In Re Venable

48 B.R. 853, 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 968, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20573, 12 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1207
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 19, 1985
DocketBankruptcy 84 B 20239
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 48 B.R. 853 (In Re Venable) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Venable, 48 B.R. 853, 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 968, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20573, 12 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

Opinion

DECISION ON OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF CHAPTER 13 PLAN

HOWARD SCHWARTZBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.

The City of Mount Vernon, New York (“the City”) objects to the confirmation of the amended Chapter 13 plan filed by Samuel and Rose Venable (“the debtors”) on the ground that their offer to pay interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum on prepetition and postpetition unpaid real estate tax liens offends the City’s Charter, which requires all delinquent real estate taxpayers in the City to pay interest on the unpaid taxes at the rate of 18 percent per annum. This objection calls into play various provisions under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.

FACTS

1. On August 2, 1984, the debtors filed with this court their joint petition for an adjustment of their debts pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.

2. Included in their schedule of assets is a three family dwelling located on South Eleventh Avenue, Mount Vernon, New York, which the debtors reside in as their principal residence. According to an affidavit sworn to on August 10, 1984 by the debtor, Samuel Venable, which was previously submitted in this case in connection with a related matter, the value of the house is $50,000.00. The holder of a purchase money mortgage against this property has filed a claim in the sum of $35,-390.62, plus interest from January 1, 1984, at the rate of 14 percent per annum.

3. The City has filed two real estate tax claims in this case. The first claim involves unpaid prepetition real estate taxes which became a lien against the debtor’s real property pursuant to the City’s Charter. The prepetition tax claim, which was filed as a priority claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6), amounts to the sum of $5378.54, together with interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum on the unpaid principal amount.

4. The City’s second claim relates to unpaid postpetition real estate taxes in the sum of $936.10 and interest of $44.75 to the date of the claim at the rate of 18 percent per annum. The postpetition real property taxes also became a lien against the real property pursuant to the City’s Charter and were claimed as an administration tax priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).

5. The debtors propose under their amended Chapter 13 plan to pay 100% of all claims, including the taxes due the City, plus interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum, over a period of 36 months.

DISCUSSION

Prepetition Interest On The Prepetition Tax Claim

Code § 502(a) supports the allowance of a' claim filed pursuant to Code § 501, including a tax obligation together with accrued interest up to the date of the filing of the petition for relief. Therefore, the City’s claim for interest that matured up to the date when the debtors filed their Chapter 13 petition, which was asserted at the rate of 18 percent per annum pursuant to the City’s Charter, is deemed allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) and must be paid.

Postpetition Interest On The Prepetition Tax Claim

Code § 502(b)(2), which disallows a claim for unmatured interest, reflects the well-established general principle that in bankruptcy cases interest upon claims, in- *855 eluding prepetition tax claims, ceases to accrue when the bankruptcy case is commenced. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 682, 86 S.Ct. 1674, 1678, 16 L.Ed.2d 853 (1966); City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 332 (1949); Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163, 67 S.Ct. 237, 240, 91 L.Ed. 162 (1946). Notwithstanding the broad ban on postpetition interest, one of the exceptions to this rule that was developed by the courts in the exercise of their equitable powers in insolvency cases with respect to secured claims was that postpetition interest was permitted “where the amount of the secured creditor’s security is sufficient to satisfy both the principal and interest due on the secured claim.” In re Boston and Maine Corp., 719 F.2d 493, 496 (1st Cir.1983) (citations omitted). This concept that an oversecured creditor may assert its right to postpetition interest was codified under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). See United Merchants and Manufacturers, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (In re United Merchants and Manufacturers, Inc.), 674 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir.1982). Hence, reference should first be made to 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) in evaluating an oversecured creditor’s postpetition interest claim, which reads as follows:

(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.

The statutory language expressly makes reference to the requirement that interest, as well as fees, costs or charges, must be “provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.” The necessity for a consensual authority has application to mortgages, trust deeds, pledges or conditional sales contracts where the secured creditor and the debtor have voluntarily bargained with reference to a specific security, including the realization of interest until the date of payment. The courts have permitted postpetition interest in such instances in support of the efficacy of credit arrangements and in furtherance of the expectations of the parties and have denied postpetition interest on statutory tax liens, which are beyond the area of voluntarily contracted debts. In re Boston and Maine Corp., 719 F.2d at 497; United States v. Yorke (In re Berber Packing Company), 276 F.2d 245, 247-48 (7th Cir.1960); United States v. Harrington (In re Childress), 269 F.2d 719, 723-24 (4th Cir.1959); see also In re Trent, 42 B.R. 279, 281 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Va.1984) (statutory judgment lien).

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Bluebook (online)
48 B.R. 853, 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 968, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20573, 12 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-venable-nysd-1985.