OPINION
RILEY, Judge.
Respondents-Appellants James Carter Bauermeister and the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (the Commission) seek appellate review of the Gibson County Cireuit Court's judgment in favor of Petitioner-Appellee Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company (SIGECO) in Bauermeister's action concerning discrimination based on a disability.1
We reverse.
ISSUES
Bauermeister and the Commission raise two issues on review which we restate as:
[678]*6781. Did the trial court go beyond the scope of its review by reweighing the evi-denee, and substituting its opinion for that of the Commission?
2, Did the trial court err by finding that the Commission's findings are not supported by substantial, reliable and probative evidence?
3. Did the trial court err by finding that SIGECO did not receive a fair hearing because the hearing officer was biased and prejudiced against SIGECO?
FACTS
Bauermeister, while employed as a laboratory technician by SIGECO, unsuccessfully applied for transfer to an electrical maintenance position. At the time of this application, and indeed during his entire employment at SIGECO, Bauermeister had the use of only one hand. This condition was due to an industrial accident which occurred in 1968 when Bauermeister was 17 years old. The accident left him with a metal prosthetic hook to substitute for the lost appendage. He was hired as a laboratory technician or "lab man" by SIGECO in 1977.
In July, 1985, Bauermeister applied to Henry Woodall, SIGECO's supervisor of employment, for transfer to the electrical maintenance department as part of an apprenticeship program (Apprentice Electrician) at the AB. Brown Generating Plant (the Plant)2 Bauermeister had applied unsuccessfully for similar positions a number of times from 1977 to 1985.
Bauermeister interviewed with Woodall who determined that Bauermeister met the initial requirements of the position. Woodall referred Bauermeister to Millard New, superintendent of the Plant for an on-site interview. (Comm'n R. at 950, 952).3 Bauermeis-ter interviewed at the Plant with New and also with Jim Diliman, maintenance supervisor, and Dave Baggett, electrical maintenance foreman. Id. at 1105. Later, New asked Dennis Glancey, who had been employed as a chemist and supervised Bauer-meister at Culley Lab, for a recommendation.
New had the authority to fill the open positions at the Plant and made the ultimate decision to reject Bauermeister's application. New hired five non-disabled applicants who had never worked at SIGECO for the open positions.
On October 1, 1985, Bauermeister filed a complaint of discrimination with the Commission alleging that SIGECO rejected his application for Apprentice Electrician on the basis of his disability.
On September 26, 1991, a hearing officer for the Commission entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for the benefit of the Commission. SIGECO filed objections to the recommended decision; however, the Commission agreed with the hearing officer and found specifically in its final order:
Evidence indicates that [Bauermeister] was at least as qualified as three of the five applicants hired after [Bauermeister]'s request for transfer to the electrical maintenance position. There is also evidence to indicate that [SIGECO] did not seek Dennis Glanceey's recommendation for [Bauer-meister] until after it had denied [Bauer-meister] for transfer and he requested a review of this decision. Evidence further indicates that at least one [SIGECO] official indicated that [SIGECO]'s concern was [Bauermeister]'s loss of his right hand, and not his safety record or qualifications.
Id. at 9.
SIGECO petitioned for judicial review and, on January 31, 1994, the Gibson Circuit [679]*679Court issued extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, which included:
4. The evidence in this case establishes by a standard of substantial evidence that the Commission was correct in findings:
a. Petitioner is a member of a protected class; and
b. Petitioner established he was otherwise qualified for the position sought.
The evidence does not, as a matter of law, establish by a preponderance that the Petitioner was, "... (excluded) from equal opportunities because of (2) handicap...." 1.0. 22-9-1-8.
5. The inferences taken by the [Commission] to substantiate its decision, as made by the Hearing Officer, are not borne out by the evidence, and are not reasonably made.
6. The record of this matter demonstrates that the provisions of LC. 4-22-1-18, now ILC. 4-21.5-5-11 in part, are not met, in that the decision of the Commission was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with law; that it was without observance of procedure required by law; and that the decision is unsupported by substantial, reliable and probative evidence.
7. The decision of the [Commission] in this cause must be set aside and is void for the reasons stated.
8. The proper remedy for resolution of this case is to set aside the decision of the [Commission], and the remand of the matter to the [Commission], for re-hearing in compliance with the findings of this Court.
(R. at 39-40) (citation omitted). It is from this decision that Bauermeister and the Commission appeal. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.
DISCUSSION L.
Initially, we examine whether the trial court went beyond the seope of its review. Bauermeister argues that the court failed to apply the proper legal analysis, reweighed the evidence, and substituted its opinion for that of the Commission. We agree.
Judicial review of ageney decisions is governed by the Administrative Orders & Procedures Act, IND.CODE 4-21.5-1-1, e seq. When a trial court, in the first instance, or an appellate court, on appeal, reviews an agency decision, it is bound by the findings of fact made by the agency if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Smith (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 165, 168. A trial court may not reweigh the evidence before the agency or judge witness eredibility; neither may a court substitute its judgment for that of the agency, that is, it cannot reverse a decision because it would have reached a different result on the evidence presented. Indiana Dep't of Natural Resources v. United Refuse (1992), Ind.App., 598 N.E.2d 608, 607, opinion adopted in part and vacated by 615 N.E.2d 100; May v. Dep't of Natural Resources (1991), Ind.App., 565 N.E.2d 867, 375. The agency's decision is presumed to be correct in view of its expertise, and the trial court is bound by the agency's findings of fact if those facts have a reasonably sound basis of evidentiary support based on a review of the record in it entirety. Bloomington v. Delta Treatment Center (1990), Ind.App., 560 N.E.2d 556, 558; Smith, 567 N.E2d at 167-68; see also Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Sutherland Lumber (1979), 182 Ind. App. 138, 394 N.E.2d 949, 951-52.
However, despite the great weight afforded an administrative body's findings, an agency's determination of ultimate fact, defined as factual conclusions derived from basic facts, is subject to a reasonableness standard. Ali v. Greater Ft. Wayne Chamber of Commerce (1987), Ind.App., 505 N.E.2d 141, 148. Because findings of ultimate fact represent inferences drawn by the agency, they are not subject to serutiny for evidentiary support in the record; the reasonableness of the agency's inferences is a question of law appropriate for judicial determination. L.S. Ayres v. Indianapolis Power & Light (1976), 169 Ind.App. 652, 664-65, 351 N.E.2d 814, 828; Smith, 567 N.E.2d at 168 (A reviewing court is not bound by an agency's interpretation of law and is free to deter[680]*680mine any legal question which arises out of the administrative action.).
In its decision, the trial court stated: This Court feels that it is important to note that the hearing conducted by the Hearing Officer, which was adopted in toto by the commission as its ruling, was composed almost entirely by review by the Hearing Officer of recorded testimony, that is, deposition. This was done by stipulation of the parties, with the knowledge and approval of the Hearing Officer, as shown by his Pre-Trial Orders. Only the testimony of witnesses Bauermeister and Penfield were heard "live" by the Hearing Officer. As a result, much of the results of the Hearing were of a two-dimensional nature. This Court would thus be in much the same position as the Hearing Officer, at least as to the deposition testimony. For that matter, so would any appellate court reviewing the action of this Court.
(R. at 24) (emphasis in original). The trial court candidly indicated that it considered its standard of review to go beyond determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings of fact. As a reviewing court, the trial court was prohibited from "weigh[ing] conflicting evidence, which appears in the record of the hearing, for the purpose of determining for whom it preponderates." Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Board of School Trustees of Baugo Community Schools (1978), 176 Ind.App. 680, 682, 377 N.E.2d 414, 416. It is not clear from our reading of the record and trial court's decision that it, in fact, did not go beyond the seope of its review of the Commission's findings of facts, and did not engage in its own weighing of the evidence. Because the trial court may have exceeded the seope of its review, it erred in reversing the Commission's findings and its decision cannot stand. See Umited Refuse, 598 N.E.2d at 607.
However, because our role in reviewing an agency decision is similar to that of the trial court's, we shall determine whether the Commission's findings of facts are based on substantial evidence and the conclusions of law have a reasonably sound basis of evidentiary support. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Muncie (1984), Ind.App., 459 N.E.2d 411, 417. If a reasonable person would conclude that the evidence and the logical and reasonable inferences therefrom are of such a substantial character and probative value so as to support the administrative determination, then the substantial evidence standard of .C. 4-21.5-5-14(d)(5) is met. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Wein-gart (1992), Ind.App., 588 N.E.2d 1288, 1289.4
IL.
Inasmuch as the parties disagree on the proper legal standard to be applied in the present case, we shall examine the legal framework to be applied in cases of discrimination based on disparate treatment, and specifically discrimination based on disability.
In interpreting and applying Indiana Civil Rights Law, Indiana courts have found it appropriate to analyze federal court decisions interpreting Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Culver Educ. Found. (1989), Ind., 585 N.E.2d 112, 115. Indeed, our decisions and that of our supreme court have specifically adopted the federal standard prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207; Culver Educ. Found., 585 N.E.2d at 115; Indiana Dep't of Correction v. Indiana Civil Rights [681]*681Comm'n (1985), Ind.App., 486 N.E.2d 612, 616-18, reh'g denied, trans. denied; Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Muncie (1984), Ind.App., 459 N.E.2d 411, 418-19. Thus, we shall look to recent federal case law to clarify the somewhat illusive standard which we employ in cases of disparate treatment.
According to Chief Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Troupe v. May Dep't Stores (1994), 7th Cir., 20 F.3d 734, different kinds and combinations of evidence can create triable issues of intentional discrimination or disparate treatment in the employment setting. Id. at 786. "One kind is evidence that can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the defendant or its agents." Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736; see Mojica v. Gannett Co. (1993), 7th Cir., 7 F.3d 552, 561 cert. denied, - U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 1643, 128 L.Ed.2d 363. This direct evidence is unobtainable for most claimants, Perryman v. Johnson Products (1983), 11th Cir., 698 F.2d 1138, 1141; see United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens (1983), 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 ("There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes."), and cireumstantial evidence is also admissible to provide a basis for drawing an inference of intentional discrimination. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
Cireumstantial evidence can be divided into three categories, the third of which is relevant to the present case.5 This is evidence that "the [claimant] was qualified for the job in question but passed over in favor of (or replaced by) a person not having the forbidden characteristic and that the employer's stated reason for the difference in treatment is unworthy of belief, a mere pretext for discrimination." Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks (1993), -- U.S. --, --, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407).
In cases of disparate treatment based on circumstantial evidence, our courts apply the analytical framework of shifting burdens developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668; and its progeny. Under this framework, the claimant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94; Weingart, 588 N.E.2d at 1289. By establishing a prima facie case, the claimant shows that his employer's conduct "did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely ...: an absolute or relative lack of qualification or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States (1977), 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, n. 44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396. Once established, the prima facie case raises a legal presumption of discrimination in the claimant's favor, requiring the employer to articulate clearly and specifically a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, thus "fram[ing] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the [claimant] will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 1094-95; Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Wellington Village Apartments (1992), Ind.App., 594 N.E.2d 518, 530, trans. denied. The employer need not, at this point, prove that the reason alleged was the actual reason, he must simply allege it. St Mary's Honor Center, -- U.S. at --, 113 S.Ct. at 2748. If such reasons are put forth, the claimant, who at all times retains the burden of proving discrimination, may attempt to demonstrate that the proffered reasons are pretex-tual. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94; Weingart, 588 N.E.2d at 1290. This framework is designed as a "sensible, [682]*682orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters (1978), 488 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957; but see Loyd v. Phillips Bros. (1994), Tth Cir., 25 F.3d 518, 528 ("The factual setting of a dispute, not an abstracted formulation never intended to be all things to all cases, will determine what steps a plaintiff needed to have taken in order to sufficiently demonstrate that discriminatory decisionmaking may have actually affected his employment situation." (emphasis in original)).
We have previously described the claimant's burden of proof in Wellington Village:
If the [employer] meets [his burden of production], the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the proffered reason is pretextual "by demonstrating either directly that the [employer] actually harbored discriminatory motive or indirectly by showing that the reasons advanced by the [employer] were, in the context of the surrounding cireumstances, unworthy of credence."
Wellington Village, 594 N.E.2d at 580 (citations omitted) (quoting Indiana Dep't of Correction v. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n, 486 N.E.2d at 618); see also Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Muncie, 459 N.E.2d at 418 (citing MeDonmell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807, 98 S.Ct. at 1826-27). This approach to the claimant's burden of proof, classified as the "pretext-only" rule by one commentator,6 represents one of three approaches taken by the federal courts who have generally been unclear on what constitutes a showing of pretext. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (1994), 7th Cir., 18 F.3d 1120, 1122; see Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (1984), 3rd Cir., 788 F.2d 1398, 1896 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087, 105 S.Ct. 592, 83 L Ed.2d 702 (A finding that the employer's proffered justification is false is equivalent to a finding that the employer intentionally discriminated.); Visser v. Packer Eng'g Ass'n (1991), 7th Cir., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (If the employer offers a pretext for why it fired the employee, the factfinder is permitted, although not compelled, to infer intentional discrimination.); Medina-Munozs v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco (1990), 1st Cir., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (A claimant must do more than simply refute or cast doubt on the company's rationale for the adverse action. He must also show a discriminatory animus based on the forbidden characteristic.).
In an effort to untangle and clarify the competing analyses of "pretext," the Supreme Court addressed a claimant's burden of proof under the MceDomnmell Douglas framework in St. Mary's Honor Center, -- U.S. --, 118 S.Ct. 2742, and specifically rejected an Eighth Circuit holding which found that once an employer's proffered reasons for his conduct were determined to be false, the claimant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.7 Id. - U.S. at --, 118 S.Ct. at 2749. The Supreme Court held:
The fact-finder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the [employer] (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the [employer]'s proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, "no additional proof of discrimination is required,."
Id. (emphasis in original).
Judge Kanne of the Seventh Cireuit, commenting on St. Mary's Honor Center in Anderson noted that the Supreme Court found that although a claimant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law simply be[683]*683cause he proves his prima facie case and shows that the employer's proffered reasons for his discharge are false, he may prevail by establishing a prima facie case and by showing that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge are factually false. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124. This permits the "trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." S. Mary's Honor Center, - U.S. at --, 118 S.Ct. at 2749. "[NJo additional proof of discrimination is required." (emphasis in original).8 Id. However, "the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the [claimant] remains at all times with the [claimant]." Id. at --, 118 S.Ct. at 2747 (citation omitted). "As such, the plaintiff might be well advised to present additional evidence of discrimination, because the fact-finder is not required to find in [his] favor simply because [he] establishes a prima facia case and shows that the employer's proffered reasons are false." Amderson, 183 F.8d at 1124 (emphasis in original).
Turning to the case at hand, Bauermeister contends that the Gibson County Court erred by finding that the evidence failed to show that SIGECO rejected Bauermeister for the Apprentice Electrician position because of his disability.9
The determination of whether Bauermeister established a prima facie case is a question of law and is properly addressed by this court. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Washburn Realtors (19983), Ind. App., 610 N.E.2d 2983, 295. Keeping in mind that "[the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, a claimant in a case of discrimination based on disability must show that he suffers from a disability; that there was a position available for which he was qualified; and that the position was given to a person who was not disabled.10 West v. Russell Corp., 868 F.Supp. 313 (M.D.Al2.1994).
The Commission's determination that Bauermeister made a prima facie case is correct. It is undisputed that Bauermeister suffers from a disability, the absence of his right hand. It is also undisputed that in 1985, SIGECO hired five Apprentice Electricians. The "Job Vacancy Notice" submitted by SIGECO required that applicants have "prior experience and/or training in electrical maintenancel,] associate degree in electronics[, and] physically able to perform heavy work." (Comm'n R. at 488). Bauermeister had worked at SIGECO for eight years when he applied for the Apprentice Electrician position. He had an associate degree in electronics from Vincennes University and additional training from Purdue University. SI-GECO rejected Bauermeister and hired five non-disabled applicants.
SIGECO is incorrect when it argues that "there was no evidence presented to the Hearing Officer showing that Bauermeister was qualified for the position to which he requested transfer." Appellee's Brief at 18. In the same paragraph, SIGECO admits that its Personnel Department determined that [684]*684Bauermeister was "minimally qualified for the position by virtue of his education and experience." Id. This satisfies the "modest initial burden" which the Supreme Court places on claimants in disparate treatment actions and does not remove from the claimant the ultimate burden of "persuading the trier of fact that the reason was pretextual and that intentional discrimination had in fact occurred.11 Barth v. Gelb (19983), D.C.Cir., 2 F.3d 1180, 1185 cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 114 S$.Ct. 1588, 128 L.Ed.2d 190 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-58, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94.). In addition, Judge Swygert, writing for the Seventh Circuit, found that the policies behind the MceDomnell Douglas framework are best served "by limiting the prima facie showing of 'qualification' to relative objective qualifications." Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel (1985), Tth Cir., 760 F.2d 132, 135 (footnote omitted); see also Jaya-singhe, 760 F.2d at 184-35 (discussion of policies which support requirement of prima facie by claimant in cases of disparate treatment analyzed under McDonnell Douglas framework).
Onee Bauermeister presented his prima facie case, the burden shifts to SIGE-CO, which must then produce evidence of an articulable, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action.
Consolidating the information in SIGE-CO's answer to the complaint, New and Glan-
cey's 1990 testimonies, and SIGECO's appellate brief, SIGECO articulates several nondiscriminatory reasons why New, the plant manager who was the ultimate decision maker in this hiring situation, rejected Bauer-meister:
1. Bauermeister was not the most qualified candidate; and
2. Glancey, who had supervised Bauer-meister at Culley Lab, gave Bauermeister a negative recommendation. According to Glancey's recommendation:
a. Bauermeister would not analyze problems correctly;
b. Bauermeister was unable to troubleshoot with his equipment;
c. Bauermeister did not take initiative. He did not accomplish tasks in a timely fashion and needed someone to tell him to do something;
d. Bauermeister did not have a safety conscious attitude. He did not follow safety procedures in handling chemicals, would not use his protective equipment, and was responsible for an acid spill that occurred while he was on duty. Bauer-meister's safety record showed four accidents.
We note that SIGECO's non-disceriminatory reasons changed somewhat from the time it filed its answer to Bauermeister's complaint to the writing of its appellate brief nearly nine years later.12 Neither controlling legis[685]*685lation nor precedent offer us guidance as to whether an employer can modify, alter, or refine its non-discriminatory reasons for a challenged action over the course of a proceeding; however, we shall consider all of SIGECO's reasons for its action.
Having articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for Bauermeister being denied the position he sought, the burden shifts to Bauermeister to establish that the proffered reasons are merely a pretext for a discriminatory reason to permit the factfin-der to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.
A claimant may show pretext by direct evidence that discrimination more likely motivated the employer or circumstantial evidence that the employer's proffered explanation was not the true reason and discrimination was. St. Mary's Honor Center, - U.S. at ---, 118 S.Ct. at 2749. "Untruthfulness may be demonstrated through evidence showing: (1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually ... motivate the adverse employment action or (8) that they were insufficient to motivate the adverse employment action." Arnett v. Tuthill Corp. (1994), N.D.Ind., 849 F.Supp. 654, 664 (quoting Weihqaupt v. American Medical Ass'n (1989), 7th Cir., 874 F.2d 419, 428 reh'g de-mied (quoting Kier v. Commercial Union Ins. (1987), "th Cir., 808 F.2d 1254, 1259, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029, 107 S.Ot. 1955, 95 LEd.2d 528)).
The record before us does not support SIGECO's proffered reason that Bauermeis-ter was not the most qualified applicant for the position. In 1985, SIGECO hired five Apprentice Electricians. One of the successful applicants, Robert Sager, had yet to graduate from ITT with an associates degree in electrical engineering and had no relevant work experience. Two of the successful applicants, Steve McCallister and Mark Pend-ley, had associate degrees in electronics; however, McCallister had worked less than a year as a maintenance person with computers and before that as a warehouse worker, and Pendley had spent the last 18 years as a salesman. Each of these applicants was hired after Bauermeister was interviewed on July 22, 1985. See (Comm'n R. at 318). Bauermeister had worked at SIGECO for eight years when he applied for the Apprentice Electrician position. He had an associate degree in electronics from Vincennes University and additional training from Purdue University. The "Job Vacancy Notice" submitted by SIGECO required that applicants have "prior experience and/or training in electrical maintenancel,] associate degree in electronics[, and] physically able to perform heavy work." Id. at 488. Based solely on objective criteria, Bauermeister was superior to these three candidates and Bauer-[686]*686meister has thus cast doubt on this rationale for his rejection.13
Bauermeister argues that the contradictions between SIGECO's proffered reasons in 1990 and the documentary evidence at the time of the 1985 decision logically and reasonably lead to a conclusion that SIGECO's stated reasons were pretextual.
First, although SIGECO's answer to the complaint stated its rejection of Bauermeis-ter was based on New's interview of him, see Id. at 8, New did not testify, nor do his notes made contemporaneously with the interview indicate that the result of the interview was unfavorable.14 See Id. at 977-80.
According to New's notes, Glanceey thought that Bauermeister's "transfer as an EM should be questioned," Id. at 278; however, in SIGECO's answer, and the testimonies of New and Glancey, Glancey's comments are portrayed as definitely not recommending Bauermeister for an Apprentice Electrician position.15As the Commission's hearing officer pointed out in his finding, there is a difference between absolutely not recommending someone for transfer and questioning the transfer. Neither New in his testimony, nor SIGECO in any submitted material, offers an explanation for this apparent inconsistency. Because New's notes were written contemporaneously with his conversations with Bauermeister and (Glancey, a factfinder could reasonably infer that Han-cey merely questioned the advisability of transferring Bauermeister, and did not flatly withhold his recommendation as New and SIGECO later claimed.
New's 1985 notes pertaining to his conversation with Glancey are inconsistent with SI-GECO's proffered reasons for its rejection in its answer and New's and Glaneey's testimonies. The notes mention only Bauermeister's mistakes in valving in and out of equipment; 16 the answer and testimonies emphasized Bauermeister's inability to analyze problems, lack of initiative and unsafe work [687]*687habits. When asked to describe Bauermeis-ter's inability to analyze problems, Glancey testified:
A. ... Mr. Bauermeister was in charge of the demineralizer operation. During one day we have a major spill and had damaged the lining, we gotten some acid into this lining in the sump area. The acid, when it reacted with water, became hot and we had a problem with the materials.
Q. Was Mr. Bauermeister responsible for that?
A. Yes.
a * i u ha #
Q. And that has to do with the analysis of the problem?
A. Well, not necessarily the analysis of that, of a problem, no. In that case, I believe Mr. Bauermeister just wasn't paying enough attention to detail and what he should have been doing at the time to make sure that the valve was closed before he left the area.
Q. He just didn't close a valve?
A. That's correct.
Q. Wouldn't that be fairly serious?
A. It caused a serious spill, yes. Luckily it went into the sump and nobody was hurt, but it damaged the lining material that we put in that area....
Q. And you didn't write up Mr. Bauer-meister for a problem like that?
A. Well, I couldn't directly attribute it to him, I guess. I knew he was working in that area, I questioned him about it, his knowledge was, "hey, I left the area in a manner that was okay." I guess I have nothing directly toward him. No, I didn't. I didn't give him a reprimand concerning that.
(Comm'n R. at 1029-80; 1034-85). This testimony reveals one valving incident which Glancey attributed to Bauermeister as opposed to "a lot of mistakes" as New's notes indicate. See also Id. at 1332-34 (Bauer-meister's testimony of the valving incident). Further, valving in and out of equipment pertains to manipulating machinery, a mechanical function, and not a function requiring analysis or problem solving skills. Thus, when directly asked about Bauermeister's problem solving skills, Glancey testified about an episode involving a lack of attention which could only demonstrate Bauermeister's unsafe work habits. Further, if Glancey told New about Bauermeister's inability to analyze problems, lack of initiative and trouble shooting problem, New failed to memorialize these problems. Instead, he chose to take note of Bauermeister's mechanical mishaps which resulted from his lack of attention.
However, although a lack of attention or a poor safety record can be serious non-discriminatory reasons for rejecting Bauermeis-ter, none of them are reflected in Bauermeis-ter's personnel file. Glanceey, who was concerned about Bauermeister's failure to analyze problems, lack of initiative, many mistakes, as well as his unsafe work habits, failed to enter any of these concerns in Bauermeister's file by way of warning, reprimand, or suspension. In fact, none of Bauer-meister's supervisors entered these problems into Bauermeister's personnel file.
Also, the documentation of Bauermeister's "deficiencies" which are contained in his personnel file do not match Glancey's testimony regarding the file. Glancey testified that Bauermeister lacked a safety conscious attitude which he illustrated by revealing that Bauermeister's safety record which "showed four accidents, with one being a lost-time accident." Id. at 7. However, Bauermeis-ter's personnel file sent by SIGECO to the Commission contains a list of three employment related injuries. Id. at 247, 250-73. The injuries occurred in 1978, 1981, and 1984, the only report for the 1981 injury was signed by Glancey. Glaneey testified that he was a plant chemist at Cully Lab from 1980 to 1982. Id. at 1027. Thus, Glaneey has no direct means, and little apparent reason, after 1982 of knowing about Bauermeister's safety record.
In addition, Woodall testified that there was nothing in Bauermeister's personnel file which indicated he had a poor safety record. Id. at 1011. And Penfield, director of industrial relations, testified that as far as the personnel department was concerned there was no information in Bauermeister's file [688]*688that showed that Bauermeister was not able to do the job of apprentice electrician. Id. at 1405.
As previously stated, a claimant may prevail by establishing a prima facie case and by showing that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for his discharge are factually false. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124. additional proof of discrimination is required." St. Mary's Honor Center, -- U.S. at --, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (emphasis in original). We are satisfied that there is sufficient, substantial evidence to allow reasonable minds to conclude that SIGECO's proffered non-discriminatory explanations were pretextual.
However, in addition, the record also reveals substantial evidence that New and others at SIGECO were predisposed to reject Bauermeister on the basis of his disability.
The posting for the job indicated that the applicant had to be "physically able to perform heavy work." (Comm'n R. at 483). New was well aware of the job's demands, as he had performed it himself.
A. So it's those type of things, but, that would-if you had three hands, you'd be better off than two hands. Let me put it that way. So any impairment that you might have would lower your total abilities to do that job, but I, I'm not gonna, I wouldn't sit here and say it would make him unable to do the job.
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Q. Mr. New what-at that time what were the, generally speaking, the duties of electricians that would be, perhaps taxing on a person who only had one hand?
A. Oh, I think those that are more involved with mechanical aspects of it, getting your equipment to and from the site. Sometimes it's big; sometimes cumbersome. Doing the rigging, for example, they got to rig to move their mechanical motors.... That's a statement that I have never seen someone with a, one arm or one hand or with a hook in the other hand do that or perform that. So that's just a, if you ask me what I thought would be the difficulties.... so, it's the type of the more the heavier part of it that I would have some concern with,. I would say that I would think he could take the proper precautions. I would think that when it comes down to manipulating small things, and again, I've never seen him do this or not do this, so I'm not sure whether that's accurate, but I would think he would have some difficulties in doing that.
Q. Anything else?
A. No. If it was, if it was an electrical shock problem he could, I'm sure he could insulate it somehow. I would think he could. So the shock part of that should not be of any concern to me. It's really the, the dexterity of it as, as a set of fingers, if that is or is not so, and his ability to manipulate heavy loads would be my main concern.
Q. What about climbing?
A. I don't know how his hook works. I'm not qualified to say that. You can ask me would I, would I think he would have to take some good precautions? Yeah, I would think he would have to.
Id. at 963-64; 970-73 (emphasis added).
Despite his concerns and uncertainty about hiring a man with a prosthesis instead of a right hand, New's notes, his testimony, and Bauermeister's testimony about the interview do not reveal that New seriously addressed his concerns apart from some discussion about Bauermeister's ability to climb ladders. Id. at 1320-22.
We note that Glaneey testified that Bauer-meister had no trouble handling small parts. "[Tlhat guy was able to tear stuff [machinery] down and put it back together that would cause a guy even with two normal hands problems. In fact, it did me." Id. at 1041. Further, Glancey testified that he told New that Bauermeister could do "everything I asked him to do, even fine detailed work." Id. at 1042. Although physical dexterity was one of New's main concerns in 1990 when he testified, he did not elicit, did not remember eliciting, or did not take notes about this information from Glancey in the 1985 meeting.
In his interview with Bauermeister and his meeting with Glancey, New could have acquired sufficient information to determine [689]*689whether Bauermeister was physically able to do the tasks of an electrician, which according to his testimony he was concerned about, yet he apparently did not.17 New preferred to speculate about Bauermeister's capabilities rather than ask Bauermeister directly or express his concerns to Glancey. "Unlike a person's race, an employer may legitimately take a handicap into consideration in determining whether an applicant or employee is qualified for a particular position." Barth, 2 F.3d at 1186. New's conjecture about how someone with a prosthesis would perform as an electrician deprived Bauermeister of proving, demonstrating, or even asserting his dis- . tinct and unique personal abilities. This is discrimination based on a disability which our laws have been set out to prohibit.
Finally, at the conclusion of New's testimony he was asked, what counsel characterized as the "ultimate question:"
Q. If Mr. Glaneey had favorably commented upon Mr. Bauermeister, all things being equal in the interview, would you have hired Mr. Bauermeister?
A. If, if his-by "favorable" you mean he was highly recommended? ... I think I would have.
(Comm'n R. at 989-990). Given the facts in Bauermeister's favor, that he had more work related experience than two of the successful candidates, more education than another of the successful candidates, and had worked for SIGECO for eight years, the fact that a "favorable" recommendation, in a situation where none of the other candidates had ree-ommendations, did not elicit a unequivocal positive response from New reasonably supports the inference that Bauermeister's rejection was not based on nondiscriminatory reasons.
New also testified:
I was aware that he had that hand, but I was determined that they was not going-again, I figured the company had already made up their mind that this man was qualified or they wouldn't have sent him.
Id. at 975.18 SIGECO asserted in its Appellate Brief that New "held the ultimate authority to transfer Bauermeister." Appel-lee's Brief at 18; see also Id. at 1402 (Pen-field's testimony that "the ultimate decision came from Millard New."). And in a 1990 interrogatory, when asked "who had responsibility of making the decision to grant or deny [Bauermeister]'s request for transfer ... to Electrical Maintenance Technician ... between July 1, 1985 and September 4, 1985," SIGECO answered: "Dennis Glancey, Millard New and Rod Penfield." Id. at 399. When asked who was responsible for making the decision to hire Apprentice Electricians, SIGECO responded: an employment supervisor, the director of industrial relations, and the plant manager. Id. at 406. It could be reasonably inferred that although New may have had the final decision whether Bauer-meister was transferred, others in the company including upper management bore some of the "responsibility of making the decision to grant or deny [Bauermeister]'s request for transfer from Laboratory Technician to Electrical Maintenance Technician." Id. at 399. Thus, testimony of SIGECO's management is relevant in determining whether day-to-day SIGECO policies and practices created an [690]*690atmosphere in which an employment decision which was discriminatory would have been tolerated.
The testimony of George Ray Hust supports the inference that discriminatory employment decisions were not outside the policies or practices of SIGECO. Hust initially joined SIGECO as an electrician in the electrical substation department, transferred to construction maintenance foreman, and in 1965 became manager of labor relations. In this position he handled grievances and complaints filed by disgruntled employees. Given this job description, a factfinder could reasonably infer that Hust had the opportunity to become particularly sensitive to SI-GECO's policies concerning issues like discrimination.
Attached to bis complaint, Bauermeister submitted two letters to support his contention of intentional discrimination. The letters were from men who attended a grievance meeting as union representatives on October 8, 1985. David E. MeNeely, who also testified via deposition, wrote that Hust said that he did not think a person with one arm could fill the Apprentice Electrician position because the position required the employee to climb ladders and "he didn't think a person with a mechanical arm could, could do that." Id. at 907. The second letter was from Darrel Smith, a janitor at Culley Lab. Smith's letter stated that Hust said that he would never admit that the arm was the reason "but that was the way he felt about it." Id. at 96.
Although Hust denied Smith's statements in his deposition, he stated that a person with only one arm would have difficulty performing an electrician's job safely and efficiently. He commented:
It's true that you may not climb for as long as a year sometime and then you may spend four or five months climbing, plus the proximity to hot equipment it's, you got a safety problem there plus a problem with manual dexterity behind hot panels. You could take a section of a city off by some inability to move or to adjust something or to-
Q: So is having both hands, is that, would that be a prerequisite of your, of the job as electrician?
A: Yes. My experience and the way we use electricians at SIGECO that's correct. [Id. at 928.]
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[Bauermeister] ultimately could do [the jobl, but he wouldn't be in my judgment proficient enough and get good enough to justify putting him in the job. [Id. at 986.]
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I am concerned that ... that inevitably he would get injured because of his inability, his lack of both hands, not only from a safety standpoint falling but getting into other equipment.
Id. at 989. Concluding his remarks, Hust said:
All I am saying is that as a supervisor [of electricians] I wouldn't put a guy with one hand on something that's very critical or something he could get into trouble with....
Q. With regard to apprentices you don't necessarily throw apprentices on everything out there either do you, right away?
A: oh, heck no. But we don't hire apprentices with an arm off there, you know. You don't do that. And we may eventualty be made to, but it's still going to cause one hell of a lot of problems in production and personnel problems.
Id. at 940-43 (emphasis added). A factfinder could reasonably infer that SIGECO's management, as represented by Hust, manager of labor relations, tolerated an atmosphere in which a decision by New to reject Bauer-meister for transfer based solely on his disability would have been permitted.19
[691]*691The testimony of Hust is cumulative and supports the Commission's ultimate finding of pretext and intentional discrimination. Thus, we find that contrary to the trial court, the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence of probative value.
IIL
Bauermeister also contends that the trial court erred when it found that SIGECO did not receive a full and fair hearing by the Commission's hearing officer. However, SI-GECO asserts the trial court was correct in finding that the Commission did not have a reasonably sound basis of evidentiary support for its finding of discrimination, but instead acted on its clearly-expressed bias against SIGECO.
Due process requirements in the context of administrative proceedings are clear in requiring that a hearing be conducted before an impartial body. New Trend Beauty School v. Indiana State Bd. of Beauty Culturist Examiners (1988), Ind.App., 518 N.E.2d 1101, 1104. A trial court (or an administrative hearing officer) has a duty to remain impartial and refrain from making unnecessary comments or remarks. Taylor v. State (1992), Ind.App., 602 N.E.2d 1056, 1059 trans. denied. The judge (or hearing officer) should be an impartial person whose conduct and remarks do not give the impression of partiality. Id. However, not all untoward remarks by a judge or a hearing officer, constitute reversible error. Id.; Parker v. State (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 105, 112, trans. denied. The remarks must harm the complaining party or interfere with the right to a fair trial, Id. Reversible error may also be established by demonstrating "by a valid and complete record that the alleged bias or prejudice stems from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what was learned through participation in the case." Matter of Sekerez (1984), Ind., 458 N.E.2d 229, 233 cert. denied 469 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 182, 83 L.Ed.2d 116.
In the present case, the trial court found that "[the transcript is replete with instances where the Hearing Officer evidenced bias or prejudice against the position of SIGE-CO." (R. at 80). However, neither the trial court in its decision nor SIGECO in its Brief offers any evidence that the bias or prejudice stems from an extra-judicial source and resulted in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what was learned through participation in the case. SIGECO does not offer any instance or manner in which it was deprived of a fair hearing. Although we do not condone the untoward remarks made by a hearing officer in an administrative hearing, and indeed recognize that in some instances the remarks might constitute error, because we find, in Issue II above, that the evidence presented by the parties supports the Commission's finding of pretext and intentional discrimination, we will not reverse the Commission decision.
The trial court erred in vacating the Commission's order. Its decision is reversed with instruction to reinstate the Commission's order.
DARDEN, J. concurs in result.
KIRSCH, J. concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.