In the Interest of S.D., a Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: October 11, 2022
• Docket: A22A1416
• Status: Published

Opinion

THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., REESE, J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE PHIPPS

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

October 11, 2022

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A22A1416. IN THE INTEREST OF S. D., a child.

PHIPPS, Senior Appellate Judge.

In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, the State appeals from a juvenile court

order closing and sealing the case. The State raises several challenges to the juvenile

court’s authority to enter such an order under the facts of this case. Because the State

has not met its burden of establishing reversible error, we affirm.

In September 2021, a complaint was filed alleging that then-16-year-old

student S. D. brought a pocket knife to school. The following December, the State

filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court alleging that, by bringing the knife to

school, S. D. had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have

constituted the felony offense of carrying a weapon in a school safety zone or at a

school function without a license to carry weapons, in violation of OCGA § 16-11-127.1 (b) (2021). Following S. D.’s February 2022 arraignment, and at his

counsel’s request, the juvenile court entered an order holding adjudication in

abeyance for 90 days.1 As conditions of the abeyance, the court required S. D. to write

two one-page essays on topics specified by the court and to participate in a conflict-

resolution program or therapy. The order provided that “if the child is compliant with

the conditions of abeyance this matter will be administratively closed and the record

sealed.”

Approximately two weeks later, S. D. filed an emergency motion for a review

hearing on the ground that his aunt — who was his guardian in Georgia — planned

to return the child to his mother in Chicago in a few days’ time. A video-conference

hearing was held later that morning. During the hearing, S. D.’s probation officer

testified that S. D. had written both of the essays assigned by the juvenile court. The

probation officer further testified that, while he had made multiple referrals for a

conflict-resolution program, services were denied due to insurance issues and the

impending plan for S. D. to return to his mother in Chicago. In light of S. D.’s

upcoming move, the probation officer recommended that the child’s case be “closed

1 The order of abeyance mistakenly indicates that the State requested abeyance. During the arraignment hearing, the State opposed S. D.’s request for abeyance.

2 successfully.” S. D.’s aunt testified that the child was permanently moving in with his

mother out-of-state and would not be returning to Georgia. The State asked for the

case to be “closed unsuccessfully and not sealed” because S. D. had not completed

a conflict-resolution program.

Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order in which it found

that S. D. had completed the two essays required as conditions of the prior order of

abeyance but had not completed a conflict-resolution program. After reviewing

several of the pertinent circumstances in this case — including the probation officer’s

recommendation to close the case “successfully” — the court closed and sealed the

case over the State’s objection. This appeal followed.

1. We first address S. D.’s contention that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.

According to S. D., none of the provisions of OCGA § 5-7-1 authorizes an appeal by

the State from the order at issue here. We disagree.

As relevant here, OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) authorizes the State to file a direct

appeal from a juvenile court “order, decision, or judgment setting aside or dismissing

. . . a petition alleging that a child has committed a delinquent act . . . .” Here, the

juvenile court’s order closing and sealing the case is the functional equivalent of an

order dismissing a delinquency petition because, as a result of the order, S. D. will no

3 longer be held to answer for the allegations in the petition. See State v. Singh, 291 Ga.

525, 526 (1) (731 SE2d 649) (2012) (“[T]he appealability of an order is ultimately

determined by its substance and effect, not its nomenclature.”); Planet Ins. Co. v.

Ferrell, 228 Ga. App. 264, 266 (491 SE2d 471) (1997) (“[P]leadings, motions and

orders are to be construed according to their substance and function and not merely

as to their nomenclature . . . .”); cf. In the Interest of A. L., 354 Ga. App. 59, 60 (840

SE2d 148) (2020) (concluding that, while the juvenile court purported to dismiss a

delinquency “petition” in the order on appeal, the court in substance dismissed the

“proceeding,” not the “petition,” as a result of which this Court lacked jurisdiction

over the State’s ensuing appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a)); see also generally OCGA

§ 15-11-35 (providing for direct appeals “[i]n all cases of final judgments of the

juvenile court”). Consequently, the order at issue is appealable by the State under

OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1), and we therefore reject S. D.’s contention that we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal.

2. The State contends that the juvenile court lacked the authority to seal this

case because neither of the prerequisites to sealing a case was satisfied. As relevant

here, under OCGA § 15-11-701 (a), the file and records in a juvenile court case must

be sealed “[u]pon dismissal of a petition or complaint alleging delinquency . . . or

4 completion of the process in a case handled through informal adjustment, mediation,

or other nonadjudicatory procedure . . . .” Pretermitting whether either of these

avenues is a necessary prerequisite to sealing a case, we conclude that both were

satisfied here.

(a) As stated above in Division 1, the juvenile court’s order closing this case

had the same practical effect as a dismissal of the delinquency petition. Consequently,

the court was required to seal the case under OCGA § 15-11-701 (a). The State,

however, maintains that the juvenile court lacked the authority to dismiss the petition

in this case. According to the State, a juvenile court may dismiss a delinquency

petition only under two specific limited circumstances, neither of which, the State

claims, is present here: (i) following a transfer of the case to superior court, OCGA

§ 15-11-566 (a); and (ii) when the evidence presented at an adjudication hearing does

not establish the allegations of delinquency, OCGA § 15-11-582 (d). But that

argument ignores several other reasons why a delinquency petition may be dismissed.

See, e.g., OCGA §§ 15-11-540 (authorizing the dismissal of a delinquency petition

“upon the motion of the prosecuting attorney setting forth that there is not sufficient

evidence to warrant further proceedings”); 15-11-660 (d)-(e) (authorizing the

dismissal of delinquency petitions for reasons related to a child’s competency); In the

5 Interest of R. D. F., 266 Ga. 294, 296 (3) (466 SE2d 572) (1996) (“The failure to

comply with [various Juvenile Code provisions] results in dismissal of the

[delinquency] petition without prejudice.”); In the Interest of C. W., 345 Ga. App.

750, 750-751 (815 SE2d 123) (2018) (“[T]he delinquency petition was subject to

dismissal because it did not disclose the name of the victim . . . .”); In the Interest of

M. B., 217 Ga. App. 660, 662 (458 SE2d 864) (1995) (concluding that the juvenile

court erred when it denied a juvenile’s motion to dismiss a delinquency petition on

the ground that, as an alleged juvenile delinquent, he could not commit the crime set

forth in the petition); see also generally In the Interest of K. C., 290 Ga. App. 416,

417 (659 SE2d 821) (2008) (“The juvenile court procedures do not implicate the

merits of a delinquency petition, and their violation does not demand an acquittal. On

the contrary, noncompliance authorizes dismissal of the petition without prejudice.”).

Consequently, we reject the State’s argument that the juvenile court’s authority to

dismiss a delinquency petition is limited to the two instances identified in its brief.

(b) Moreover, as explained more fully below, the court’s disposition here also

constituted a “completion of the process” through a “nonadjudicatory procedure”

under OCGA § 15-11-701 (a). This issue involves statutory construction, which is a

legal question that we address de novo. See State v. Hammonds, 325 Ga. App. 815,

6 815 (755 SE2d 214) (2014). We note that the parties have not cited, and research has

not revealed, any Georgia appellate decisions explicitly defining the phrases

“completion of the process” or “nonadjudicatory procedure” as used in this context.

[I]n considering this question of statutory interpretation, we necessarily begin our analysis with familiar and binding canons of construction. Indeed, in analyzing the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. And toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, consider the text contextually, read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would, and seek to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage. In sum, where the language of a statute is plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, an appellate court must construe the statute accordingly.

In the Interest of L. T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591-592 (754 SE2d 380) (2014) (citations

and punctuation omitted). With those general guiding principles in mind, we also

highlight the General Assembly’s express intent that the Juvenile Code — of which

OCGA § 15-11-701 is a part — “shall be liberally construed to reflect that the

paramount child welfare policy of this state is to determine and ensure the best

interests of its children.” OCGA § 15-11-1; accord In the Interest of M. B., 217 Ga.

7 App. at 661 (“The juvenile code is concerned with the care, guidance, and well-being

of children.”).

So viewed, the plain meaning of the phrase “nonadjudicatory procedure”

includes, at the very least, the disposition of a delinquency petition without an

adjudication of its merits. Thus, by closing and sealing the case without adjudicating

the merits of the delinquency petition, the juvenile court in this case disposed of the

petition via a “nonadjudicatory procedure.” The State, however, contends that a

“nonadjudicatory procedure,” as used in OCGA § 15-11-701 (a), must be narrowly

defined by the following provisions in OCGA § 15-11-510:

(c) A juvenile court intake officer may elect to pursue a case through informal adjustment or other nonadjudicatory procedure in accordance with the provisions of Code Section 15-11-515.

(d) If a case is to be prosecuted further and handled other than by informal adjustment or other nonadjudicatory procedure, a referral shall be made to the prosecuting attorney and a petition for delinquency shall be filed within 30 days of the filing of a complaint.

According to the State, the juvenile court’s disposition of S. D.’s case does not

constitute a “nonadjudicatory procedure” because (a) no intake officer complied with

8 OCGA § 15-11-515 and (b) the State filed a delinquency petition before the juvenile

court disposed of the case. We are unpersuaded.

Nothing in the plain language of OCGA § 15-11-510 or OCGA § 15-11-701

(a) unambiguously limits the meaning of the phrase “nonadjudicatory procedure” as

urged by the State. And given the mandate that the Juvenile Code be liberally

construed to ensure the best interests of children, the phrase must be read to afford

a juvenile court the flexibility and discretion necessary to adequately address the best

interest of each child via a procedure that is “nonadjudicatory.” We therefore hold

that the phrase “nonadjudicatory procedure” includes, at a minimum, any disposition

of a delinquency petition that does not entail adjudication of the petition’s merits.

The State further argues that, even if this case was disposed of through a

nonadjudicatory procedure, no “completion of the process” occurred under OCGA

§ 15-11-701 (a) because S. D. did not participate in a conflict-resolution program or

therapy, as required by the juvenile court’s prior order of abeyance. Once again,

however, the State seeks to read the statute too narrowly. Nothing in the plain

language of OCGA § 15-11-701 (a) suggests that the phrase “completion of the

process” places such narrow limits on a juvenile court’s authority to find that the

“process” of the specific “nonadjudicatory procedure” it employed in a particular case

9 has been completed under all of the circumstances and in light of the best interest of

the child at issue. And the State has identified no legal authority so limiting the

meaning of the phrase “completion of the process” as used in OCGA § 15-11-701 (a).

Importantly, during the final hearing in this case, the juvenile court found that:

(i) S. D. had “no prior history”; (ii) there was no indication that he used the knife at

issue in this case offensively; (iii) his failure to participate in a conflict-resolution

program resulted from the decisions of adults in his life to move him to Chicago and

thus was beyond his control; and (iv) in light of those circumstances, it was in S. D.’s

best interest to “have a clean record.” And in its ensuing written order, the court

further found that S. D.’s mother understood the need for conflict-management

services and had agreed to attend therapy with the child, based on the testimony of

S. D.’s aunt. Notably, the State does not challenge any of these findings on appeal.

Given the specific facts and procedural posture of this case, we hold that the

juvenile court was authorized under the statutory scheme at issue to conclude that the

“process” of the “nonadjudicatory procedure” employed by the court was completed

in light of all of the circumstances and S. D.’s best interest. We therefore affirm the

juvenile court’s judgment.

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Reese, J., concur.