MANION, Circuit Judge.
Irene Mojica, an Hispanic female, worked the “graveyard” shift as the overnight disc jockey at a popular Chicago radio station, WGCI-FM, owned by Gannett Company, Inc. In July 1990 she sued Gannett claiming, among other things, sex and national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, because she had never been promoted into a better time slot. A few weeks before the scheduled trial, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1099. [555]*555The district court applied the new law retroactively, and the jury awarded Mojica compensatory and punitive damages for her national origin discrimination claim. Gannett then filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The district court ruled on that motion by reversing the punitive damages award — finding insufficient evidence of malice — but otherwise letting the verdict stand. Gannett appeals the district court’s failure to grant j.n.o.v. on the jury’s finding of discrimination. Mojica cross-appeals on the district court’s decision to strike the punitive damages award.
I. Facts
WGCI-FM is a popular Chicago radio station with programming geared for a black audience. To attract the maximum number of possible listeners, WGCI-FM separates its programming into six air shifts: 1:00am— 5:00am (overnight); 5:00am — 9:00am (morning drive); 9:00am — 2:00pm (mid-day); 2:00pm — 6:00pm (afternoon drive); 6:00pm— 10:00pm (evening shift); and 10:00pm— 1:00am (“quiet storm”). The format for each shift differs depending upon the presumed tastes of expected listeners. For instance, the morning and afternoon drive-time shifts — which attract by far the largest audiences — involve the chatter of the disc jockeys, along with some music, news, and traffic information. The other shifts are music-oriented, with different musical sounds appropriate to the pace and mood of the time of day.
Gannett hired Mojica in 1979, and she held several positions with WGCI-FM and its predecessor, WVON-AM. In January 1987, Mojica became the full-time overnight disc jockey at WGCI-FM. The overnight shift attracted the smallest listening audience and Mojica was paid less than the other disc jockeys at the station. She sought promotion into one of the more lucrative time slots. Between the time Mojica first became the full-time overnight disc jockey and the time she filed suit, five positions became available in non-overnight shifts at WGCI-FM. Four of those positions were filled by black disc jockeys, and one position — the “quiet storm” position which became available in January 1990 — was filled by an Hispanic woman, Anna “Coco” Cortez. Mojica remained stuck in the overnight shift.
On July 6, 1990, Mojica filed suit against Gannett in the district court, alleging that she was paid less than male disc jockeys in violation of the Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)) and Title VII, and sexually harassed in violation of Title VII. She also claimed that she was denied promotion on the basis of her sex, her national origin, and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Discovery proceeded and the district court scheduled trial for early December 1991. But in mid-November, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, thereby amending the prevailing civil rights laws. The district court determined that the new Act applied retroactively. On November 27, 1991, the district court allowed Mojica to amend her complaint to assert claims under the new Act. 779 F.Supp. 94.
Two weeks later, the district court conducted the trial. All of Mojica’s claims were tried to a jury. Mojica presented evidence that while she was the overnight disc jockey, five disc jockey positions became available in more lucrative shifts. She applied for each position but the station did not promote her. To prove that the failures to promote were motivated by discriminatory intent, Mojica introduced evidence that she was a popular disc jockey. She also introduced the testimony of Anna “Coco” Cortez, an Hispanic female disc jockey who was hired into one of the positions for which Mojica was passed over. Cortez testified that she was not given the salary which the station promised, and she eventually left her job because of that. Finally, and significantly, Mojica testified that in the winter of 1986, the station’s general manager, Marv Dyson, told her that he would not assign her to a non-overnight shift because she was not “a black male.” He denied ever making that comment.
The district court gave the jury a combined instruction on Mojica’s national origin claims under section 1981 and Title VII. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Moji-ca on this combined national origin claim, and awarded her $35,000 in compensatory dam[556]*556ages and an additional $125,000 in punitive damages. Mojica failed on all of her other claims. After trial, Gannett filed a motion for j.n.o.v. The district court granted Gan-nett’s motion on the punitive damages award, finding insufficient evidence of malice to support the award. The district court otherwise denied Gannett’s motion, and let stand the jury’s finding of discrimination and its $35,-000 award to Mojica. Gannett appeals that denial of its motion. Mojica cross-appeals the district court’s decision to strike the punitive damages award.
II. Analysis
In making its decision to apply the new Act retroactively, the district court faced a somewhat uncharted course. Congress had made no definitive statement in the text of the new Act as to whether it should apply retroactively. See Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co., 963 F.2d 929, 932 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 207, 121 L.Ed.2d 148 (1992) (“whether Congress intended prospective or retroactive application of the 1991 Civil Rights Act cannot be deciphered from either the language of the statute or from the legislative history.”) Without congressional guidance, the district court was forced to resolve the issue of retroactivity based on existing judicial precedent. But two distinct lines of cases emanated from the Supreme Court of the United States. One line of cases endorsed a presumption in favor of retroactive application unless the statute included a clear legislative statement to the contrary. See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711-712, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016-17, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1968). A second line of cases rejected retroactivity, and observed a presumption favoring prospective application of newly-enacted statutes. See cases cited in Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1586, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990). Upon reaching this fork in the road, the district court chose the Bradley-Thorpe path and applied the Civil Rights Act of 1991 retroactively.
In the time since this case was tried, this court has addressed and resolved the conflicting Supreme Court precedent on the issue of retroactivity in Mozee and Luddington v. Indiana Bell Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.1992). Both Mozee and Luddington concerned the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to cases which were pending on appeal when the new Act became effective. In Mozee, we extensively discussed the prevailing precedent and concluded that “the Supreme Court has left us with two seemingly contradictory lines of eases.... ” Mozee, 963 F.2d at 935. We resolved this contradiction by establishing a presumption against retroactive application of newly-enacted statutes, stating the general rule that “statutory provisions impacting substantive rights and obligations will not be retroactively applied.” Id. at 936. We reasoned that “the better and more fair rule is to hold parties accountable for only those acts that were in violation of the law at the time the acts were performed.” Id. In Luddington, we reaffirmed the presumption against retroactivity: “[t]he idea that the law should confine its prohibitions and regulations to future conduct, so that persons subject to the law can conform their conduct to it and thus avoid being punished ... is a component of the traditional conception of the ‘rule of law.’ ” Luddington, 966 F.2d at 227-28. We specifically held that “the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] is applicable only to conduct engaged in after the effective dates (plural because several sanctions carry different effective dates) in the Act, at least if the suit had been brought before the effective date.” Id. at 229-30.1
[557]*557We decided Mozee in May of 1992 and Luddington one month later.2 The case now before the entire court was originally argued on October 19, 1992. In his dissent from the decision to rehear this case en banc, Judge Cummings describes the disposition of the panel which initially heard this case. Mojica v. Gannett Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1168, 1159 (7th Cir.1993) (Cummings, J., dissenting from grant of rehearing en banc). To summarize, Judge Cummings took the position that the presumption against retroactivity established in Mozee and Luddington did not apply to this case. He noted that while those cases were pending on appeal when the new Act passed into law, this case was pending before the trial court. Judge Cummings and a second panel member3 determined, for reasons essentially set forth in the dissent to the en banc, that Congress intended the new Act to apply to all trials taking place after the Act’s passage. The proposed opinion was circulated to the full court under Circuit Rule 40(f), and a majority of the court decided to rehear this case en banc. Id. at 1158.
On rehearing, this case presents several issues. First, because the full court may decide to overrule previous cases, we must decide, whether the presumption against ret-roactivity established in Mozee and Ludding-ton should remain the law of this Circuit. Second, we must determine whether this presumption against retroactivity applies to cases which were pending in the trial court when the new Act passed into law. Third, we must apply our decision on retroactivity to the case before us. Finally, we must settle the other issues — unrelated to retroac-tivity — raised in this appeal and cross-appeal.
A Retroactivity.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case involving the issue of retroactivity. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, cert. granted, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1250, 122 L.Ed.2d 649 (1993). The rule stated in that case eventually will control the issue in the federal courts.4 In the meantime, this court has already articulated a general rule concerning retroactivity in Moz-ee and Luddington.5 When sitting en banc, the full court has the power to change general rules stated in previous cases. See Varhol v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1560 (7th Cir.1990). As a practical matter, therefore, the first issue before us is whether the presumption against retroactivity should remain the law of this Circuit.
In his concurrence in Kaiser, Justice Scalia discusses the history of Supreme Court precedent relating to retroactivity and expounds the policies against retroactive application of newly-enacted statutes. Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 840-59, 110 S.Ct. at 1579-88. At the core of his discussion is the inescapable reality that retroactive application “is contrary to fundamental notions of justice_” Id. 494 U.S. at 855, 110 S.Ct. at 1586. This is so because retroactive application often penalizes conduct which was acceptable, at least under the rule of law, when the conduct occurred. General retroactive application diminishes one’s ability to conform conduct to the boundaries imposed by law. This does not mean that Congress is prohibited from re-[558]*558troaction. On the contrary, Congress may advance the will of the citizenry, in some circumstances, by changing laws after the fact. But our legal system leaves that authority exclusively to Congress, and places constitutional limits on its exercise. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9. Courts should not presume retroaction. Instead, absent a clear legislative statement to the contrary, courts should presume that legislation was intended to operate only prospectively. See Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 857-59, 110 S.Ct. at 1588.
In Mozee and Luddington we embraced Justice Scalia’s conclusions from Kaiser. We see no reason to overturn those decisions. ■ The weight of history and tradition, as well as considerations of fairness, compel us to observe a presumption against retroactive application of newly-enacted statutes. We need not repeat the reasoning displayed in Mozee and Luddington. Those cases remain the law of this Circuit, and they stand independently in their precedential value.
B. Mozee, Luddington And This Case.
The historical reason for applying statutes prospectively is to advance “[t]he principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place_” Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 855, 110 S.Ct. at 1586. Therefore, courts should look to the time of the conduct giving rise to the claim to determine the statute’s applicability. Simply put, if the conduct took place before the statute’s enactment, it is not covered; if after, it is covered. In Luddington we followed this principle, holding that “the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] is applicable only to conduct engaged in after the effective dates ... at least if the suit had been brought before the effective date.” Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229-30 (emphasis added).
Mojica filed her lawsuit on July 6, 1990. The lawsuit necessarily followed in time the conduct upon which it was based; indeed, all of the alleged failures to promote occurred in 1989 and 1990. The new Act became law in November of 1991. That Mojica later amended her complaint to assert the new law does not change the fact that the conduct occurred (and the lawsuit was filed) before the effective dates. Under Mozee and Luddington, because the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred before the new Act became effective, Gannett is not liable under the new law. Gannett is potentially liable only under the civil rights laws in effect at the time it failed to promote Mojica.
In his dissent from the decision to rehear en banc, Judge Cummings took the position that the presumption against retroactivity established in Mozee and Luddington did not apply to this case. First, he made a distinction between our previous cases and this one: Mozee and Luddington were pending on appeal but this case was pending before the trial court when the new Act passed into law. Next, he discerned that Congress intended the new Act to apply to trials taking place after the law’s passage, regardless of when the conduct giving rise to the claim took place. “[T]he Act is not addressed to employer’s conduct, but rather to the conduct of federal judges administering trials under previously enacted civil rights laws.” Mojica, 986 F.2d at 1162.
But this reasoning assumes that the trial, instead of the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct, is the temporal event which controls the application of the law. This assumption contradicts the holdings of Mozee and Luddington that the time of the conduct controls liability. It also ignores the reasoning behind those cases — that it would be “unfair to make persons accountable for acts that did not violate statutory laws when they were performed.” Mozee, 963 F.2d at 939; accord Luddington, 966 F.2d at 228. Under Judge Cummings’ approach, Gannett could be liable for an alleged discriminatory failure to promote under section 1981, even though the law (section 1981) in effect at the time of the conduct did not prohibit such alleged discrimination. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (former section 1981 excluded claims based on failure to promote or transfer an employee, unless the “promotion rises to a level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relationship between the [559]*559employee and employer_”).6
In theory, a statute may include certain procedural or damage provisions which do not impact substantive rights, and therefore should apply to trials taking place after enactment. See Mozee, 963 F.2d at 939 (“it is arguable that courts should apply the procedural and damage provisions in effect at the time of the trial.”); Luddington, 966 F.2d at 228 (“[procedural innovations not likely to bias a decision systematically in favor of one litigant rather than his opponent can, without serious affront to the values crystallized in the phrase ‘rule of law,’ be applied to cases pending when the innovations were adopted....”). Indeed, courts are responsible to faithfully apply laws as Congress drafted them; if Congress intended certain non-substantive provisions of a law to apply to pending trials, then courts should so apply them. See Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71, 69 S.Ct. 944, 952-53, 93 L.Ed. 1207 (1949) (new rule defining forum non conveniens); Bonet v. Texas Co., 308 U.S. 468, 467, 60 5.Ct. 349, 351-52, 84 L.Ed. 401 (1940) (new method of enforcing awards). But this case implicates only two provisions relating to procedure and damages, neither of which should have been applied at the trial. First, the district court allowed the Title VII claims to be tried to the jury, which was not allowed under the former Title VII but is permitted under the new Act. Second, the jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages, which were not recoverable under the previous Title VII.
To allow a jury trial for a case governed substantively by the former Title VII is to ignore the equitable nature of that provision. The amended Title VII allows for jury trials, but that is because of the legal remedies— including compensatory and punitive damages — available under the new law.7 The previous Title VII allows only equitable remedies, and as long as that substantive law governs a case, the plaintiff has no right to trial by jury. See Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1293 (7th Cir.1987). Nor does the right to compensatory and punitive damages conferred by the new Title VII apply retroactively. As we stated in Luddington, “[t]he amount of care that individuals and firms take to avoid subjecting themselves to liability whether civil or criminal is a function of the severity of the sanction, and when the severity is increased they are entitled to an opportunity to readjust their level of care in light of the new environment created by the change.” Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229.
In sum, the district court erred by applying the new Act to this ease. Because Gan-nett’s alleged failure to promote Mojica — the conduct giving rise to her claim — took place before the enactment of the new Act, the former civil rights laws govern her ease. To the extent some provisions of the new Act may apply to pending trials, no such provisions are implicated in this appeal.8
[560]*560
C. Consequences of Misapplication.
At trial Mojica alleged that Gannett violated federal laws by paying her less than other disc jockeys, by sexually harassing her, and by refusing to promote her because of her sex, her national origin, and in retaliation for complaining about discrimination. The jury found in Mojica’s favor only on the national origin discrimination claim. Mojica does not appeal the jury’s findings as to the other claims. The question before us, then, is whether the improper application of the new Act requires reversal of the jury’s finding of national origin discrimination.
Mojica actually made two national origin discrimination claims: one under Title VII and one under section 1981. The court provided the jury with a combined instruction on that claim, and the jury returned one verdict: that Gannett engaged in national origin discrimination. The jury did not distinguish the statutory basis of the verdict. Therefore it is impossible to know to what extent the jury assessed liability under Title VII as opposed to section 1981.
There are two problems with the jury’s combined verdict. First, the jury should not have been allowed to consider the section 1981 claim. In Patterson, 491 U.S. at 184-86, 109 S.Ct. at 2377, the Supreme Court held that the former section 1981 — the law that governs this case — excluded claims based on the failure to promote or transfer an employee, unless the “promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and employer.... ” The amended section 1981 eliminated this requirement, effectively overruling Patterson. See Harriston v. Chicago Tribune, 992 F.2d 697, 702 n. 3 (7th Cir.1993). But Mojica’s case should have been governed by the former law. Mojica presents no facts showing that the promotions to the more lucrative time shifts would have involved new and distinct relations with Gan-nett. See id. at 702. By allowing Mojica to proceed under the new Act, the district court essentially allowed her to proceed with a new claim which did not exist at the time the challenged conduct occurred.
The second problem with the jury’s verdict is that under the former law, the jury should not have been allowed to consider Mojica’s Title VII claims. True, under the former law the jury was allowed to make factual findings if Title VII claims were tried with section 1981 claims. See Handy Button, 817 F.2d at 1293. But we have already held that the jury should not have considered the section 1981 claims in the first place. Therefore the jury’s finding has no force. Even if we were to defer to the jury’s factual finding of national origin discrimination, it would be impossible to reconcile the jury’s damage award with the former Title VII. Indeed, the jury awarded $35,000 in “compensatory damages.” The former Title VII allows recovery only for back pay and provides other equitable remedies. There is no way to determine at this point what portion of the jury’s $35,000 damage award was meant to compensate for back pay.
The verdict is beyond rescue. This case must be remanded so that the district court can consider the Title VII discrimination claim. We decline to remand the section 1981 claim. Mojica offers no facts indicating that the promotions involved the opportunity to enter into a new and distinct contractual relationship.
D. Other Arguments.
1. Insufficiency of the evidence.
Under any version of the civil rights laws the plaintiff must prove discrimination. If [561]*561Mojica did not prove discrimination at the first trial, the district court’s failure to apply the proper civil rights laws would not matter. There would be no reason to remand to give Mojica a second chance to prove discrimination. Gannett argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of discrimination. If there was no evidence of discrimination presented at the trial, there is no reason to remand; this case would be over. Therefore, it is necessary to address Gannett’s insufficiency argument.
In any discrimination case, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his employment was adversely affected by his protected class status. Kizer v. Children’s Learning Center, 962 F.2d 608, 611 (7th Cir.1992); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1988). The plaintiff can meet this burden either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), or by successfully navigating the course of shifting burdens authorized in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See also St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). But once the plaintiff prevails before a jury, the method of proof becomes extraneous. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-17, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481-83, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Mathewson v. National Automatic Tool Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 87, 90 (7th Cir.1986). A district court passing on a motion for j.n.o.v. simply asks whether the substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of discrimination. Id. We review de novo the district court’s decision. Id.
Mojica presented evidence of discrimination at the original trial by testifying that Marv Dyson, the station general manager, told her in 1986 that she would not be promoted into a more lucrative shift because she was not “a black male.” She also testified that when she told her other superiors of Dyson’s comment, they reacted as if Dyson had foolishly revealed a guarded company secret. One even responded: “He said that to you? He is not supposed to say that. You could charge him with discrimination.” Gannett never objected to this testimony. Mojica also introduced evidence that she was a popular disc jockey and that the station had failed to pay another Hispanic woman disc jockey the amount that they had promised her. The district court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of discrimination.
To determine if there was substantial evidence, we must ascertain “whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party winning the verdict.” Mathewson, 807 F.2d at 90. We do not make credibility determinations; we leave that to the jury. Id. The jury could have believed Mojica’s testimony about Marv Dyson’s statement. If they believed that testimony, as well as Mojica’s other testimony about how the other station supervisors reacted to the statement, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the radio station had a policy against hiring Hispanic females into prime-time disc jockey positions. Gannett never made a bona fide occupational qualification defense; it never argued that being a black male was a necessary qualification for a prime time disc jockey at a radio station with programming aimed at a black audience. Gannett argues simply that Marv Dyson never made the statement. But. the jury could have believed Mojica. Because we conclude that the verdict is supported, we need not comment on any of the other evidence Mojica relied on to prove discrimination.
2. Mojica’s cross-appeal.
Mojica cross-appeals, arguing that the district court incorrectly overturned the jury’s punitive damages award. The district court determined that there was insufficient evidence of malice to support the award of punitive damages. We agree. But in accordance with our decision on retroactivity, we affirm the district court’s decision to strike punitive damages because under the former Title VII — which applies to this case — Mojica is not entitled to punitive damages.
[562]*562III. Conclusion
The district court erred by applying the Civil Rights Act of 1991 retroactively to this case. We reverse the jury’s verdict and remand for a bench trial solely on the issue of whether Gannett committed national origin discrimination under the former Title VII. If so, the district court should award appropriate damages.
Reversed and Remanded.