In re Wells Fargo & Co. S'holder Derivative Litig.

282 F. Supp. 3d 1074
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedOctober 4, 2017
DocketLead Case No. 16–cv–05541–JST
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (In re Wells Fargo & Co. S'holder Derivative Litig.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Wells Fargo & Co. S'holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

Opinion

JON S. TIGAR, United States District Judge

Before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint filed by defendants John D. Baker II, Elaine L. Chao, John S. Chen, Lloyd H. Dean, Elizabeth A. Duke, Susan E. Engel, Enrique Hernandez, Jr., Donald M. James, Cynthia H. Milligan, Federico F. Peña, James H. Quigley, Judith M. Runstad, Stephen W. Sanger, Susan G. Swenson, and Suzanne M. Vautrinot (collectively, the "Director Defendants"), ECF No. 144, Timothy J. Sloan, ECF No. 139, Carrie Tolstedt, ECF No. 140, Michael J. Loughlin, ECF No. 141, and John R. Shrewsberry, ECF No. 143.1 The Court will grant the motions in part and deny them in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a shareholder derivative action on behalf of Wells Fargo & Company *1082("Wells Fargo") against the company's officers, directors, and senior management. ECF No. 83, Consolidated Amended Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 64. Plaintiffs allege that, "[f]rom at least January 1, 2011 to the present ('the Relevant Period'), Defendants knew or consciously disregarded that Wells Fargo employees were illicitly creating millions of deposit and credit card accounts for their customers, without those customers' knowledge or consent." Id. ¶ 1.

A. Wells Fargo's Cross-Selling and Alleged Fraudulent Account-Creation Scheme2

Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo, "under Defendants' watch, ... defrauded their customers in an attempt to drive up 'cross-selling,' i.e., selling complementary Wells Fargo banking products to prospective or existing customers." Id. As summarized by Plaintiffs:

To achieve their publicly touted goal of selling eight products per household-referred to as the 'Great Eight' or 'Gr-eight' initiative-Defendants imposed strict quotas regulating the number of products Wells Fargo bankers must sell. Those quotas translated into unrelenting pressure on bankers to open numerous accounts per customer. Bank employees were thus driven to engage in unlawful account-creation practices. And because Wells Fargo's success in cross-selling was central to its financial results and market participants' assessment of the Company, Defendants were also highly motivated to foster and perpetuate those unlawful practices. Indeed, the goal of Wells Fargo's high pressure cross-selling strategy was to show leadership in cross-selling, and, most importantly drive up the Bank's share price ... result[ing] in enormous compensation for the Bank's executives.

Id. ¶ 2.

Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo's Officers and Directors either knew or should have known about the allegedly fraudulent cross-selling practices as early as 2007, when the Board's Audit and Examination Committee and then-Chairman and CEO John Stumpf "received letters from an employee discussing how the Gr-Eight Initiative created a high pressure sales culture that resulted in 'unethical and illegal activity,' including 'routine deception and fraudulent exploitation of [Wells Fargo's] clients.' " Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants were on notice of the fraudulent practices based on (1) complaints as early as 2008 through Wells Fargo's "EthicsLine" service related to "gaming" and "sales incentives"; (2) a 2008 whistleblower lawsuit by an employee related to creation of fake brokerage accounts; (3) several wrongful termination and employment discrimination lawsuits filed as early as 2009 that included allegations of unethical practices; (4) investigations and inquiries by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau *1083("CFPB") as early as 2012; and (5) a December 21, 2013 article in the Los Angeles Times that detailed the fraudulent account creation and the internal policies and pressure that led to it. Id. ¶¶ 22-38.

Plaintiffs allege that "[n]otwithstanding that knowledge ... neither Stumpf nor the other Defendants disclosed the improper activities to the public, and instead continued to tout their purported success in cross-selling, including reporting artificially inflated cross-selling metrics." Id. ¶ 17. Wells Fargo's SEC filings and annual reports not only included these allegedly inflated cross-selling metrics, but repeatedly emphasized the importance of these metrics and its cross-selling strategy to Wells Fargo's financial performance and business model. See id. ¶¶ 124-140.

According to Plaintiffs, Defendants participated in preparing and signed onto the following public filings, which Plaintiffs allege contained false or misleading statements and "artificially inflated reported retail bank household cross-sell metric for each reporting period":

Filing Date Cross-Sell Signed by Metric 1Q 2011 10-Q May 6, 2011 5.79 Stumpf, Sloan 2Q 2011 10-Q August 5, 2011 5.84 Stumpf, Sloan 3Q 2011 10-Q November 8, 2011 5.91 Stumpf, Sloan 2011 10-K February 28, 2012 5.92 Stumpf, Sloan, Baker, Chao, Chen, Dean, Engel, Hernandez, Milligan, Peña, Runstad, Sanger, Swenson 1Q 2012 10-Q May 8, 2012 5.98 Stumpf, Sloan 2Q 2012 10-Q August 7, 2012 6.00 Stumpf, Sloan 3Q 2012 10-Q November 6, 2012 6.04 Stumpf, Sloan 2012 10-K February 27, 2013 6.05 Stumpf, Sloan, Baker, Chao, Chen, Dean, Engel, Hernandez, James, Milligan, Peña, Runstad, Sanger *10841Q 2013 10-Q May 8, 2013 6.10 Stumpf, Sloan 2Q 2013 10-Q August 7, 2013 6.14 Stumpf, Sloan 3Q 2013 10-Q November 6, 2013 6.15 Stumpf, Sloan 2013 10-K February 26, 2014 6.16 Stumpf, Sloan, Baker, Chao, Dean, Engel, Hernandez, James, Milligan, Peña, Quigley, Runstad, Sanger, Swenson 1Q 2014 10-Q May 7, 2014 6.17 Stumpf, Sloan 2Q 2014 10-Q August 6, 2016 6.17 Stumpf, Shrewsberry 3Q 2014 10-Q November 5, 2014 6.15 Stumpf, Shrewsberry 2014 10-K February 25, 2014 6.17 Stumpf, Shrewsberry, Baker, Chao, Chen, Dean, Duke, Engel, Hernandez, James, Milligan, Peña, Quigley, Runstad, Sanger, Swenson 1Q 2015 10-Q May 6, 2015 6.13 Stumpf, Shrewsberry 2Q 2015 10-Q August 5, 2015 6.13 Stumpf, Shrewsberry 3Q 2015 10-Q November 4, 2015 6.13 Stumpf, Shrewsberry 2015 10-K February 24, 2016 6.11 Stumpf, Shrewsbeny, Baker, Chao, Chen, Dean, Duke, Engel, Hernandez, James, Milligan, Peña, Quigley, Sanger, Swenson, Vautrinot 1Q 2016 10-Q May 4, 2016 6.09 Stumpf, Shrewsberry 1Q 2016 10-Q August 3, 2016 Not reported Stumpf, Shrewsberry

Id. ¶ 367 (footnotes omitted).

B. The Moving Defendants

1. Officer Defendants

Defendant John G. Stumpf served as Wells Fargo's CEO from June 2007 until his resignation on October 12, 2016. Id. ¶ 70. He was also a director between June 2006 and January 2010, when he became Chairman of the Board. Id. According to the complaint, Mr. Stumpf admitted in testimony before Congress that he learned of the problem of opening of fraudulent accounts as early as 2013, and that he was "made aware, generally, of issues" related to cross-selling as early as 2011. Id. ¶ 258-260.

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