In re: Walmart Inc. Securities Litigation

CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedApril 8, 2024
Docket1:21-cv-00055
StatusUnknown

This text of In re: Walmart Inc. Securities Litigation (In re: Walmart Inc. Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Walmart Inc. Securities Litigation, (D. Del. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

IN RE: WALMART INC. Civil Action No. 21-55-CFC SECURITIES LITIGATION CLASS ACTION

Brian E. Farnan, Michael J. Farnan, FARNAN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Sara Fuks, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A., New York, New York Counsel for Plaintiffs Robert W. Whetzel, Raymond J. DiCamillo, John M. O’Toole, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Sean M. Berkowitz, Nicholas J. Siciliano, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Chicago, Illinois Counsel for Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

April 8, 2024 Wilmington, Delaware

N\

LF fol CHIEF JUDGE Lead Plaintiff Kim Kengle, as trustee of the Kim K. Kengle 2000 Trust, along with named plaintiff Roseanne Lacy, filed this Class Action against Defendants Walmart Inc., Douglas McMillon, and M. Brett Biggs. A corrected version of the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) was filed on May 2, 2023. D.I. 75. The SAC has two counts. In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that all three defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5. DI. 75 Ff 392-401. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that McMillon and Biggs violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. D.I. 75 ff 402-06. Plaintiffs allege that during the Class Period (March 31, 2017- December 22, 2020) Defendants violated these securities laws by failing to timely and completely disclose to investors in thirteen different forms filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that Walmart was the subject of parallel criminal and civil investigations (the Investigations) conducted by the Eastern District of Texas (EDTX) United States Attorney’s Office. See D.I. 75 1-7; D.I. 72 at 14. DI. 68.

Defendants have moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the SAC. I. BACKGROUND The following background is based on the allegations in the SAC and the documents incorporated by reference in the SAC, all of which I must accept as true in deciding the pending motion. See Umland v. Planco Fin., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A. The Controlled Substances Act Although this is a securities class action, much of Plaintiffs’ SAC focuses on whether Walmart complied with the Controlled Substance Act (the CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. The CSA was enacted to “provide meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels.” D.J. 75 758. The Act created a category of drugs—controlled substances—that are strictly monitored because of their high abuse potential. D.I. 75 759. Opioid painkillers are categorized as controlled substances, and anyone who “manufactures, distributes, or dispenses” opioid painkillers is required by the CSA to register with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). D.I. 75 62. Distributors and pharmacists are subject to numerous CSA requirements. Distributors must for example identify and report to the DEA suspicious controlled

substance orders that are unusual in size, pattern, or frequency. D.I. 75 ff 63, 64. Pharmacists, before filling controlled substance prescriptions, must look for “red flags”: prescriptions that call for drug combinations that pharmacists know are dangerous and susceptible to abuse. If a pharmacist cannot resolve all relevant red flags, she must refuse to fill the prescription. D.I. 75 69. The CSA imposes civil penalties for failing to report suspicious orders to the DEA and for violating the dispensing rules. D.I. 75 ff 71, 74. B. The Government’s Investigation into Walmart’s Opioid Sales and Walmart’s Corporate Financial Disclosure Statements In addition to selling retail products, Walmart operates approximately 5,000 pharmacies. D.I. 75 { 8. Customers can use these pharmacies to fill prescriptions for controlled substances, including prescription opioids. D.I. 75 99. Until 2018, Walmart “self-distributed” these controlled substances to its pharmacies. D.I. 75 Thus, Walmart both employed pharmacists and was a controlled substance distributor. D.I. 75 J 48. On December 27, 2007, the DEA sent letters to every registered controlled substance distributor, including Walmart. D.I. 75 7 141. The letters warned distributors about the dangers of prescription drug abuse. D.I. 75 142. In 2009, the DEA threatened to revoke a California Walmart pharmacy’s controlled substance registration. D.I. 75 7188. Asa result, in March 2011, Walmart and the DEA entered a “nationwide memorandum of agreement” (the

2011 MOA). DI. 54189. The 2011 MOA required Walmart to adopt a program to ensure that it complied with the CSA when Walmart’s pharmacists filled controlled substance prescriptions. D.I. 29 Jf 189, 191. Although the 2011 MOA

was created because of concerns relating to a specific California pharmacy, it applied to every Walmart pharmacy. D.I. 75 ¢ 192. The MOA expired in March 2015. D.I. 75 { 190. In October 2013, Walmart created a document titled “Controlled Substance Risk Assessment: Executive Summary” (CSRA). D.I. 75 9145. That document “stated that Walmart had not ‘[d]Jesigne[d] & operate[d] a system [sic] to detect suspicious orders and report them to the DEA when discovered.” D.I. 75 J 145 (quoting CSRA) (alterations in the original). Although the CSRA “recognized that it was necessary to create and operate such a system to ‘meet obligations of [the 2011] MOA,” the CSRA “did not contain an expected date for such a system.” D.I. 75 145 (quoting CSRA). In June 2014, Walmart’s Health and Wellness Department created a “Portfolio Scoring Worksheet, Suspicious Order Monitoring” (2014 PSW). D.I. 75 149. The 2014 PSW was designed to assess the effectiveness of Walmart’s suspicious monitoring program. D.I. 75 7150. According to the 2014 PSW, because of Walmart’s insufficient suspicious order monitoring systems, Walmart faced a “severe” risk of “potential financial or reputational impact.” D.I. 75 { 150.

The 2014 PSW also stated that Walmart’s suspicious order monitoring was “related to a settlement [or] agreement with a Government Agency” and was “Board informed.” D.I. 75 { 150 (alteration in the original). In 2015, Walmart’s U.S. Compliance Department submitted a proposal to “design and operate a system to identify ‘Suspicious Orders’ of controlled substances.” D.I. 75 4 152. That proposal “acknowledged that the Company’s suspicious order monitoring program still required immediate and substantial enhancements in order to help Walmart avoid DEA enforcement as a result of non- compliance with the CSA.” D.I. 75 152 (alterations and emphasis omitted). The Compliance Department “requested that a project be performed to modify Walmart’s suspicious order monitoring system to allow program enhancements to help Walmart to avoid DEA enforcement as a result of noncompliance with 21 CFR 1301.74(b)[,]” and it noted “that the ‘benefits’ to be achieved from ‘completing this initiative’ are ‘Compliance with federal law and VAWD accreditation standards.’” D.I. 75 ¥ 152. In the summer of 2016, the DEA began investigating two Texas doctors who

were prescribing opioids. D.I. 75 | 202. On December 7, 2016, the DEA raided a Walmart store and “obtain[ed] records” relating to the Texas doctors. D.I. 75 4 203. “Walmart has acknowledged that on December 7, 2016 it learned that the

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