UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LEONITE IRVING,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 19-3818 (RDM)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Leonite Irving, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Defendants the District of Columbia, Muriel Bowser, Quincy L. Booth, and the Warden
of the District of Columbia jail, alleging that their deliberate indifference to an episode of inmate
violence of which he was the victim violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Dkt. 1 at 2–5
(Compl.). Defendant District of Columbia (hereinafter “the District”) moves to dismiss, Dkt. 10,
arguing that (1) Irving’s Complaint fails to state a claim under Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); and (2) the “Court should abstain from
considering [the remaining claims in] Plaintiff’s Complaint because he has a duplicative dispute
pending in [D.C.] Superior Court,” Dkt. 10 at 6. 1
1 In its motion to dismiss, the District notes that “Defendants Muriel Bowser and Quincy Booth have not been properly served with a summons and copy of the Complaint” and that “no summons was issued for Defendants Booth or John Doe.” Dkt. 10 at 3 n.2. Defendant Bowser, however, was served prior to the filing of the instant motion, Dkt. 6, Dkt. 7, and Defendant Booth has since been served, Dkt. 15, Dkt. 17. It is true that John Doe has not yet been served, but that is because the United States Marshals Service cannot effectuate service on an unidentified defendant. To avoid entry of default, Defendants Bowser and Booth shall promptly respond to the Complaint or seek an extension of time to do so in light of the possibility that Irving will file an amended complaint, as authorized below. For the reasons that follow, the District’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
As it must, the Court accepts Irving’s factual allegations as true for purposes of
evaluating the District’s motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Court is further mindful that “pro se pleadings should be liberally construed,” Nichols v.
Vilsack, No. 13-cv-1502, 2015 WL 9581799, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2015) (quotation marks
omitted), and that Irving must be afforded “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged,” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotation
marks omitted).
On March 18, 2019, Irving was repeatedly stabbed by a fellow inmate at the D.C. jail
where he was then incarcerated. Dkt. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶¶ 1–3). The attack took place in Irving’s
housing unit, and when he “tried to run and get away” from his assailant, Irving found the “sally
port gates were closed,” preventing his escape. Id. at 3–4 (Compl. ¶¶ 2–4). The unit officers
stationed nearby meanwhile refused to intervene and instead “stood [] and watched” Irving’s
assault. Id. (Compl. ¶ 5). By the time the attack ended, Irving “had received 8 stab wounds[] to
his body and head.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). He was then “rushed to [an] outside
hospital” where he received “numerous stitches to close the stab wounds.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 7).
On December 20, 2019, Irving filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming (1) that
Defendants exhibited “deliberate indifference to the serious risk of inmate[-]on[-]inmate violence
that threatened [his] safety and proximately caused his injuries,” and (2) that their deliberate
indifference violated both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 3, 5 (Compl.). At the same time, Irving filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, Dkt. 2, which the Court granted, Dkt. 4. 2
On March 4, 2020 Irving moved for appointment of counsel, Dkt. 5 at 1, and to amend
his Complaint such that “all Defendants be sued in [their] [i]ndividual as well as the[ir] [o]fficial
[c]apacit[ies],” id. at 2. On June 30, 2020, the District notified the Court that Irving’s instant suit
“appear[ed] duplicative of [a] case filed in Superior Court of the District of Columbia, where
[Irving] is represented by counsel.” Dkt. 9 at 1. Accordingly, the Court denied Irving’s motion
for appointment of counsel “without prejudice pending a determination of whether this case is
duplicative of the pending case in Superior Court in which Plaintiff is represented by counsel.”
Minute Order (July 17, 2020). As the Court explained, “[u]ntil that question is resolved, the
Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff is ‘unable to retain counsel by other means[] and the
degree to which the interests of just[ice] will be served by appointment of counsel.’” Id.
(quoting Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 228 F. Supp. 3d 28, 47 (D.D.D. 2017)).
Shortly after the Court denied Irving’s motion for appointment of counsel, the District
filed the instant motion to dismiss. Dkt. 10. Because Irving was proceeding pro se, the Court
notified him that he was “entitled to file a memorandum and supporting evidence in response” to
the District’s motion. Dkt. 12 at 1. The Court further informed Irving that if he “fail[ed] to
respond to [the District’s] motion in the time provided, the Court may (1) treat the motion as
conceded; . . . (2) rule on [the] motion based on [the District’s] arguments alone and without
2 Under the terms of the Court’s order, Irving was “obligated to pay an initial filing fee in the amount of $18.68” and to pay “twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to his prison account as continued partial payments on the remaining balance of the $350.00 filing fee.” Dkt. 4 at 1. Thus far, Irving has made two payments to the Clerk totaling $14.94—that is, $3.74 short of the initial filing fee that Irving was ordered to pay. Nevertheless, the District has not identified any authority stating (or even argued) that Irving’s failure to tender his full filing fee requires the dismissal of his Complaint. considering Plaintiff’s arguments; or (3) dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to prosecute.” Id.
(citing Bristol Petrol. Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962)). Finally, the Court noted that “if Plaintiff ‘files an opposition to
a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may
treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.’” Id. (quoting Xenophon
Strategies, Inc. v. Jernigan Copeland & Anderson, PLLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 61, 72 (D.D.C.
2017)).
On August 28, 2020, Irving filed his opposition to the District’s motion to dismiss. Dkt.
13. The District filed its reply to Irving’s opposition on September 10, 2020. Dkt. 16. The
District’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 10, is thus now ripe for the Court’s consideration.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint. A complaint must contain “‘a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957));
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. Instead, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). If the complaint’s allegations fail to meet this
standard, the court must dismiss the action. Id. To be sure, complaints by pro se litigants are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, even a pro se litigant must comply with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987).
Accordingly, “a pro se complaint, like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be
granted,” as required by Rule 12(b)(6). Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (citation omitted)).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court will first consider whether abstention is proper and will then address whether
Irving’s Monell claim is adequately pled under Rule 12(b)(6).
A. Abstention
The District argues that the “Court should abstain from considering Plaintiff’s Complaint
[in its entirety] because [Irving] has a duplicative dispute pending in Superior Court (Irving v.
District of Columbia, 2020 CA 001777 B).” Dkt. 10 at 6. In support of that argument, the
District points to the Colorado River abstention doctrine, by which “a district court may abstain
from exercising jurisdiction in circumstances of parallel, duplicative litigation.” Foster-El v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)).
When deciding whether to abstain under Colorado River, a district court should consider
several factors, none dispositive: “(1) whether one court assumed jurisdiction . . . first; (2) the
inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) the
order of jurisdiction in the concurrent forums; (5) whether the case involves federal law; and
(6) whether the state-court proceeding can adequately protect the parties’ rights.” Id. (citing
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1983)). Importantly, however, the propriety of Colorado-River abstention ‘“does
not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they
apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.’”
Edge Inv., LLC v. District of Columbia, 927 F.3d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 16) (emphasis added). The balance is so weighted, the Supreme Court
explained in Colorado River itself, because of the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” 424 U.S. at 817; see also Edge Inv., 927 F.3d at
553 n.3 (collecting cases). Consequently, “the [general] rule is that the pendency of an action in
the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the [f]ederal court having
jurisdiction.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted). In turn,
“dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding” is warranted
only in the face of “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 818; see also Hoai v. Sun Ref. & Mktg.
Co., 866 F.2d 1515, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Colorado River created a narrow exception to the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, and only truly exceptional circumstances will justify a stay or
dismissal on grounds of judicial economy.” (quotation marks omitted)).
The District argues that those exceptional circumstances are present here because “[t]he
facts of this case and Plaintiff’s Superior Court case are the same and the claims are similar.”
Dkt. 10 at 7. 3 Thus, “[l]itigation of the same matter in two different forums would result in
piecemeal litigation—duplicative judicial effort which would potentially render conflicting
results.” Id. And that, the District reasons, presents a “compelling case” for abstention. Id.
3 The District effectively ignores the other Colorado River factors, and perhaps with good reason, as many of them tip against abstention: the Court here assumed jurisdiction first (factor one); the federal forum is not inconvenient relative to the state forum, as both are in D.C. (factor two); and the case involves federal law (factor five). See Foster-El, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 71; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 815–818. But it does not. Although the facts in each case are similar, the claims are not: this action
alleges violations of the federal Constitution made actionable through federal statute; the
Superior Court case alleges violations of municipal law made actionable through the common
law of tort. Compare Dkt. 1 (Compl.) with Dkt. 2 (Compl.), Irving v. District of Columbia, 2020
CA 001777 B. 4 Abstaining and then dismissing Irving’s Complaint with prejudice in light of
that difference, as the District requests, Dkt. 10 at 7, would risk leaving him without a forum to
raise his constitutional claims at all: the Superior Court is not obligated to grant Irving leave to
amend and, were the Court to dismiss his claims with prejudice, Irving would face the risk that
the Superior Court would treat this Court’s order as preclusive. Moreover, even if the Court
were to dismiss without prejudice, and even if the Superior Court were to grant leave to amend,
the District might then remove the entire case to this Court based on federal-question
jurisdiction, frustrating the interest in judicial efficiency. The Colorado River doctrine is
designed to help federal courts manage their resources, not to inhibit plaintiffs from pressing
their claims.
In addition, and perhaps more fundamentally, the D.C. Circuit has emphasized that
“‘Colorado River’s factor concerning the avoidance of piecemeal litigation does not favor
abstention unless the circumstances enveloping those cases will likely lead to piecemeal
litigation that is abnormally excessive or deleterious.”’ Edge Inv., 927 F.3d at 556 (quoting
Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pagés Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004)
4 Although the Superior Court complaint is neither referenced in nor integral to Irving’s Complaint in this case, the Court may take judicial notice of the “underlying case record” in a related case. United States Telesis, Inc. v. Ende, 64 F. Supp. 3d 65, 67 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom. U.S. Telesis Inc. v. Ende, No. 14-7146, 2015 WL 653325 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 5, 2015); see also Veg–Mix, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 832 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[I]t is settled law that the court may take judicial notice of other cases including the same subject matter or questions of a related nature between the same parties.” (internal citations omitted)). (emphasis added)). “[T]he mere risk of duplicating efforts and different results,” by contrast,
“‘does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816); see also Hoai, 866 F.2d at 1520 (“The mere desire to resolve
all issues involving related facts in one court does not justify depriving [a plaintiff] of his federal
forum.”).
Such “abnormal[]” or “deleterious” consequences are not present in this matter, and that
counsels decisively against abstention. Edge Inv., 927 F.3d at 556. As Edge explained:
[M]ere duplication and potential inconsistency—in their simplest forms—are all we have here. There are only two, relatively confined litigations at issue: a single Superior Court action . . . and a single federal-court action. Moreover . . . the vast majority of the claims that [plaintiff] asserts in federal court were also asserted in the Superior Court; both cases arise from the same core set of facts; and the issues will be resolved largely by reference to the same evidence.
. . . In short, this case raises nothing like the piecemeal litigation risks at issue in Colorado River . . . . Instead, it is a garden-variety example of two lawsuits proceeding concurrently in two courts.
Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, brackets, and alterations omitted). These cases are in that
garden, too.
The Court will, accordingly, deny the District’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Colorado
River.
B. Monell
The District more successfully argues that Irving’s Monell claims—that is, the sole
claims against the District itself—should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private cause of action against any “person” who, under
color of state or District of Columbia law, deprives another individual of a federal constitutional
or statutory right. See generally Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–94. Municipalities like the District of
Columbia may be held liable under § 1983 for their “agents’ constitutional torts” if those agents “acted pursuant to municipal policy or custom.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36,
38 (D.C. Cir. 2004). To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that
(1) “there was an underlying constitutional [or statutory] violation;” and (2) “the municipality’s
policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.” Bell v. District of Columbia, 82 F. Supp.
3d 151, 155 (D.D.C. 2015). To satisfy the second prong of this test—that is, to show that a
municipality’s “custom or policy caused the claimed violations of his constitutional rights,” id.—
a plaintiff must allege that the municipality (1) “explicitly adopted the policy that was the
moving force of the constitutional violation;” (2) “knowingly ignore[d] a practice that was
consistent enough to constitute custom;” or (3) failed to “respond[] to a need . . . in such a
manner as to show deliberate indifference to the risk that not addressing the need will result in
constitutional violations,” Warren, 353 F.3d at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff
may also succeed by alleging that an authorized, municipal policymaker made a one-time
decision that resulted in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Singletary v. District of
Columbia, 766 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Here, the District argues that Irving “only vaguely alleges that unit officers at D.C. Jail
‘stood by and watched’ as [he] was stabbed by his fellow inmates” and that “Monell[] claims of
this sort—which allege injury based solely on the isolated acts of government employees or
agents—must fail.” Dkt. 10 at 6 (quoting Dkt. 1 at 4 (Compl. ¶ 5)). The District further
contends that Irving’s opposition to its motion to dismiss “fails to respond to [its] argument that
[Irving’s] Complaint fails to properly plead municipal liability,” and thus, that “the Court should
treat [the District’s] argument [as to Monell liability] as conceded.” Dkt. 16 at 1 (citing Hopkins
v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Glob. Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003)). The Court agrees that Irving has not responded to the District’s Monell liability
arguments and that the point is arguably conceded. See Dkt. 12 at 1; see also Xenophon
Strategies, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 72; Hopkins, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 25. But even if Monell liability
properly remained in dispute, Irving’s claims against the District of Columbia would nonetheless
fail as a matter of law: his Complaint fails to articulate any connection between a municipal
policy or custom and the alleged failure of prison staff to deter, halt, or remediate the attack to
which he was subject. Irving does not identify any policy of the District that caused him harm;
he does not allege that attacks at the jail were “consistent enough to constitute [a] custom” about
which the District or one its policymakers was aware; and he does not claim that the District
knew or should have known of the risk of” prison attacks like this one. Warren, 353 F.3d at 39.
As this Court has previously observed, in most cases of municipal liability “the municipality
received notice of the risk before the constitutional tort occurred.” Williams v. Ellerbe, 317 F.
Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D.D.C. 2018). “In the present case, however, [Irving] fails to allege that the
District had any advance notice or reason to believe that the” constitutional torts alleged here
would occur. Id.
For these reasons, Irving’s claims against the District of Columbia will be dismissed
without prejudice. The Court will permit Irving to file an amended complaint within 45 days, if
appropriate. The Court cautions Irving, however, that he must have a good-faith basis for
alleging municipal liability and that, absent a factual basis for asserting such a claim, he should
not do so.
CONCLUSION
The District’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 10, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; it
is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against the District of Columbia are DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim; it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before March 30, 2021; it
is further
ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear for a telephonic status conference on
April 2, 2021 at 3:00 pm to discuss further proceedings in this matter; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s pending motion for leave to amend, Dkt. 5 at 2, is DENIED
as moot in light of the Court’s order granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint on or
before March 30, 2021.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge
Date: February 9, 2021