In Re Trent

42 B.R. 279, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 453, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5060
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedSeptember 11, 1984
Docket13-50338
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 42 B.R. 279 (In Re Trent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Trent, 42 B.R. 279, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 453, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5060 (Va. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM E. ANDERSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

Lynchburg Postal Credit Union, Inc. (the Credit Union), the holder of a claim against the debtors secured by a judgment lien against real property of the debtors, asserts entitlement to postpetition interest under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) and objects to confirmation of the debtors’ Chapter 13 plan based on 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

FACTS

The facts of this case are not in dispute. The debtors executed an unsecured note on November 10, 1978, payable to the Credit Union in the amount of $15,926.11. On November 1, 1983, in the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, the Credit Union obtained a judgment against the debtors for a total amount of $22,060.23 based on their default on this note. On November 14, 1983, that judgment was docketed in the Clerk’s Office of the Circuit Court of Campbell County, Virginia, thereby perfecting a judgment lien on the debtors’ real estate located in Campbell County, Virginia. See Va.Code § 8.01-458.

The debtors filed their Chapter 13 petition on May 18, 1984. The- filed amended plan of the debtors proposes to pay all secured creditors except the Credit Union outside the plan. The value of the debtors’ unencumbered equity in the real estate to which the judgment lien of the Credit Union attached greatly exceeds the amount of the claim now secured by it.

ISSUES

I. Does 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) entitle the Credit Union to postpetition interest as part of its secured claim?

II. Does the Chapter 13 plan as proposed by the debtors comply with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)?

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. At issue here is the interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which such claim arose.

11 U.S.C. § 506(b). Although the claim of the Credit Union is a “secured claim” for its entire amount under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and is “secured by property the value of which .. is greater than the amount of such claim ... ”, it is the *281 opinion of the Court that the Credit Union is not entitled to postpetition interest on its claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

The legislative intent of 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) was to codify pre-Code case law. In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir.1982). Viewed from this perspective it is apparent that the grammatically correct reading of this somewhat ambiguously drafted statute is that the clause “... provided under the agreement under which such claim arose” modifies the clause “... interest on such claim ...” as well as the clause “... any reasonable fees, costs, or charges ...” Collier on Bankruptcy (15th Ed.) ¶ 506.05. As such the entire provision seems to contemplate a secured claim created by voluntary agreement between the debtor and the holder of the secured claim.

11 U.S.C. § 506(b) codifies one of three pre-Code exceptions to the prohibition of payment of postpetition interest on claims. Under pre-Code law payment of postpetition interest was allowed "... where the amount of the secured creditor’s security is sufficient to satisfy both the principal and interest due on the secured claim.” In re Boston and Maine Corp., 719 F.2d 493, 496 (1st Cir.1983). In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., supra. However, the cases draw a distinction between voluntarily created contractual liens and statutory liens. In re Boston and Maine Corp., supra at 497.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted this “over-secured creditor” pre-Code exception to the denial of postpet-ition interest on claims “... not ... to extend ... beyond the area of contractual debts to statutory liens .... ” United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir.1959). Therefore this Court will not extend the application of 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) to allow payment of postpetition interest as part of the claim of the Credit Union which is secured by a statutory judgment lien.

II. The Credit Union has also objected to confirmation of the proposed amended plan of the debtors on the grounds that the plan does not meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).

“The Court shall confirm a plan if ... with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan .. (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and (ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim ...”

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). In the absence of acquiescence in the plan by the holder of a secured claim provided for in the plan or surrender of the property securing the claim by the debtor, the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) must be met before the Court will confirm a plan. The' debtors’ proposed amended plan as it is presently before the Court does not meet these requirements.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) requires that a plan providing for an allowed secured claim state that the lien securing such claim is retained by its holder.

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Bluebook (online)
42 B.R. 279, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 453, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5060, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-trent-vawb-1984.