NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-2143 __________
JENN-CHING LUO, Appellant
v.
OWEN J. ROBERTS SCHOOL DISTRICT; RICHARD MARCHINI; GEOFFREY BALL ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-22-cv-02546) District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 12, 2024 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2024) ___________
OPINION * ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se appellant Jenn-Ching Luo appeals from orders of the District Court
dismissing his complaint with prejudice and denying his motion for reconsideration. For
the following reasons, we will affirm.
The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et
seq., requires states receiving federal education funding, like Pennsylvania, to provide a
Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to disabled children until they reach 21 years
of age. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 267 (3d Cir. 2014). To
address education gaps wrought by COVID-19, Pennsylvania enacted Act 66 of 2021
which, in part, extended education enrollment for the 2021-2022 school year. See Act of
June 30, 2021, P.L. 353, No. 66, § 1 (amending Public School Code of 1949, P.L. 30,
No.14). As relevant here, § 1383 of the Act allowed students with a disability who were
enrolled for the 2020-2021 school year, and turned 21 years old during that time, to
attend a school entity for the 2021-2022 school year; and § 1501.10 of the Act allowed
any student over 18 years of age “in a school entity . . . to repeat a grade level to make up
for any lost educational opportunities.” Id.
Luo is the father of B.L., a special needs student who enrolled in the 2021-2022
school year in the Owen J. Roberts School District pursuant to § 1501.10 of Act 66. B.L.
turned 21 during that school year; thus, over Luo’s objections, the School District
determined that B.L. would not be entitled to continued enrollment after the end of the
2021-2022 school year.
2 In January 2022, Luo filed an administrative due process complaint arguing that
that the School District was required to provide B.L. with a FAPE for the 2022-2023
school year pursuant to § 1501.10 of Act 66. Luo also claimed that the School District
was required under the “stay put” provision of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), to allow
B.L. to remain in his educational placement beyond the 2021-2022 school year while
proceedings challenging B.L.’s education programs remained pending. 1 Following a
hearing in March 2022, the Hearing Officer issued a decision concluding that B.L. had
“no right to continued enrollment or to a FAPE beyond the end of the 2021-22 school
year.” ECF No. 7-2 at 17.
In June 2022, Luo filed a complaint with the District Court challenging the
Hearing Officer’s decision pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). The complaint also
brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the School District, its director of
Pupil Services Richard Marchini, and its Special Education Supervisor Geoffrey Ball for
violations of his constitutional rights. In an order entered June 29, 2022, the District
Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It subsequently denied
Luo’s timely motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). This appeal ensued.
1 At the time the administrative complaint was filed, there were multiple matters pending in the District Court which involved Luo and the School District, and regarded B.L.’s education rights. See ECF No. 7-2 at 5, ⁋17 & n.5. 3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and will affirm if the complaint fails
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc.,
662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Jonathan H. v. The Souderton Area Sch. Dist.,
562 F.3d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 2009) (observing that an IDEA action pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)
“is an original civil action rather than an appeal,” and thus is “governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure”).
We agree with the District Court that Luo’s claim challenging the Hearing
Officer’s decision fails as a matter of law. 2 First, Luo argued that the Hearing Officer,
like the School District, deprived B.L. of “a year to make up for lost educational
opportunities due to COVID-19,” as provided by Act 66. But this claim is based on his
misunderstanding that § 1501.10 of Act 66 both allowed students to repeat a grade “to
make up educational opportunities” lost during the 2020-2021 school year and provided
students with “an additional year” of schooling thereafter. ECF No. 1 at 7, ⁋45 & 8, ⁋47;
ECF No. 8 at 6; Reply Br. at 5-6. Rather, as the Hearing Officer determined, the plain
2 Contrary to Luo’s argument on appeal, see Br. at 44-45, the District Court properly considered the Hearing Officer’s decision in evaluating the motion to dismiss. See S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover, in evaluating the claim seeking to vacate the Hearing Officer’s decision, the District Court was required to apply a “modified” de novo review, giving “due weight” to the ALJ’s factual determinations and “special weight” to the ALJ’s credibility determinations. L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. Of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2006). Notably, in his complaint, Luo contested the Hearing Officer’s conclusions of law but not his fact finding. See ECF No. 1 at 9-12.
4 language of § 1501.10 provided only that students could repeat a grade level during the
2021-2022 school year. See ECF 7-2 at 8-9. Section 1383 of Act 66 provided an
additional year of schooling for disabled students who turned 21 during the 2020-2021
school year and, thus, were no longer entitled to a FAPE under the IDEA. But that
provision did not apply to B.L., nor did Luo contend that it did. 3 Luo elected to enroll
B.L. for the 2021-2022 school year to repeat a grade level, 4 and Luo did not contend that
B.L. was not permitted to do so. See ECF No. 1 at 4, 6-7; ECF No. 7-2 at 4-5, 10; Reply
Br. at 5-6. That is all that B.L.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-2143 __________
JENN-CHING LUO, Appellant
v.
OWEN J. ROBERTS SCHOOL DISTRICT; RICHARD MARCHINI; GEOFFREY BALL ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-22-cv-02546) District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 12, 2024 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2024) ___________
OPINION * ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se appellant Jenn-Ching Luo appeals from orders of the District Court
dismissing his complaint with prejudice and denying his motion for reconsideration. For
the following reasons, we will affirm.
The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et
seq., requires states receiving federal education funding, like Pennsylvania, to provide a
Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to disabled children until they reach 21 years
of age. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 267 (3d Cir. 2014). To
address education gaps wrought by COVID-19, Pennsylvania enacted Act 66 of 2021
which, in part, extended education enrollment for the 2021-2022 school year. See Act of
June 30, 2021, P.L. 353, No. 66, § 1 (amending Public School Code of 1949, P.L. 30,
No.14). As relevant here, § 1383 of the Act allowed students with a disability who were
enrolled for the 2020-2021 school year, and turned 21 years old during that time, to
attend a school entity for the 2021-2022 school year; and § 1501.10 of the Act allowed
any student over 18 years of age “in a school entity . . . to repeat a grade level to make up
for any lost educational opportunities.” Id.
Luo is the father of B.L., a special needs student who enrolled in the 2021-2022
school year in the Owen J. Roberts School District pursuant to § 1501.10 of Act 66. B.L.
turned 21 during that school year; thus, over Luo’s objections, the School District
determined that B.L. would not be entitled to continued enrollment after the end of the
2021-2022 school year.
2 In January 2022, Luo filed an administrative due process complaint arguing that
that the School District was required to provide B.L. with a FAPE for the 2022-2023
school year pursuant to § 1501.10 of Act 66. Luo also claimed that the School District
was required under the “stay put” provision of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), to allow
B.L. to remain in his educational placement beyond the 2021-2022 school year while
proceedings challenging B.L.’s education programs remained pending. 1 Following a
hearing in March 2022, the Hearing Officer issued a decision concluding that B.L. had
“no right to continued enrollment or to a FAPE beyond the end of the 2021-22 school
year.” ECF No. 7-2 at 17.
In June 2022, Luo filed a complaint with the District Court challenging the
Hearing Officer’s decision pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). The complaint also
brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the School District, its director of
Pupil Services Richard Marchini, and its Special Education Supervisor Geoffrey Ball for
violations of his constitutional rights. In an order entered June 29, 2022, the District
Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It subsequently denied
Luo’s timely motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). This appeal ensued.
1 At the time the administrative complaint was filed, there were multiple matters pending in the District Court which involved Luo and the School District, and regarded B.L.’s education rights. See ECF No. 7-2 at 5, ⁋17 & n.5. 3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and will affirm if the complaint fails
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc.,
662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Jonathan H. v. The Souderton Area Sch. Dist.,
562 F.3d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 2009) (observing that an IDEA action pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)
“is an original civil action rather than an appeal,” and thus is “governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure”).
We agree with the District Court that Luo’s claim challenging the Hearing
Officer’s decision fails as a matter of law. 2 First, Luo argued that the Hearing Officer,
like the School District, deprived B.L. of “a year to make up for lost educational
opportunities due to COVID-19,” as provided by Act 66. But this claim is based on his
misunderstanding that § 1501.10 of Act 66 both allowed students to repeat a grade “to
make up educational opportunities” lost during the 2020-2021 school year and provided
students with “an additional year” of schooling thereafter. ECF No. 1 at 7, ⁋45 & 8, ⁋47;
ECF No. 8 at 6; Reply Br. at 5-6. Rather, as the Hearing Officer determined, the plain
2 Contrary to Luo’s argument on appeal, see Br. at 44-45, the District Court properly considered the Hearing Officer’s decision in evaluating the motion to dismiss. See S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover, in evaluating the claim seeking to vacate the Hearing Officer’s decision, the District Court was required to apply a “modified” de novo review, giving “due weight” to the ALJ’s factual determinations and “special weight” to the ALJ’s credibility determinations. L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. Of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2006). Notably, in his complaint, Luo contested the Hearing Officer’s conclusions of law but not his fact finding. See ECF No. 1 at 9-12.
4 language of § 1501.10 provided only that students could repeat a grade level during the
2021-2022 school year. See ECF 7-2 at 8-9. Section 1383 of Act 66 provided an
additional year of schooling for disabled students who turned 21 during the 2020-2021
school year and, thus, were no longer entitled to a FAPE under the IDEA. But that
provision did not apply to B.L., nor did Luo contend that it did. 3 Luo elected to enroll
B.L. for the 2021-2022 school year to repeat a grade level, 4 and Luo did not contend that
B.L. was not permitted to do so. See ECF No. 1 at 4, 6-7; ECF No. 7-2 at 4-5, 10; Reply
Br. at 5-6. That is all that B.L. was entitled to under Act 66.
Second, the Hearing Officer properly determined that the stay-put provision of the
IDEA did not require the School District to maintain B.L.’s enrollment after the end of
the 2021-2022 school year. The “stay-put” provision provides that, “during the pendency
of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local
educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-
3 After the Hearing Officer’s decision, Pennsylvania enacted Act 55 of 2022 (“Act 55”), which allowed disabled students, like B.L., who turned 21 during the 2021-2022 school year and were enrolled for that school year, to attend a school entity for the 2022-2023 school year. See Act of July 8, 2022, P.L. 620, No. 55, § 16 (amending Public School Code of 1949, P.L. 30, No. 14). However, it does not appear that Luo elected to enroll B.L. under Act 55, and Luo asserts the Act is “irrelevant” to his claims. Br. at 44. 4 As the Hearing Officer observed, because B.L. is in a specialized program for students with disabilities, “repeating a grade level means reteaching skills that were previously presented” (or “more accurately,” providing funds so that B.L.’s private school could reteach his 2020-2021 curriculum during the 2021-2022 year). ECF No. 7-2 at 9. The Hearing Officer also observed that, under ACT 66, some disabled students, like B.L., who chose to repeat a grade under § 1501.10 would “age out of IDEA eligibility without a regular high school diploma.” Id. Act 55 subsequently remedied that. 5 current educational placement of the child . . . until all such proceedings have been
completed.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). The purpose of the provision is “to maintain the
educational status quo while the parties' dispute is being resolved.” T.M. ex rel. A.M. v.
Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2014). The Hearing Officer
properly determined that the protections of the stay-put provision terminate, like the right
to a FAPE, once a student turns 21, see ECF No. 7-2 at 10-14. See Bd. of Educ. of Oak
Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. 200 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 659
(7th Cir. 1996) (so holding, reasoning that, otherwise, “parents [could] obtain adult
benefits for their child to which they had no entitlement simply by filing a claim for
compensatory education on the eve of their child’s turning 21”); see also Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988) (holding (under the predecessor IDEA statute) that a student
over age 21 “is no longer entitled to the protections and benefits of the [statute]”).
Therefore, B.L. was not entitled to the protections of the stay-put provision after he
finished the 2021-2022 school year.
Based on the foregoing, the District Court properly dismissed the claim seeking to
vacate the Hearing Officer’s decision. And because it is clear B.L. was not deprived of a
right to an additional year of educational benefits under Act 66, Luo’s remaining claims –
for violations of his equal protection and “liberty” rights – fail as a matter of law. Those
claims were also based on Luo’s misunderstanding of §1501.10. We agree with the
District Court that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because amendment of Luo’s
claims would be futile, see Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 6 2008), and that there was no basis for granting reconsideration, see Max’s Seafood Café
ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the
purpose of a Rule 59(e) motion “is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 5
5 Appellant’s motion to certify a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is denied. 7