NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1073 __________
JENN-CHING LUO, Appellant
v.
OWEN J. ROBERTS SCHOOL DISTRICT; GEOFFREY BALL; SHARON W. MONTANYE; SWEET STEVENS KATZ WILLIAMS LLP; THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-06568) District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 24, 2025
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2025) ___________
OPINION * ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Appellant Jenn-Ching Luo appeals from orders of the District Court granting
judgment on the administrative record in favor of defendant Owen J. Roberts School
District and against Luo, and denying Luo’s motion for reconsideration. For the
following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
The parties are quite familiar with the procedural history of this case, so we need
not restate it in detail here. Briefly, Luo is the parent of B.L., a former special needs
student in the School District. The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA)
required the School District to provide B.L. with a free appropriate public education
(FAPE), which included designing and implementing an Individualized Education Plan
(IEP) for B.L. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1), 1414(d)(2)(A). An IEP “is developed
through a collaborative process between a child’s parents, teachers, and school officials.”
A.J.T. v. Osseo Areas Sch., No. 24-249, 2025 WL 1657415, at *4 (U.S. June 12, 2025).
Accordingly, on June 6, 2016, an IEP meeting was held to discuss B.L.’s independent
educational evaluation (IEE), which was prepared by Dr. Michele Robins. Luo was at
the meeting with other members of the IEP team, including Geoffrey Ball, a Special
Education Supervisor for the School District, and an administrator from B.L.’s private
school. Robins participated in the meeting by phone conference.
After the IEP meeting, the private school administrator prepared and circulated a
summary of the meeting. The School District provided input and revisions, and Luo
responded with his input, disagreeing in part with the School District. The administrator 2 and his staff prepared several drafts of the IEP, incorporating the parties’ input. A final
version of the IEP was sent to Luo and the School District. The School District then
provided Luo with a NOREP, a form used to provide a parent with notice of any potential
changes to a student’s IEP. Luo returned the NOREP, indicating on the form that he did
not consent to the changes and was requesting a due process hearing.
On June 22, 2016, Luo filed an administrative due process complaint under the
IDEA, challenging the IEP meeting and the revised IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). In
particular, Luo claimed that his ability to participate in the meeting and the decision
making process was impeded because (1) he was not given notice that Dr. Robins would
participate by teleconference, and he did not agree to it, (2) Dr. Robins did not fully
participate in the meeting, and she was not asked about her recommendations to which
there was some objection; (3) Dr. Robins left the meeting before it concluded. Luo also
claimed that the IEP was revised by Ball without his consent. He alleged that, due to the
foregoing, the School District and Ball [ ] violated [his] procedural right and denied a
FAPE.” ECF No. 55-9.
After administrative hearings, Hearing Officer Jake McElligott issued a decision
finding that Luo was not denied his right to meaningfully participate in the IEP meeting.
See ECF No. 55-3 at 9, 13. McElligott nevertheless ordered changes to the IEP and
directed the IEP team to reconvene to allow for an in-person meeting with Dr. Robins.
Id. at 9-11, 13.
3 Luo filed an action in the District Court pursuant to the IDEA, challenging
McElligott’s decision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (providing a party aggrieved by a
hearing officer’s decision under the IDEA the right to bring a civil action in a district
court). 1 The District Court found that the record evidence supported McElligott’s
determination that Luo was not denied meaningful participation in the meeting and,
therefore, that he was not denied a FAPE. Accordingly, it granted judgment on the
administrative record in favor of the School District and against Luo. Luo filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied. He then timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court properly
applied modified de novo review, giving “due weight” to McElligott’s findings. S.H. v.
State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003). We review the
District Court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. D.S. v.
Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010). As the party aggrieved by
McElligott’s decision, Luo had the burden of persuasion before the District Court. See
Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2012).
Luo argues on appeal that the School District denied him a FAPE by permitting
Dr. Robins to participate in the IEP meeting telephonically without his agreement. He
notes, correctly, that the IDEA contemplates alternative means of participation, such as
1 Luo’s complaint also included numerous claims against various defendants stemming from the administrative hearing. In a prior appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of those claims, and remanded for proper consideration of the § 1415(i)(2) action. See Luo v. Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., No. 24-10130, 2024 WL 4199008 (3d Cir. Sept. 16. 2024). 4 by “conference calls,” when the parent and the “local education agency” agree. 20
U.S.C. § 1414(f) (emphasis added). He also contends that Dr. Robins was not excused
from “attending” the meeting in person. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(C)(ii). Luo argues that
these alleged procedural violations amount to the denial of a FAPE, and because they
occurred during the development of the IEP, the IEP denied a FAPE. We disagree.
Luo relies on Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982), which set forth a two-part inquiry for courts
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1073 __________
JENN-CHING LUO, Appellant
v.
OWEN J. ROBERTS SCHOOL DISTRICT; GEOFFREY BALL; SHARON W. MONTANYE; SWEET STEVENS KATZ WILLIAMS LLP; THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-06568) District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 24, 2025
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2025) ___________
OPINION * ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Appellant Jenn-Ching Luo appeals from orders of the District Court granting
judgment on the administrative record in favor of defendant Owen J. Roberts School
District and against Luo, and denying Luo’s motion for reconsideration. For the
following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
The parties are quite familiar with the procedural history of this case, so we need
not restate it in detail here. Briefly, Luo is the parent of B.L., a former special needs
student in the School District. The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA)
required the School District to provide B.L. with a free appropriate public education
(FAPE), which included designing and implementing an Individualized Education Plan
(IEP) for B.L. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1), 1414(d)(2)(A). An IEP “is developed
through a collaborative process between a child’s parents, teachers, and school officials.”
A.J.T. v. Osseo Areas Sch., No. 24-249, 2025 WL 1657415, at *4 (U.S. June 12, 2025).
Accordingly, on June 6, 2016, an IEP meeting was held to discuss B.L.’s independent
educational evaluation (IEE), which was prepared by Dr. Michele Robins. Luo was at
the meeting with other members of the IEP team, including Geoffrey Ball, a Special
Education Supervisor for the School District, and an administrator from B.L.’s private
school. Robins participated in the meeting by phone conference.
After the IEP meeting, the private school administrator prepared and circulated a
summary of the meeting. The School District provided input and revisions, and Luo
responded with his input, disagreeing in part with the School District. The administrator 2 and his staff prepared several drafts of the IEP, incorporating the parties’ input. A final
version of the IEP was sent to Luo and the School District. The School District then
provided Luo with a NOREP, a form used to provide a parent with notice of any potential
changes to a student’s IEP. Luo returned the NOREP, indicating on the form that he did
not consent to the changes and was requesting a due process hearing.
On June 22, 2016, Luo filed an administrative due process complaint under the
IDEA, challenging the IEP meeting and the revised IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). In
particular, Luo claimed that his ability to participate in the meeting and the decision
making process was impeded because (1) he was not given notice that Dr. Robins would
participate by teleconference, and he did not agree to it, (2) Dr. Robins did not fully
participate in the meeting, and she was not asked about her recommendations to which
there was some objection; (3) Dr. Robins left the meeting before it concluded. Luo also
claimed that the IEP was revised by Ball without his consent. He alleged that, due to the
foregoing, the School District and Ball [ ] violated [his] procedural right and denied a
FAPE.” ECF No. 55-9.
After administrative hearings, Hearing Officer Jake McElligott issued a decision
finding that Luo was not denied his right to meaningfully participate in the IEP meeting.
See ECF No. 55-3 at 9, 13. McElligott nevertheless ordered changes to the IEP and
directed the IEP team to reconvene to allow for an in-person meeting with Dr. Robins.
Id. at 9-11, 13.
3 Luo filed an action in the District Court pursuant to the IDEA, challenging
McElligott’s decision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (providing a party aggrieved by a
hearing officer’s decision under the IDEA the right to bring a civil action in a district
court). 1 The District Court found that the record evidence supported McElligott’s
determination that Luo was not denied meaningful participation in the meeting and,
therefore, that he was not denied a FAPE. Accordingly, it granted judgment on the
administrative record in favor of the School District and against Luo. Luo filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied. He then timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court properly
applied modified de novo review, giving “due weight” to McElligott’s findings. S.H. v.
State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003). We review the
District Court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. D.S. v.
Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010). As the party aggrieved by
McElligott’s decision, Luo had the burden of persuasion before the District Court. See
Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2012).
Luo argues on appeal that the School District denied him a FAPE by permitting
Dr. Robins to participate in the IEP meeting telephonically without his agreement. He
notes, correctly, that the IDEA contemplates alternative means of participation, such as
1 Luo’s complaint also included numerous claims against various defendants stemming from the administrative hearing. In a prior appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of those claims, and remanded for proper consideration of the § 1415(i)(2) action. See Luo v. Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., No. 24-10130, 2024 WL 4199008 (3d Cir. Sept. 16. 2024). 4 by “conference calls,” when the parent and the “local education agency” agree. 20
U.S.C. § 1414(f) (emphasis added). He also contends that Dr. Robins was not excused
from “attending” the meeting in person. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(C)(ii). Luo argues that
these alleged procedural violations amount to the denial of a FAPE, and because they
occurred during the development of the IEP, the IEP denied a FAPE. We disagree.
Luo relies on Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982), which set forth a two-part inquiry for courts
addressing § 1415(i)(2) suits: first, determine whether there is a procedural violation, and
second, determine whether the IEP is substantively adequate. Luo argues that, due to the
procedural violations, both the School District and the IEP “failed the first prong test,”
and thereby denied him a FAPE. Appellant’s Br. at 20, 22. He is mistaken. While
“[s]ubstantive inadequacy automatically entitles the parents to reimbursement,”
“procedural violations . . . only do so if they ‘impeded the child's right to a [FAPE],’
‘significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking
process,’ or ‘caused a deprivation of educational benefits.’ R.E. v. New York City Dep’t
of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 190 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, as relevant here,
even assuming that the School District ran afoul of IDEA’s procedural requirements with
regard to Dr. Robin’s appearance at the IEP meeting, such “procedural violation[s] [are]
actionable under the IDEA only if [they] . . . seriously deprive[d] [Luo] of [his]
participation rights.” Bayonne, 602 F.3d at 565.
5 The record supports McElligott’s determination that Luo was not denied a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the IEP meeting. 2 Contrary to Luo’s contention
on appeal, the School District did not “block” Dr. Robins from attending the IEP
meeting. It worked to coordinate a date for her to attend. When Dr. Robins indicated
that she could not appear in person before the end of the school year (in either late May
or June), the School District arranged for her to appear telephonically. Notably, Luo did
not object at the IEP meeting to Dr. Robins’ participation.
McElligott found that Dr. Robins “was not overly expressive” at the meeting, and
that her participation “was not deep or comprehensive.” ECF No. 55-3 at 4, 8. However,
Luo has not shown that her participation would have been different had she attended the
meeting in person. 3 Luo also claimed that the IEP team did not review Dr. Robins’ IEE
report with her. But all team members had a copy of the report before the meeting, and
2 The District Court concluded that “McElligo[t]t’s decision adequately addressed any procedural failing” related to Dr. Robins’ attendance because “[t]he order required the parties to reconvene in order to discuss Dr. Robins’ findings in-person.” ECF No. 58. We agree with Luo that the order would not address any perceived procedural violation at the IEP meeting. Indeed, McElligott concluded that there was no procedural violation, and ordered the parties to reconvene only to address Luo’s “concerns.” ECF No. 55-3 at 10, 13-14. Moreover, the order indicated that, if Dr. Robins was “unable or unwilling to attend,” the meeting need not be held. Id. at 14. 3 In support of this claim, Luo argues in his reply brief that Dr. Robins left “shortly after the start of the meeting.” Reply Br. at 16. He forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in his opening brief. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). Moreover, the record does not support it. McElligott found that Dr. Robins “could not participate for the entirety of the IEP meeting and dis-connected (sic) the call before the meeting’s end,” citing Ball’s testimony that Dr. Robins left with “about five to 10 minutes remaining in the [75 minute] meeting.” ECF Nos. 55-3 at 4, 55-5 at 10. 6 Dr. Robins’ findings were consistent with previous school evaluations. See ECF No. 55-
5 at 9, 14. As McElligott found, the IEP Team discussed Dr. Robins’ recommendations.
Luo expressed his concerns about B.L., and explained why he believed Dr. Robins’
recommendations should be adopted; and when the other team members objected to the
recommendations, he expressed his disagreement. See, e.g., id. at 10-11, 20-21, 25. Luo
also could have questioned Dr. Robins directly about the IEE report. The District Court
therefore did not err in determining that the IEP meeting did not result in the denial of a
FAPE. Accordingly, it properly granted judgment on the administrative proceedings in
favor of the School District and against Luo.
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.