ALARCON, Circuit Judge:
FACTS
In the early morning of March 7, 1975, Clayton Hirst, a member of the Blackfeet Native American Tribe, was found dead in his jail cell in the Glacier County Jail in Cut Bank, Montana, hanged by the neck from his belt. Appellants, the heirs of Clayton Hirst, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging that Glacier County, the City of Cut Bank, and various county and city officials had violated his civil rights.
Appellants put forward two theories of liability for Clayton Hirst’s death. First, appellants alleged that Clayton Hirst had been murdered by electrocution, and his body hanged afterwards to disguise the murder. The murder allegedly spawned a conspiracy among county and city officials to suppress the true facts of Hirst’s death. Alternatively, appellants claimed that Clayton Hirst had committed suicide, and that his suicide was the direct and foreseeable result of the defendants’ gross negligence in leaving Clayton Hirst in the sole control of a violent deputy sheriff, employed by the defendants despite a history of violent behavior towards prisoners. In connection with their § 1983 claim based on gross negligence, appellants requested the district court to take pendent jurisdiction over a related state law claim based on simple negligence.1
[1255]*1255On the day set for jury selection, appellants filed a motion challenging the jury panel, claiming that the jury selection procedure employed in the district court invidiously discriminated against Native Americans. The court, after a hearing, found no evidence of intentional discrimination in the selection procedure, and denied appellants’ motion.
Over appellants’ strenuous objections, the court divided the trial into two phases. The manner of Clayton Hirst’s death was to be determined in the trial’s first phase; in the second phase, any remaining issues would be decided.
The jury found that Clayton Hirst had committed suicide.
After the jury’s verdict was returned, the court requested appellants to make an offer of proof on their claim that the gross negligence of the defendants was responsible for Clayton Hirst’s suicide. Appellants offered to prove the following facts in support of that claim:
1. County officials were grossly negligent in hiring the deputy sheriff. This deputy had a long history of violence towards minority prisoners, and had been dismissed from his previous job as a deputy sheriff because of his abuse of prisoners.
2. Responsible county officials either failed to inquire as to the deputy’s competence when they hired him, or showed deliberate indifference to his obvious unsuitability for the position.2
3. Once county officials had hired the deputy they were grossly negligent in continuing to employ him as a guard, and in giving him sole and unsupervised control of the jail.
4. During his tenure as a deputy sheriff for Glacier County, the deputy had abused prisoners within his charge.
5. On one occasion the deputy had allegedly taunted prisoners committed to his supervision.
6. On another occasion, Hirst’s older brother James had been incarcerated in the city jail. The deputy, while employed by the county, had stripped James Hirst, sprayed him with mace, and left him in an unventilated cell where he would have suffocated to death had another deputy not happened upon him.
7. County officials were on notice of the deputy’s violent behavior. Law enforcement personnel in the county were informed of the mace incident.
8. Nothing was done to investigate the maeeing incident or to reprimand the deputy for his behavior.3
9. The afternoon before his death, Hirst, a cheerful person with no history of depression or mental illness, was visibly upset and apparently in fear of his life.
10. At the time of his death, Hirst was the only prisoner in the jail, alone on the second floor of the prison structure, isolated from the police dispatcher and other prison personnel on the first floor.
11. The deputy had been alone with Hirst at some point on the afternoon Hirst died, and the deputy at all times had access to the second floor of the prison.
12. Despite Hirst’s troubled mental state, and his subjugation to a deputy with known sadistic tendencies, Hirst was allowed by [1256]*1256prison officials to retain his belt, in violation of the prison’s own policies.4
The court, after hearing the offer of proof, ruled that the proposed evidence did not establish a prima facie case of gross negligence. The court dismissed appellants’ § 1983 action and the pendent state claim.
Appellants contend that the court erred in dismissing their § 1983 action and the pendent state law claim, and argue that the court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial. Appellants also assert that their evidence established a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination in the juror selection process, and that the district court was incorrect in finding otherwise.
For the reasons stated below, we hold that appellants’ offer of proof sufficiently established a prima facie case of negligence under § 1983 and we reverse the court’s dismissal of appellants’ § 1983 action. We further hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating the trial, and that the court correctly concluded that appellants’ evidence failed to establish a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination in the juror selection process. We remand the question of the court’s pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim for reconsideration in light of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
THE JURY CHALLENGE
Appellants allege that the entire procedure used in the Great Falls District to select petit jurors invidiously discriminated against Native Americans, in violation of the equal protection principles embodied in the due process clause of the fifth amendment.5
The panel of 60 persons from which the jury in this case was drawn was chosen according to the Revised Plan for Random Jury Selection of the District Court for the District of Montana [“The Plan”].6 In conformity with the plan’s requirements, the court clerk selected, at random, the names of 1,000 potential jurors from the voters registration list for the Great Falls District. Juror qualification questionnaires were sent to 300 persons whose names were selected at random in a public drawing from the 1,000 names on the master jury list. As required by statute,7 the juror questionnaire requested the prospective juror to identify his or her race; thus, the race of the prospective juror was clearly displayed on most of the returned questionnaires. Persons who failed to respond to the initial mailing were sent a follow-up questionnaire. If the prospective juror failed to return the second questionnaire, no further attempts were made to contact that person, although the plan did require that further steps be taken.8 Ultimately, 287 of the 300 [1257]*1257persons completed and returned questionnaires. Because of a realignment of the geographical boundaries of the Great Falls division, 112 additional returned questionnaires from another geographical area were added. All told, 399 persons returned questionnaires, 19 of whom (4.76 percent) identified themselves as Native Americans.9 The district court took judicial notice of the fact that Native Americans constituted 6.36 percent of the population in the district.
Almost 50 percent of the 399 persons returning questionnaires availed themselves of excuses from jury service available under the jury selection plan; 14 of the 19 persons identifying themselves as Native Americans were among those excused. Among the exemptions available upon request was one for those living 100 miles or more from the courthouse. The record contains no evidence as to the number or race of the persons excused from jury service on the basis of the 100 mile exemption.10
Of the 200 persons remaining in the jury pool after those requesting excuses were eliminated, only five persons (2.5 percent) remained who identified themselves as Native Americans. None of the 60 persons on the jury panel from which the Hirst jury was chosen were Native Americans. Mary Kendall, an activist in the Native American community; testified that she could recall only one Native American ever being called to serve on a Great Falls federal jury, despite her personal acquaintance with over 5,000 Native Americans of voting age.
Appellants claim that these facts established a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination in the juror selection process, shifting the burden of proving nondiscrimination to the defendants. Appellants’ claim rests on two alternative theories. First, appellants contend that the jury selection process resulted in the “progressive decimation” of the number of Native Americans available for jury service: Despite a Native American population of 6.36 percent in the District, at most only 5.26 percent of the persons returning juror questionnaires were Native Americans, and only 2.5 percent of the persons remaining on the jury venire from which petit juries were chosen were Native Americans. We are told that this “progressive decimation” must be viewed in light of the fact that the race of each prospective juror was clearly displayed on the face of the returned questionnaires, affording those who granted exemptions a “clear opportunity to discriminate” against Native Americans.11 According to appellants, the “progressive decimation” of Native Americans available for jury service, coupled with the ‘clear opportunity to discriminate’ provided by the designation of race on the questionnaire, establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the juror selection process. Appellants cite Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972), in support of their position.
Alternatively, appellants contend that the totality of circumstances in this case, including the availability of the 100 mile exemption, the testimony of Mary Kendall, and the Clerk’s failure to summon non-responding jurors, suggests that the jury selection plan was either consciously designed or administered so as to decrease substantially the number of Native American citizens available for jury service. Appellants argue that the totality of these circumstances is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.
In our view, appellants’ evidence does not establish a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination under either theory.
[1258]*1258Our analysis of appellants’ contention begins with a recognition that a state may not deliberately and systematically exclude members of an identifiable group from participation as jurors in the administration of justice. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628-29, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1224, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972). See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477, 74 S.Ct. 667, 670, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954).12 Similarly, substantial under-representation of an identifiable group is constitutionally impermissible under equal protection principles when it results from purposeful discrimination.13 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1279, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 629-31, 92 S.Ct. at 1224-25.
For purposes of discussing appellants’ first theory, we assume that the numbers of Native Americans available for jury service in this particular instance decreased significantly after excuses from jury service had been granted.14 It is also true that the race of each prospective juror was clearly in evidence on the returned questionnaires. However, we disagree with appellants’ suggestion that the mere susceptibility of a selection procedure to abuse, even where accompanied by evidence that a given group is substantially underrepresented on a single venire, establishes a prima facie ease of intentional discrimination as a matter of law.
The elements of proof required to establish a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination in the juror selection process turn of necessity on the circumstances of each case. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 626, 629, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1222, 1223, 1224, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1976). The proportion of an identifiable group eliminated from the pool of eligible jurors, along with the susceptibility of the selection process to abuse, are surely important factors in this determination. Indeed, the substantial underrepresentation or the complete exclusion of an identifiable group, [1259]*1259coupled with a juror selection procedure susceptible of abuse, has been held to establish a prima facie case in cases where intentional discrimination could not otherwise be demonstrated. See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550-51, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79, 74 S.Ct. 667, 670-71, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561-63, 73 S.Ct. 891, 892-93, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953). In Hernandez v. Texas, for example,15 jurors were selected by “key men” who utilized such subjective criteria as “good moral character” in selecting jurors. In Alexander, Avery, and Whitus, jur- or selection at certain crucial points was purportedly done in a random fashion. However, in the plans challenged in these cases, the names of jurors were selected from cards which were color-coded according to the race of the person named on the card,16 from segregated tax roles,17 or from questionnaires bearing an “information card” clearly designating the juror’s race.18 In each of these cases, proof of the substantial underrepresentation or exclusion of an identifiable group, along with evidence that the juror selection system was susceptible of abuse, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The minimal evidentiary requirements approved in these cases, in our view, reflect judicial recognition that the actual intrusion of racial bias in those particular juror selection systems was virtually incapable of further proof, short of an open admission of discrimination by those involved in the selection process. It would have been virtually impossible, for example, for the challengers to have produced further evidence that an allegedly random selection process was not
random but was in fact distorted by racial prejudice, or that the “key men” actually ignored the quality of “good moral character” in chosing jurors, and instead selected only white jurors for racial reasons.19
These cases, however, do not support appellant’s much broader claim that the mere susceptibility of a system to abuse, along with a single instance of substantial under-representation on a jury venire, establishes a prim a facie case of intentional discrimination as a matter of law. In our view, whether further evidence of intentional discrimination is required depends in large part upon such crucial considerations as the difficulty of proving that bias had intruded into a particular selection procedure. See generally Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 481 — 82, 74 S.Ct. at 671-72. Different juror selection systems are susceptible to covert abuse in varying degrees: a system in which jury commissioners select jurors on the basis of such vague and non-quantifiable attributes as “good moral character” is obviously more easily abused with impunity than a selection method in which objective selection criteria are mechanically applied.
The proof problems faced by the challengers in the cases discussed above are clearly absent in this case. Appellants here suggest that intentional racial discrimination intruded at the point in the selection process when juror excuses were granted. This claim can easily be documented from information contained in the returned questionnaires, which list not only the race of the prospective juror, but also any excuses from jury service requested by a prospective juror, and any excuses granted.20 Tab[1260]*1260ulation of the data contained in those and related documents, all available for appellants’ inspection upon appropriate motion,21 could easily have disclosed any possible pattern of racial bias in the granting of excuses from jury service. At the point in the selection process where requested excusáis were granted, jurors in the plan were not selected at random, nor were they selected according to subjective criteria. They were culled from those returning juror questionnaires by a mechanical, non-discretionary process of granting the requested excuses listed on the juror questionnaire. See United States v. Hanson, 472 F.Supp. 1049, 1055 (D.Minn.1979). Here, unlike the cases cited by appellants, the claim of racial bias can easily be supported by further evidence.22 Thus, a mere showing of underrepresentation in this case, even when coupled with evidence that the juror selection procedure was susceptible of abuse, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.23
Appellants’ second theory fares no better. It is true that an invidiously discriminatory purpose in juror selection may often be inferred from the totality of relevant circumstances. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2052, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Here, however, the district court found that the evidence simply did not support a finding of intentional discrimination. We must uphold that factual finding so long as it is not clearly erroneous. United States v. Smith, 625 F.2d 278, 279-80 (9th Cir. 1980). As discussed above, the underrepresentation of Native Americans on the jury venire, along with the fact that the prospective juror’s race was clearly designated on the returned questionnaires, was insufficient to establish a prima facie ease of intentional racial bias. The district court’s conclusion that the additional evidence introduced by appellants did not provide legally significant support for their contention was not clearly erroneous. Appellants point out that the court clerk failed to summon jurors who did not respond to the questionnaire as he was required to do by the Plan. Appellants introduced no evidence concerning the race of the persons failing to respond, however, nor did they introduce any proof from which it could be inferred that such persons were likely to be Native Americans.24 Similarly, appellants suggest that the availability of an exemption for those living over 100 miles from the courthouse was designed virtually to guarantee that a disproportionate number of Native Americans would request exemptions from jury service, since the major reservations were all located over 100 miles from the courthouse. Appellants introduced no evidence, however, other than counsel’s unsupported assertion, that the majority of Native Americans lived over [1261]*1261100 miles from the courthouse, or that Native Americans did in fact avail themselves of this exemption in disproportionate numbers.25 Finally, appellants’ failure to lay a proper foundation for the testimony of Mary Kendall may have substantially undermined any value her testimony might otherwise have had. Appellants never established, for example, (1) whether Mary Kendall had actually inquired of the 5,000 Native American persons known to her if they had served on a federal jury; (2) whether any of those persons had been sent questionnaires but had requested excuses; (3) whether she had personal knowledge that these 5,000 persons presently lived in the district; (4) whether these persons were otherwise fully qualified to serve as jurors. Her testimony may simply have been too conelusory and vague to add any weight to appellants’ attempt to establish a prima facie case. There were thus ample grounds upon which the district court based its conclusion that appellants had failed to establish a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination. We uphold the district court’s denial of appellants’ motion.
The Bifurcation Order
Over appellants’ objections, the district court divided the trial into two phases. In the first phase, the jury was to determine only the manner of Clayton Hirst’s death, whether by electrocution or by self-inflicted hanging. The evidence was to be confined to the issue of how Clayton Hirst met his death. The issues remaining after the jury’s verdict were to be tried in the trial’s second phase, before the same jury. This bifurcation was within the sound discretion of the district court. We must uphold the court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Moss v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 25-26 (6th Cir. 1965); See Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 44-45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 928, 86 S.Ct. 1447, 16 L.Ed.2d 531 (1966).
The court bifurcated the trial for a number of reasons. First, bifurcation simplified the issues for the jury. If the jury were to find that Clayton Hirst was electrocuted, the appellants’ claim that certain officials conspired to cover up the murder could be considered in the trial’s second phase. Conversely, the complex conspiracy issue would be eliminated if the jury found that Clayton Hirst died by self-inflicted hanging. Secondly, the court feared that unless the trial was conducted in this order, there was danger of unnecessary jury confusion, since certain evidence relevant to the conspiracy issue might tend to obscure the more fundamental question of how Clayton Hirst’s death occurred.
While conceding that the trial court has broad discretion to order bifurcation in appropriate circumstances, appellants claim that the bifurcation order here emasculated their proof on a crucial issue — namely, the identity of the murderer of Clayton Hirst. Appellants suggest that the deputy in charge of the jail’s prisoners at the time Clayton Hirst died, was the person who murdered Clayton Hirst. The evidence which appellants wished to introduce consisted primarily of testimony about this deputy’s violent and brutal conduct towards Native American persons on previous occasions.26
[1262]*1262In our view, appellants’ dispute is not primarily with the court’s bifurcation order; it is with the court’s evidentiary ruling barring testimony about the deputy’s prior acts. As we note below, the disputed evidence may be admissible in any retrial to establish appellants’ claim of negligence. However, the court’s ruling excluding the disputed evidence in the trial’s first phase for the purposes for which appellants offered it was correct.
Evidence of prior acts is ordinarily not admissible to prove that a person acted in a particular way on a particular occasion. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) does provide, however, that evidence of prior acts is admissible to prove identity where identity is in issue. The parties here agree that the identity of the alleged murderer of Clayton Hirst was a material issue in the case.
The “identity” exception to Rule 404(b) must be applied with care, however, since too broad an application might allow into evidence the very matter which the general rule excludes — i.e., character evidence. See Wright and Graham, 22 Federal Practice and Procedure § 5246 (1978). For that reason, courts have traditionally taken a narrow view of the “identity” exception to § 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 466 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1972).
The relevance of the deputy’s prior acts of violence to the identity of the murderer apparently rests on a “modus operandi” theory. The deputy’s prior acts allegedly demonstrate a unique method of operation, from which a jury could infer that the deputy was indeed the murderer of Clayton Hirst. None of the proffered evidence, however, involved taking a prisoner’s life. While the evidence, if true, suggests an extremely violent and brutal character, it does not demonstrate the unique handiwork of a murderer. Given the rather narrow construction of the “modus operandi” exception in this circuit, requiring a very close similarity between the prior acts and the conduct sought to be established, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to have excluded this evidence when introduced for the purpose of establishing the identity of the murderer. Even had the trial not been bifurcated, the evidence would not have been admissible for that purpose.
Dismissal of the § 1983 Action Based on Gross Negligence
Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing their § 1983 claim. The district court found, as a matter of law, that the evidence contained in appellants’ offer of proof would not establish a claim under § 1983 premised on gross negligence.27
[1263]*1263Subsequent to the time that the district court’s ruling was handed down, the Supreme Court decided the case of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). In Parratt, the Supreme Court held that negligent conduct by persons acting under color of state law may be actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There is no express requirement of a particular state of mind in Section 1983. The precise holding in Parratt was summarized by the Court as follows:
Accordingly, in any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 451 U.S. at 535, 101 S.Ct. at 1913.
The complaint here clearly alleges that the actions were taken under color of state law and that there was a deprivation of life. We are, therefore, compelled to remand this matter for trial consistent with the views expressed in Parratt. We recognize that appellants’ complaint alleges that defendants were grossly negligent. The pleadings were drafted prior to Parratt and at a time when it was reasonable to believe that the law required something more than simple negligence to state a claim under section 1983. The trial of this matter upon remand must be according to the law as interpreted by the court in Parratt.
We are satisfied that the complaint and the offer of proof made a sufficient showing of causation.
The hiring and supervision of those with primary control of prisoners is a serious matter, demanding a high degree of care.28 Cf. Rundle v. Madigan, 356 F.Supp. 1048, 1053 (N.D.Cal.1972) (delegating authority to wield and discharge a firearm demands a high degree of care). Appellants’ offer of proof outlined a systematic failure on the part of the relevant county officials to exercise even minimal care in the hiring and supervision of the deputy in charge of prisoners at the Glacier County Jail.
Appellees’ duty to protect Hirst from unreasonable risks of harm was uncontroverted. Appellants’ offer of proof, in our view, was sufficient to allege a triable issue that the county defendants’ conduct in hiring and supervising their deputies was negligent and created a foreseeable risk that a violation of Hirst’s civil rights would occur, and in fact proximately caused his death. Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F.Supp. 1111, 1116 (E.D.Mich.1979); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F.Supp. 585, 589-91 (D.R.I.1978). See Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974); Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F.Supp. 1188, 1192-95 (N.D.Ill.1979). See also Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1973); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972). It is true, of course, that a trial of these issues may show that the proof does not support these allegations. Appellants are entitled to present their proof to a trier of fact.
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANTS’ PENDENT STATE LAW CLAIMS
The district court took pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim for simple negligence brought by appellants against various county and city employees. At the close of trial, however, the district court dismissed the state law claim, holding that the court [1264]*1264had no jurisdiction to consider it. While the court’s ruling was correct at the time it was entered, subsequent changes in the relevant law require that the pendent law issue be remanded for reassessment.
The original complaint filed in the district court named Glacier County and the City of Cut Bank as defendants. Toward the beginning of the litigation, the district court dismissed them from the lawsuit. At the time these entities were dismissed, case law clearly held that the city and county could not be sued under § 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Appellants’ pendent state law claim thus included only the individual persons named as defendants.
Under Montana law, however, the governmental entity which employs an alleged tortfeasor — in this case the city and the county — is deemed an indispensable party in any negligence action brought against an employee.29 As noted above, these entities had already been dismissed from the lawsuit. Because the district court had no independent basis of federal jurisdiction over these entities under applicable precedent the district court also had no jurisdiction over them for purposes of the pendent state law claim. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). Because the court had no jurisdiction over indispensable parties to the state law claim, it was compelled to dismiss that claim. See Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 257, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 1257, 12 L.Ed.2d 280 (1964).
After the city and the county had been dismissed, the Supreme Court decided Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Monell held that local governmental entities may in fact be sued under § 1983 where the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights resulted from the execution of an official governmental policy or custom. Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2035. Because we must decide this case on the basis of the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76-77, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2086-87, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), we hold that the dismissal of the city and the county must be reversed.30
Under Monell, the city and county would be amenable to suit under § 1983 for a deprivation of Clayton Hirst’s [1265]*1265constitutional rights if that deprivation resulted from official policy, practice or custom.31 See Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F.Supp. 1188, 1192-95 (N.D.Ill.1979). We cannot ascertain from the state of the record whether this is in fact the case, since the city and the county were dismissed at an early stage in the litigation. On remand, the appellants should at least be given the opportunity to amend the pleadings and to show that their remaining claim or claims against these entities is cognizable under § 1983 in light of the Monell decision.
If appellants’ claim or claims against the city and the county do in fact rest on some official policy, practice, or custom of those entities, these entities will be a proper defendant in appellants’ § 1983 action. The district court will also have jurisdiction over appellants’ state law claim, since there will be federal jurisdiction over all indispensable parties to the state law cause of action. We express no opinion as to how the district court should exercise its discretion in determining the appropriateness of assuming pendent jurisdiction over the state law negligence claim. We merely remand that question for reassessment in light of the Monell decision.
Because we affirm the district court’s ruling on the bifurcation and juror selection questions, we conclude that the jury’s verdict in the trial’s first phase should not be disturbed. On remand, the jury should be instructed that Clayton Hirst committed suicide.32 Evidence relating solely to the electrocution/hanging controversy, or to other matters eliminated from the case by the jury’s verdict, may properly be excluded from the trial.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.