Inquiry Concerning Judge Christian Coomer

892 S.E.2d 3, 316 Ga. 855

Opinion

316 Ga. 855 FINAL COPY

S21Z0595. INQUIRY CONCERNING JUDGE CHRISTIAN COOMER.

PER CURIAM.

In our system of separated powers, each branch of state

government secures compliance with its decisions in different ways.

Alexander Hamilton famously put it this way in Federalist No. 78:

“The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of

the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but

prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen

are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence

over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength

or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution

whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but

merely judgment; and must ultimately depend on the aid of the

executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).1

That our judgment is our only power shapes the kind of conduct

we must insist upon from Georgia’s judges. The judiciary’s judgment

will be obeyed only so long as the public respects it, and that respect

will not long survive judges who act in a manner that undermines

public confidence in their judgment and integrity. In this case, Court

of Appeals Judge Christian Coomer is charged with patterns of

behavior regarding his use of campaign funds and his dealings with

a legal client that allegedly undermined public confidence. The

Hearing Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”)

found that he indeed committed those acts, that he did so in bad

faith, that those acts violated the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct,

and that the violations warranted his removal.

Upon review, the matter is initially a close one: at least some

1 The United States Supreme Court has quoted from this passage of the

Federalist Papers in explaining the importance of the independence and integrity of the judiciary. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 445 (135 SCt 1656, 191 LE2d 570) (2015); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249-250 (40 SCt 550, 64 LE 887) (1920), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (121 SCt 1782, 149 LE2d 820) (2001). 2 evidence supports many of the Hearing Panel’s findings, while at

least some evidence also supports many of Judge Coomer’s

contradictory explanations. But the Hearing Panel viewed the live

testimony personally and weighed demeanor and credibility in

making its findings, and we generally defer to its findings if

supported by sufficient evidence. And enough of the Hearing Panel’s

findings are supported by sufficient evidence that, notwithstanding

alternative ways that the evidence could have been viewed, we defer

to the Hearing Panel’s findings regarding Judge Coomer’s actions

and the bad faith in which the Hearing Panel found those actions to

have been taken. Once we arrive at that conclusion, the matter

ceases to be close; the appropriate sanction is to remove Judge

Coomer from the bench.

1. Background and Procedural History

As recounted in greater detail in our decision the last time this

matter came to our Court, see Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga.

841 (885 SE2d 738) (2023), Judge Coomer was admitted to the State

Bar of Georgia in 1999. At the time of his appointment to the Court

3 of Appeals in 2018, he both maintained a private law practice and

served in the Georgia House of Representatives. He applied for a

vacancy on the Court of Appeals on March 29, 2018, withdrawing

from consideration the following month. Judge Coomer applied for a

vacancy on this Court on August 30, 2018, and on September 14,

2018, Governor Nathan Deal announced his intention to appoint

Judge Coomer to the Georgia Court of Appeals. On October 31, 2018,

Governor Deal appointed Judge Coomer to the Court of Appeals, and

Judge Coomer was sworn in to the position that same day. Judge

Coomer was elected to a full six-year term in 2020.

The JQC in late 2020 charged Judge Coomer with a number of

alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The charges, later

amended, largely involve campaign-finance issues and Judge

Coomer’s handling of one particular client relationship that began

before Judge Coomer became a judge. As a result of those charges,

Judge Coomer has been suspended from office since January 6,

2021, pending final resolution of the JQC’s proceedings against

4 him.2

In late 2022, the JQC tried Judge Coomer in a hearing held

over a three-month period. On January 30 of this year, the Hearing

Panel submitted its Report and Recommendation to this Court,

finding that the Director had proved most of the counts charged and

recommending that we remove Judge Coomer from office.

In March, this Court issued an opinion concluding that two key

issues necessitated a remand for additional findings. First, many of

the JQC’s charges arose from conduct by Judge Coomer before he

became a judge or judicial candidate, but the text of the Code makes

clear that it does not reach conduct of those who are neither judges

nor judicial candidates. See Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. at

2 To be clear, Judge Coomer did not suspend himself voluntarily. Instead,

this Court suspended him after Judge Coomer agreed, for purposes of the JQC’s motion to suspend him, that the JQC could prove the allegations against him and that the allegations in the motion and the original formal charges, if taken as true, warranted suspension under the standard set forth in JQC Rule 15 (C). The Court previously had rejected Judge Coomer’s initial attempt to consent to a suspension without having satisfied the evidentiary standard of the rule. This interim suspension was with pay as provided by JQC Rule 15 (C) and the Georgia Constitution’s requirement that “[a]n incumbent’s salary, allowance, or supplement shall not be decreased during the incumbent’s term of office.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. V. 5 850-855 (4) (b). And second, the Hearing Panel applied the wrong

standard for determining whether a judge may be disciplined under

the Georgia Constitution; given the manner in which the Amended

Formal Charges were framed, and given that none of the counts

against Judge Coomer allege anything about actions he took in a

judicial capacity, in order for Judge Coomer to be disciplined, the

Director had to prove that he acted in bad faith. See id. at 858-862

(6). We therefore directed the Hearing Panel to, among other things,

“issue new findings that (1) determine which counts against Judge

Coomer that were proved by clear and convincing evidence are

properly within the scope of the Code of Judicial Conduct; (2) clearly

articulate which counts, if any, may support discipline within the

constitutional framework as articulated in this opinion, with

particular attention toward whether the Director proved bad faith

for any of those counts; and (3) reconsider what, if any, discipline is

appropriate based on the revised findings.” Id. at 863 (7).

The Hearing Panel issued a new Report and Recommendation,

filed with this Court on May 12, 2023. That report concurred with

6 the parties’ agreement as to which charges survived our March

opinion in that they “involve allegations of misconduct occurring

during the time [that Judge Coomer] was either a candidate for

judicial office, had been appointed to the Court of Appeals, or was

actually serving as a state-wide appellate judge.” The Hearing Panel

found that Judge Coomer acted in bad faith while engaging in all of

the misconduct at issue in the surviving charges. And the Hearing

Panel reaffirmed its conclusion that Judge Coomer should be

removed from office. Judge Coomer filed Exceptions to that Report

and Recommendation, and we then received a response brief from

the JQC Director and a brief from Judge Coomer replying to the

JQC’s response.

2. Analysis

In considering the Hearing Panel’s Report and

Recommendation and Judge Coomer’s Exceptions to it, we begin by

reviewing the Hearing Panel’s findings about Judge Coomer’s

underlying conduct during the relevant time period. We determine

that at least the findings ultimately material to our conclusion are

7 not clearly erroneous.3 We then consider whether these findings

support the Hearing Panel’s conclusion that Judge Coomer violated

the Code of Judicial Conduct, and conclude that findings as to at

least some of this conduct support a conclusion that Judge Coomer

violated Rule 1.1 of the Code. Without reaching a conclusion as to

whether all of the Hearing Panel’s findings of Rule 1.1 violations are

supported, we move on to considering whether Judge Coomer’s

conduct violated Rule 1.2 (A), and whether Judge Coomer’s conduct

that violated Rule 1.1 and/or Rule 1.2 (A) was undertaken in bad

faith. We conclude that the record does support the Hearing Panel’s

ultimate findings that this conduct was undertaken in bad faith, and

that, not only did some of Judge Coomer’s conduct violate Rule 1.1,

but at least a substantial portion of his conduct violated Rule 1.2 (A).

Having thus concluded that it is within our constitutional power to

discipline Judge Coomer, we consider the appropriate sanction, and

3 Judge Coomer levies a variety of challenges to the Hearing Panel’s

findings. A number of those challenges are well-taken. But the well-taken challenges are made to findings that are ultimately unnecessary to our conclusion, so we do not address them in this opinion. 8 decide that Judge Coomer should be removed from office.

(a) Generally speaking, the Hearing Panel’s material findings about Judge Coomer’s conduct are not clearly erroneous.

The most detailed findings of the Hearing Panel are those

included in the Hearing Panel’s original Report and

Recommendation, which the Hearing Panel incorporated by

reference in its Second Report and Recommendation. Those findings

include the following. A significant portion of the conduct at issue

involved Judge Coomer’s relationship with James Filhart, an elderly

client whom Judge Coomer began representing in 2015. At that

time, Filhart hired Judge Coomer to pursue an action for

guardianship of Filhart’s girlfriend. After successful resolution of

that action, Filhart continued to engage Judge Coomer’s assistance

on various legal issues, including various estate-planning matters.

Among those matters, Judge Coomer drafted a May 2018 will for

Filhart that named Judge Coomer and his heirs among the

beneficiaries and Judge Coomer as executor and trustee. By the

terms of the will, Judge Coomer had authority to cancel debts owed

9 to Filhart upon Filhart’s death.4

Also before Judge Coomer was sworn in as a judge, he accepted

several loans of money from Filhart. During the relevant time

period, while his August 2018 application of a state appellate

judgeship was pending (and thus the Code applied to him), Judge

Coomer drafted a promissory note dated September 8, 2018, in

which he accepted a loan of $130,000 from Filhart to CAC Holdings

LLC, a limited liability company solely controlled by Judge Coomer

that effectively lacked assets. The note provided an interest rate of

four percent with a single repayment on January 1, 2026, when

Filhart would be more than 80 years old. The loan was not secured,

and Judge Coomer provided no personal guarantee. Filhart

discussed with Judge Coomer the prospect of liquidating stock

holdings to fund the loan and did in fact sell various stocks to fund

the loan.

4 The drafting of the May 2018 will did not occur during a time that Judge

Coomer was subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct and thus cannot itself support a violation of the Code, but the will’s terms are relevant because they were still in effect at the time that Judge Coomer accepted a loan from Filhart in September 2018 (a time at which he was subject to the Code). 10 On September 19, 2018, five days after the announcement of

Judge Coomer’s appointment to the Court of Appeals, Filhart

executed a new will drafted by Judge Coomer. This will also named

Judge Coomer and his heirs as beneficiaries, but Judge Coomer’s

spouse was designated to serve as executor and trustee.

By early 2019, after Judge Coomer had been sworn in to the

Court of Appeals, the relationship with Filhart had soured. On

February 22, 2019, Filhart e-mailed Judge Coomer demanding that

Judge Coomer return “all the money you borrowed from me asap”

and stating that because of Judge Coomer “talking me into selling

all my stocks at one time, I owe $11,000 more [in] taxes than I would

have if I hadn’t sold them.” Judge Coomer replied via e-mail later

that day, stating, “I didn’t tell you to sell your stocks and I don’t

know anything about that.” Filhart also demanded Judge Coomer

provide invoices and other documents related to Judge Coomer’s

representation of him, but for more than a year, Judge Coomer

refused, saying he would not communicate with Filhart until he

provided a letter from a doctor stating that he was of sound mind.

11 Judge Coomer repaid the September 2018 loan in full in April 2020,

but only after Filhart filed a lawsuit against him. He provided

invoices and other requested documents to Filhart in June 2020, but

only after the JQC had initiated its investigation.

The other relevant allegations against Judge Coomer involve

campaign-finance issues. In three instances in October and

November 2018, Judge Coomer transferred campaign funds to his

law firm operating account and, in two of those instances, failed to

report the transfers on his campaign contribution disclosure report

(“CCDR”). Judge Coomer claimed that the three transfers were to

reimburse his law firm assistant for work she did on campaign- or

legislative-related activities, but neither Judge Coomer nor his

assistant documented or kept track of the time spent on that work.

A final set of campaign-finance allegations stems from a trip

that Judge Coomer took to Hawaii with his family in the fall of 2018,

after his appointment to the Court of Appeals had been announced

but before he had been sworn in to the court and relinquished his

role as a legislator. Although Judge Coomer attempted to identify a

12 legislative purpose for the trip, ultimately the trip was entirely

leisure. Judge Coomer used a credit card to purchase airfare for the

trip for himself and his family in June and August 2018 and to

purchase goods and services while in Hawaii. Judge Coomer paid

the credit card bill for those purchases using funds from his

campaign account. Judge Coomer reimbursed his campaign account

for the trip expenses after the trip, although he did not do so fully

until after the Georgia Campaign Finance Commission (“CFC”)

began investigating him. Judge Coomer failed to disclose the use of

campaign funds for the Hawaii trip on his CCDRs for September 30,

2018, October 25, 2018, and December 31, 2018.

As discussed in our prior opinion in this matter, “[i]n

considering whether the Director has met the standard of proof as

to charges of misconduct, we employ a clear and convincing proof

standard.” Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. at 847 (3) (citation

and punctuation omitted). We generally review factual findings by

the JQC Hearing Panel for clear error and defer to the Hearing

13 Panel’s credibility determinations. See id.5 Generally speaking, we

cannot say that these findings by the Hearing Panel are clearly

erroneous, as there is sufficient evidence to support the findings.

Indeed, many of the factual findings detailed above are supported

by documentary evidence or otherwise undisputed. Judge Coomer’s

principal argument against the Hearing Panel’s findings is that the

evidence supports different findings instead. And he is right that

there is evidence that could have supported different findings, had

the Hearing Panel been convinced otherwise. But Judge Coomer’s

argument is ultimately unpersuasive because the record does not

compel the different findings that he prefers; instead, this record

would have supported findings in either direction, and we defer to

the findings that the Hearing Panel actually made (and that are

supported by the record).

(b) Some of the conduct by Judge Coomer found by the

5 Although we do generally defer to factual findings by the Hearing Panel

(and ultimately do so here on the critical points), the broad and discretionary nature of our review in judicial discipline matters means that we need not always defer even in situations where we would defer to a factfinder in an ordinary appeal. See Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. at 847 (3). 14 Hearing Panel violated Rule 1.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

That the Hearing Panel’s factual findings as outlined above are

supported by record evidence does not necessarily mean that each of

these instances of alleged misconduct amounted to a violation of the

Code of Judicial Conduct. In order for an action by Judge Coomer to

provide a basis for discipline, it must constitute a violation of some

provision of that Code.

And even if an action does violate a provision of the Code, given

that Judge Coomer’s conduct at issue here did not involve an

exercise of judicial power, the Georgia Constitution does not permit

us to discipline Judge Coomer unless his actions were also taken in

bad faith. The Georgia Constitution sets out five grounds for

discipline, two of which were alleged as a basis for discipline of

Judge Coomer in the Amended Formal Charges: “willful misconduct

in office” and “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice

which brings the judicial office into disrepute.” Ga. Const. of 1983,

Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII (a). “Willful misconduct in office”

encompasses only actions taken in a judicial capacity, and, as we

15 noted in our prior opinion, “[n]one of the counts against Judge

Coomer allege anything about actions he took in a judicial capacity.”

Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. at 860 (6). When a judge is

acting as a judge, the judge is acting in a judicial capacity; when a

person who is a judge acts outside of that capacity, this Court’s

ability to discipline the judge is more limited. In order for actions

taken outside of a judge’s judicial capacity to constitute “conduct

prejudicial to the administration of justice” and thus within our

constitutional power to discipline, those actions must be taken in

bad faith. See id. at 858-860 (6). Therefore, any discipline of Judge

Coomer in this matter requires a finding that he carried out the

conduct at issue in bad faith.6

6 In a footnote to his Exceptions, Judge Coomer argues that finding that

he acted in bad faith when bad faith was not alleged in the Amended Formal Charges violates his due process rights under state and federal law. But the Amended Formal Charges did allege that Judge Coomer took actions that constituted “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute” within the meaning of Article VI, Section VII, Paragraph VII (a) of the Georgia Constitution. And, even before our prior opinion in this case, it was established law that in order for actions taken outside of a judge’s judicial capacity to fall within that provision, those actions must be taken in bad faith. See Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. at 859 (6) (citing cases). Accordingly, the allegations put Judge Coomer on notice that

16 Considering first whether Judge Coomer’s various actions

violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, the JQC generally alleged

that Judge Coomer’s conduct violated two rules found in the Code of

Judicial Conduct: Rules 1.1 and 1.2 (A). The JQC also alleged a few

instances in which Judge Coomer violated Rule 4.2 (B), one of which

the Hearing Panel found was encompassed within the time period

during which Judge Coomer was governed by the Code.

Several actions by Judge Coomer clearly amounted to

violations of Rule 1.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; the only

question is whether the particular action was taken in bad faith

bad faith was required to prove the charges against him, and this argument fails. Elsewhere in his Exceptions, Judge Coomer argues that his due process rights were violated by a number of discovery rulings by the Hearing Panel that deprived him of particular evidence, either altogether or in advance of certain testimony. He also argues that the Hearing Panel erred in curtailing his banker’s testimony about Judge Coomer’s lack of prior deceitful behavior and lack of financial distress. And he argues that his due process rights were violated because the JQC “secretly subpoenaed all of Judge Coomer’s bank records and used the GBI to do so in violation of JQC Rule 4 (B) (6), Comment 2’s prohibition on ‘use [of] active law enforcement officials or staff to investigate complaints . . .’ and Judge Coomer’s right to move to quash overly broad subpoenas under JQC Rule 14 (E).” We conclude that Judge Coomer has not shown that the Hearing Panel exceeded its authority in these rulings in any way material to our resolution of this matter. 17 such that discipline is constitutionally permissible, which we

address in conjunction with our discussion of whether Judge

Coomer’s actions violated Rule 1.2 (A). Rule 1.1 provides that

“[j]udges shall respect and comply with the law.” Coomer

acknowledges that his drafting of the September 2018 will violated

Rule 1.8 (c) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPCs”),

which states that “[a] lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving

the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent,

child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a

client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is

related to the donee.” The Code defines “law” as “denot[ing] court

rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, judicial

emergency orders . . . and decisional law, including the Code of

Judicial Conduct and Advisory Opinions of the Judicial

Qualifications Commission.” See Code Terminology. The GRPCs are

rules promulgated by this Court, see Bernocchi v. Forcucci, 279 Ga.

460, 463 (2) (614 SE2d 775) (2005), which presumptively brings

them within the scope of “court rules,” and Judge Coomer makes no

18 argument that the GRPCs are not “court rules.”7 As a result, the

drafting of the September 2018 will violated Rule 1.1.

The same goes for the two instances within the relevant time

period in which Judge Coomer failed to disclose on his CCDR

transfers from his campaign account to his law firm account. OCGA

§ 21-5-34 (b) (1) (B) requires candidates for election to public office

to file CCDRs that include certain information about any

expenditure by the campaign greater than $100. By failing to do so

in these two instances, Judge Coomer violated Rule 1.1 of the Code

of Judicial Conduct.

Regarding the Hawaii trip, a candidate’s campaign funds are

permitted to be used to pay for only “ordinary and necessary

expenses . . . incurred in connection with such candidate’s campaign

for elective office or such public officer’s fulfillment or retention of

such office.” OCGA § 21-5-33 (a). The record shows that Judge

Coomer did not have a campaign- or legislative-related reason for

7 Because no such argument is before us today, we do not foreclose such

an argument in a future case. 19 his family’s Hawaii vacation, either when he initially purchased the

airline tickets for his family or at any subsequent point, despite

attempting to manufacture one. Judge Coomer argues that it would

have been permissible to use campaign funds to pay for trip

expenses for him and his wife had he found a legitimate legislative

purpose for the trip and that it was his intent to do so. But Judge

Coomer does not suggest, because he cannot, that it would have ever

been proper to use campaign funds to pay for travel and other

vacation expenses for his children. As confirmed by the CFC’s

consent order, Judge Coomer’s use of campaign funds to pay for the

Hawaii trip were “unordinary and unnecessary expenses” that

violated OCGA § 21-5-33 (a). And thus Judge Coomer violated Rule

1.1.8

8 The Hearing Panel also found that Judge Coomer’s use of campaign

funds for the Hawaii trip violated Rule 4.2 (B) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that “[j]udicial candidates, including incumbent judges, shall not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of themselves or members of their families.” The Hearing Panel concluded that the rule was violated because Judge Coomer used campaign funds to pay for goods and services in Hawaii for his and his family’s personal benefit after he had been appointed as a judge. Although Judge Coomer argues that the Hearing Panel’s finding that he acted in bad faith in making these

20 Looking past these clear Rule 1.1 violations, Judge Coomer has

raised several serious questions about whether certain of his other

actions actually violated the GRPCs and campaign-finance laws as

the JQC alleges, and, therefore, whether those actions violated Rule

1.1.9 We do not need to resolve these questions about the other

alleged violations of particular GRPC or campaign-finance rules,

however, because as discussed below, we conclude that the Hearing

Panel did not clearly err in finding that at least a substantial portion

expenditures is not supported by the record, he does not appear to contest its conclusion that this rule was violated. There does not appear to be any published Georgia appellate decision construing the contours of Rule 4.2 (B), including whether it applies to contributions solicited for a campaign for an office other than a judicial office. Given Judge Coomer’s failure to take exception to the Hearing Panel’s interpretation of the rule, and given that we conclude that at least certain use of campaign funds for the Hawaii trip violated Rule 1.2 (A), this case does not require us to resolve any questions about the parameters of Rule 4.2 (B). 9 For instance, he argues that GRPC 1.8 (a)’s requirement that generally

transactions entered into with clients must be fair and reasonable does not apply to the loan that he received from Filhart because Filhart was not a client at the time that the loan was accepted; the Hearing Panel made no clear finding about whether Filhart was a client at that precise time. Judge Coomer also raises difficult questions about whether the GRPCs the Hearing Panel found he violated in failing to provide certain documents even apply to the sort of requests at issue. And he questions the enforceability of a campaign-finance regulation, Ga. Comp. R, & Regs., r. 189-3-.04 (1), which he suggests imposes a requirement for detail in disclosure of credit card transactions that is not authorized by OCGA § 21-5-6 (a) (7), a legal question that no published judicial decision appears to address. 21 of that conduct also violated Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of Judicial

Conduct.

(c) Other conduct violated Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Hearing Panel’s findings that Judge Coomer acted in bad faith are supported by the record.

Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that

“[j]udges shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public

confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the

judiciary.” This Rule also existed in similar form in the former

Canon 2 (A), which directed judges to both “respect and comply with

the law” and act in “a manner that promotes public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary[.]”10 The current rule was

adopted by this Court in May 2015, effective January 1, 2016. See

In re Judicial Qualifications Comm. Formal Advisory Opinion No.

239, 300 Ga. 291, 291 n.1 (794 SE2d 631) (2016). The current

10 We note that at some point Canon 2 (A) was revised from a rule that

used the term “should” to one that used the term “shall.” Compare Inquiry Concerning Peters, 289 Ga. 633, 633 n.2 (715 SE2d 56) (2011); with Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 1305, 259 Ga. 640, 642 (2) (388 SE2d 328) (1989). As explained in the Preamble to the current Code of Judicial Conduct, the use of the term “shall” signifies a “binding obligation[,]” while the use of the term “should” indicates an “advisory statement[.]” 22 provision has been employed with some frequency in recent years as

a basis for discipline of Georgia judges. See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning

Norris, 314 Ga. 10, 12 (2) (875 SE2d 627) (2022); Inquiry Concerning

Baker, 313 Ga. 359, 360 (1), 361-363 (2) (870 SE2d 356) (2022);

Inquiry Concerning Hays, 313 Ga. 148, 149-150 (868 SE2d 792)

(2022). But although this Court has periodically discussed whether

a particular fact pattern violates Rule 1.2 (A) or former Canon 2 (A),

the Court has offered little engagement with the text of the rule, the

kind of analysis that generally applies, and the outer boundaries of

the rule, which is itself fairly vague. See Inquiry Concerning Baker,

313 Ga. at 361 (1), 362-363 (2) (Court finding itself unable to

conclude, without additional information, that judge violated Rule

1.2 (A) by receiving assistance from court staff on personal matters,

giving city solicitor feedback on prosecutors’ performance, and

requesting reassignment of certain prosecutors); Matter of Inquiry

Concerning a Judge No. 94-70, 265 Ga. 326, 329 (3) (454 SE2d 780)

(1995) (concluding that magistrate obtaining felony warrants for

entire board of commissioners in the midst of a political squabble

23 involving her salary violated former Canon 2 (A)’s prescription to act

in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary).11

We recognize that the broad language at issue — which says

the rule applies “at all times” and invokes a standard based on how

the public might perceive particular conduct — must be understood

in the light of judges’ due process right to fair notice of what conduct

may lead to discipline. See Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. at

849 (4) (a) & n.3 (explaining that the JQC’s authority to enforce the

Code of Judicial Conduct is limited by state and federal due process

protections, which include “fair notice of what conduct is

prohibited”); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 491, 249 Ga.

30, 31 (287 SE2d 2) (1982) (opining that prior Canon 2 (A) was

“extremely broad” and had been “attacked as being nebulous and

incapable of rational application” before concluding with “no

hesitancy” that particular conduct at issue in the case violated rule).

11 Because pertinent language of Canon 2 (A) was carried forward into

Rule 1.2 (A), the prior case law interpreting the former canon is relevant. See In re Judicial Qualifications Comm. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239, 300 Ga. at 291 n.1. 24 And given the frequency with which Rule 1.2 (A) is invoked as a

basis for seeking judicial discipline, the JQC should keep these

concerns in mind in future cases in which it seeks to use this rule.

But whatever the limits to Rule 1.2 (A)’s enforceability, at least

a substantial portion of the conduct that the Hearing Panel found

Judge Coomer engaged in falls well within those limits. The

Terminology section of the Code defines “integrity” as “probity,

fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character.”

Applying this definition, Rule 1.2 (A)’s reference to the integrity of

the judiciary means that judges are not above the law and must

respect the law, because otherwise they cannot be trusted to apply

the law honestly and fairly. The rule of law depends on such public

trust. We do not expect judges to be perfect; judges are human. But

we can and do expect them to be honest. The judiciary has no place

for dishonest persons. And public confidence that judges are honest

is particularly important given the place of the judiciary in our

system of government: “The judiciary’s authority . . . depends in

large measure on the public’s willingness to respect and follow its

25 decisions. As Justice Frankfurter once put it . . . , ‘justice must

satisfy the appearance of justice.’” Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,

575 U.S. 433, 445-446 (135 SCt 1656, 191 LE2d 570) (2015) (quoting

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (75 SCt 11, 99 LE 11) (1954)).

Thus, for the judiciary to serve its constitutional role properly and

for that function to be seen as legitimate, judges cannot be perceived

to be dishonest or above the law.

Judge Coomer’s conduct (as found by the Hearing Panel) that

violates this standard of integrity also amounts to conduct

undertaken in bad faith, the constitutional requirement that must

be met in order for this Court to discipline Judge Coomer in this

matter. As we explained in our prior opinion in this case, the concept

of bad faith in this context generally encompasses at least two

general characteristics: that the duty breached by the actor was

known to that actor, and that the actor was acting with some self-

interest or ill will. It certainly “must involve something more than

negligence.” Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. at 860 (6). As we

explained, “[b]ad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but

26 it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies

conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through

some motive of interest or ill will.” Id. (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Given the overlap between this standard and the Code’s Rule

1.2 (A), we will discuss these issues together with respect to each

instance of Judge Coomer’s conduct. The Hearing Panel found

generally that “the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence

that [Judge Coomer] knew that it was improper for him to put his

interests and his family’s interests ahead of his client’s (or the

public’s) in each of these instances of misconduct — in other words,

that he acted in bad faith.” We also note that the Hearing Panel

made clear that its findings of bad faith were based in significant

part on personally observing Judge Coomer throughout days of in-

person hearings, including his own testimony. This is the kind of

finding to which we offer considerable deference. In general, we

conclude that the Hearing Panel’s findings of bad faith are

supported by the evidence, and that Judge Coomer’s actions violated

27 the standard set by Rule 1.2 (A).

(i) Dealings with Filhart

Considering first Judge Coomer’s dealings with Filhart, the

Hearing Panel found clear and convincing evidence of bad faith in

that based on the Hearing Panel’s observations of Judge Coomer and

Filhart, the Hearing Panel concluded that “Filhart was exploitable,

[Judge Coomer] exploitative, and the predictable results of that mix

were the exploitation of a trust-based relationship to further [Judge

Coomer]’s interests to the detriment of Filhart’s. Bad faith writ

large.”

The record contains evidence that can support these general

findings of bad faith with respect to Judge Coomer’s dealings with

Filhart. Although Judge Coomer has emphasized that the Hearing

Panel did not find that he actually intended to distribute Filhart’s

assets in a manner other than that directed by Filhart, the Hearing

Panel did make findings that Judge Coomer took advantage of

Filhart’s trust in order to position himself into a place of authority

over Filhart’s wealth. In particular, the Hearing Panel specifically

28 rejected Judge Coomer’s representation that he considered Filhart

to be a friend and never would have taken advantage of a friend,

saying “the evidence does not support such a claim.” Filhart’s

uncontradicted testimony made clear that he did not distinguish

between when Judge Coomer was acting as his lawyer and when he

was acting merely as a trusted friend. Regardless of Judge Coomer’s

subjective feelings toward Filhart, evidence in the record showed

that Judge Coomer had limited social contact with Filhart,

interacting with him more as a lawyer than as a friend. And the

notion that Filhart was “exploitable” is supported by the evidence

that Filhart had few friends and no family close by and was

relatively isolated socially.

The Hearing Panel’s findings of bad faith with respect to Judge

Coomer’s dealings with Filhart generally are bolstered by findings

of bad faith regarding particular actions by Judge Coomer. With

respect to the September 2018 loan from Filhart, the Hearing Panel

found that the evidence about the loan transactions showed bad

29 faith “res ipsa loquitur,”12 noting that the transactions were

“[u]nsecured, unguaranteed loans[.]” The Hearing Panel did not

clearly err in finding that Judge Coomer acted in bad faith in

accepting an unsecured, unguaranteed loan from Filhart based on

the nature of the transaction itself.13 Moreover, Judge Coomer’s

explanation for the loan — that it was offered by Filhart as a way to

encumber some of his funds until his Teamsters’ pension fund was

12 Judge Coomer argues that this was an improper application of the tort

law concept of res ipsa loquitur. But we take the Hearing Panel’s use of this term not as a reference to tort law, but as a finding that the terms of the estate- planning and loan documents themselves were evidence of bad faith. 13 In reaching this conclusion, we do not rely on several aspects of the

Hearing Panel’s characterization of the loan. Specifically, we need not and do not rely on the Hearing Panel’s characterization of the loan as “unconscionable,” which Judge Coomer argues is both factually and legally erroneous and a violation of his due process rights in that he “had no notice before trial that an unconscionability claim was at issue.” The Hearing Panel also generally described the loans from Filhart to Judge Coomer as “from client to lawyer/judge” in finding that the loans inherently were taken in bad faith. But the Hearing Panel’s second Report and Recommendation was unclear as to whether the Hearing Panel had found that Filhart was a client of Judge Coomer at the time Judge Coomer accepted the September 2018 loan, at another point describing Filhart as a “former client” when discussing Judge Coomer’s acceptance of “another unconscionable loan” from him; we therefore do not assume that Filhart was a client at the time of the September 2018 loan. And the Hearing Panel generally described the loans from Filhart as having “maturity dates that far exceed expected lifespans”; prior loans from Filhart to Judge Coomer, before he became a judicial candidate, had maturity dates of 2038 and 2048, but such a description would not appear to apply to the September 2018 loan. 30 expected to become insolvent — is undermined by the evidence that

Filhart needed to liquidate stock holdings (ultimately with adverse

tax consequences) in order to fund the loan.14 The loan was a

substantial one that would not come due until Filhart was in his

eighties. That loan formally was provided to an entity that was

controlled by Judge Coomer but itself had little to no assets, and the

loan was unsecured and not guaranteed by Judge Coomer

personally. And at the time the loan was accepted, Judge Coomer

was the executor and trustee under Filhart’s will. Because the loan

was unsecured and not guaranteed, and provided to an entity that

itself had assets insufficient to cover the loan, any collection of the

debt was doubtful, and so Judge Coomer would have had the power

to forgive the loan in the event of Filhart’s death. See OCGA § 53-

12-261 (b) (22) (C) (trustee’s powers include the power “[t]o

compromise all debts, the collection of which are doubtful, belonging

to the estate or trust when such settlements will advance the

14 Filhart testified at the hearing that he could not remember whose idea

the loan was. 31 interests of those represented”).

The Hearing Panel’s findings of bad faith in Judge Coomer’s

September 2018 estate-planning work for Filhart also have support

in the record. The Hearing Panel found that prior wills that gave

Judge Coomer authority to allocate Filhart’s estate to Judge Coomer

himself, and decide how much of the outstanding loan balances owed

by Judge Coomer should be forgiven, also showed bad faith on their

face. Exchanging Judge Coomer’s wife for Judge Coomer as executor

and trustee in the September 2018 will (the estate-planning work by

Judge Coomer that actually came within the time period during

which he was governed by the Code of Judicial Conduct) did not

impress the Hearing Panel, which suggested that this merely

showed that Judge Coomer understood the law (“no negligence

here,” the Hearing Panel opined). The Hearing Panel found that the

will was particularly “damaging” to its view of Judge Coomer in that

it also showed “his unwillingness, even after his judicial

appointment, to relinquish control of Filhart as a source of potential

financial gain.” In addition, the Hearing Panel found

32 “unpersuasive” Judge Coomer’s testimony that it was Filhart’s idea

to name Judge Coomer’s wife as the new executrix and trustee in

Filhart’s will; the Hearing Panel’s finding is supported by the

testimony of Filhart and Judge Coomer’s wife in contravention of the

testimony of Judge Coomer himself. Even under the new will, a

member of Judge Coomer’s immediate family had the power to

forgive the balance on the September 2018 loan in the event of

Filhart’s death; assuming Judge Coomer would have an incentive to

forgive the balance on a loan to an unfunded entity controlled by him

(and that he did not personally guarantee), his wife would have

similar incentives to do so. And although Judge Coomer’s wife

testified that she would have consulted a lawyer friend, rather than

her husband, if she had questions about her duties as executor and

trustee, she also testified that at the time the September 2018 will

was executed, she had not spoken to Filhart about his wishes for his

assets and instead had received information on that point only from

her husband.

33 interactions with Filhart after their relationship began to

deteriorate also are supported by the record. In that regard, the

Hearing Panel found:

Bad faith similarly permeated [Judge Coomer]’s failure to provide Filhart with billing records and his case file, as well as [Judge Coomer]’s false claims about his knowledge of Filhart’s plans to sell stock to fund one of the loans Filhart made to [Judge Coomer]. These actions . . . were made knowingly and with the intent to either obstruct or bring to a halt Filhart’s efforts to learn more about what [Judge Coomer] had done with all the money Filhart had paid for legal services. Put differently, it was in [Judge Coomer]’s interest, as a newly minted appellate judge, to have Filhart the Gadfly go away and these professionally improper actions furthered that interest.15

Judge Coomer now acknowledges that he “should have given Mr.

Filhart file records sooner.” And yet at the time that it mattered,

Judge Coomer dodged Filhart’s requests for documents, insisting

instead that Filhart had to give proof of mental competence.16 And

15 Although the Hearing Panel also found that these actions were “clear

violations of duties [Judge Coomer] owed to Filhart[,]” we need not and do not decide whether that conclusion is correct. 16 The Hearing Panel declined to conclude that Judge Coomer violated

Rule 1.2 (A) by demanding that Filhart provide documentation of his mental health status. But we consider evidence of such in determining whether the Hearing Panel erred in finding that Judge Coomer acted in bad faith by refusing to give Filhart requested documents. 34 the Hearing Panel’s finding that Judge Coomer misrepresented his

purported ignorance of Filhart’s liquidation of stock to fund the

September 2018 loan when Filhart brought it up later also is

supported by the record, notwithstanding Judge Coomer’s attempts

to argue that his response to Filhart was accurate in the narrow,

literal sense that Judge Coomer was aware that Filhart had

considered selling the stocks but not that he had actually done so.17

17 Although Judge Coomer now suggests that it was literally true for him

to say he “didn’t know anything about that” because he was responding to Filhart’s statements about Judge Coomer persuading him to sell his stocks and incurring a tax liability due to the stock sale, the Hearing Panel’s interpretation of this dismissive statement as simply feigning ignorance of Filhart’s plan to sell stock to finance the loan is not clearly erroneous. And the Hearing Panel’s finding that Judge Coomer knew that Filhart planned to sell stocks to finance the loan also is not clearly erroneous. Judge Coomer emphasizes that the Hearing Panel’s first Report and Recommendation said at various points that he did not act with “dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation” in his dealings with Filhart, and that the Hearing Panel’s second Report and Recommendation incorporated those findings by reference. Judge Coomer is not wrong. But those statements in the first Report and Recommendation were narrow, and were specifically focused on applying the standard of GRPC 8.4 (a) (4), not making broader and more general observations about Judge Coomer’s integrity in his dealings with Filhart. And the second Report and Recommendation brought more clarity to the Hearing Panel’s general view that Judge Coomer acted without integrity in his dealings with Filhart. As noted above, the Hearing Panel generally found that Judge Coomer’s dealings with Filhart amounted to “the exploitation of a trust-based relationship to further [Judge Coomer]’s interest to the detriment of Filhart’s.” Also noted above, the Hearing Panel specifically referred to Judge Coomer’s claims that he did not know about Filhart’s plans to sell stock to fund a loan to Judge Coomer as “false.” 35 In the light of the Hearing Panel’s supported factual findings

of bad faith by Judge Coomer in his dealings with Filhart, we

conclude that these actions violated Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of

Judicial Conduct. While his application for an appellate judgeship

was pending, Judge Coomer accepted a substantial, unsecured loan

from a vulnerable person who trusted him, against the backdrop of

a will that gave Judge Coomer considerable authority over Filhart’s

estate. After it was announced that Judge Coomer would be

appointed to the bench, he did not attempt to extricate himself from

Filhart’s affairs by paying off the loan, or by suggesting a new lawyer

to draft a new will that removed Judge Coomer’s family from those

who stood to benefit. Rather, Judge Coomer himself drafted a new

will for Filhart that maintained Judge Coomer’s status as a

beneficiary, an act that Judge Coomer admits violated GRPC 1.8 (c).

Although the new will removed the executor and trustee positions

from Judge Coomer, it did not remove them far; instead, it merely

turned those roles over to his wife. When Filhart later became

disenchanted with Judge Coomer and sent him an angry e-mail

36 about the stock sale, Judge Coomer disingenuously feigned

ignorance about the stock transaction. He did not offer to repay two

loans early at that time, instead waiting to pay those off until April

2020, after Filhart had sued him. And when Filhart asked for

various documents, Judge Coomer continued to stall. These actions

do not “promote[ ] public confidence in the . . . integrity . . . of the

judiciary”; rather, they undermine such public confidence. These

actions present to the public a picture of a judge who will abuse a

position of trust in order to take advantage of a vulnerable person

for his own personal financial benefit. They present a picture of a

judge who, when confronted with the consequences of those actions,

does not cooperate or try to rectify his wrongs, but stalls and

obfuscates. And they present a picture of not mere negligence, but

conscious wrongdoing motivated by self-interest, and thus actions

taken in bad faith.

(ii) Hawaii Trip

Judge Coomer’s handling of campaign-finance matters

undermined public confidence, too. The Hearing Panel said it could

37 easily find bad faith in Judge Coomer’s handling of financing of the

Hawaii trip, as he admitted that he understood prior to planning the

trip that applicable rules forbid using campaign funds for personal

or family travel expenditures. As the Hearing Panel found, Judge

Coomer “put self-interest ahead of his obligation to obey the law[.]”

These findings of bad faith in Judge Coomer’s handling of financing

of his Hawaii vacation find sufficient support in the record. Judge

Coomer does not seriously contest that it was permissible to use his

campaign funds to pay for vacation expenses for his children. In

particular, Judge Coomer offered testimony about an earlier trip to

Israel — which took place in 2017, while he was a legislator but

before he was governed by the Code of Judicial Conduct — that his

“intent was, at all times, to reimburse the campaign for” money

spent on his children’s airfare for that trip, showing that he knew

prior to the Hawaii trip that the use of campaign funds for personal

leisure was forbidden. Although Judge Coomer did partially

reimburse his campaign for the Hawaii trip soon after taking it, the

record shows that he did not fully reimburse his campaign until after

38 the CFC began investigating him for possible campaign finance

violations. And there is no dispute that Judge Coomer failed to

disclose clearly the Hawaii trip as a campaign expenditure, merely

listing it as a credit card charge, demonstrating an attempt to

conceal these improper expenditures.

In the light of the Hearing Panel’s findings about the Hawaii

trip, we conclude that Judge Coomer’s actions in this regard violated

Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Essentially, Judge

Coomer floated himself a loan from his campaign funds to pay for a

family leisure trip, while knowing from the outset that it was

impermissible to pay for such expenses with those funds, and

compounded the violation by failing to disclose it despite his

knowledge that disclosure was required. He did not reimburse his

campaign account fully until the CFC began investigating him,

adding to a pattern of failing to rectify his mistakes until it served

his own interests to do so. These actions, especially when combined

with all the rest of his self-interested conduct, present to the public

a picture of a judge who will bend the rules and abuse the access to

39 campaign cash that a public office affords him when it benefits him

financially.

(iii) Law Firm Transfers

The Hearing Panel’s finding that Judge Coomer’s failure to

report transfers of campaign funds to his law office account involved

bad faith also is supported by the record. The Hearing Panel found

that Judge Coomer acted in bad faith because he “knew of his

statutory obligation to account for the movement of funds into and

out of his campaign account.” The Hearing Panel supported its

finding that Judge Coomer knew of his obligation to report such by

noting that Judge Coomer did report one such transfer that occurred

within a week of the two that he did not report. This reporting

failure also violated Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

These actions, especially when combined with all the rest of his self-

interested conduct, present to the public a picture of a judge who

will not honestly account for his handling of campaign cash, and

thus cannot be trusted to handle judicial matters before him with

40 honesty and integrity.18

*

In sum, in addition to the Rule 1.1 violations we already have

discussed, we conclude that Judge Coomer’s various actions as found

by the Hearing Panel also violated Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of

Judicial Conduct, in that they undermined “public confidence in the

. . . integrity . . . of the judiciary.” We also conclude that the record

generally supports the Hearing Panel’s findings that Judge Coomer

undertook the conduct at issue in bad faith, including the conduct

that we have found constitutes a violation of Rule 1.1 and/or Rule

1.2 (A).

And, based on the factual findings that we have upheld, we

agree that Judge Coomer’s actions were “prejudicial to the

administration of justice which brings the judicial office into

disrepute.” Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII (a). Therefore, it is

18 In reaching this conclusion, we assign no weight to the Hearing Panel’s

repeated characterization of campaign funds as being held in “public trust.” Campaign funds are not held in public trust; they simply have statutory limitations on permissible uses. 41 within our constitutional power to sanction Judge Coomer.

(d) Removal is the appropriate sanction.

That conclusion brings us to the question of the appropriate

sanction. As we said before, this is a close case from an evidentiary

perspective; the evidence may very well have supported different

findings, especially as to bad faith. But having determined that the

relevant findings that the Hearing Panel made are supported by

sufficient evidence, our decision about the proper sanction is not a

difficult one. The Hearing Panel’s findings that we have determined

were not clearly erroneous show that Judge Coomer has exploited a

vulnerable person, has repeatedly violated campaign finance rules

and flouted professional norms, and has done so knowingly and for

his own personal financial benefit. By demonstrating a pattern of

refusing to comply with the law and professional norms when

noncompliance was in his interest, he has undermined the public’s

trust in his ability to follow and apply the law honestly and fairly in

cases that come before him. And he was dishonest and exploitative

in his dealings with a vulnerable person, a quality that is flatly

42 incompatible with being a judge. Accordingly, his continued service

would undermine the public’s confidence in the judicial system as a

whole. Based on all of these aspects of Judge Coomer’s actions, we

conclude that removal is the appropriate sanction.

This conclusion accords with our precedent. We have removed

a judge whose actions show a disregard of the law for personal

benefit. See Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 491, 249 Ga.

at 31-32 (removing justice of the peace who pleaded nolo contendere

to assisting relative in fraudulent obtainment of welfare benefits).

We also have removed a judge for taking advantage of a vulnerable

person, even where the judge’s actions were taken in his personal

capacity, on the ground that “the deception and over-reaching

practiced against” that vulnerable person “was odious conduct, and

diametrically opposite from the commands of the” Code of Judicial

Conduct. See Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 1305, 259

Ga. 640, 642-643 (4) (b) (388 SE2d 328) (1989) (removing probate

judge who schemed to terminate employment of decedent’s

housekeeper in order to increase share of decedent’s estate that

43 judge and his wife would inherit). And we have removed a judge for

making false claims, as the Hearing Panel found that Judge Coomer

made to Filhart. See Matter of Inquiry Concerning Judge Robertson,

277 Ga. 831 (596 SE2d 2) (2004) (removing judge who, in filing to

run for an elected magistrate judge position, submitted an affidavit

falsely stating that he had never been convicted of a felony involving

moral turpitude).

Our decision to remove Judge Coomer is also informed by his

response to the JQC inquiry. Of course, a judge faced with an ethics

investigation by the JQC has every right to defend himself. He can

argue that his actions do not violate a particular statute or rule,

including the Code of Judicial Conduct. He can disagree with JQC

staff or the Hearing Panel as to appropriate sanctions. He can

dispute the factual accuracy of the allegations against him. And

judges must be free to do all of those things without fear that a

sanction will be worse if they simply fail to prevail.

But judges cannot be misleading during that process, any more

than lawyers can be misleading during State Bar disciplinary

44 processes. See Rule 1.2 (A) (“Judges shall act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the . . . integrity . . . of

the judiciary.”); see also In the Matter of Mays, 269 Ga. 100 (495

SE2d 30) (1998) (disbarring attorney for various rules violations

after considering that lawyer was misleading during the State Bar

disciplinary proceedings).19

Here, the Hearing Panel found multiple instances in which

Judge Coomer was disingenuous, if not outright dishonest, in his

testimony or the positions that he took before the Hearing Panel.

Although Judge Coomer testified in broad terms that he considered

Filhart a friend and “had no interest in doing anything wrong or bad

to him or . . . using his assets in some way he didn’t want them

used[,]” the Hearing Panel found that “the evidence does not support

such a claim.” More specifically, the Hearing Panel found

19 We recognize that imposing discipline on a judge solely based on the

judge’s response to a JQC inquiry, without the JQC first filing formal charges against the judge alleging such conduct constituted a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, might raise due process concerns. This case does not present that scenario, however. Having already concluded that Judge Coomer violated several provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct through his actions before the JQC inquiry, we consider his actions during the JQC process as an aggravating factor only in determining the proper sanction. 45 “unpersuasive” Judge Coomer’s testimony that it was Filhart’s idea

to name Judge Coomer’s wife as executrix, testimony inconsistent

with the testimony of Filhart and Judge Coomer’s wife. And, as

discussed above, regarding transfers from Judge Coomer’s campaign

account that ultimately went to his legal assistant, although the

Hearing Panel said that it did “not doubt that [Judge Coomer]’s

assistant helped him with legislative work[,]” it appeared to

question the veracity of Judge Coomer’s claim as to the specific

amounts at issue.

Judge Coomer argues that the Hearing Panel failed to consider

evidence in mitigation. In particular, he notes his public service and

his lack of disciplinary record in those various positions. He also

emphasizes “[h]is always timely payments to Mr. Filhart; his

attempts to balance his personal, law firm, and campaign finance

accounts; his early pay-off of the last two notes to Mr. Filhart; his

prompt resolution of campaign finance issues with the CFC; his

inexperience with the ethical and campaign finance issues he faced;

his compliance with civil penalties imposed by the CFC; his prompt

46 resolution of Mr. Filhart’s lawsuit; and the isolated, remote nature

of the conduct with no chance of repetition[.]” He also argues that

his expressions of remorse — in the form of admissions to some

mistakes — and the fact that he already has served a lengthy

suspension should serve in mitigation — with no acknowledgment

that the suspension has been with full pay.

But regardless of the extent to which the Hearing Panel

considered these factors,20 the question of whether Judge Coomer

should be removed from office is ultimately one for this Court. See

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VIII; see also Inquiry

Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. at 847 (3) (“[T]his Court reaches its own

conclusions regarding disciplinary sanctions against a sitting judge,

20 The Hearing Panel clearly considered some of these things, noting in

its initial Report and Recommendation that “[i]n reaching its recommendation of removal, the Hearing Panel has also considered that [Judge Coomer] has no prior disciplinary record, that he was somewhat cooperative in the JQC and CFC disciplinary proceedings, and that some who know him view him as a man of ‘good Christian character.’” Moreover, it clearly saw some aspects of Judge Coomer’s case very differently than he characterizes them in arguing that there are mitigating factors; the Hearing Panel described Judge Coomer’s behavior as a “long and unbroken pattern of violating multiple attorney ethics rules and campaign finance laws to his own financial benefit” and noted that Judge Coomer at his hearing “insisted that his mistakes were few and harmless.” 47 and the recommendations of the Hearing Panel are not binding upon

us.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). In evaluating that

question, we have considered Judge Coomer’s history of public

service,21 the nature of the conduct at issue, and Judge Coomer’s

behavior during the JQC inquiry.22 We conclude that removal is the

appropriate sanction. Accordingly, it is ordered that Judge Christian

Coomer of the Court of Appeals of Georgia be removed from office,

21 We have considered Judge Coomer’s history of public service, including

his having served honorably in the military. See Inquiry Concerning Norris, 314 Ga. at 15 (2) (noting that JQC Hearing Panel considered, among other mitigating factors, respondent judge’s “long record of ‘honorable public and military service’” and that “‘this case appears to have been a lone (but significant) incident’”); Inquiry Concerning Hays, 313 Ga. at 150 (noting among other mitigating factors that respondent judge served “honorably” in the military and “lacks a prior disciplinary history”). But we do not ascribe much weight to his lack of a lawyer disciplinary record, something we do not appear to have relied on explicitly in prior judicial discipline cases. Indeed, few lawyers with a public disciplinary record are likely to receive subsequent judicial appointments. To the extent that Judge Coomer asks us to consider his lack of prior judicial discipline, this point carries little, if any, mitigating force, given that Judge Coomer scarcely had time to commit any other violations. The allegations span Judge Coomer’s entire time as a candidate for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals up to the time the charges were filed, and the considerable majority of his service on the Court of Appeals, and he was suspended from office in this proceeding after less than two and a half years on the bench. 22 We do not consider the statewide nature of Judge Coomer’s judgeship

as either a mitigating or an aggravating factor. The Hearing Panel argued that the statewide nature of his judgeship warranted punishment harsher than if he had been a trial judge with limited geographic jurisdiction. But there is one Code of Judicial Conduct, and it applies to all judges equally. 48 effective upon disposition of any motion for reconsideration filed

pursuant to this Court’s Rule 27, or upon the expiration of the time

for filing such a motion without any such motion having been filed.

As a result of this order, Judge Coomer “shall not be eligible to be

elected or appointed to any judicial office in this state until seven

years have elapsed” from the date of this order. OCGA § 15-1-13 (a).

Removed from office. All the Justices concur, except Bethel, J., not participating, and Colvin, J., disqualified.

Decided August 16, 2023.

Judicial discipline.

Charles P. Boring, Courtney M. Veal, Anna G. Cross, Meredith

C. Kincaid, for Judicial Qualifications Commission.

Copeland Stair Valz & Lovell, Mark D. Lefkow; Cathey &

Strain, Dennis T. Cathey; Stites & Harbison, Johannes S. Kingma,

for Coomer.