Jeanty v. Bottini Fuel Oil

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 5, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-08316
StatusUnknown

This text of Jeanty v. Bottini Fuel Oil (Jeanty v. Bottini Fuel Oil) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jeanty v. Bottini Fuel Oil, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KERVIN JEANTY, Plaintiff, 21-CV-8316 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND BOTTINI FUEL OIL; MARK BOTTINI; NANCY DOE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297. Plaintiff alleges that in January 2019, Defendants fired him from his job as a driver “for not driving in [the] snow.” (ECF 2, at 3.) By order dated October 26, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court

must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Kervin Jeanty brings this complaint against three defendants: Bottini Fuel Oil, Mark Bottini, and Nancy Doe. Plaintiff’s claims concern Defendants’ decision to fire him in January 2019, because Plaintiff “refus[ed] to continue driving in the snow with hazardous fuel oil.” (ECF 2, at 5.) He alleges that Defendant Nancy Doe, during a hiring interview “made a comment,” that is, she stated: “I don’t like Dogs. I hate dogs, they kill dogs.” (Id.). In the complaint, immediately following this reference to Nancy Doe’s alleged comment, Plaintiff states that he is African American and Hispanic. Plaintiff asserts claims under federal and state law, seeking damages.! He indicates that he did not file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or any other government agency. DISCUSSION A. Claims Under Title VII Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer

... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This antidiscrimination provision prohibits employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under Title VII. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).

' This action is one of four that Plaintiff filed the same day. See Jeanty v. Blue Rhino, 1:21-CV-8326, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 2021) (complaint asserting claims under Title VII and alleging that he did not receive a bonus and was eventually terminated); Jeanty v. UPS United Parcel Service Freight, ECF 1:21-CV-8311, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 2021) (complaint asserting claims under Title VII and alleging that he was not hired during UPS’s hiring event); Jeanty v. United Parcel Service, ECF 1:21-CV-08312, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 2021) (complaint alleging that Plaintiff was not hired due to discrimination). Plaintiff also brought prior actions that are now closed. See, e.g., Jeanty v. Precision Pipeline Solutions LLC, ECF 7:18-CV-7721, 78 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2021) (granting summary judgment for employer on Title VII claim); Jeanty v. Newburgh Beacon Bus Corp., 7:17-CV-9175, 30 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2018) (granting motion to dismiss employment discrimination claims).

At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by

giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87.

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Jeanty v. Bottini Fuel Oil, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeanty-v-bottini-fuel-oil-nysd-2021.