James Benjamin v. Michael Jacobson, Commissioner of the Department of Correction of the City of New York

172 F.3d 144, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5130, 1999 WL 188240

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 23, 1999
• Docket: Docket 96-7957
• Status: Published

Opinions

Judge JACOBS concurs in the majority opinion, and files a separate opinion joined by Chief Judge WINTER and Judges KEARSE, JOHN M. WALKER, Jr., McLaughlin, joseé cabranes, and PARKER.

Judge LEVAL concurs in all but Part II.A. of the majority opinion, and files a separate opinion joined by Judge OAKES and joined in part by Judge CALABRESI.

Judge CALABRESI concurs in the result, and files a separate opinion.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge,

with whom Chief Judge WINTER, and Judges walker, McLaughlin, Jacobs, CABRANES, and PARKER join, and with whom Judges OAKES and LEVAL join except for Part H.A.:

Plaintiffs James Benjamin et al., who are pretrial detainees, appealed from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Harold Baer, Jr., Judge, entered pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA” or the “Act”), Pub L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 §§ 801-810 (1996), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (Supp. II 1996); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3626(b)(3), (e)(2), (e)(3) (West Supp. 1998), vacating certain consent decrees entered in 1978 and 1979 (the “Consent Decrees” or the “Decrees”) in actions brought by classes of pretrial detainees against defendant officials of the City of New York (collectively the “City”) to challenge the conditions of confinement of persons held in City institutions awaiting trial or other disposition of criminal charges. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ challenges to the constitutionality of the PLRA’s provision requiring -the termination of consent decrees not meeting criteria set by' the Act, vacated the Consent Decrees, and dissolved the injunctions that had been entered pursuant to the Decrees. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F.Supp. 332 (1996) (“Benjamin I”). A unanimous panel of this Court upheld the district court’s rejection of the constitutional challenges but reversed the vacatur of the Decrees, ruling that the Act does not call for the termination of consent decrees not meeting the requirements of the Act, but merely limits the power of federal courts to enforce those decrees and leaves the decrees intact and enforceable in state courts. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (1997) (“Benjamin II ”). On en banc reconsideration, we conclude that the PLRA requires the termination of consent decrees that do not meet the criteria established by the Act; that that provision does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers or infringe the due process, equal protection, and other constitutional rights invoked by plaintiffs; and that plaintiffs should be afforded an opportunity to show that, under the Act’s criteria, the continuation of prospective relief is warranted. We therefore vacate the decision of the panel; we affirm in part and reverse in part the order of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

This action comprises seven related class actions brought during the mid-1970s by pretrial detainees in certain New York City jails, alleging that conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights. See Benjamin v. Malcolm, 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y.) (Rikers Island House of Detention for Men, now called the James A. Thomas Center); Forts v. Malcolm, 76 Civ. 101 (S.D.N.Y.) (Rikers Island Correctional Institution for Women, now called the Rose M. Singer Center); Ambrose v. Malcolm, 76 Civ. 190 (S.D.N.Y.) (Bronx House of Detention for Men); Maldonado v. Ciuros, 76 Civ. 2854 (S.D.N.Y.) (Rikers Island Adolescent Reception and Detention Center); Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 79 Civ. 4913 (E.D.N.Y.); Detainees of the Queens House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 79 Civ. 4914 (E.D.N.Y.); Rosenthal v. Malcolm, 74 Civ. 4854 (S.D.N.Y.) (Rikers Island Adult Mental Health Unit). The Consent Decrees were designed “to ensure that prison conditions became and remained safe and humane.” Benjamin I, 935 F.Supp. at 337. The Decrees, inter alia,

ensure that detainee mail and property are handled properly, and that procedures in concert with constitutional protections are followed during detainee cell and body searches. On an institutional level, the Consent Decrees seek to maintain the physical plant of the jails in a condition safe for human habitation. They mandate that attention be given to vermin and insect control, sanitation, maintenance and refuse removal. Other provisions govern food services to the detainees and ensure that the detainees are adequately fed while in custody, with food that is prepared and served in a sanitary environment.

Id. As noted in Benjamin II, “[tjhese decrees have generated a judicially administered structure comprising over ninety related court orders and extending to more than thirty discrete areas of prison administration.” 124 F.3d at 165.

A. The PLRA and the Proceedings in the District Court

Effective April 26,1996, Congress enacted the PLRA which, inter alia, provides that in civil actions arising under federal law challenging conditions in prisons (including pretrial detention facilities) “prospective relief’ may not be granted in the absence of certain findings:

[pjrospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). With respect to judgments entered prior to the effective date of the PLRA, the Act provides for the termination of prospective relief that was ordered without the court having made these findings as to need, narrowness, and intrusiveness:

IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE RELIEF. — In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.

Id. § 3626(b)(2) (“termination provision”). However, the Act provides that even if the need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings had not been made in connection with the entry of the decree, the prospective relief is not to be terminated

if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.

18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West Supp.1998), as amended and made applicable to all pending cases, see Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123(a)(2) & (b), 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (Nov. 26, 1997) (changing “current or ongoing” to “current and ongoing”).

In the Act, “the term ‘prospective relief ” is defined to “mean[ ] all relief other than compensatory monetary damages,” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7), and “ ‘relief means all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlement agreements,” id. § 3626(g)(9). The term “private settlement agreement” is defined to “mean[j an agreement entered into among the parties that is not subject to judicial enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled,” id. § 3626(g)(6); the term “consent decree” is defined to “meant ] any relief entered by the court that is based in whole or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not include private settlement agreements,” id. § 3626(g)(1).

Shortly after the PLRA’s effective date, the City moved for the immediate termination of the Consent Decrees and related orders on the ground that the Decrees had been entered without the need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings required by the PLRA. Plaintiffs conceded that no such findings had been made and that the requisite findings would not be supported by the record in its present state; but they challenged the constitutionality of the Act as applied to existing consent decrees, arguing principally that it violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers and denies them equal protection and due process. In support of their separation of powers contention, plaintiffs argued that the Act requires the reopening of final judgments and thereby exceeds Congress’s power as elucidated in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) (“Plant ”), and impermissibly prescribes a rule of decision without changing the underlying substantive law, contrary to the principle established in United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871). They also argued that the Act impermissibly deprives the federal courts of their Article III power to remedy violations of constitutional rights. Plaintiffs requested an opportunity, if the court rejected their constitutional arguments, to create a factual record as to the current conditions in City detention facilities in order to permit the court to make the findings required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West Supp.1998) for the continuation of the injunctive relief granted by the Consent Decrees. The United States intervened in the action in order to defend the constitutionality of the Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a).

In Benjamin I, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the Act’s termination provision and granted the City’s motion. See 935 F.Supp. at 358. The court reasoned that the Act does not violate the principle barring Congress from reopening final judgments because a consent decree calling for continued compliance with prescribed standards is not a final judgment in the same sense in which a judgment for monetary relief would be final:

Where the suit is an action at law for damages and the judgment has become final for res judicata purposes, the judgment is no longer subject to congressional enactments. See Plaut, [514 U.S. at 225-26, 115 S.Ct. 1447]. Where the judgment imposes an executory decree, though, and the court retains supervisory jurisdiction, the judgment’s prospective effects are not final for separation-of-powers purposes.

Benjamin I, 935 F.Supp. at 345. The district court viewed “the Consent Decrees [as] executory judgments with prospective effects,” and noted that they “impose[d] injunctive relief over which this Court has retained supervisory jurisdiction.” Id. at 347. The court concluded that the Decrees were subject to alteration by Congress without infringing the principle announced by Plant.

The district court also found no violation of the principle enunciated in United States v. Klein. It reasoned that “while Congress did not amend the substantive law with respect to permissible prison conditions,” it also did not prescribe a substantive rule of decision but merely “changefd] the law governing the district court’s remedial powers.” Benjamin I, 935 F.Supp. at 350. The court also rejected the suggestion that the PLRA prevented the courts from effectively remedying violations of constitutional rights. It observed that the Act allows the courts, on the condition that they make the requisite findings as to relief, to “continue to define the scope of prisoners’ constitutional rights, review the factual record, apply the judicially determined constitutional standards to the facts as they are found in the record and determine what relief is necessary to remedy the constitutional violations.” Id. at 351.

The district court rejected plaintiffs’ due process arguments, reasoning that because the Consent Decrees were not “final” with respect to future conditions, plaintiffs had no vested rights in their continued enforcement. See id. at 356. The court rejected the equal protection arguments, noting that prisoners are not a suspect class and stating, inter alia, that the Act was “supported by plausible legitimate government interests and the means chosen to advance these goals are rationally designed.” Id. at 354.

The court also denied plaintiffs’ request for an opportunity to present evidence as to the need for continuation of the prospective relief provided for in the Decrees. It stated that “[t]he statute provides for ‘immediate termination’ and based on the current record before the Court, the defendants are entitled to vacatur of the Consent Decrees.” Id. at 357. The court entered an order stating that “the Consent Decrees in these cases are VACATED pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2).” 935 F.Supp. at 358.

Plaintiffs promptly asked the court to, inter alia, rescind its vacatur of the Consent Decrees pending a hearing as to the existence of continuing violations. They argued that because of the course, complexity, and time-pressures of the litigation, they had not had an opportunity to present such evidence. In the alternative, plaintiffs asked the court to certify questions of the Act’s interpretation and constitutionality for an immediate appeal and to stay its ruling pending appeal. The court denied the motions for rescission and a hearing but granted the motion for a stay until such time as a stay pending appeal could be sought from this Court.

Plaintiffs promptly appealed, and this Court granted motions for an expedited appeal and a stay.

B. The Panel Decision

Plaintiffs pursued their constitutional challenges to the PLRA on appeal. In Benjamin II, the panel unanimously affirmed the district court’s rejection of the constitutional challenges to the termination provision, albeit on different reasoning, and it reversed the vacatur of the Consent Decrees. The panel based its conclusions on its view that the Act does not require the termination of consent decrees entered-without the mandated need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings; rather the panel concluded that the Act merely prohibits federal courts from enforcing such decrees and leaves parties free to seek enforcement of the consent decrees in state courts.

The panel began by noting that the PLRA had been enacted in part to answer the criticism that federal courts had overstepped their authority in the context of prison litigation. After quoting § 3626(b)(2)’s provision for “the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of’ the specified need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings, the panel stated as follows:

This, language can be read in either one of two ways, each of which, if constitutionally valid, would respond to the criticisms that led to the PLRA. The first interpretation would limit the jurisdiction of federal courts so that these courts could not in the future enforce past consent decrees, except insofar as the decrees were found to be tailored to a federal right. The second would render null and void all past federally approved prison consent decrees unless these decrees met the requirement of being narrowly tailored to a federal right....

The correct reading of the section turns on the meaning of the words “termination of prospective relief.” If “prospective relief’ includes the past Decrees themselves, then these are terminated and annulled under the law. If, instead, “termination of prospective relief’ means that no future relief — that is neither future enforcement nor articulation — is available in federal courts under past Decrees, then the Decrees remain valid, but no longer subject to federal jurisdiction.

At a glance, the second interpretation seems plausible. The statute defines “prospective relief’ as “all relief other than compensatory monetary damages.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7). It also states that “the term ‘relief means all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlement agreements.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(9) (emphasis added). One could, therefore, maintain that “prospective relief’ includes the Decrees because (1) “prospective relief’ includes all relief except damages, (2) “relief’ includes “consent decrees,” and (3) consent decrees are not damages.

But, in fact, such a reading has significant linguistic problems. Taken literally, it would imply that the word “relief,” without more, includes within it “private settlement agreements.” Yet it would be a remarkable twisting of language to describe a contract or an agreement as a form of relief. We simply do not talk that way. The ordinary way of talking and writing is to speak of relief available under or pursuant to a private settlement agreement. Since it is clear that private settlement agreements are not a form of relief, why does the definition expressly exclude them? Under the circumstances, it makes more sense to read the definitional phrase as saying “the term ‘relief means all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes [all relief granted pursuant to] consent decrees but does not include [relief granted pursuant to] private settlement agreements.” While one can define anything to mean anything, courts should be reluctant to read a definitional sentence to mean something that makes another part of the same sentence meaningless or completely superfluous.

124 F.3d at 166-67 (emphases and brackets in original). The panel found that its second hypothesized interpretation (ie., that the Act requires annulment of past federal consent decrees not narrowly tailored to the vindication of a federal right) created serious separation of powers problems, for “[u]nder the second interpretation, the termination provision will strip the plaintiffs of all of the protections they negotiated into the Consent Decrees except for those narrowly tailored to federal rights.” Id. at 168.

Instead, reasoning that “federal consent decrees are not only federal court judgments but also, and separately, contracts arising under state law,” the panel adopted its first interpretation (ie., that the PLRA simply eliminates the federal courts’ enforcement jurisdiction), concluding that the “underlying contract, in its time made into a judgment, is left untouched.” Id. at 178. The panel concluded that the PLRA “simply force[s] the plaintiffs to seek redress for the non-federal aspects of the Decrees in state court as opposed to federal court.” Id. at 168.

The panel also concluded that in light of its interpretation that the Act “does not annul the underlying Decrees, but, instead, only changes the forum in which they can be enforced,” id. at 174, plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges should be rejected. See, e.g., id. at 170, 173, 174, 176-77 (separation of powers); id. at 176 (due process); id. at 177 n. 18 (due process and equal protection).

In sum, the panel concluded that “the non-federal aspects of the Consent Decrees are hereafter not to be enforced by the federal courts,” but that the plaintiffs “should be able to get all the relief from state courts, including specific performance, that had previously been available to them federally under the Consent Decrees.” Id. at 178. “[W]hile the defendants may be entitled to immediate termination of prospective relief from the federal courts, there is nothing to prevent the plaintiffs from seeking the enforcement of the Consent Decrees in state courts.” Id. at 165 (emphases in original). In light of its conclusion that prospective relief entered without the required need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings need not be terminated, and that the Act merely requires that enforcement of that relief be sought in state court, the panel reversed the district court’s vacatur of these Consent Decrees and ruled that plaintiffs are entitled, at their option, to have an evidentiary hearing in the district court on their allegations of current and ongoing violations of federal rights or to “seek enforcement of the Decrees in their entirety in state court.” Id. at 180.

C. Rehearing En Banc

The City petitioned for rehearing, with a suggestion for rehearing en banc, arguing principally that the panel had misinterpreted the PLRA, and in doing so had “vitiate[d] the -redress that Congress sought to provide to overburdened states and municipalities by transforming a statute intended to protect defendants from extra-constitutional burdens into one that ensures the perpetuation of those burdens via the state courts.” (City Petition for Rehearing at 3.) In December 1997, we agreed to rehear the appeal en banc.

On rehearing, plaintiffs contend principally (1) that Benjamin II’s construction of the PLRA as terminating only the Decrees’ enforceability in federal, not state, court, was correct, and (2) that this Court should nonetheless conclude that the Act’s termination provision violates Article III of the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers, and that application of the termination provision to the Decrees denies them due process and equal protection. -They also urge, if the Act’s termination provision is upheld, that they be given a meaningful opportunity to present evidence to the district court that the Decrees should be continued.

The City disagrees with Benjamin II’s interpretation of the PLRA. It argues that the district court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the PLRA and vacating the Decrees was correct, and it urges that the order of the district court be affirmed. The State of New York has filed a brief on behalf of itself and numerous other States as amici curiae, supporting the position of the City. The United States, as intervenor, has filed a brief arguing that the Act is not unconstitutional, that the panel opinion in Benjamin II should be reversed to the extent that it does not uphold the PLRA as written, and that the matter should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings to determine the need for continuation of the future relief ordered in the Decrees.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Act provides for the termination, though not the annulment, of consent decrees that do not meet the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria established by the Act; that plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the termination provision were properly rejected; and that plaintiffs were entitled to an opportunity to show, in accordance with the Act, that any or all of the prospective relief ordered by the Decrees should be continued. We therefore vacate the panel decision, affirm the district court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges, reverse the district court’s vacatur of the Consent Decrees, and remand for further proceedings.

II. INTERPRETATION OF THE PLRA

A. The Scope of the PLRA’s Termination Provisions

The PLRA sets limitations on, inter alia, the power of the courts to continue certain forward-looking relief in civil actions challenging conditions in prisons or pretrial detention facilities. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(b) TERMINATION OF RELIEF.—

(2) IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE RELIEF. — In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.

(3) LIMITATION. — Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.

(c) SETTLEMENTS.—

(1) CONSENT DECREES. — In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, the court-shall not enter or approve a consent decree unless it complies with the limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a).

(2) PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS. — (A) Nothing in this section shall preclude parties from entering into a private settlement agreement that does not comply with the limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a), if the terms of that agreement are not subject to court enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.

(B) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party claiming that a private settlement agreement has been breached from seeking in State court any remedy available under State law. ■

18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(b)(2), (c); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West Supp.1998).

The most pertinent terms used in these provisions are defined in the Act as follows:

(1) the term “consent decree” means any relief entered by the court that is based in whole or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not include private settlements;

(5) the term “prison” means any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law;

(6) the term “private settlement agreement” means an agreement entered into among the parties that is not subject to judicial enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled;

(7) the term “prospective relief’ means all relief other than compensatory monetary damages;

(9) the term “relief’ means all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlement agreements.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(g)(1), (5), (6), (7), (9).

In interpreting a Congressional enactment, we generally assume that the ordinary meaning of language used in the statute accurately expresses Congress’s purpose, unless the statute contains a contrary indication. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990). If the statute includes an explicit statutory definition, we accord that definition controlling weight, see, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484, 107 S.Ct. 1862, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987), even if it varies from common usage, see, e.g., Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502, 65 S.Ct. 335, 89 L.Ed. 414 (1945).

The PLRA’s termination provision affects only “prospective relief.” In order to determine whether that provision is meant to be applied to consent decrees, therefore, we look to the Act’s explicit definition of prospective relief and, as necessary, to the definitions of the terms to which that definition refers. The definition of “prospective relief’ does not refer in haec verba to consent decrees but states simply that prospective relief is any “relief’ other than compensatory monetary damages. The definition of relief, however, expressly “includes consent decrees.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(9). This inclusion ,is reinforced by the definition of the term “consent decree” itself, which “means [consensual court-ordered] relief.” Id. § 3626(g)(1). These definitions make it doubly plain that a consent decree, to the extent that it awards a remedy other than compensatory monetary damages, constitutes prospective relief within the meaning of the Act. We thus conclude that the termination provision applies to consent decrees.

The Benjamin II panel reached the opposite conclusion principally because the definition of “relief” also expressly excludes “private settlement agreements,” an exclusion the panel found superfluous because one does not ordinarily characterize an agreement as relief. We share the panel’s view that this is not a natural characterization; nor do we think it entirely natural to characterize a consent decree itself, as contrasted with the decretal provisions it contains, as relief. The awkwardness in this instance does not, however, obscure Congress’s intent. In defining relief to exclude private settlement agreements (ie., agreements that are not subject to court enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled), Congress simply excluded those agreements from the governmental obligations that must be based on need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings, and hence preserved them from termination.

Congress may, of course, choose to formulate its enactments in any of a number of ways. It might, for example, state in haec verba that “A, B, C, and D are prohibited.” Or it might state simply that “X is prohibited,” and define “X” to mean “A, B, C, or D.” The scope of both statutory prohibitions would be the same. Congress’s selection of the definitional structure for the PLRA, stating that the court must terminate “prospective relief’ not supported or supportable by need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings, and defining prospective relief to include consent decrees but to exclude private settlement agreements, is the equivalent of a provision stating that the court is to terminate consent decrees as to which need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings have not been and cannot be made, but it is not to terminate private settlement agreements even if such findings could not be made. We think it clear from the statutory terms distinguishing between consent decrees and private settlement agreements that Congress intended to free governments from judicial constraints not based on need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings, but not to relieve them of their private contractual obligations — however broad— that are not judicially ordered.

We do not see any basis for inferring that Congress meant federal consent decrees that are not based on need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings to remain in effect and amenable to enforcement in state courts. It seems implausible that Congress meant to forbid a federal court to enforce these federal judgments but to allow them to be enforceable in a state court, and the language of the Act is contrary to any suggestion that a decree not supported by the-mandated findings is to be allowed to remain in effect. Although the word “termination” is not defined in the Act, its ordinary meaning is the antithesis of continuation.

We also note our disagreement with the Benjamin II panel’s view that federal consent decrees not supported by the mandated findings remain enforceable in state courts' on the theory that settlement agreements are both private agreements and consent decrees. An agreement leading to a consent decree is normally conditional, setting out actions and forbearances to which the defendant agrees and stating that the settlement is conditioned on being so-ordered by the court. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Malcolm, 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1978) (Stipulation for Entry of Partial Final Judgment at 1 (“IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiffs and the defendants herein, and subject to approval by the Court ” (emphasis added))). A plaintiff willing to settle constitutional claims by way of a consent decree seeks the assurance that, if the defendant fails to fulfill its agreed obligations, those obligations will be enforceable through the court’s exercise of its contempt power. We are not aware of any practice whereby the plaintiffs, especially in institutional litigation involving constitutional claims for injunctive relief, agree to a consent decree and also agree — either in the same document or in a separate document — to give up their claims unconditionally in exchange for undertakings by the defendants that would not be enforceable except through the commencement of a new lawsuit for breach of contract.

Where the parties have made an agreement to settle conditional on approval by the federal court, there is no enforceable agreement if the condition fails. The parties may of course enter into an agreement that is not conditioned on such approval, but that would be a different agreement from an accord envisioning a consent decree. The court’s approval of any judgment, whether litigated or consensual, is of course subject to change if the conditions underlying the judgment change. See, e.g., System Federation No. 91, Railway Employes’ Department, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961) (“System Federation ”) (“court will not continue to exercise its powers [ junder [a consent decree] when a change in law or facts has made inequitable what was once equitable”); Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) (“court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment ... [on a showing that] ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application”).

* And if the federal court, though having once approved, withdraws its approval and terminates prospective relief, the condition upon which the parties agreed to bind themselves will have failed. In such circumstances, we see no basis, consistent with fundamental principles of contract law or with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, on which a state court would have the power to reinstate obligations originally imposed in the federal consent decree but terminated by the federal court.

Nor, given the Act’s definitions, does it appear that Congress thought federal consent decrees would simultaneously be private settlement agreements. A consent decree is defined as relief “entered by the court,” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(1), and it is well established that a federal court ordinarily has the power to enforce its own orders and judgments, see, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356-57, 116 S.Ct. 862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966). A private settlement agreement, in contrast, is defined as relief that is “not subject to judicial enforcement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(6). Given these definitions, it appears that Congress sought to make the Act’s concepts of consent decrees and private settlement agreements mutually exclusive.

We note also that the Act, in contrasting the treatment to be given to private settlement agreements, specifies that those agreements are enforceable “in State court.” Id. § 3626(c)(2)(B). The absence of any similar statement indicating state-court enforceability of federal consent decrees reinforces our view that Congress meant the Act to require the termination of consent decrees that are not supportable by need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings and not simply to make such decrees unenforceable by federal courts but enforceable by state courts. Certainly given the goal of relieving governmental entities of judicially ordered burdens that “extend ... further than necessary” to remedy a federal violation, ■id. § 3626(a)(1)(A), it-would seem anomalous for Congress simply to transfer judicial enforcement of unnecessary relief from one forum to another.

In sum, the Act explicitly requires the “immediate termination of any prospective relief’ that was approved or granted in the absence of the specified need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings. Id. § 3626(b)(2). Since prospective relief, under the set of definitions provided in the Act, includes a consent decree to the extent that the decree does not award compensatory monetary damages, we think it clear from the statute itself that, if those findings were not made in connection with the entry of the decree, see id., and if the court does not proceed to make the requisite findings that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West Supp.1998), the Act requires the termination of such a consent decree.

Although we view the language of the Act as sufficiently clear not to require resort to legislative history for explanation, see, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (in resolving question of Congress’s intent, “we look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear”), we note that the history of the Act confirms our interpretation that the Act calls for the termination of consent decrees that lack the requisite need-narrowness-intrusiveness foundation. A Congressional conference report describing the termination provision of a predecessor bill that was virtually identical to the termination provision that was eventually included in the PLRA stated that “[p]rior consent decrees are made terminable upon the motion of either party, and can be continued only if the court finds that the imposed relief is necessary to correct the violation of the federal right.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-378, at 166 (1995) (emphasis added). Similarly, an earlier predecessor bill, H.R. 667, 104th Cong. (1995), would have required the immediate termination of any prospective relief and defined “relief’ to include consent decrees. The House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 667 stated that the termination provision “allows a jurisdiction that is already subject to an existing federal consent decree that was entered with no finding of any constitutional violation, to move to terminate that decree.” H.R.Rep. No. 104-21, at 26 (1995) (“House Report”) (emphasis added). The House Report also explained that the relevant section would

limit[ ] the remedial scheme a court may order or approve to the least intrusive remedy .... [and would] reasonably and permissibly limit[ ] the use of court-enforced consent decrees to resolve prison conditions suits, while freely allowing the use of private settlement agreements.

Id. at 24-25.

In sum, we agree with the conclusions of the First Circuit in Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2366, 141 L.Ed.2d 735 (1998), that although the definition of consent decrees as “relief’ “contradicts conventional” usage, the Act, when “[r]ead literally, ... requires termination of the consent decree itself,” id. at 654, and that the language of the Act, read literally, accurately reflects the intent of Congress. Accordingly, we reject the Benjamin II panel’s view that the Act does not require that consent decrees unsupportable by need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings be terminated.

B. The Meaning of “Termination”

We also, however, reject the view of the district court that, if a consent decree was entered without the requisite need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings, the Act requires that the decree be vacated. The Act states that such decrees are to be “terminat[ed]”; it does not speak of vacatur or use the term “vacate.” There is a potentially significant difference between the terms, and we see no basis for assuming that Congress thought the two interchangeable. As the First Circuit observed,

Nothing in the PLRA or its legislative history speaks of vacating consent decrees. Congress chose to use the verb “terminate” and to eschew the verb “vacate.” The distinction between these two words is clear: “terminate” means “to put an end to” or “to end,” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1471 [ (6th ed.1990) ], whereas “vacate” means “to annul” or “to render ... void,” id. at 1548.

In the present context, this distinction may well possess practical significance .... While terminating a consent decree strips it of future potency, the decree’s past puissance is preserved and certain of its collateral effects may endure. Vacating a consent decree, however, wipes the slate clean, not only rendering the decree sterile for future purposes, but also eviscerating any collateral effects and, indeed, casting a shadow on past actions taken under the decree’s imprimatur.... [Njothing in the PLRA even hints that consent decrees must be vacated when prospective relief is terminated....

Inmates of Suffolk. County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d at 662.

We likewise see no indication in the Act itself or in its legislative history that Congress meant past consent decrees to be annulled and stripped of all past significance or collateral effect. Accordingly, we conclude that the Act requires only that consent decrees not supportable by need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings- be terminated, not vacated.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Plaintiffs contend that when the Act is read to require termination of consent decrees, it is unconstitutional in several respects. They contend principally that the termination provision violates the separation of powers principle of the Constitution by requiring the courts to reopen final judgments and violates Article III by stripping the courts of their power and duty to fashion adequate remedies in constitutional eases. We note that plaintiffs have not, in this en banc rehearing, renewed their contention that the termination provision violates the principle enunciated in United States v. Klein; accordingly, that contention is no longer before this Court. Plaintiffs also argue that the application of the Act’s termination provision to the Decrees would violate their rights to due process and equal protection. We reject all of their contentions.

A. Separation ofPoivers

The Constitutional principle of separation of powers protects each of the three Branches of the federal government from encroachment by either of the other Branches. Article III of the Constitution “establishes a ‘judicial department’ with the ‘province and duty ... to say what the law is’ in particular cases and controversies.” Plant, 514 U.S. at 218, 115 S.Ct. 1447 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). The separation of powers “serves both to protect the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government, ... and to safeguard litigants’ right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.” Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Plaut, the Supreme Court established that one facet of the separation of powers principle prevents Congress from requiring the courts to reopen final judgments. At issue in Plaut was a then-recently-enacted statutory provision dealing with statutes of limitations in civil actions brought to enforce the federal securities laws. The Plaut plaintiffs had previously commenced a federal securities fraud action seeking money damages; when commenced, their action was timely under the then-applicable statute of limitations. While their suit was pending, however, the Supreme Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991), ruled that such actions were subject to a shorter limitations period. Under that ruling, the Plaut plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed as time-barred; the plaintiffs did not appeal, and the judgment dismissing their case became final. Thereafter, Congress passed a statute purporting to reinstate actions that had been dismissed under Lampf but that would have been timely had the prior limitations period been applied.

The Court.ruled that because the dismissal of the Plaut plaintiffs’ action had become final before the new legislation went into effect, Congress had “exceeded its authority by requiring the federal courts to exercise [t]he judicial Power ... in a manner repugnant to the text, structure and traditions of Article III.” Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217-18, 115 S.Ct. 1447 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court stated that Article III

gives the Federal Judiciary thé power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy — with an understanding, in short, that “a judgment conclusively resolves the case” because “a ‘judicial Power’ is one to render dispositive judgments.” Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 905, 926 (1990). By retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress ... violate[s] this fundamental principle.

Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19, 115 S.Ct. 1447.

Having achieved finality, ... a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very ease was something other than what the courts said it was.

Id. at 227, 115 S.Ct. 1447 (emphasis in original).

“Finality,” however, .may be defined differently for different purposes, and the Plaut Court distinguished the judgment at issue before it, which dismissed a complaint seeking money damages, from other types of judgments. Making particular reference to the decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1855) (“Wheeling Bridge II ”), see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 14 L.Ed. 249 (1851) (“Wheeling Bridge /”), the Plaut Court noted that a separation of powers contention had been rejected to the extent that challenged legislation had “altered the prospective effect of injunctions,” 514 U.S. at 232, 115 S.Ct. 1447. In Wheeling Bridge I, the Supreme Court had ruled that a bridge across the Ohio River was so low as to obstruct navigation, in violation of then-existing federal law, and the Court entered an injunction ordering the bridge elevated or abated. See Wheeling Bridge I, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 521, 626. Thereafter, Congress enacted a statute declaring the bridge a lawful structure, designating it a post-road for carriage of the mails, and authorizing the bridge’s owner to maintain the bridge at its then-present height. Subsequently, after the bridge had been destroyed by a storm, Pennsylvania sought to enjoin reconstruction of the bridge at the same height, arguing that the statute legalizing the bridge was unconstitutional because it “ha[d] the effect and operation to annul the judgment of the court already entered, or the rights determined thereby.” Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431.

The Wheeling Bridge II Court noted that had its prior judgment been a judgment for money damages, Pennsylvania’s contention would have had merit (and indeed did have merit insofar as the prior judgment had awarded costs), for the judgment would have been final within the meaning of the separation of powers principle and could not have been altered by an Act of Congress. See id. (“if the remedy in this case had been an action at law, and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for damages, the right to these would have passed beyond the reach of the power of congress.”). However, to the extent that Wheeling Bridge I granted forward-looking injunctive relief, the Wheeling Bridge II Court ruled that the judgment was “executory” rather than final, and thus its enforcement could be prevented by Congress:

[T]hat part of the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction, is executo-ry, a continuing decree, which requires not only the removal of the bridge, but enjoins the defendants against any reconstruction ’ or continuance. Now, whether it is a future existing or continuing obstruction depends upon the question whether or not it interferes with the right of navigation. If, in the mean time, since the decree, this right has been modified by the competent authority, so that the bridge is no longer an unlawful obstruction, it is quite plain the decree of the court cannot be enforced.

Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431-32.

The Plant Court observed that cases such as Wheeling Bridge II “distinguish themselves” from Plant, 514 U.S. at 232, 115 S.Ct. 1447, which involved only requests for monetary relief. The Plant Court stated that nothing in its holding called into question the principle established in Wheeling Bridge II, that legislation does not violate the separation of powers by “altering] the prospective effect of injunctions.” Plant, 514 U.S. at 232, 115 S.Ct. 1447. We understand the parameters drawn by Plant and Wheeling Bridge II to be as follows: Under the separation of powers, Congress lacks the authority to alter a finally rendered judgment ordering the payment of money. On the other hand, to the extent that a court’s final judgment consists of an injunction, Congress may require alteration or termination of its future effect if the law on which the injunction was predicated has been changed. Those conditions are satisfied here. By statute Congress has altered the courts’ remedial powers so that, in this class of cases, injunctions may not be issued if they are not constitutionally mandated. Congress may accordingly require the termination of the executory portions of injunctions that exceed the courts’ present remedial powers.

The proposition that a court has the authority to alter the prospective effect of an injunction in light of changes in the law or the circumstances is, of course, well established. See, e.g., System Federation, 364 U.S. at 646-47, 81 S.Ct. 368; United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932) (“Swift ”); Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562, 62 S.Ct. 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668 (1942); Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431-32. “The source of the power to modify is of course the fact that an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief.” System Federation, 364 U.S. at 647, 81 S.Ct. 368. Further, that authority extends to injunctions entered on consent of the parties. “[T]he power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions,” even though the injunction “was entered by consent,” is “inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need.” Swift, 286 U.S. at 114, 52 S.Ct. 460. See also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, -, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2006, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (“A court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of [statutory or decisional law] changes.”); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 391, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (consent decree may be reopened “to the extent that equity requires”); System Federation, 364 U.S. at 651, 81 S.Ct. 368; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 133 F.2d 955, 957 (7th Cir.1943) (“though a decree may be final as it relates to an appeal ..., yet, where the proceedings are of a continuing nature, it is not final, ... and the injunction will be vacated ... where the law has been changed”).

In System Federation, for example, a consent decree enjoined a railroad and several unions from discriminating against the railroad’s nonunion employees because of their nonunion status. At the time the decree was entered, a federal statute made such discrimination unlawful. Six years later, however, Congress amended the statute to allow collective bargaining agreements permitting an employer to require union membership as a condition of employment, and the unions asked the district court to modify the decree to make it clear that the injunction against such conditions was thenceforth to “have no prospective application.” System Federation, 364 U.S. at 645, 81 S.Ct. 368 (internal. quotation marks omitted). The district court “acknowledged its authority to modify the consent decree but declined to do so, primarily out of regard for the fact that the unions . ’.. had consented ... [to] an undertaking which the District Court considered was not unlawful either before or after the ... amendments.” Id. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. Refusing “to recede from” the “principles of the Wheeling Bridge case,” 364 U.S. at 650, 81 S.Ct. 368, the System Federation Court noted that when the underlying law governing the conduct of the parties has been altered, the court has the power to dissolve the injunction, even “though it was entered by consent,’ ” id. at 647, 81 S.Ct. 368 (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 114, 52 S.Ct. 460), in order to avoid “rendering] protection in no way authorized by the needs of safeguarding statutory rights,” System Federation 364 U.S. at 648, 81 S.Ct. 368.

Given the inherent power of the courts to modify or terminate forward-looking in-junctive provisions in light of changes in law or circumstances, and given the distinction drawn by the Plaut Court between monetary judgments and judgments granting prospective injunctive relief, we conclude that plaintiffs’ separation of powers challenge to the PLRA’s termination provision must be rejected. Section 3626(b)(2) does not require the termination of any relief other than prospective relief, and the definition of prospective relief expressly excludes compensatory monetary damages. Thus, the PLRA does not seek retroactively to revise past adjudications by the Judicial Branch that had become “final” within the meaning of Plaut.

Most of our sister Circuits that have considered this question have also reached the conclusion we reach here today. See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2368, 141 L.Ed.2d 737 (1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2875, 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d at 656-57; Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1089 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2374, 141 L.Ed.2d 741 (1998); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 371-72 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1277, 117 S.Ct. 2460, 138 L.Ed.2d 217 (1997). The only contrary court of appeals opinion of which we are aware, issued by a panel of the Ninth Circuit, was withdrawn by that court in connection with its granting of rehearing en banc. See Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.), petition for rehearing granted, and panel opinion withdraim, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc).

For the reasons discussed above, we share the majority view that the Act’s requirement for the termination of prospective relief, where that relief is not and cannot be supported by need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings, does not violate the finality ** principle of separation of powers.

B. Interference With Article III Bower

Nor is there merit in plaintiffs’ contention that the PLRA’s provision for termination of consent decrees strips the courts of their Article III power and duty to remedy constitutional wrongs, for the Act neither alters the scope of substantive rights nor limits the type of relief that may be ordered if that relief is necessary to redress violations of those rights. Rather, the Act forbids forward-looking relief in excess of what the court finds is necessary. Congress’s power to limit the remedial authority of the federal courts, which is grounded in its power to “ordain and establish” inferior federal courts, U.S. Const. Art. Ill, § 1, is well established. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941). Congress may, for example, establish substantive and procedural prerequisites to the granting of specific types of relief, see, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30, 58 S.Ct. 578, 82 L.Ed. 872 (1938) (certain statutorily-specified findings required before court may issue injunction in labor dispute); or give one court exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of a particular statutory scheme, see Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88, 63 S.Ct. 1019, 87 L.Ed. 1339 (1943); or bar all federal courts from enjoining the collection of state taxes so long as adequate remedies are available in state court, see California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 407-08, 411, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442 n. 8, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) (listing “other instances in which Congress has regulated and restricted the power of the federal courts to grant injunctions”).

In the PLRA, Congress has neither defined nor altered the federal rights that may be vindicated in prisoner litigation. Nor has it forbidden the court, if it finds a violation of federal right, to order or enforce such relief as the court finds is needed to remedy the violation of that right. The Act’s termination provision simply forbids the continuation of prospective relief that exceeds what is needed to remedy a continuing violation of the federal right. Existing consent decrees may have ordered, without adjudication of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims or without adjudication of the appropriate scope of the remedy for a proven federal violation, more relief than was needed to remedy the violations. The Act’s elimination of the parties’ ability to obtain judicial enforcement of the forward-looking provisions of a judgment obtained without such adjudications neither affects the court’s power “ ‘to say what the law is’ in particular cases and controversies,” Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218, 115 S.Ct. 1447 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177), nor infringes “litigants’ right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government,” Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848, 106 S.Ct. 3245 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court remains authorized to adjudicate the controversies before it and to order such relief as is necessary to remedy the federal violations it finds established. We conclude that the Act does not represent an abrogation of Article III power.

C. Due Process and Equal Protection

Plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional contentions do not require extended discussion. Their principal due process contention is that the termination provision deprives them of vested contractual rights. As discussed in Part III.A. above, however, the provisions of a consent decree that order prospective relief remain subject to modification or alteration for changes in law or circumstances. Such right as a litigant may have to prospective relief is thus neither final nor “vested” in the constitutional sense.

Further, as the System Federation Court noted, a court considering whether modification of a consent decree is warranted is not bound by principles of contract:

“We reject the argument ... that a decree entered upon consent is to be treated as a contract and not as a judicial act.... [I]n truth what was then adjudged was not a contract as to any one. The consent is to be read as directed toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment of the right to exact revision in the future, if revision should become necessary in adaptation to events to be.”

364 U.S. at 651, 81 S.Ct. 368 (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-15, 52 S.Ct. 460). The System Federation Court stated that “[t]he parties cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase from a court of equity a continuing injunction.” 364 U.S. at 651, 81 S.Ct. 368.

We conclude that plaintiffs’ due process contentions were properly rejected. Accord Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d at 1426-27 (“a decree, unlike a money judgment, is subject to later adaptation to changing conditions. Legislative modification of the law governing the decree thus does not impermissibly divest the inmates of any vested rights”); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d at 658 (“modifiable decrees cannot create vested rights”); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d at 1091 (“a judgment that is not final for purposes of the separation of powers is also not final for purposes of due process”).

Plaintiffs’ equal protection argument is principally that the PLRA burdens the right of access to courts and thus warrants “strict scrutiny.” The right of access to courts is indeed fundamental, see, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-23, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578-80, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), but the termination provision does not impair that right. As discussed in Part III.B. above, nothing in the Act alters plaintiffs’ federal rights or prevents 'the court from granting such relief as is necessary to remedy violations of those rights. Plaintiffs remain free to seek an adjudication that their federal rights are being violated and to secure the relief necessary to remedy such federal violations as they establish. Further, under the Act, existing provisions for prospective relief designed to remedy violations of those rights are not to be terminated where the need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings can be made with respect to the continuation of such relief. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West Supp.1998). Thus, plaintiffs’ fundamental right of access to the courts is not burdened. Accord Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d at 660 (“[u]nder the PLRA, the courthouse doors remain open and the withdrawal of prospective relief — above and beyond what is necessary to correct the violation of federally protected rights — does not diminish the right of access”); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d at 1090 (“[t]he right to enforce a consent decree that goes beyond the bounds of constitutional necessity is not equivalent to the right to bring constitutional grievances to the attention of the courts”); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d at 373 (“[s]imply put, the Inmates have confused the right of access to the courts with the scope of the available substantive relief’).

Since no fundamental right is burdened, and prisoners are not a suspect class, strict scrutiny of the Act is not warranted. Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim must thus be rejected “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the burden is on the person challenging the legislation “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it, ... whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.” Id. at 320-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs fall far short of meeting their burden. The terms and legislative history of the Act make it clear that, in the unique context of litigation challenging prison conditions, see generally Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-08, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), Congress adopted the remedial and termination provisions in order to promote, inter alia, principles of federalism and judicial restraint. The objective of limiting the grant or continuation of prospective relief in this context to no more than what is found necessary to remedy the violation of a federal right is unquestionably a legitimate one. Accord Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d at 660; Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d at 1427; Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d at 1090; Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d at 374.

IV. PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND

As indicated in Part II above, we have concluded that the Act requires the termination of consent decrees providing for prospective relief entered without the requisite need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings, but that it does not require the annulment or vacatur of those decrees. Accordingly, we reverse so much of the order of the district court as vacated the Decrees at issue here.

Further, as noted in Part I.A. above, the Act contains a “LIMITATION” on the immediate termination requirement, which provides that

[prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.

18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West Supp.1998) (emphasis added). Although § 3626(b)(2) uses the phrase “immediate termination” of prospective relief where there have been no need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings (emphasis added), at least two aspects of that subsection, read in conjunction with the “LIMITATION” subsection that follows it, persuade us that the word “immediate” was not intended to mean without any time intervening between motion and termination.

First, although the termination provision presupposes the absence of need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings, the “LIMITATION” subsection provides that prospective relief “shall not terminate” if the court makes the requisite written need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings; presumably such written findings cannot be made instantaneously upon the motion by a defendant for termination of a decree. Hence, Congress must have intended that there be some interval during which the requisite findings could be made. Second, the findings envisioned by the “LIMITATION” subsection must be “based on the record” and must state that prospective relief is “necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right.” Evidence presented at a prior time, however, could not show a violation that is “current and ongoing.” Hence, the “record” referred to cannot mean the prior record but must mean a record reflecting conditions as of the time termination is sought. In sum, we interpret §§ 3626(b)(2) and (3), read together, to mean that, when the plaintiffs so request in response to a defendant’s motion for termination, the district court must allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to show current and ongoing violations of their federal rights.

In the present case, plaintiffs asked the district court to allow them an opportunity to present evidence of such current and ongoing violations and of the need for continuation of the prospective relief provided in the Decrees. We conclude that plaintiffs should have been given that opportunity. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings.

The Act provides that a motion for immediate termination of prospective relief pursuant to § 3626(b)(2) operates to stay such relief beginning on the 30th day after such a motion, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(e)(2) (West Supp.1998). The Act also allows the district court to postpone the automatic stay for 60 additional days for good cause other than general calendar congestion. Id. § 3626(e)(3). Since the district court here did not allow plaintiffs to make a record with respect to the need for a continuation of prospective relief, we instruct that the 30-day period prior to the commencement of the automatic stay is to be deemed to begin on the day following the issuance of our mandate herein.

Plaintiffs have also argued that the above 30- and 60-day periods are insufficient to give them a meaningful opportunity to make a record as to the need for continuation of prospective relief and hence constitute a denial of due process. We regard any challenge at this time to the constitutionality of the automatic stay provision as premature, and we decline to address it on this appeal.

Plaintiffs have also requested that this Court extend the stays we have previously entered during the pendency of this appeal, in order to keep the Consent Decrees in place until the proceedings on remand have been completed. In light of our reversal of the district court’s order vacating the Decrees, we regard our prior stays as moot, and we decline to extend them further. Our current stay will be vacated upon the issuance of the mandate.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of plaintiffs’ arguments that are properly before us on this en banc rehearing and, except as indicated above, have found them to be without merit. We conclude (a) that the PLRA permissibly provides for the termination of forward-looking provisions of consent decrees in the absence of the need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings required by the Act, but does not provide for vacatur of those decrees; and (b) that plaintiffs should have been given an opportunity to present evidence showing the need for continuation of prospective relief.

The opinion of the panel is vacated. The current stay granted by this Court is terminated. The order of the district court is affirmed insofar as it upheld the constitutionality of § 3626(b)(2), and is reversed insofar is it vacated the Consent Decrees, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So far as we are aware, none of the consent decrees at issue in the present cases contains any concessions of federal rights by class representatives for the prisoners. If there were such concessions, the district court would have the power to relieve the parties if such concessions became inequitable.

As indicated earlier, wé do not address the limitation on Congressional power to prescribe a rule of decision, enunciated in United States v. Klein, since plaintiffs have not argued that issue to the en banc court.