In the Interest of C. W., a Child

815 S.E.2d 123
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedMay 15, 2018
DocketA18A0364
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 815 S.E.2d 123 (In the Interest of C. W., a Child) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of C. W., a Child, 815 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

McMillian, Judge.

This case concerns the timeliness of an oral motion to dismiss two counts of a delinquency petition on the basis that the victim of the alleged acts of delinquency was not named. We find that under the facts of this case the motion was not timely or properly made and accordingly reverse the juvenile court's order dismissing the challenged counts.

The record shows that C.W. was arrested on January 25, 2017, and placed in detention, which was continued following a hearing a few days later. A delinquency petition was filed on January 31, 2017, alleging delinquent acts which, had C.W. been an adult, would constitute the crimes of attempted aggravated sodomy (Count 1); attempted sodomy (Count 2); sexual battery (Count 3); and two counts of simple battery (Counts 4 & 5); Counts 1 and 2 referred only to the "victim," while the remaining counts referred to the victim by name. An amended delinquency petition was filed on February 1, 2017, adding an additional count of simple battery against a different victim, who was referred to by name (Count 6).

An adjudicatory hearing was held on February 3, 2017. After the witnesses were sworn but before the State could call its first *125 witness, C.W.'s counsel made a motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the delinquency petition, arguing that those counts were fatally defective because they did not name the victim of the alleged acts of delinquency, violating the juvenile's due process rights. The State opposed the motion, and the juvenile court took the matter under advisement and continued the hearing. The juvenile court subsequently granted the motion to dismiss, finding that C.W.'s due process rights were violated because Counts 1 and 2 failed to provide sufficient information for him to prepare his defense. The juvenile court also rejected the State's argument that the motion should be denied because it was not in writing and untimely. Pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a), the State then filed this appeal. 1

The resolution of this appeal requires us to answer two questions-(1) whether the delinquency petition was subject to challenge because the name of the victim was not disclosed, and (2) whether the juvenile's challenge to the petition in the form of a motion to dismiss was timely and properly made. We agree with the juvenile court that the delinquency petition was subject to dismissal because it did not disclose the name of the victim, but find that the juvenile's oral motion to dismiss was not timely or properly brought.

There is no question that a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding is entitled to "scrupulous adherence to due process[.]" C.L.T. v. State , 157 Ga. App. 180 , 180 (1), 276 S.E.2d 862 (1981). See also OCGA § 15-11-470 ("The purpose of this article is: ... (2) To accord due process of law to each child who is accused of having committed a delinquent act[.]") Thus, while a delinquency petition does not have to be drafted with the "exactitude" of a criminal accusation or indictment, it must satisfy due process. T.L.T. v. State , 133 Ga. App. 895 , 897 (1), 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975).

To comport with due process, the language of a delinquency petition must pass two tests "(1) it must contain sufficient factual details to inform the juvenile of the nature of the offense; and (2) it must provide data adequate to enable the accused to prepare his defense." T.L.T. , 133 Ga. App. at 897 (1), 212 S.E.2d 650 . See also In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1 , 33 (III), 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 LE2d 527 (1967) (the delinquency petition must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity" to satisfy due process); OCGA § 15-11-522 (The delinquency petition must set forth "plainly and with particularity: (1) the facts which bring a child within the jurisdiction of the court[.]"); In the Interest of C.H. , 306 Ga. App. 834 , 837 (4), 703 S.E.2d 407 (2010) (trial court erred in denying special demurrer when petition did not allege misconduct with particularity); cf. C.L.T., 157 Ga. App. at 180 (1), 276 S.E.2d 862 (delinquency petition sufficient to charge simple assault when it alleged altercation between juvenile and his mother and father).

Our law is settled that an allegation that the accused has committed a crime against a particular person that does not contain the name of the victim is considered deficient and subject to challenge. E.g., State v. Grube , 293 Ga. 257 , 260 (2), 744 S.E.2d 1 (2013) ; Dennard v. State , 243 Ga. App. 868 , 534 S.E.2d 182

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Bluebook (online)
815 S.E.2d 123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-c-w-a-child-gactapp-2018.