In Re Ziegler

6 B.R. 3, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 874, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5282, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 194
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedApril 16, 1980
DocketBankruptcy 1-79-02190
StatusPublished
Cited by40 cases

This text of 6 B.R. 3 (In Re Ziegler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Ziegler, 6 B.R. 3, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 874, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5282, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 194 (Ohio 1980).

Opinion

DECISION ON OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF CREDITOR THORP CREDIT, INC. OF OHIO

BURTON PERLMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

In this Chapter 13 case, a meeting of creditors was held pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a). At that meeting, creditor Thorp Credit, Inc. of Ohio (hereafter “Thorp”) registered a verbal objection to confirmation of the plan which was presented. Subsequently, debtor’s plan was amended, but Thorp maintained its objection to confirmation. The court heard oral argument on the objection.

The schedule filed by debtor shows that the collateral for the loan made by Thorp to debtor consists of a second mortgage on the residence of debtor and a 1976 Bobcat automobile. Thorp filed a proof of claim which states that the principal amount now owing by debtor is $8,875.58. The proof of claim also states that the fair market value of the *4 property on which Thorp has a lien is $8,141.00. The proof of claim contains a written rejection of the plan proposed. Debtor has filed no objection to the proof of claim, and it is therefore accepted that the value of Thorp’s collateral is $8,141.00.

In the premises, if the plan proposed is to be confirmed, it must be done under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) which provides a mechanism for confirmation where the other courses possible under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) are not utilized. Such other possibilities are that the holder of the allowed secured claim accept the plan, § 1325(a)(5)(A), or the debtor surrender the collateral to the creditor, § 1325(a)(5)(C). The course left open under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) is stated in the statute in the following words:

“(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
$ :}s * * *
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim;”

Thorp points out that the plan now before us fails to provide in express terms as required by the statute, that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing the claim. Upon examination of the plan, we are compelled to agree with the creditor. Debtor will have to amend the plan to accommodate this requirement of the statute before it can be confirmed.

The real controversy between the parties, however, relates to § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). It is the position of the debtor recalling that there is no dispute that the value of the collateral is $8,141.00 that all that the plan must provide is that this amount be paid out over the life of the plan. Creditor, on the other hand, also starting from the valuation of $8,141.00, says that since payments over a period of time are contemplated by the plan, a total in excess of $8,141.00 are required to give it something having a present value of $8,141.00.

As its first thrust on oral argument, debt- or asserted the position that the objection to confirmation was not well taken, for all that is necessary, says debtor, to meet § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is for there to be a determination of whether the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the claim or is less than the amount of the claim, and here it is undisputed that the claim exceeds the value of the security. The basis for debt- or’s argument in this respect, as we understand it, is its interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 506 of which subparagraphs (a) and (b) are here relevant and are now quoted: “§ 506. Determination of secured status

(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to set off is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which such claim arose.”

We note that under the facts agreed to by the parties, applying § 506(a), that Thorp’s “allowed secured claim” amounts to $8,141.00 and that the balance of its claim, the difference between $8,875.58 and $8,141.00, or $734.58, is unsecured.

*5 It is to § 506(b) that debtor looks to support its thesis which is stated above. That subparagraph provides that a creditor is entitled to interest and reasonable fees etc. where the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the allowed secured claim. Debtor suggests that it should be inferred from this subparagraph that where the value of the collateral is equal to or less than the allowed secured claim, then interest and fees etc. may not be allowed. We find this contention of debtor without merit. The legislative history of § 506(b) states that:

“Subsection (b) codifies current law by entitling a creditor with an over secured claim to any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which the claim arose. These fees, costs, and charges are secured claims to the extent that the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the underlying claim.”

See House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977) 356, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6312. It is clear to us that the intent of this subsection is to give statutory authority for regarding interest and appropriate fees as part of the allowed secured claim in the special (and rare) situation where the value of collateral exceeds that of the claim. We perceive no intent in this subsection on the part of Congress to make a general expression as to when a creditor is entitled to receive interest, with a dividing line being whether value of collateral exceeds or is less than the claim. Having rejected debtor’s argument in this respect, it will be apparent that our view is that before a Chapter 13 plan can be confirmed, there must be a determination, pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), of “the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan”, and that such value be “not less than the allowed amount, of such claim.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 B.R. 3, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 874, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5282, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 194, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-ziegler-ohsb-1980.