Christopher Williams v. City of Long Beach

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: July 31, 2020
• Docket: 2:19-cv-05929
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

O 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court 8 Central District of California 9 10

11 CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, Case № 2:19-cv-05929-ODW (AFMx)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v.

14 CITY OF LONG BEACH, SERGEANT ORDER GRANTING RAY ALEXANDER, individually and as a DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 15 peace officer, OFFICER DEDIER BIFURCATE PLAINTIFF’S 16 REYES, individually and as a peace MONELL CLAIMS AGAINST THE officer, OFFICER BRYANT YURIAR, CITY OF LONG BEACH AND TO 17 individually and as a peace officer, STAY MONELL-RELATED SERGEANT DEREK ERNEST, DISCOVERY [37] 18 individually and as a peace officer, and DOES 1-10, 19 Defendants. 20 21 22 I. INTRODUCTION 23 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate Plaintiff’s Monell 24 Claims Against the City of Long Beach and to Stay Monell-Related Discovery 25 (“Motion”). (Mot. to Bifurcate (“MTB”), ECF No. 37.) For the reasons discussed 26 below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.1 27

28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 This case arises from an incident that allegedly took place in the early-morning 3 hours of March 24, 2018. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff 4 alleges that he was watching and recording a street fight when Defendant Officer 5 Dedier Reyes unlawfully used force to detain Plaintiff in such a manner that injured 6 Plaintiff’s right elbow. (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was wrongfully held 7 and denied medical attention, and that Reyes conspired with Defendants Officer 8 Bryant Yuriar and Sergeant Derek Ernest to cover up Reyes’s unlawful use of force. 9 (FAC ¶ 7.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sergeant Ray Alexander, as the 10 supervising officer in charge, failed to timely direct Plaintiff’s release despite knowing 11 that Plaintiff was mistakenly detained. (FAC ¶ 7.) 12 Both of Plaintiff’s causes of action arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s 13 first cause of action alleges a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 14 rights by the individual police officer Defendants (collectively, the “Officers”). (FAC 15 ¶¶ 8–17.) Plaintiff’s second cause of action against Defendant City of Long Beach 16 (the “City”) is based on municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social 17 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (FAC ¶¶ 18–23.) Defendants now move to bifurcate 18 Plaintiff’s Monell claim2 and to stay Monell-related discovery. (See generally MTB.) 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) permits the Court to order a separate trial 21 of separate claims or issues “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and 22 economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The Court might bifurcate a trial to “avoid[] a 23 difficult question by first dealing with an easier, dispositive issue.” Danjaq LLC v. 24 Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 961 (9th Cir. 2001). The court has broad, discretionary 25 authority to order bifurcation. Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982). 26 27 2 Defendants also request bifurcation of the issues of punitive damages and liability as to Plaintiff’s 28 first cause of action, to the extent that Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim against the Officers Defendants relies on the same evidence of prior misconduct as his Monell claim. (MTB 11–12.) 1 The moving party has the burden to prove that bifurcation is appropriate. Clark v. 2 I.R.S., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (D. Haw. 2009). 3 A municipality may be liable for causing a cognizable injury under 42 U.S.C. 4 § 1983 if the injury is a result of a custom or policy of the municipality. See Monell, 5 436 U.S. at 690–91. When such Monell claims are asserted in conjunction with 6 claims against individual defendants, courts often bifurcate them in the interests of 7 “convenience and judicial economy” and “the avoidance of potential prejudice [to the 8 individual defendants] and confusion.” See, e.g., Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 9 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 10 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2098 (2017) (reversing and 11 remanding for new trial finding abuse of discretion in failing to bifurcate liability from 12 damages). Indeed, no case “authorizes the award of damages against a municipal 13 corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has 14 concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.” City of Los Angeles v. 15 Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam). Rather, “[i]f a person has suffered no 16 constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the 17 departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive 18 force is quite beside the point.” Id. 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 Here, Defendants request that Plaintiff’s Monell claim and the issue of punitive 21 damages be decided in a second phase of trial, as well as a stay in discovery of any 22 matters relevant exclusively to Plaintiff’s Monell claim. (See generally MTB.) The 23 Court addresses these requests in turn. 24 A. Defendants’ Request to Bifurcate 25 In support of its motion to bifurcate, Defendants assert that (1) bifurcation will 26 avoid juror confusion and undue prejudice to the Officers; (2) bifurcation will promote 27 convenience and economy; and (3) the claims to be bifurcated involve separable 28 issues. The Court agrees. 1 1. Bifurcation Would Reduce the Potential for Juror Confusion and 2 Prejudice to the Officers 3 Defendants express concern that “Plaintiff will likely attempt to prove his 4 Monell claim by introducing evidence concerning alleged misconduct of the officer 5 defendants and other non-party officers that stem from prior unrelated incidents.” 6 (MTB 4.) Thus, Defendants argue, “[t]he simultaneous presentation of this Monell 7 evidence and evidence related to Plaintiff’s individual claims will unfairly prejudice 8 the officer defendants by tainting them with unrelated claims of alleged wrongdoing 9 that have nothing to do with their conduct during this incident.” (MTB 4.) 10 Plaintiff seemingly acknowledges that evidence of prior wrongful acts is not 11 generally admissible for proving that Defendants acted in the same wrongful manner 12 in this instance. (See Opp’n 3.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that evidence of prior 13 acts is still admissible for proving that the Officers acted with a particular intent, plan, 14 or motive, as well as for impeachment purposes, and that Plaintiff intends to introduce 15 such evidence accordingly. (Opp’n 2–4, 22.) Plaintiff contends, “Since the jury is 16 allowed to hear the prior complainants and victims of brutality perpetrated by these 17 Defendants, introduced by Plaintiff to attack these Defendants’ credibility, there can 18 be no jury confusion or undue prejudice to Defendants.” (Opp’n 25.) Plaintiff is 19 mistaken. 20 To be sure, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) permits the introduction of 21 evidence of prior wrongful acts to establish, among other things, that Defendants acted 22 with a particular intent, plan, or motive. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). However, 23 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) also explicitly states that such evidence “is not 24 admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion 25 the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) (emphasis 26 added). Similarly, although the Court may, on cross-examination, allow specific 27 instances of a witness’s conduct to be inquired into if they are probative of a witness’s 28 character for truthfulness, see Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a)(3) and 608(b), 1 “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on 2 a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” Fed. 3 R. Evid. 404(a)(1) (emphasis added). 4 With these Rules in mind, Plaintiff intends to navigate the fine line between 5 impermissible propensity evidence and permissible evidence for proving intent or 6 character for untruthfulness, as to his first claim against the Officers. (See Opp’n 2–4, 7 22.) As to his Monell claim, however, Plaintiff intends to rely on that same body of 8 evidence of prior specific acts to establish his case-in-chief. (See Opp’n 3, 24–25.) 9 The Court is unconvinced that such simultaneous presentation of the evidence would 10 not pose any risk of unfairly prejudicing the officers. Indeed, the evidence Plaintiff 11 intends to present in support of his Monell claim—which admittedly includes specific 12 instances of the Officers’ prior wrongful acts—may very well unfairly prejudice the 13 Officers as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action relating to the specific incident allegedly 14 involving Plaintiff, at least in part due to the jury’s likely confusion. 15 Plaintiff’s argument that evidence of prior acts may be admissible for limited 16 purposes does not change the outcome. Whether any particular piece of evidence is 17 admissible at trial is not presently at issue. Rather, the question is whether Defendants 18 have shown that bifurcation would tend to avoid a risk of prejudice to the Officers. 19 And as to that question, the Court finds that Defendants have indeed shown the 20 existence of such a risk. Moreover, the Court finds that bifurcation would avoid it. 21 2. Bifurcation Will Promote Convenience and Economy 22 Next, Defendants argue that bifurcation will promote convenience and economy 23 because “[i]f the officer defendants are found not to have violated Plaintiff’s 24 constitutional rights, Plaintiff will be precluded from pursuing his Monell claims 25 against the City.” (MTB 7 (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at 799 and Wilson v. Morgan, 477 26 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007)). For his part, Plaintiff argues that no matter what 27 happens with respect to his first claim, his Monell claim will not be precluded because 28 exoneration of the Officers would not preclude a Monell claim based on the City’s 1 failure to adequately train the Officers, or any other collective, constitutional failure 2 attributable to the City. (See Opp’n 9–11 (citing, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 3 U.S. 378 (1989) and Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 916–17 (9th Cir. 2002)).) 4 Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Heller, upon which 5 Defendants rely, is not applicable to the case at hand. (Opp’n 9; see also MTB 7.) 6 Neither side is fully correct. “In Heller, the Supreme Court held a jury’s 7 determination that an individual officer did not use constitutionally excessive force 8 precluded § 1983 municipal liability on that ground.” Fairley, 281 F.3d at 916 9 (emphasis added) (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at 799). Thus, Heller does control as to 10 claims arising from a constitutional violation by one of the Officers, such as Plaintiff’s 11 excessive force claim. See id. To be sure, however, Plaintiff is also correct that 12 Heller “ha[s] no bearing on . . . Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the 13 City for . . . alleged constitutional deprivations [that] were not suffered as a result of 14 actions of the individual officers, but as a result of the collective inaction of the 15 [municipality].” Fairley, 281 F.3d at 916–17. 16 The trouble with Plaintiff’s argument is that he has alleged both types of 17 liability—liability based on the Officers’ allegedly unconstitutional acts as well as 18 liability based on the collective inaction of the City—against all Defendants. Thus, 19 even if the Officers are found to have committed no constitutional violation and 20 Plaintiff proceeded on his Monell claims only as to the municipality’s direct liability, 21 the segment of Monell claims that stem from the unconstitutionality of acts allegedly 22 committed by the Officers would be precluded, even under the cases cited by Plaintiff. 23 See, e.g., Fairley, 281 F.3d at 916. Plaintiff’s contention that bifurcation could not 24 result in any conservation of judicial resources is a bridge too far. 25 Indeed, because Plaintiff’s Monell claim is based on the City’s acts as well as 26 the acts of the Officers, there exists a possibility of convenience and economy if 27 Plaintiff’s claims are bifurcated because exoneration of the Officers as to Plaintiff’s 28 first claim would necessarily obviate the need to hear at least a portion of Plaintiff’s 1 Monell claim. See, e.g., Fairley, 281 F.3d at 916; see also Heller, 475 U.S. at 799. 2 Accordingly, the Court finds that the interests of convenience and economy also 3 support bifurcation here. 4 3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Separable 5 Defendants also argue that bifurcation is appropriate because Plaintiff’s claims 6 involve separate issues. (MTB 9–11.) The thrust of Defendants’ argument is that 7 Plaintiff’s first cause of action against the Officers involves only the alleged incident 8 involving Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff’s second cause of action against the City under 9 Monell will require proving a “well-established custom or practice of the City, which 10 cannot be proven with a single occurrence.” (MTB 9–11.) In response, Plaintiff 11 argues that he intends to use the same body of evidence to establish both of his claims, 12 and that bifurcation is therefore inappropriate. (Opp’n 3.) 13 The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s claims are inseparable due to 14 necessarily overlapping evidence. To the contrary, “[c]ourts in this 15 [d]istrict . . . routinely bifurcate trials in [a] manner” that defers the issues of punitive 16 damages and Monell liability for a second phase of trial. See Bedetti v. City of Long 17 Beach, No. CV 14-9102-DMG (JCx), 2017 WL 5495146, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 18 2017); see also, e.g., Green v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. 2:12-cv-06007-CAS (CWx), 19 2014 WL 174988, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2014); Deats v. Cty. of Orange, No. CV 20 09-6322 PSG (PJWx), 2010 WL 11549563, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (“To 21 prevent prejudice to any of the defendants in this case, and to promote judicial 22 economy, the Court bifurcates Plaintiff’s Monell claims from the other claims in the 23 lawsuit.”). Indeed, this Court’s precedent indicates that bifurcating is not only 24 possible, but also routine. 25 For the reasons detailed above, including to prevent prejudice to the Officers 26 with respect to Plaintiff’s first claim and to promote judicial economy, the Court 27 concludes that bifurcation is appropriate here. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 28 Defendants’ motion to bifurcate this case into two phases—the first to determine the 1 Officers’ liability as to Plaintiff’s first claim, and the second to determine whether the 2 City is liable under Monell and the measure of any punitive damages against the 3 Officers with respect to Plaintiff’s first claim. 4 B. Defendants’ Request to Stay -Related Discovery 5 As to whether Monell-related discovery should be stayed, Defendants argue that 6 “[t]he same reasons that support bifurcation also provide good cause for a stay of 7 discovery with respect to the claims against the City until Plaintiff’s claims against the 8 individual officers are adjudicated.” (MTB 12.) Plaintiff protests, arguing that 9 “[b]ecause bifurcation at this time is not appropriate, stay of the Monell discovery and 10 separating discovery in phases would unnecessarily prolong the process and waste 11 judicial resources in overseeing two phases of discovery.” (Opp’n 25.) 12 The Court concludes that a partial stay of discovery is appropriate here for the 13 same reasons that bifurcation is appropriate. In particular, staying Monell-related 14 discovery will promote “[o]ne of the purposes of Rule 42(b)[, which] is to permit 15 deferral of costly and possibly unnecessary discovery proceedings pending resolution 16 of potentially dispositive preliminary issues.” Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry. 17 Co., 424 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1970). Further, as Defendants point out, courts that 18 bifurcate Monell claims from those against individual officers often stay 19 Monell-related discovery at the same time. See, e.g., Reyna v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 20 No. CV 19-2629 PA (MAAx), 2019 WL 6357251 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2019); N.P. v. 21 Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-6003 PA (PJWx), 2009 WL 10700183 (C.D. 22 Cal. Nov. 19, 2009). 23 Accordingly, the Court also GRANTS Defendants’ request to stay 24 Monell-related discovery until after the liability or non-liability of the Officers is 25 determined. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 In summary, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate □□□□□□□□□□□ 3 || Monell Claims Against the City of Long Beach and to Stay Monell-Related Discovery as detailed above. (ECF No. 37.) 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 July 31, 2020 9 : fg

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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