NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: July 22, 2025
S25Y0775. IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES M. DALZIEL, JR.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master Adam M. Hames, who
recommends that Charles M. Dalziel, Jr. — State Bar No. 203730,
admitted 1980 — be suspended for at least one year for violating Rules 1.6 (a),1 1.15 (I) (c),2 and 1.16 (d)3 of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) and that he not be reinstated until
a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist certifies that he is mentally
competent to practice law. The special master concluded that Dalziel
violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to promptly account for a client’s
retainer; violated Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing to refund
an “unearned” portion of the retainer, thereby converting it to his
personal use; and violated Rule 1.6 (a) by improperly disclosing
1 Rule 1.6 (a) provides:
A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court. Disbarment is the maximum penalty for violating this rule. 2 Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides, in relevant part, “a lawyer shall promptly
deliver to the client . . . any funds . . . that the client . . . is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client . . . , shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.” Disbarment is the maximum penalty for violating this rule. 3 Rule 1.16 (d) provides, in relevant part, “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as . . . refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.” A public reprimand is the maximum penalty for violating this rule.
2 confidential information about the client in response to a Bar
grievance filed by the client. Having carefully reviewed the record,
we agree that Dalziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c)’s accounting
provision, and we conclude that the proper sanction is a six-month
suspension with Dalziel’s reinstatement conditioned on certification
that he is fit to practice law.
1. Procedural History
In March 2023, the Bar filed a formal complaint charging
Dalziel with violating Rules 1.6 (a), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.16 (d).4 Dalziel
filed an answer in which he admitted some of the Bar’s factual
allegations but denied the rule violations. The Bar deposed him in
November 2023. The special master held a disciplinary hearing in
4 The Bar’s complaint also charged Dalziel with violating Rule 1.16 (a),
which states that a lawyer “shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in the violation of the [GRPC] or other law; (2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged.” The complaint did not specify which subsection Dalziel violated, but the special master assumed the Bar was referring to subsection (3), and the special master concluded that the evidence for this allegation was insufficient. The Bar has not challenged this conclusion.
3 December 2024, at which the only witness was Dalziel’s client,
“W.G.” Dalziel did not attend the hearing or notify the Bar or the
special master that he would not be there. The special master filed
his report and recommendation in January 2025. Neither Dalziel
nor the Bar filed exceptions to the special master’s report, and they
did not seek review by the State Disciplinary Review Board.
2. Relevant Facts
In October 2020, W.G., a financial advisor, got a demand letter
from a law firm representing one of his clients for losses the client
claimed to have sustained through W.G.’s investments. W.G. hired
Dalziel, an experienced securities lawyer, to represent him. W.G.
paid Dalziel a retainer of $3,650, which covered 10 hours at Dalziel’s
rate. In early November 2020, Dalziel sent a written response to the
claimant’s lawyer. Later that month, while the demand matter was
still open, W.G. requested and received Dalziel’s assistance with an
issue related to one of the claimant’s pending investments. The
demand matter was still open on January 25, 2021, when W.G.
4 asked for and got Dalziel’s advice on the possibility of compromising
with the claimant.
Ultimately, the claimant filed no suit against W.G. On
February 20, 2021, Dalziel called W.G. to let him know that Dalziel
was closing W.G.’s file. W.G. once again asked for an accounting of
the retainer — he had already asked for an accounting several times
in the preceding months, but Dalziel had not given him one. Dalziel
said he would get back to him, but W.G. did not hear from Dalziel
until four months later, when Dalziel sent him the bill for his
services. The bill, which the Bar submitted into evidence at the
disciplinary hearing, indicated that Dalziel spent a total of 17.4
hours on several tasks. Dalziel spent at least 10 hours on the
demand matter — including 9.6 hours through when the demand
response was sent and at least 0.4 hours advising W.G. on the
claimant’s pending investment and whether to compromise with the
claimant. The invoice indicated that Dalziel applied the $3,650
retainer to the balance, and W.G. owed an additional $2,701. When
W.G. did not pay the bill, Dalziel left voice messages in which he
5 threatened to get an arrest warrant for theft of services and warning
that “heads” would “roll” if Dalziel did not get paid. W.G. also
received an email from Dalziel in which Dalziel described himself as
“dying,” “desperate,” and “totally besieged financially.” In the end,
W.G. paid Dalziel no additional money, and Dalziel did not refund
any portion of the retainer to W.G.
W.G. filed a Bar grievance against Dalziel. In Dalziel’s multiple
responses to the Bar, he claimed that W.G. had filed the grievance
to avoid paying the bill. Dalziel also called W.G. a “deadbeat” (and
other names); alleged that W.G. was hiding assets from creditors;
and disclosed information related to W.G.’s prior bankruptcy — in
which Dalziel did not represent W.G. In Dalziel’s deposition
testimony, he said he learned of the bankruptcy from public records
after W.G. filed the grievance. At the disciplinary hearing, W.G. did
not testify to whether he told Dalziel about the bankruptcy or the
alleged asset hiding. W.G. said he had worked with many alcoholics
and Dalziel’s conduct appeared to be due to alcohol abuse, and W.G.
no longer trusted lawyers because of Dalziel. Dalziel was evaluated
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: July 22, 2025
S25Y0775. IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES M. DALZIEL, JR.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master Adam M. Hames, who
recommends that Charles M. Dalziel, Jr. — State Bar No. 203730,
admitted 1980 — be suspended for at least one year for violating Rules 1.6 (a),1 1.15 (I) (c),2 and 1.16 (d)3 of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) and that he not be reinstated until
a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist certifies that he is mentally
competent to practice law. The special master concluded that Dalziel
violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to promptly account for a client’s
retainer; violated Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing to refund
an “unearned” portion of the retainer, thereby converting it to his
personal use; and violated Rule 1.6 (a) by improperly disclosing
1 Rule 1.6 (a) provides:
A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court. Disbarment is the maximum penalty for violating this rule. 2 Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides, in relevant part, “a lawyer shall promptly
deliver to the client . . . any funds . . . that the client . . . is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client . . . , shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.” Disbarment is the maximum penalty for violating this rule. 3 Rule 1.16 (d) provides, in relevant part, “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as . . . refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.” A public reprimand is the maximum penalty for violating this rule.
2 confidential information about the client in response to a Bar
grievance filed by the client. Having carefully reviewed the record,
we agree that Dalziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c)’s accounting
provision, and we conclude that the proper sanction is a six-month
suspension with Dalziel’s reinstatement conditioned on certification
that he is fit to practice law.
1. Procedural History
In March 2023, the Bar filed a formal complaint charging
Dalziel with violating Rules 1.6 (a), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.16 (d).4 Dalziel
filed an answer in which he admitted some of the Bar’s factual
allegations but denied the rule violations. The Bar deposed him in
November 2023. The special master held a disciplinary hearing in
4 The Bar’s complaint also charged Dalziel with violating Rule 1.16 (a),
which states that a lawyer “shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in the violation of the [GRPC] or other law; (2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged.” The complaint did not specify which subsection Dalziel violated, but the special master assumed the Bar was referring to subsection (3), and the special master concluded that the evidence for this allegation was insufficient. The Bar has not challenged this conclusion.
3 December 2024, at which the only witness was Dalziel’s client,
“W.G.” Dalziel did not attend the hearing or notify the Bar or the
special master that he would not be there. The special master filed
his report and recommendation in January 2025. Neither Dalziel
nor the Bar filed exceptions to the special master’s report, and they
did not seek review by the State Disciplinary Review Board.
2. Relevant Facts
In October 2020, W.G., a financial advisor, got a demand letter
from a law firm representing one of his clients for losses the client
claimed to have sustained through W.G.’s investments. W.G. hired
Dalziel, an experienced securities lawyer, to represent him. W.G.
paid Dalziel a retainer of $3,650, which covered 10 hours at Dalziel’s
rate. In early November 2020, Dalziel sent a written response to the
claimant’s lawyer. Later that month, while the demand matter was
still open, W.G. requested and received Dalziel’s assistance with an
issue related to one of the claimant’s pending investments. The
demand matter was still open on January 25, 2021, when W.G.
4 asked for and got Dalziel’s advice on the possibility of compromising
with the claimant.
Ultimately, the claimant filed no suit against W.G. On
February 20, 2021, Dalziel called W.G. to let him know that Dalziel
was closing W.G.’s file. W.G. once again asked for an accounting of
the retainer — he had already asked for an accounting several times
in the preceding months, but Dalziel had not given him one. Dalziel
said he would get back to him, but W.G. did not hear from Dalziel
until four months later, when Dalziel sent him the bill for his
services. The bill, which the Bar submitted into evidence at the
disciplinary hearing, indicated that Dalziel spent a total of 17.4
hours on several tasks. Dalziel spent at least 10 hours on the
demand matter — including 9.6 hours through when the demand
response was sent and at least 0.4 hours advising W.G. on the
claimant’s pending investment and whether to compromise with the
claimant. The invoice indicated that Dalziel applied the $3,650
retainer to the balance, and W.G. owed an additional $2,701. When
W.G. did not pay the bill, Dalziel left voice messages in which he
5 threatened to get an arrest warrant for theft of services and warning
that “heads” would “roll” if Dalziel did not get paid. W.G. also
received an email from Dalziel in which Dalziel described himself as
“dying,” “desperate,” and “totally besieged financially.” In the end,
W.G. paid Dalziel no additional money, and Dalziel did not refund
any portion of the retainer to W.G.
W.G. filed a Bar grievance against Dalziel. In Dalziel’s multiple
responses to the Bar, he claimed that W.G. had filed the grievance
to avoid paying the bill. Dalziel also called W.G. a “deadbeat” (and
other names); alleged that W.G. was hiding assets from creditors;
and disclosed information related to W.G.’s prior bankruptcy — in
which Dalziel did not represent W.G. In Dalziel’s deposition
testimony, he said he learned of the bankruptcy from public records
after W.G. filed the grievance. At the disciplinary hearing, W.G. did
not testify to whether he told Dalziel about the bankruptcy or the
alleged asset hiding. W.G. said he had worked with many alcoholics
and Dalziel’s conduct appeared to be due to alcohol abuse, and W.G.
no longer trusted lawyers because of Dalziel. Dalziel was evaluated
6 by a psychologist, whose report was put into evidence. Based on the
report, the special master found that Dalziel had a long history of
alcohol abuse and significant mental-health issues, both of which
were present when Dalziel represented W.G.
In its formal complaint, the Bar alleged that Dalziel violated
Rule 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing to account for W.G.’s retainer
despite numerous requests; Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing
to return the “unearned” portion of the retainer;5 and Rule 1.6 (a) by
disclosing confidential client information in his grievance-response
disclosures.
3. Special Master’s Conclusions of Law
The special master concluded that Dalziel violated Rule
1.15 (I) (c) by failing to provide the accounting despite W.G.’s
requests. The special master also concluded that Dalziel violated
5 We note that the wrongful retention of unearned fees is typically charged not as a violation of Rule 1.15 (I) (c), for which disbarment is authorized, but as a violation of Rule 1.16 (d), for which the maximum penalty is a public reprimand. See In the Matter of Cleveland, 317 Ga. 515, 516 n.10 (893 SE2d 692) (2023).
7 Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing to return the “unearned”
portion of the retainer and that, by failing to return it, Dalziel
converted it to his personal use. In this regard, the special master
acknowledged that it was “not crystal clear” that Dalziel owed W.G.
a refund. As noted above, Dalziel’s bill indicated that he worked at
least ten hours on the demand matter — which would have
consumed the retainer — from October 2020 through January 25,
2021, when it was undisputed that Dalziel performed work for W.G.
Despite this evidence, the special master concluded that Dalziel
“billed for more time than the client’s requested scope of work.”
Finally, the special master concluded that Dalziel’s grievance
response violated Rule 1.6 (a). In this regard, the special master
determined that the bankruptcy information and purported asset
hiding gave Dalziel no defense to the grievance. See Rule 1.6 (b) (1)
(iii) (lawyer may reveal information gained in professional
relationship with client if lawyer reasonably believes disclosing it is
necessary to respond to allegations concerning lawyer’s
representation of client). However, the special master did not
8 address whether or to what extent Dalziel gained that information
in the course of his professional relationship with W.G.
Following this Court’s precedent, the special master relied on
the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA
Standards”) to determine the appropriate discipline. See In the
Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996). In relevant
part, the special master determined that Dalziel intentionally
violated duties owed to his client, which falls under ABA Standard
4.0. The special master noted that suspension is generally
appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is not
properly dealing with a client’s property, knowingly and improperly
reveals information related to the representation of a client, or
engages in a pattern of neglect and the lawyer’s acts or omissions
actually or potentially injure the client. See ABA Standards 4.12,
4.22, 4.42 (b). Regarding injury to W.G., the special master
concluded that, while the financial harm from the fee issue was not
significant and any damage from the disclosures was hard to
measure, the potential injury from Dalziel’s unprofessional conduct
9 could have been great, the disclosures were “embarrassing,” and
W.G. “expressed his distrust of all lawyers as a result of Dalziel’s
actions.”
Turning to aggravation and mitigation, the special master
determined that Dalziel acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, see
ABA Standard 9.22 (b); there were multiple offenses in the matter,
see ABA Standard 9.22 (d); and Dalziel showed no understanding of
the wrongful nature of his conduct, see ABA Standard 9.22 (g). Also
aggravating were Dalziel’s substantial experience as an attorney,
see ABA Standard 9.22 (i), and Dalziel’s threatening voice
messages.6 In mitigation, the special master noted that there was no
evidence Dalziel had any prior disciplinary history, see ABA
Standard 9.32 (a), and that Dalziel was experiencing personal and
emotional problems, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c). The special master
concluded that Dalziel’s alcohol abuse and mental-health issues
6 The special master noted that the voice messages did not “fit neatly”
into the ABA’s aggravating-factor categories, but, as the special master recognized, the ABA’s standards are generally instructive but are not controlling. Cf. In the Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 271 (6) (892 SE2d 761) (2023).
10 were not mitigating under ABA Standard 9.32 (i) because there had
been no meaningful, sustained period of rehabilitation.
Although the Bar sought a suspension of at least six months,
the special master, relying on cases in which attorneys improperly
converted client funds, recommended that Dalziel be suspended at
least one year. See, e.g., In the Matter of Veach, 310 Ga. 470 (851
SE2d 590) (2020).
4. Analysis
This Court generally defers to a special master’s factual
findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly
erroneous, but we review de novo the special master’s conclusions of
law as to what rules were violated and what discipline is
appropriate. See In the Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 258 (2) (892
SE2d 761) (2023). Moreover, because this Court has ultimate
discretion in attorney-discipline cases, we need not defer to
factfinders in such cases to the same degree that we defer to them
in other appeals. See id. at 258-259 (2) (citing In the Matter of Turk,
11 267 Ga. 30, 31 (1) (471 SE2d 842) (1996); and Inquiry Concerning
Coomer, 316 Ga. 855, 860 (2) (a) n.5 (892 SE2d 3) (2023)).
The record amply supports the special master’s determination
that Dalziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to provide an
accounting of the retainer despite W.G.’s requests. We agree with
the special master that Dalziel’s violation of the rule was mitigated
by his lack of disciplinary history and his personal and emotional
problems. We also agree that Dalziel’s alcohol abuse and behavioral-
health issues were not mitigating without a sustained, meaningful
period of rehabilitation and that Dalziel’s infraction was aggravated
by his substantial experience as a lawyer and his refusal to
acknowledge his wrongful conduct. Whether Dalziel violated Rule
1.15 (I) (c)’s accounting provision intentionally or through a pattern
of neglect, a six-month suspension is proper, particularly given his
apparent lack of remorse. Cf. In the Matter of Coleman, 278 Ga. 864,
864 (607 SE2d 556) (2005) (accepting attorney’s petition for
voluntary discipline and six-month suspension where she failed to
provide requested accounting). We agree that Dalziel should not be
12 reinstated until a licensed behavioral-health professional certifies
With regard to the other rule violations, we question whether
the evidence supports the conclusions that Dalziel retained or
converted unearned fees or that he owed W.G. a refund; that Dalziel
gained the bankruptcy information in his professional relationship
with W.G.; or that Dalziel’s disclosures were wholly irrelevant to his
grievance defense.7 But we need not resolve these issues because it
would not change the appropriate discipline in this case.
Accordingly, based on Dalziel’s violation of Rule 1.15 (I) (c)’s
accounting provision, we order that he be suspended from the
practice of law for at least six months, effective from the date this
opinion is issued, and that he not be reinstated until a licensed
psychologist or psychiatrist certifies that he is mentally competent
to practice law. See Coleman, 278 Ga. at 864 (accepting attorney’s
petition for voluntary discipline and six-month suspension where
7 However, we strongly disapprove of the personal insults that riddled
Dalziel’s responses to the Bar.
13 she failed to provide requested accounting). When Dalziel believes
that the conditions for his reinstatement have been met, he shall
demonstrate compliance in a petition for reinstatement submitted
to the Review Board, which will then issue a report and
recommendation to this Court. Dalziel shall not undertake the
practice of law until this Court issues an opinion granting his
petition for reinstatement. He is reminded of his duties under Bar
Rule 4-219 (b). See In the Matter of Lank, 300 Ga. 479, 482-483 (796
SE2d 252) (2017).
Six-month suspension with condition on reinstatement. Warren, P.J., and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ., concur. Peterson, C.J., not participating.