implementing HO McElligott’s decision from the second administrative hearing before

the time to appeal the decision had expired (Claim 14). The procedural safeguards

governing the provision of a FAPE are set forth at 20 U.S.C. § 1415, including the right

to challenge a revised IEP by filing a due process complaint, and the right to a hearing on

that complaint. As relevant here, the statute also provides that Luo, as the party

aggrieved by McElligott’s decision upholding the IEP, had 90 days to bring a civil action

in the District Court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) with respect to the due process

complaint. But the statute does not provide any protections against implementation of the

HO’s decision during the appeal period, and Luo could have moved in the District Court

to stay implementation of the IEP while his § 1415(i)(2) claim was pending.

Accordingly, he has failed to sufficiently plead that the District defendants denied him

any process that was due.

Finally, we agree with the District Court that Luo’s claims that the District

defendants violated his “liberty right” to “direct” B.L.’s education (Claims 3, 5, 10-13 &

16) and his “property” right to a bus aide (Claim 4) were not actionable under § 1983.

Luo’s various allegations regarding the bus aide, a bullying incident on the bus, and the

IEP or IEP meetings are related to B.L.’s education and services under the IDEA, and, as

such, any perceived violations of Luo’s rights cannot be remedied under § 1983. See

A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007).

We now turn to Luo’s argument that the District Court failed to address his claim,

brought pursuant to § 1415(i)(2), which sought review of HO McElligott’s decision. See

8 ECF No. 1 at 20-23. Although the District Court recognized the claim, and purported to

grapple with it, the Court misconstrued it “as an IDEA claim against the School District,”

and conflated it with several of Luo’s § 1983 claims. ECF No. 39 at 9-11. We will

therefore remand this matter for proper consideration of the § 1415(i)(2) claim. We note

that, when, as here, a plaintiff brings a civil action under the IDEA, a district court “shall

receive the records of the administrative proceedings,” “shall hear additional evidence at

the request of a party,” and, “basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,

shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).

Based on the foregoing, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment to the extent

it dismissed the § 1415(i)(2) claim, and remand for further proceedings. 5 We will

otherwise affirm.

5 Luo’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied. His request for a sanction is denied without prejudice to his raising the issue in the District Court, where Appellees’ alleged conduct occurred. 9