International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Walla Walla

586 P.2d 479, 90 Wash. 2d 828, 1978 Wash. LEXIS 1136

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Decided: November 9, 1978
• Docket: 44369
• Status: Published

Opinions

Hicks, J.

May the City of Walla Walla, having provided a civil service system for its fire department, maintain a policy governing promotions within that department on the basis of the "rule of three"? We answer in the affirmative.

Local 404, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO (Union) brought this action asserting that the Civil Service Commission of the City of Walla Walla (City) acted contrary to RCW 41.08 by certifying three names to the city manager for appointment to a vacant fire chief position. This practice, referred to in civil service parlance as the "rule of three", had been followed by the City for a number of years. The issue at trial was the validity of the pertinent ordinance. The trial court found that city ordinance No. A-2795, governing fire department civil service, was not in accord with RCW 41.08 and voided the ordinance, insofar as it embodied that practice.

RCW 41.08 was enacted in 1935. It requires organization of a civil service commission for city fire fighters and sets forth standards under which the commission operates. One of these standards, RCW 41.08.040(9), requires the commission to certify to the appointing authority the name highest on the list of eligible persons when a vacancy occurs. However, 41.08.010 provides that RCW 41.08 does not apply to cities which subsequently provide for civil service by regulations which "substantially accomplish the purpose of this chapter." That provision also exempts cities which had fire department civil service systems in effect at the time of the chapter's enactment.

The single issue before us is whether the City's inclusion of the "rule of three" in its ordinance is such a departure from the legislative intent, expressed and implicit in RCW 41.08, that the ordinance fails to substantially accomplish the purpose of the chapter.

We have not previously had occasion to examine the purpose of RCW 41.08. We have, however, considered a companion chapter, RCW 41.12, an almost identical statute concerning city police. In Reynolds v. Kirkland Police Comm'n, 62 Wn.2d 720, 725, 384 P.2d 819 (1963), we said:

After a complete reading of RCW chapter 41.12 (Laws of 1937, chapter 13, p. 23), we are of the opinion that its purpose is to establish a civil service system to (1) provide for promotion on the basis of merit, (2) give police officers tenure, and (3) provide for a civil service commission to administer the system and to investigate, by public hearing, removals, suspensions, demotions, and discharges by the appointing power to determine whether such action was or was not made for political or religious reasons and whether it was or was not made in good faith for cause.

We think the same purpose may be ascribed to RCW 41.08.

The Union argues that: (1) uniformed civil service (including fire fighters and police officers) is a particularly sensitive area of public employment requiring special protection from abuse; (2) removing all discretion from the appointing authority is the only way to eliminate the detrimental features of the "spoils" system; and (3) the "rule of one" is therefore an essential feature of any system that purports to "substantially accomplish" the purpose of RCW 41.08.

In interpreting statutes, our function is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wn.2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965). We cannot agree that the legislature intended to eliminate all discretion from the decision-making process. RCW 41.08-.100 provides for.a probationary period of appointment "[t]o enable the appointing power to exercise a choice in the filling of positions".

More importantly, we do not believe the legislature intended that a "rule of one" was necessarily required of those cities which created fire department civil service systems. RCW 41.08.010 adopts a flexible approach by exempting cities which subsequently adopt systems "substantially" accomplishing the purpose of the chapter. A statute should be construed so that each word and phrase is given effect (Chelan County v. Fellers, 65 Wn.2d 943, 400 P.2d 609 (1965)), and we do not ignore the implication that cities be given flexibility in their approach.

An important indication of the legislative intent can be gleaned from the history of RCW 41.08. In 1935, both Bellingham and Tacoma used the "rule of three" in their civil service systems which included the fire departments. Had the legislature considered the "rule of one" to be essential to fire department civil service, it could easily have conditioned the exemption on the adoption of that rule.

While the statute adopts the "rule of one" for the statutory system, we do not find the legislature's preference for that provision to be of such overriding concern that it is essential under RCW 41.08. The purpose delineated in Reynolds and ascribed to this legislation is substantially accomplished by Walla Walla ordinance No. A-2795. As the Court of Appeals said in Bellingham Firefighters Local 106 v. Bellingham, 15 Wn. App. 662, 666, 551 P.2d 142 (1976):

The "rule of three" which has been used by the City of Bellingham since 1904, with the exception of one period of 2 1/2 years, is a well-established and well-recognized method of carrying out and accomplishing the purposes of civil service. If the state statute had meant to mandate a "rule of one" in every city fire department it could have said so. The statute does not mandate compliance with the methods used in the statute; rather, it requires substantial accomplishment of its purpose. The statute intended to allow cities and towns a local option as to methods and techniques and as to the many recognized and acceptable methods of setting up a civil service system to substantially accomplish the purpose of civil service.

We are in agreement.

Reversed.

Hamilton, Stafford, Utter, Brachtenbach, Horowitz, and Dolliver, JJ., concur.