In Re Connecticut Aerosols, Inc.

31 B.R. 883, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1279, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5754, 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1207
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJuly 21, 1983
Docket19-20274
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 31 B.R. 883 (In Re Connecticut Aerosols, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Connecticut Aerosols, Inc., 31 B.R. 883, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1279, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5754, 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1207 (Conn. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF INTEREST TO BE APPLIED TO TAX CLAIM [11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C)]

ALAN H.W. SHIFF, Bankruptcy Judge.

On March 31, 1982, Connecticut Aerosols, Inc. (Debtor) filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Subsequently, the debtor filed a disclosure statement and a plan of reorganization to which the United States (Government) objected. The objection was based in part on the Debtor’s proposal to pay “interest as required under applicable law” on the Government’s tax claim. The Government contended that the plan’s language was “sufficiently ambiguous so as to fail to indicate that interest will be paid in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 6621, 1 and not the statutory rate under Connecticut law.” Thereafter, the Government withdrew its objection pursuant to an agreement with the debtor in which the question of the applicability of 26 U.S.C. § 6621 was left open. That question has been brought back to the court’s attention by the debtor’s instant motion for the determination of the rate of interest to be applied to the Government’s tax claim.

II.

The Debtor concedes, and the court agrees, that the Government’s priority tax claim in the amount of $223,241.48 is entitled to interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C).- Section 1129(a)(9)(C) provides:

(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met
(9) Except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that
(C) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(6) of this title, the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments, over a period not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of such claim, of a value, as of the *885 effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim.

This section represents a departure from the former law which did not permit the payment of tax claims over a period of time. 3 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 63.20 at part 63 — page 20 (1981). As is clear from both the language of section 1129(a)(9)(C) and its legislative history, the debtor’s right to defer payments is not to be at the expense of the claimant’s right to receive the full amount of his allowed claim.

Tax claims entitled to priority under 507(a)(6) ... may be required to take deferred cash payments over a period not to exceed 6 years after the date of assessment of the tax with the present value equal to the amount of the claim, [emphasis added]

124 Cong.Rec. H 11,103 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 Cong.Rec. 17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). Thus, interest must be applied to the Government’s claim to assure that it receives the value equal to the allowed amount of its claim despite the deferred payments. In re Bay Area Services, 26 B.R. 811, 10 B.C.D. 101 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1982); In re Moore, 25 B.R. 131, 9 B.C.D. 1246 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Tex.1982). But see In re Burgess Wholesale MFG Opticians, Inc., 16 B.R. 733 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1982).

A.

Effective Date of Plan

Before turning to the issue of how the required interest rate should be calculated, I must determine the effective date of the plan within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). This question is important because the order of confirmation rendered on November 16,1982 is presently on appeal to the district court. If the plan was not effective at the time of confirmation, then the applicable interest rate under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) cannot be calculated.

The debtor, in its Memorandum of Law, observed that most courts have used the confirmation date as the effective date. The Government did not discuss this issue in its Memorandum of Law and the Bankruptcy Code is silent on this question. See 3 Norton on Bankruptcy, supra, § 63.15 at part 63 — page 19.

In this case, the Plan of Reorganization defines Effective Date as follows;

Effective date shall mean the first business day following the last day on which an appeal from an Order of the Court confirming this Plan may be taken under applicable law and no such appeal has been taken or if such an appeal has been taken, the first business day following the date upon which such appeal has been exhausted and the Plan may proceed.

Although a plan may proceed despite a pending appeal from its confirmation order, 2 the plain intent of the definition here is to delay the effective date until any appeal has been resolved. Accordingly, the court cannot now fix the interest rate as required under section 1129(a)(9)(C) but will nevertheless rule on the proper standard to be employed if and when a plan becomes effective.

B.

Interest Rate

The debtor argues that the rate established by 26 U.S.C. § 6621 is not indicative of current economic conditions. Instead, the debtor offers to pay interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). That section, which governs rates for interest on federal judgments provides in pertinent part:

Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price of the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment.

*886 Although the courts have applied various methods for determining the proper interest rate under section 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) 3 and the materially similar 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), 4 I will confine my discussion to the alternatives urged by the parties.

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31 B.R. 883, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1279, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5754, 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-connecticut-aerosols-inc-ctb-1983.