OPINION
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I, INTRODUCTION
Attorney Elliott Friedman, acting for all plaintiffs in a complex tort suit, deposited an $81,000 settlement contribution in his client trust account. Without permission from the other plaintiffs' attorneys, he drew on the trust account to advance funds to his client and to pay himself attorney's fees not yet due him. He also drew on the trust account to pay himself fees in the matters of five other claimants before he had deposited the settlement funds in those matters. These payments breached fiduciary duties he owed the other plaintiffs in the tort suit and put the account out of trust. The Alaska Bar Association's hearing committee, finding violations of five disciplinary rules, recommended a six-month suspension from practice and a year of probation. The bar's disciplinary board adopted most of the com[623]*623mittee's findings. But, finding that Friedman had acted with selfish motives, it recommended a four-year suspension. Although we agree substantially with the board's sanetion analysis, our precedents and our independent evaluation of Friedman's mitigating conduct compel a slightly reduced sanction. We therefore order Friedman suspended for three years.
II, FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
The sinking of the F/V UYAK II in 1987 caused the deaths of most of her crew. The decedents' estates and the survivors sued the vessel's owner, Cal-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. Elliott Friedman represented the estate of decedent Rodrigo Jaime. Other attorneys represented the other plaintiffs.
The case was complex, and the plaintiffs' attorneys decided to pursue a global settlement. Disputes about Cal-Alaska's insurance coverage complicated the settlement. Friedman, as de facto leader of the plaintiffs' attorneys, eventually negotiated a settlement on behalf of all claimants for a lump sum of about $670,500, of which Cal-Alaska itself was to contribute $81,000.
Concerned that Cal-Alaska might not pay its share, the plaintiffs' attorneys attached special importance to collecting Cal-Alaska's contribution. - Cal-Alaska sent its $81,000 contribution to Friedman on May 28, 1990, with a letter from Cal-Alaska's counsel stating that the "check ... is to be held in trust by you for further distribution in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement." The check stated: "Settlement Payment by Cal-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. to be held in trust per settlement agreement of West of England, et al., v. Cal-Alaska Fisheries, Inc., et al., Cause No. C88-398C (USDC)." On May 25 Friedman deposited the check in his client trust account pending receipt of the remaining settlement contributions and agreement among the plaintiffs on how to divide the settlement proceeds. Friedman believed that he would receive the remaining settlement contributions within sixty days. But disagreements among the plaintiffs on how to allocate the lump-sum settlement proceeds delayed payment of the remaining contributions for nearly a year. As of May 19, 1990, the plaintiffs had not agreed on how much each was to receive; the plaintiffs did not reach agreement until May 1, 1991. The other settlement contributors then paid their shares. Friedman did not receive the last contribution until late May 1991; he deposited it in the trust account soon thereafter.
On May 29, 1990, four days after Cal-Alaska's contribution was deposited in his client trust account and about one year before the remaining settlement contributions were deposited in his trust account, Friedman wrote a $15,000 check on the account for partial payment of fees he had "earned" and costs he had advanced in the UYAK II case and in an unrelated case. The bar's hearing committee later found that Friedman had personally prepared this check. A week later he signed a check on the trust account to advance his UYAK II client $10,000. On December 18, 1990 he signed a $6,000 trust account check to pay himself an additional $3,000 in fees in UYAK IL.
Friedman had no permission from the other UYAK II plaintiffs' attorneys to draw on Cal-Alaska's $81,000 contribution when he paid himself fees and advanced funds to his client in May, June, and December 1990.
In late 1990 and early 1991 Friedman signed seven client trust account checks paying himself attorney's fees in five other claimants' matters unrelated to the UYAK IZ suit. As to each of those matters, the funds settling the matter had not yet been received or deposited in the trust account when he signed the check.1 In effect, Friedman used [624]*624trust funds being held for the UYAK II settlement to pay himself fees in these five non-UYAK II matters and replaced the UYAK II funds as the settlement checks in those five matters were received and deposited in the trust account.
These draws caused the trust account to be "out of trust." At one point in early 1991, the balance was only $8,588.29, although the trust account should have contained at least $81,000 awaiting final distribution to all the UYAK II claimants.
B. The Disciplinary Proceedings
In May 1992 counsel for another UYAK II claimant filed a bar grievance, alleging that Friedman had promised to place the $81,000 in a segregated, interest-bearing account. When bar counsel asked Friedman to respond to the allegation, Friedman denied it; he claimed that he had deposited the money in his trust account as required by law and had not used the money for any purpose. Bar counsel continued to request and receive information from Friedman about his bank accounts. Bar counsel eventually filed a petition for formal hearing. After Friedman answered the petition, bar counsel moved for summary judgment on all counts. Friedman opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment.
The hearing committee granted summary judgment. It found that Friedman did not maintain the Cal-Alaska $81,000 settlement contribution in trust "as the express terms of his trust required him to do." It found that the trust account had a minimum balance of $67,548 to $42,106 between September 29 and December 81, 1990. At one point some months before Friedman received permission to draw on the UYAK II trust money, the balance dropped to $8,583.29. The committee also found that Friedman had failed to account for and distribute some interest earned on the UYAK II settlement money. It noted that Friedman correctly believed the Jaime estate would be entitled to substantially more than the amount he had advanced to it and that his total fees in UYAK II, based on the total settlement, exceeded the fees he paid himself in May and December 1990. It found that Friedman violated: (1) Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) through the attorney's fee and client advances in UYAK II and the other five matters; (2) DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) through his improprieties within the context of litigation, based on these same acts; (8) DR 9-102(A) (lawyer's management of money held in trust for others) based on these same acts; (4) DR 1-102(A)(8) (illegal conduct involving moral turpitude) because his conduct amounted to the eriminal act of misapplication of funds; and (5) DR 6-101(A)(8) (neglect of a legal matter) by failing to disburse the excess settlement funds and by failing to account for one party's interest on funds (although the committee declined to find this conduct was intentional).2 The committee granted Friedman summary judgment on the allegation that he had engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law.
The committee then considered the issue of sanctions. Following a hearing at which Friedman testified at length, it recommended a six-month suspension, a one-year probationary period, and periodic auditing of Friedman's client trust account.
Bar counsel appealed the committee's ree-ommendation to the bar's disciplinary board and Friedman cross-appealed from the sum[625]*625mary judgment entered against him by. the committee. The board concluded that Friedman's cross-appeal was moot, and adopted the committee's findings that Friedman had violated DR 1-102(A)(8), (4), and (5), DR 9-102(A), and DR 6-101(A)@8). The board agreed in part and disagreed in part with the committee's analysis and findings concerning aggravating and mitigating cireumstances and recommended that Friedman be suspended from the practice of law for four years. -It also recommended that Friedman be assessed bar counsel's costs and fees.
Friedman appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
" 'Bar counsel has the burden of proving the charges of misconduct in a petition for formal hearing by clear and convincing evidence. This court reviews the evidence adduced before the hearing committee independently while giving deference to the findings of the board'"3 A respondent attorney who challenges the board's findings of fact on appeal has the burden of showing that the findings are erroneous.4 We ordinarily will not disturb findings of fact made upon conflicting evidences.5
As to questions of law and questions concerning the appropriateness of sanctions, we exercise our independent judgment.6 We determine sanctions on a case-by-case basis,7 guided but not constrained by the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 8 and by the sanctions imposed in comparable disciplinary proceedings.9
We perform a three-step analysis in imposing attorney sanctions.10 We first address the first three prongs of the ABA Standards for imposing sanctions, determining the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, and the extent of the actual or potential injury.11 We next "look to the ABA Standards to discern what sanction is recommended for the 'type' of misconduct found in [step 1]." 12 Finally, after determining the recommended sanction, we decide whether aggravating or mitigating factors should affect that sanction.13
B. Duty Violations Found by the Com-mattee and the Board
1. DR 1-102(A)(4) (dishonest conduct)
The hearing committee found that Friedman violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by misapplying funds held in trust.14 The disciplinary board reviewed the record and adopted the committee's findings of fact.
The hearing committee found that Friedman stood in a fiduciary relationship to all the UYAK II claimants when he agreed to hold the settlement money in trust, pending an apportionment agreement and disbursement. It concluded that Friedman breached his fiduciary duty by paying fees to himself in May and December 1990, by advancing $10,000 to his client in the UYAK ZI matter in June 1990 before the UYAK II plaintiffs had agreed on an apportionment, and by advancing fees to himself in the five non-UYAK II matters before he had received the [626]*626settlement funds in those matters. From its finding that Friedman "knowingly" wrote checks against the settlement proceeds before the express conditions of his trust allowed him to do so, the committee inferred that he intended the "natural and probable consequences of his ... knowing actions," ie., the impairment and misapplication of the settlement funds and the corresponding breach of his fiduciary duties.
After Friedman testified at the sanction hearing, the committee's sanction recommendation stated that
even though Friedman consciously intended to make advance payments to himself and to his clients from trust account funds, he did not consciously intend to deprive either his clients or the UYAK II co-plaintiffs of any funds to which they ultimately would be entitled. Rather, when Friedman made the advance payments, he believed these amounts had been "earned" even though no final apportionment had been agreed to in the UYAK II litigation and, in the five other cases, the settlement proceeds had not yet been received.
Friedman argues that there is no evidence of the intent necessary for a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).15 He claims that the intentional misconduct the rule requires cannot be inferred from a showing of a "knowing" mental state. "Knowing" includes the "conscious awareness of the nature or attendant cireum-stances of the conduct ... without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result." 16 In contrast, intent in this context requires a "conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result." 17
We agree with Friedman that finding "knowing" conduct is insufficient to support a violation of this rule. But "it is permissible to infer that an accused intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her knowing actions."18 The hearing committee drew such an inference, finding intentional misconduct. We do not think it erred in doing so.
Friedman also asserts that the committee's finding of intentional misconduct on summary judgment conflicts with its later conclusion, reached after the sanction hearing, that Friedman "did not consciously intend to deprive either his clients or the UYAK II co-plaintiffs of any funds...." We think that the committee's statement in its sanction recommendation was consistent with its carlier finding that he had intentionally misapplied the trust funds. The committee's sanction recommendation simply found that Friedman did not intend to permanently deprive anyone of their share of the settlement proceeds. That finding does not preclude a finding of intentional misconduct in misapplying trust account funds.
Friedman implies that there was a procedural defect in finding the intent element upon summary judgment. Although we are unenthusiastic about a finding of intent on summary judgment, the procedure followed here probably cured any procedural deficiency: first, after hearing Friedman's extensive testimony at the sanction hearing, the hearing committee made additional findings and conclusions; second, the board independently considered the committee's proceedings, findings, and conclusions, as well as the record.
But in any event, we are the ultimate finder of fact in bar disciplinary matters,19 and we read the record to establish that Friedman intended to draw on the trust account, that he knew that settlement funds had not been deposited, and that he knew that drawing on the account to pay himself fees before the settlement funds had been deposited would violate the disciplinary rules. Friedman's testimony demonstrates that he knew, when he signed the relevant checks, that it was improper to pay himself attor[627]*627ney's fees in the five non-UYAK II matters before the settlement moneys in those matters had been placed in the account.20 The hearing committee found that Friedman engaged in intentional misconduct and the evidence convinces us that in at least some of these matters, Friedman knew that the settlement checks had not yet been received. For example, in the Bear, Hamilton, and Whitt matters, Friedman paid his clients nothing until after he had received the settlement funds, even though he had advanced attorney's fees to himself weeks or months before receiving the settlement funds. He also testified that as soon as he settled a case, even if the settlement was only oral, he would tell his bookkeeper what the contingent fee arrangement was and that within a week or two he would sign a check drawn on his trust account for his fees. But receipt of a settlement check within two weeks of an oral agreement to settle would be unusual in a personal injury matter, and Friedman himself expressed his belief that insurance companies tended to delay payment, sometimes by as much as three months, because "they'll keep them as long as they can because they get the interest off the money rather than the client."
We therefore agree with the committee and the board and find independently that Friedman violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
2. DR 1-102(4)(5) (conduct prejudicial to admimistration of Justice)
The hearing committee found that Friedman violated DR 1-102(A)(5) by advancing fees to himself before receiving the [628]*628settlement funds in the five non-UYAK II matters and by advancing $10,000 to the Jaime estate and fees to himself in the UYAK II case before an apportionment agreement was reached.21 The committee concluded that conduct occurring outside the courtroom but within the context of a settlement is encompassed by "the administration of justice" as that phrase is used in DR 1-102(A)(5).
Friedman argues that Alaska case law requires active interference with a civil or criminal proceeding for a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5). He contends that his alleged misconduct does not rise to this level. He notes that, unlike the conduct in cases cited by bar counsel and the committee in which lawyers fraudulently notarized a client's signature 22 or wrote offensive letters to the state,23 his acts did not prejudice the administration of justice. He asserts that attorneys routinely release such funds to their clients. Friedman claims that there is no evidence that his alleged conduct interfered with or impeded the administration of any case or proceeding. He alleges that bar counsel's "bald assertion" that "[tlhere is little that is more reprehensible and prejudicial to the interests of justice than a lawyer mishandling funds entrusted to him{,]" is insufficient to support summary judgment.
Bar counsel's unenthusiastic defense of the committee's finding asks us to conclude that invading funds earmarked for settlement in a pending case interferes with the administration of justice. Bar counsel also concedes that a reversal of the committee's finding on this issue would not undermine the disciplinary board's ultimate recommendation for discipline because that recommendation did not rest on this finding.
Most of our cases discussing this rule involved conduct that actively interfered with civil or criminal proceedings. For example, in In re West,24 the attorney's conduct induced the state to enter into a settlement which otherwise would have been lost or delayed.25 We there cited other examples:
This court has found DR 1-102(A)(5) violations where an attorney fabricated a deed and attached it to an amended complaint, [In re] Walton, 676 P.2d [1078,] 1081-88 [(Alaska 1983)]; where an attorney submitted an inaccurate interrogatory response,: [In re] Simpson, 645 P.2d [1223,] 1228 [(Alaska 1982)]; and, where an attorney signed an affidavit, which was filed with the court, stating that a note was prepared and sent on a certain date when the note was actually prepared five years later, [In re] Stump, 621 P.2d [263,] 267 [(Alaska 1980)].[26]
These cases involved affirmative acts intended to mislead others in the course of judicial proceedings for the benefit of the attorney or the attorney's client. Thus, in In re Vollin-time,27 we found a DR 1-102(A)(5) violation where an attorney wrote a deliberately harassing letter to federal officials, accusing them of incompetence, perjury, fraud, cheating, and criminal lability, to influence coer-cively a matter impacting the attorney's client.28
The cases suggest that DR 1-102(A)(5) contemplates conduct which impedes or subverts the process of resolving disputes; it is conduct which frustrates the fair balance of interests or "justice" essential to litigation or other proceedings. Cases elsewhere are in accord with this reading of the rule.29
Friedman's conduct affected or potentially affected his clients and the other plaintiffs. [629]*629But it did not adversely affect litigation proceedings or a process fundamental to the administration of justice. It therefore did not prejudice the "administration of justice," as that phrase is used in DR 1-102(A)(5), and consequently did not violate this rule.
3. DR 9-102(A) (handling of client funds)
The hearing committee found that Friedman violated DR 9-102(A).30 It concluded that Friedman could not collect his fees for his work in UYAK II and that he could not advance settlement proceeds to his client until all UYAK ZJ plaintiffs had agreed to an apportionment of the settlement proceeds. It also concluded that Friedman could not collect his fees for his work in the non-UYAK II matters before receiving and depositing the settlement checks in those matters.
Friedman argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because his affidavit denied that settlement funds were withdrawn before he earned them.31 Bar counsel responds that it is irrelevant whether Friedman had "earned" the funds when he withdrew them and that the relevant inquiry is whether the funds were "due" when they were withdrawn. Bar counsel notes that the findings of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board that Friedman withdrew the funds before they were "due" established the violation.
Attorney's fees are not "due" in a matter until the settlement funds in that matter have been deposited. As a matter of policy, the lawyer, not the client, should bear the risk of non-payment in this situation. Friedman presents no evidence to contradict the bar's evidence that in six matters (including UYAK II ), Friedman paid himself a fee before the settlement funds were deposited. Friedman's affidavit at most raises a genuine dispute about whether he had earned the fees he withdrew; but that dispute is not material, and it is undisputed that the settlement proceeds from which the fees were to be paid had not been fully received. We therefore conclude that Friedman violated DR 9-102(A).
4, DR 1-102(A)(3) (Megal conduct involving moral turpitude)
Finally, the hearing committee found that Friedman violated DR 1-102(A)(3),32 because it found that his behavior constituted the crime of misapplication of property under AS 11.46.620(a).33 Misapplication of property is committed "if the person knowingly misapplies property that has been entrusted to that person as a fiduciary."34 Misapplication of property worth $500 or more is a class C felony.35
[630]*630Friedman argues that it was not appropriate to decide on summary judgment whether he violated DR 1-102(A)(8). The crime of misapplication of property requires a "knowing" mental state; an individual's mental state, he argues, cannot be determined on summary judgment. Friedman also contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a summary judgment; Friedman af-fied that he did not know or believe that he was breaching any fiduciary duties owed to his clients or to the UYAK II co-plaintiffs. Bar counsel points out that the hearing committee twice found that Friedman knew he was impairing the trust account and thus that he had committed the crime of misapplication of property; bar counsel urges us to make the same finding.
Misapplication of property is an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Alaska Statute 11.46.620 requires that a defendant, to be guilty of misapplying property, must both act knowingly and know that the act is unlawful.36 Thus, to find that Friedman violated the statute requires finding not only that he knowingly engaged in conduct that violated fiduciary rules but also that he acted with subjective awareness of the wrongdoing-that he actually knew that his acts violated those rules.37
In In re Mann, we held that an attorney who misapplied trust funds violated DR 1-102(A)(3).38 Mann acted in knowing violation of the law when he diverted client funds to make mortgage payments on his house and was convicted of misapplication of property; he spent sixty days in jail.39
Friedman acknowledged that he prema turely withdrew money from his trust account, but argues on appeal that he did not understand that the rules governing fiduciary responsibility prohibited his conduct. He refers us to his testimony at the sanction hearing and to his affidavit.
But our review of his testimony convinces us that he understood that it would be wrong to write checks to himself for fees before depositing the settlement funds.40 And, because we conclude that he knew that the settlement funds for at least some matters had not yet been deposited or even received when he paid himself fees from the trust account, we agree with the committee and the board that Friedman violated DR 1-102(A)(3).41
C. Mental State
We next consider the second prong, Friedman's mental state. The hearing committee found, and the disciplinary board agreed, that Friedman "consciously intended to make advance payments" from trust account funds. But the committee also found, based on evidence presented at the sanction hearing, that "he did not consciously intend to deprive either his clients or the UYAK II co-plaintiffs of any funds to which they ultimately would be entitled." The committee thus distinguished between Friedman's state of mind concerning the act of withdrawing the money and his state of mind about how withdrawals might affect clients and others to whom he owed a fiduciary duty. The disciplinary board did not expressly address this finding.
[631]*631We agree that Friedman intentionally disbursed the funds knowing that he was doing so prematurely. He thus intentionally violated the trust under which the UYAK II partial payment had been received as well as the terms under which the funds were entrusted to him for deposit in his trust account. Evidence supports the committee's finding that he did not intend to deprive his clients or others of monies which would be due them. As it turned out, his misconduct did not actually deprive them of trust funds. But because the account was out of trust, the UYAK II co-plaintiffs and his own clients were unwittingly dependent on Friedman's personal resources. Subsequent audit revealed that those resources would have been sufficient to satisfy all such claims, suggesting that his intention was not to permanently deprive clients or the co-plaintiffs of anything they were to be paid. But this does not alter our conclusion that he consciously intended to make advance payments that he knew were premature.
D. «Injury
We turn to the third prong, the extent of potential or actual injury. The parties agree that no client of Friedman's suffered actual injury. The potential for financial injury, as it fortuitously turns out, was minimal, because Friedman had sufficient personal funds to cover any demand for money any client or UYAK IZ party might have made.
But bar counsel argued, and the hearing committee agreed, that Friedman caused actual injury to the public, because "the public suffers injury whenever a lawyer fails to maintain personal integrity by improperly handling funds held in trust." We agree with that analysis.
E. - Initial Determination of Appropriate Sanction
We now consider the discipline called for under the ABA Standards, absent aggravating or mitigating cireumstances.
As to the violations of duties Friedman owed clients, the hearing committee reasoned that suspension was the most applicable sanction under ABA Standards § 4.1, because the committee was not persuaded that Friedman knowingly converted client funds. As to violations of duties he owed the public, including the UYAK II claimants, the committee noted that Friedman appeared to have violated AS 11.46.620, and concluded that either suspension under ABA Standards § 5.12 or disbarment under ABA Standards § 5.11(a) was appropriate. The disciplinary board concluded that three of the applicable standards- §§ 4.11, 442(c), and 5.l1(a)-called for disbarment, absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Different standards potentially apply to each of Friedman's violations. Considered together, the standards suggest that disbarment is appropriate, absent mitigating factors.
Friedman violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by intentionally engaging in misconduct that involved "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."42 ABA Standards § 5.11(b) applies to such conduct.43 It states that disbarment is generally appropriate in such cases.44
Friedman violated DR 9-102(A) when he drew on the trust account to pay himself fees before they were due.45 Bar counsel urges us to apply ABA Standards § 4.11, which generally calls for disbarment, to this misconduct.46 ABA Standards § 4.12, which recommends suspension "when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes [632]*632infury or potential injury to a client,"47 also potentially applies. Given Friedman's conscious intention to use trust funds to pay himself fees before they were due, we agree with bar counsel's assertion that Friedman temporarily " 'diverted UYAK II settlement funds to his own use." We note, as did the hearing committee, that disbarment should be reserved for cases in which the lawyer uses the client's funds for the lawyer's own benefit.48 But that is precisely what Friedman did here. That no individual harm resulted does not change the nature of his act. On the other hand, it appears he did not intend to permanently deprive anyone of trust proceeds. Either sanction therefore could apply to this violation.
ABA Standards § 5.11(a), calling for disbarment, also applies because Friedman engaged in "serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes misappropriation." - Friedman's conduct, if committed in Alaska, would have violated AS 1146.620(a) and would have been a class C felony.49
F. Aggravating and Mitigating Ctircum-stances
"[Alfter making the initial determination as to the appropriate sanction, the court [should] then consider any relevant aggravating or mitigating factors.50 Because disbarment is the most severe sanction we can impose, aggravating factors are relevant only to the extent that they neutralize the mitigating factors.51
The ABA Standards recognize ten aggravating factors.52 The disciplinary board found four aggravators here: a pattern of misconduct, submission of false statements, illegal conduct, and a dishonest or selfish motive. The board thus differed from the hearing committee, which had found no dishonest or selfish motive.
Friedman disputes the existence of a selfish motive. The board based its finding on the fact that Friedman "used the withdrawn mon[ies] for his own purposes." Friedman contends that this finding is inconsistent with the weight of the evidence. In support, he points out that the hearing committee found that he did not intend to deprive clients of any money and withdrew funds only when he believed he bad earned them.
We independently review the evidence while giving great weight to the board's factual findings.53 Friedman relies on the testimony of Jeffrey Martin, a Certified Public Accountant audit specialist. Martin opined that Friedman's handling of the trust accounts never placed a client at risk and that there was no evidence of fraud. Friedman also relies on his own testimony that he did not withdraw settlement monies as fees until he believed he had earned them.
But our review of the evidence discussed above convinces us that Friedman knew he was drawing on trust funds to pay himself fees before they were due. This use of the funds was dishonest and for his selfish motive. Lack of an intention to deprive clients or others of monies that were to be paid to them later does not establish that his intervening use of these monies was honest or [633]*633unselfishly motivated. Our conclusion here is consistent with our holding above regarding Friedman's state of mind.54 We therefore agree with the board that this aggravator applies here.
The board did not err in applying the "illegal conduct" aggravator. The committee applied this aggravator based on its finding that Friedman committed misapplication of property. Because we concluded in Part IILB4 that Friedman had the mental state necessary to be guilty of misapplication of property, this aggravator applies.
We also find no clear error in the board's finding that two other aggravators applied. The finding of a "pattern of misconduct" is supported by evidence that the conduct extended over the course of a year and involved at least six clients and tens of thousands of dollars. The finding of "submission of false statements" is supported by evidence of Friedman's letters to bar counsel stating that the $81,000 had been deposited in his client trust account and had not been used for anything. Friedman claims that he did not know that these statements were false at the time he made them; but he made no attempt to check his records to verify his own statement.
ABA Standards § 9.32 specifies possible mitigating factors.55 The board found four mitigators: absence of a prior disciplinary record; good character or reputation; delay in disciplinary proceedings (the period between June 1994, when bar counsel ended the investigation, and December 1995, when bar counsel filed the petition); and remorse. The board rejected three additional miti-gators recommended by the hearing committee: personal or emotional problems; a physical disability; and the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.
On appeal, neither party challenges the board's discussion of mitigators. The record supports that discussion.
Friedman argues that a weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, in light of our prior cases, does not support the board's recommendation of a four-year suspension. As we have noted previously, there is no "magic formula" for determining how aggravating and mitigating cireumstances af-feet an otherwise appropriate sanction.56 "Each case presents different cireumstances which must be weighed against the nature and gravity of the lawyer's misconduct." 57
Our past cases cireumseribe our analysis here. The disciplinary board paid "particular attention" to In re Mann. Mann was suspended for three years after confessing to appropriating client funds in order to make past-due mortgage payments on his home.58 Mann turned himself in to police and was ultimately convicted of a class C felony.59 His voluntary disclosure mitigated the sancetion of disbarment.60
At the other end of the spectrum are In re West61 and In re Triem.62 West intentionally notarized his deceased client's signature, knowing that the client's widow had falsified [634]*634the signature at West's direction.63 The attorney's motive was to induce the state to enter into a negotiated property-loss settlement which would have at least temporarily foundered if the client's fatal heart attack had been revealed.64 We found that West clearly intended the consequences of his actions, and we made the observations quoted above in Part III.B.2.65 West received a ninety-day suspension.66
In Triem, the lawyer was publicly censured.67 He violated DR 1-102(A)(d) when he told his opponent that discovery materials had been placed in the mail, but then retrieved them from the mail without telling opposing counsel.68 He thus deceived counsel into believing that discovery materials had been produced.69 The court concluded that a harsher sanction was unnecessary because Triem did not submit the false documents to the court and had already been penalized by the court for his misrepresentation.70
We think that the nature of Friedman's misconduct was similar to Mann's and much worse than West's and Triem's. Mann was suspended for three years. Given this precedent and the mitigating factors, we believe the appropriate sanction is suspension for three years. Mann's conduct differs from Friedman's in two main respects. He took much less money than Friedman. And he self-reported, whereas Friedman denied withdrawing the money. We find that the former distinction is not as great as it might seem. Mann took what he needed, as did Friedman. As to the second distinetion, Friedman's denial is certainly an aggravator. However, based on our independent evaluation of the record, the following cireum-stances convince us that a three-year suspension, like Mann's, is appropriate and that a four-year suspension would be too harsh: (1) Friedman's lack of a prior disciplinary record; (2) the absence of loss or injury to his clients; (8) his undisputed dedication to his clients and outstanding commitment to pro bono and public service; and (4) the significant measures that Friedman took to remedy the problems caused by his conduct. -_-
Friedman relies on a variety of other circumstances to support his argument that no sanction greater than a six-month suspension is appropriate. . He notes the committee's findings that his clients and all UYAK II parties received what they were entitled to without delay attributable to Friedman. He also correctly notes that the fees he paid himself corresponded to the fees he would be entitled to charge. His assertion that no client has ever filed a grievance against him is not disputed by bar counsel. He also notes the unusual cireumstances of his legal education 71 and the undisputed evidence establishing his public service and the quality of his work for his clients.72 He notes disabling cireumstances.73
We have considered these cireumstances. They do not convince us that the sanction he proposes is sufficient.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we find that Friedman violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 9-102(A), and [635]*635DR 1-102(A)(8), and therefore impose the sanction of a three-year suspension from the practice of law.74
MATTHEWS, Chief Justice, dissents as to sanctions.
BRYNER, Justice, dissenting.