James F. Hull v. United States

324 F.2d 817, 13 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 702, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 3721
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedNovember 14, 1963
Docket19953_1
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 324 F.2d 817 (James F. Hull v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
James F. Hull v. United States, 324 F.2d 817, 13 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 702, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 3721 (5th Cir. 1963).

Opinion

GEWIN, Circuit Judge.

The appellant Hull, a Certified Public Accountant, was found guilty by a jury in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas of the charges contained in Counts 8 through 15 relating to false income tax returns alleged to have been prepared by him. Counts 1 through 4 relate to alleged false income tax returns of the OTM Corporation, and as to these counts the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict. Counts 5 through 7 had to do with alleged false income tax returns of Burleigh Sanford, Sales Manager for the OTM Corporation, and the jury acquitted Hull on the Sanford counts. We do not question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of guilty as found by the jury, but we reverse because of errors committed during the trial.

The counts under which Hull was convicted charged that he did willfully and knowingly “ * * * aid and assist in, and counsel, procure and advise” in the preparation and presentation to the District Director of Internal Revenue of false and fraudulent income tax returns of 3 salesmen in violation of Title 26 U.S.C.A. § 7208 (2) 1 The salesmen were employees of the above mentioned corporation. Hull was a minor stockholder and was also Secretary. The corporation paid the salesmen involved, namely, Brown, Lahrmann and Holsombaek, a fixed salary plus an amount equal to 1% of their gross sales; and in some instances there was an additional allowance for automobile mileage.I. 2 The unreported commission sometimes exceeded the stated salary of the salesmen. There was testimony to the effect that the commission was paid to the salesmen to defray expenses in their selling en *819 deavors and their efforts to promote sales. The record clearly demonstrates that all of the commission paid to salesmen was not used for such purposes. 3 The salesmen were required to file a statement with the company relating to the amount of commissions each salesman was entitled to receive. All three salesmen admitted that their actual expenses did not equal the amount of the 1% commission. 4 No accurate records were kept of expenses actually incurred. Each salesman asserted that he relied on the advice of the appellant Hull to the effect that it was not necessary to report the commissions. It is also evident from the record that the failure to report the commissions was a deliberate and considered conclusion, and often formed the basis of separate discussions between the salesmen involved and the appellant Hull. The practice was continued over a period of 3 or 4 years. The salesmen admitted that they considered the commission as extra compensation for services rendered; that a substantial portion of sums so received had not been expended for expenses incurred. There is ample evidence that the salesmen continued to make inquiry about reporting the commissions and questioned the accountant’s advice that it was not necessary to report the same. There is no evidence that any of the salesmen sought counsel or advice from any other source. Unquestionably, the salesmen knew they were receiving income which was not reported in their respective returns. 5

*823 Hull contends that the counts under which he was convicted are insufficient because they fail to state the amount of income which was not reported, resulting in an absence of essential facts upon which to base a conclusion that the returns were false as to “a material matter”. We disagree with the appellant and hold the counts involved to be sufficient. Gaunt v. United States, 1 Cir., 1950, 184 F.2d 284. We further conclude that there is no merit in Hull’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that a showing of a tax deficiency is a prerequisite to conviction.

There are 11 specifications of error. Some of them contain no merit, but we have concluded that there was error in the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the testimony of accomplices. We do not approve the written charge requested by the appellant as a correct statement of law on the subject, but that charge together with the objections of the defendant clearly and forcefully brought the question to the attention of the trial court. There was objection to the court’s failure to charge on the subject. Of importance also is the fact that the court stated to the jury the court’s opinion that the Government’s case under the corporation counts was not nearly so strong as it was under the remaining counts having to do with income tax returns of the various salesmen. 6 Further, after the jury had deliberated for *824 approximately an hour and a half, it returned to the courtroom and the foreman requested the court to restate its instructions to the jury as to the first 4 counts of the indictment, which were the counts relating to the OTM Corporation. Not only did the court have its oral charge re-read as to the first 4 counts, but the statement quoted in the margin referring to the counts involving the salesmen was read again to the jury. At this point, counsel for the appellant again called to the attention of the court the fact that it had refused to charge the jury as to accomplice testimony; and repeated appellant’s objection to the emphasis of the court on the importance of the testimony of the salesmen. The jury was left with the emphasis naturally attendant upon the second reading of the charge.

As stated in our recent case of Dunn v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 318 F.2d 89, the better and safer practice is for counsel to submit a written request for instructions in accordance with Rule 30 F.R.Crim.P. As there pointed out however, 7 oral requests are sufficient if the court is clearly informed of the point involved. In the instant case the subject was brought to the court’s attention by the requested charge, and by 2 separate and distinct objections on the part of the defendant pointing out the failure of the court to charge on the matter of accomplice testimony. One of the salesmen, Sanford, who appeared as a Government witness against Hull, was criminally prosecuted, entered a plea of guilty, and received a sentence in Federal court in Houston, Texas, under an indictment charging tax evasion, which charge arose out of, or at least related to substantially the same subject matter as that involved here. At the time of trial the other 3 salesmen, Lahrmann, Brown and Holsomback, had agreed to a 50% fraud penalty arising out of the very transactions for which Hull was being prosecuted. As pointed out in Dunn and in Phelps v. United States, 5 Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 49, the existence of reversible error in a given case depends on the circumstances of that case and the conduct of the trial as a whole. In our view there was convincing evidence that the salesmen were accomplices with.

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Bluebook (online)
324 F.2d 817, 13 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 702, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 3721, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/james-f-hull-v-united-states-ca5-1963.