In the Interest of A. A., a Child (Mother)

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: A26A0324
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

April 24, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0324. IN THE INTEREST OF A. A., a child.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

The mother of A. A. appeals the order awarding the permanent guardianship

of A. A. to his paternal grandmother. The mother has not shown reversible error. So

we affirm.

1. Background

In reviewing the juvenile court’s findings that support a guardianship order, we

construe

the evidence in favor of the judgment and determine[ ] whether a rational trier of fact could have found clear and convincing evidence that reunification services should not be provided. We neither weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses; we defer to the juvenile court’s factfinding and affirm unless the appellate standard is not met.

In the Interest of K. G., 343 Ga. App. 345, 347(2)(b) (807 SE2d 70) (2017) (citation

modified).

So viewed, the record shows that in February 2023, the Paulding County

Division of Family and Children Services initiated dependency proceedings

concerning then four-month-old A. A. and his five-year-old half sister, M. S. The

juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and placed them in the custody of

A. A.’s paternal grandparents.

In August 2023, the division filed a petition to make the paternal grandmother

A. A.’s permanent guardian. The juvenile court scheduled a hearing on the petition

for permanent guardianship (as well as on a petition for legitimation of M. S., A. A.’s

half sister) for April 15, 2024.

Prior to the hearing, the mother, the father of A. A., the father of M. S., the

grandmother who was the temporary guardian and proposed permanent guardian, the

guardian ad litem, and the parties’ counsel met to discuss the case. When the hearing

convened, the attorney for the division announced to the court that they had reached

2 a resolution for both children. She announced that they had agreed that M. S. would

remain with the grandmother until the end of the school year, at which time custody

would be returned to the mother. She announced that the parties agreed that the

grandmother would have permanent guardianship of A. A. and that the parents would

have visitation; would be informed of his medical appointments; and would have

access to A. A.’s medical records.

The attorneys for the parents of A. A. confirmed that they agreed with those

terms. The guardian ad litem stated that she was “in full agreement” with the

permanent guardianship as to A. A. But she had concerns regarding M. S., because she

thought the grandmother might not feel comfortable with “transitional visits” until

the end of the school year.

The court swore in the grandmother to ask about her concerns. She gave

sometimes conflicting testimony. She testified that she was willing to have

guardianship of M. S., but that she was not willing to keep M. S. until the end of the

school year. She testified that she was concerned that the parents did not have a car

since A. A.’s father’s source of income was driving for Uber. Contrary to her prior

3 testimony, the grandmother testified that she was willing to keep M. S. until the

school year ended, so as not to disrupt her education, but she was “just not willing to

take the parents’ responsibility.”

The attorney for M. S.’s putative father then questioned the grandmother about

her testimony that the parents had “lost their car three times since December.” The

attorney for the mother objected on the ground that the testimony was not relevant.

The court overruled the objection.

The attorney for the mother expressed her concern, since the parties already

had reached a resolution. She said:

Well, Your Honor, I’m asking for a continuance. This is not how — like I said, we pre–tried all of this and I think we’ve gone — I have not — without knowing that this was something that now the [c]ourt is going to consider, to derail a whole plan we had, I’m asking for a continuance to be able to consult with my client more about this, if we’re going to go down this long line of testimony for Your Honor to then potentially deny return to custody of M. [S.]

The court responded that he would allow the attorney for the putative father to

complete her questioning, and then he would consider a continuance.

4 After the attorney for M. S.’s father completed her questioning of the

grandmother, the attorney for the mother voiced her concerns about the grandmother

seemingly changing her position from the agreed upon plan. The court responded that

he would allow the attorneys to consult with their clients. The attorney for the mother

then asked that both children be returned to the mother immediately and the cases be

closed. The court paused the proceedings for the attorney to speak with her client.

When the proceedings resumed, the mother’s attorney again requested that the

children be returned to the mother that day. She proposed alternatively that the

guardian ad litem’s “dual role” be bifurcated so that one guardian ad litem could

represent the children’ best interests and another could represent the children’s

expressed wishes. She also stated that the original agreement — for a permanent

guardianship for A. A. and a return of M. S.’s custody to the mother once the school

year ended — was “still a viable plan.”

The court noted that the guardian ad litem had a potential conflict because her

recommendation differed from M. S.’s stated desire to be with her mother. He

decided that the current guardian ad litem would be a “stated interest attorney”; that

he would appoint separate guardians ad litem for the children; and that he would

5 continue the hearing for a month. The attorney for the mother did not object to the

continuance, and, indeed, said “that’s fine” when the court proposed a time.

The court asked the mother’s attorney whether she was still asking for the

children to be returned to the mother that day, and the attorney responded that “yeah,

I’m asking for M. [S.] to go home today.” She did not reiterate her request that A. A.

be returned to the mother. The court ruled that pending the next hearing, the children

would remain with the grandmother and that the plan would be for M. S. to return to

her mother.

On July 16, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order “nunc pro tunc to April

15, 2024,” continuing the hearing and denying the mother’s request for the immediate

return of custody of both children.

The court convened a “permanent guardianship permanency hearing” on May

22, 2024. The division asked that the petition for permanent guardianship of M. S. be

dismissed and that the court award the grandmother the permanent guardianship of

A. A. The mother testified that she did not consent to the paternal grandmother being

made A. A.’s permanent guardian; the father consented.

6 On July 26, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order “nunc pro tunc to May

22, 2024,” dismissing the petition as to M. S. and awarding the permanent

guardianship of A. A. to his paternal grandmother. The mother filed a timely notice

of appeal, challenging the permanent guardianship.

2. Permanency planning

The mother argues that the juvenile court erred by granting the division’s

petition for permanent guardianship “without ensuring statutory compliance relating

to permanency planning.” She has not shown reversible error.

The mother argues that the record does not include permanency plan

documents or reflect that a permanency plan hearing was timely conducted. But she

did not raise this objection in the guardianship proceedings in the juvenile court.

Indeed, when the juvenile court asked her attorney whether she “want[ed] to say

anything else” about the permanency plan report (which apparently had been

prepared but was not filed in the guardianship proceeding), she responded, “Not

about that. Just closing.” So the mother has not preserved this argument for appeal.

In the Interest of D. E., 269 Ga. App. 753, 756(2) (605 SE2d 394) (2004).

7 In her reply brief, she argues that we should review her enumeration for plain

error under OCGA § 24-1-103(d). That statute, however, requires plain error review

of trial court rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence. See Keller v. State, 308

Ga. 492, 497(2)(a) (842 SE2d 22) (2020) (plain error review is limited to specific

categories of alleged errors). But the mother is not challenging a juvenile court ruling

admitting or excluding evidence.

Most importantly, we reject the mother’s argument that any failure to include

a permanency plan in the guardianship proceeding deprived her of notice that the

division was pursuing a permanent guardianship.1 The division filed a petition for

permanent guardianship that was served on the mother. See OCGA § 15-11-241. At

the April 15 hearing that was continued for the appointment of additional guardians

ad litem and because of uncertainty regarding the guardianship of M. S., the attorney

for the mother confirmed that a permanent guardianship for A. A. and M. S. returning

to her mother’s custody was “still a viable plan.” And at the permanent guardianship

1 We note that the guardianship proceeding is separate from the dependency proceeding, with a separate complaint and a separate case number. And the mother did not request the dependency proceedings to be included in the record on appeal. So it is not clear whether any permanency plan report was filed in the dependency proceedings, where they are statutorily required. OCGA § 15-11-231. 8 hearing, the mother testified that she understood that the division had filed a petition

to make the paternal grandmother A. A.’s permanent guardian.

3. Juvenile court’s analysis

The mother argues that the juvenile court applied “the incorrect standard of

review and standards of law” when considering the guardianship petition. She has not

shown reversible error.

(a) Reunification

She argues that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s

conclusion that reasonable efforts to reunify A. A. with his mother would be

detrimental to him, as OCGA § 15-11-240(a)(1) required before the entry of the order

of permanent guardianship. On this issue, the court concluded that:

reasonable efforts to reunify the [c]hild with the parents would be detrimental to the [c]hild, as the [c]hild has lived with [the grandmother- guardian] for the entirety of his life. The parents returned the [c]hild to [the guardian], cutting one visit to just a few hours, due to the [c]hild’s inconsolable crying. [The guardian] is able to meet the [c]hild’s elevated medical needs. The [f]ather consents to the guardianship and the [m]other’s circumstances remain unchanged. The parents do not have stable housing or income. They did not complete treatment as recommended by their substance abuse evaluations. The [m]other is not

9 in treatment for her mental health or taking any medication to address her mental health. The dependency of the [c]hild is unresolved. The parents have not visited the [c]hild consistently in more than six months.

Viewed in favor of the judgment, In the Interest of K. G., 343 Ga. App. at 347(2)(b), the

evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings.

(b) Child’s best interests

The mother also argues that evidence did not support the trial court’s finding

that “the appointment of a permanent guardian for such child is in the best interests

of such child,” and that the proposed guardian was the individual most appropriate

to be his guardian as OCGA § 15-11-240(a)(4) required before the entry of the order

of permanent guardianship. She argues only that no documentary or testimonial

evidence from an expert or professional therapist was introduced to establish that A.

A. would be better off with the proposed guardian. But she cites no authority, and we

have found none, that requires evidence from an expert or a professional therapist to

support such a finding.

(d) Child’s wishes

10 The mother argues that the court erred by failing to take into account A. A.’s

wishes in violation of OCGA § 15-11-103(a). That statute, however, provides that a

child in a dependency proceeding has the right to be represented by an attorney. It

does not require a juvenile court to consider the child’s wishes in guardianship

proceedings. (And, of course, A. A. was only 18-months old at the time of the final

hearing on permanent guardianship.)

(d) Lack of specificity

The mother argues that the juvenile court’s order fails to provide sufficient

detail and specificity. But she has not shown error in this regard. The juvenile court

found facts based on the testimony of the witnesses. He made conclusions of law, and

applied the facts to the applicable law, OCGA § 15-11-240, to make his decision to

grant the petition for the appointment of a permanent guardian for A. A.

(e) Standard for guardianship

The mother argues that the juvenile court applied the wrong standard because

he considered the factors articulated in Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587 (544 SE2d 99)

(2001), a case that involved a custody dispute between a noncustodial father and the

maternal grandparents under OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1), not a guardianship proceeding

11 brought by the division under OCGA § 15-11-240. The court did not err in relying on

Clark. That reliance was limited to the question whether the division had met its

burden of rebutting the presumption of parental custody. See In the Interest of M. F.,

298 Ga. 138, 144-145(2) (780 SE2d 291) (2015) (citing Clark and noting that

presumption of parental custody applies in the context of a petition to modify

guardianship under OCGA § 15-11-244). The court also applied the factors set out in

OCGA § 15-11-240, the statute that grants juvenile courts authority to appoint

permanent guardians for dependent children.

3. April 15 hearing

The mother enumerates error regarding the April 15 hearing.2 She argues that

the trial court erred when it denied her motion for a return of custody at the hearing

and when it instantly denied her request for a continuance of the April 15 hearing.

2 We reject the division’s argument that we lack jurisdiction to consider this enumeration of error because the mother’s notice of appeal referenced only the final order. “[A]n appellant need only include in the notice of appeal the single judgment that entitles the appellant to take an appeal, and an appellate court must review other orders raised on appeal that may affect the proceedings below regardless of whether or not those orders are expressly included in the notice of appeal.” Mateen v. Dicus, 281 Ga. 455, 456 (637 SE2d 377) (2006). See also OCGA § 5-6-34(d); In the Interest of S. W., 363 Ga. App. 666, 669(1) (872 SE2d 316) (2022). 12 (a) Denial of motion for return of custody

Specifically, the mother argues that the juvenile court applied the wrong

standard when denying her oral motion for the return of custody at the April 15

hearing. She argues that OCGA § 15-11-134(b) required the court to determine

whether the return of custody would be contrary to the child’s welfare. That statute

provides, “Any order continuing a child’s placement outside of the physical custody

of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian shall be based on a finding by the

court that return of such child to such custody would be contrary to his or her

welfare.” OCGA § 15-11-134(b).

Pointing to the trial court’s order memorializing the events of the April 15

hearing and continuing the hearing to the next month, she argues that the juvenile

court incorrectly applied a best interests standard. He did not. The court simply held

that the request for return of custody was denied. He mentioned “best interests”only

with respect to the continuance, holding that it was “not contrary to the children’s

best interests as the children are placed with family and the continuance is one month

away.”

13 We hold that the mother’s challenge to the denial of her oral motion for return

of custody is moot. The order of permanent guardianship “entered by the juvenile

court superseded the [continuance order that included a denial of the motion for

return of custody], effectively mooting . . . the issue[ ] the [mother] raise[s] regarding

the validity of the [denial of her motion].” Beavers v. Provost, 304 Ga. 841, 842-43 (822

SE2d 257) (2018) (footnote omitted) (challenge to dependency removal order that

granted the division custody of dependent children was mooted by later entry of order

of adjudication and disposition that continued custody in the division). See also In the

Interest of H. J., 377 Ga. App. 557, 562(1) (923 SE2d 189) (2025) (juvenile court’s

subsequent adjudication of dependency mooted parents’ arguments concerning initial

removal order); In the Interest of C. E., 366 Ga. App. 612, 617(1) (884 SE2d 22) (2023)

(mother’s challenges to preliminary protective hearing were mooted by adjudication

of dependency); In the Interest of P. M., 201 Ga. App. 100, 100-01 (410 SE2d 201)

(1991) (improper emergency order extending custody in the Department of Family

and Children Services was mooted by later order extending custody in the

department).

(b) Continuance

14 The mother enumerates as error the juvenile court’s denial of her request for

a continuance of the April 15 hearing. She seems to argue that the trial court erred by

denying her motion for a continuance early in the hearing and instead ordering a

continuance later in the proceeding. She has failed to persuasively articulate how the

delay in ordering the continuance harmed her.

Judgment affirmed. Watkins and Padgett, JJ., concur.