This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1758
In re the Marriage of Zachary Dean Hollingsworth, petitioner, Respondent,
vs.
Anne Marie Halling Roe, Appellant.
Filed November 17, 2025 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Connolly, Judge
Anoka County District Court File No. 02-FA-23-57
Zachary D. Hollingsworth, Blaine, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Elizabeth M. Porter, Elizabeth M. Porter, LLC, Apple Valley, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from the judgment and decree dissolving the parties’ marriage, appellant-
wife argues that the district court abused its discretion in (1) denying her request for spousal
maintenance, (2) miscalculating respondent-husband’s child-support obligation, and
(3) denying her request to change her name. We affirm the denial of appellant’s request for maintenance and the calculation of respondent’s child-support obligation, but we
reverse and remand in part with instructions to change appellant’s name.
FACTS
Appellant Anne Marie Halling Roe (wife) and respondent Zachary Dean
Hollingsworth (husband) were married in May 2012. The parties had two daughters during
the marriage, one born in October 2013, and another born in July 2017. In 2023, husband
filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. The parties later reached a stipulated
agreement resolving most of the disputed issues. The remaining issues for trial consisted
of, among other things, spousal maintenance and child support.
The district court met with the parties’ lawyers in chambers before trial. The district
court then stated on the record that “I don’t believe in long, spousal maintenance periods.
I think that those, in the long run, create more issues than they are worth.” The trial then
began, at which evidence was presented that, during the marriage, husband changed careers
to become a plumber. At the time of trial, husband was employed full time as a plumber,
with a net monthly income of approximately $4,887. Husband also has a net monthly
income of approximately $663 through his service with the National Guard.
Wife attended Aveda Institute and became an esthetician before the parties wed.
After the parties’ first child was born, wife reduced her hours “so that [the parties] always
had someone to watch [their child].” Wife later opened her own salon and, at the time of
trial, was working part time. According to wife, she had net profits of $19,389 in 2021,
and $27,056 in 2022.
2 A vocational expert with 15 years of vocational rehabilitation experience provided
a “Labor Market Survey regarding the earning potential of [wife].” In providing this
survey, the vocational expert reviewed “current job postings in the Minneapolis – St. Paul
area,” and spoke with “three subject matter experts,” each of whom had more than 15 years
of experience and were “actively working in the Twin Cities.” According to the vocational
expert, two of the individuals she spoke with worked for salons and the third was self-
employed. The vocational expert opined that, based on her market survey, an individual
such as wife who is a self-employed esthetician and has 15 years of experience, could earn
“approximately $100,000 to $150,000 annually” if she was working full time.
At the end of trial, wife submitted proposed findings that sought to change her legal
name to “Anne Marie Halling Roe.” The district court denied this request, concluding that
the court “has no evidence that a change of name is necessary.” The district court also
found that wife “is voluntarily underemployed and . . . has unjustifiably limited her
income.” The district court then denied wife’s request for spousal maintenance,
determining that maintenance is not appropriate “[g]iven the parties’ respective
employment history, the standard of living they established, [wife’s] ability to immediately
increase her income, [wife’s] ability to provide complete self-support in the near future,
[and] the distribution of marital assets.” Finally, the district court determined that, based
on the parties’ equal parenting-time schedule, husband’s gross monthly income of $9,973,
3 and wife’s “potential gross monthly income” of $8,333, husband’s basic child-support
obligation to wife is $97 per month. Wife appeals.1
DECISION
I.
Wife challenges the district court’s denial of her request for spousal maintenance.
District courts generally have broad discretion in decisions regarding spousal maintenance.
Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). A district court abuses its
discretion when it makes findings that are unsupported by the evidence or when it
improperly applies the law or when it resolves the question in a manner that is contrary to
logic and the facts on record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 & n.3 (Minn. 1997).
This court reviews legal questions de novo, but reviews findings of fact for clear error.
Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21,
2007). Findings are clearly erroneous if “they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her request for
transitional maintenance2 because (A) husband has the ability to pay and wife does not
1 Husband did not file a brief in this appeal, and this court ordered that the appeal proceed under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03. 2 After recent amendments, Minnesota law now provides:
A maintenance award may be transitional or indefinite. An award of temporary maintenance issued before August 1, 2024, is deemed transitional maintenance. An award of permanent maintenance issued before August 1, 2024, is deemed indefinite maintenance. Maintenance awarded during the pendency of an initial proceeding for dissolution or legal
4 presently have sufficient income to meet her reasonable monthly expenses; (B) the other
spousal-maintenance factors support an award of spousal maintenance; and (C) the district
court stated on the record that it does not believe in spousal maintenance.
A. Wife’s need versus husband’s ability to pay
If a party requests spousal maintenance, the district court must address whether the
spouse seeking spousal maintenance established a need for maintenance under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 1 (2024). Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. 2021); see Lyon
v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989) (stating that an award of spousal maintenance
requires a showing of need). “If a party requests spousal maintenance, a district court must
engage in a two-step analysis.” Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 695 (Minn. App.
2019). The first step is to consider “whether the party seeking maintenance has
demonstrated a showing of need.” Id. (quotation omitted). A party demonstrates a showing
of need if “the party is unable to provide for his or her reasonable expenses through
employment income or investment income or a combination of both.” Id. If a party makes
the threshold showing of need, the second step is for the district court to consider the
appropriate amount and duration of maintenance. Id. In making this determination, the
district court considers “all relevant factors.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2024).
The district court acknowledged that husband has an ability to pay spousal
maintenance, finding that he has “a surplus” of income after considering his income and
separation pursuant to section 518.131 is deemed temporary maintenance.
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3(a) (2024).
5 reasonable expenses. But in denying wife’s request for spousal maintenance, the district
court found that wife is “voluntarily underemployed and has unjustifiably limited her
income” by working “the 19 hours per week she has been working.” The district court
found that wife “can and should work 40 hours per week,” and that she is “capable of
increasing her income substantially by increasing her services offered by an additional 20
hours per week,” as well as “raising her prices to match the current prices within the trade
and to meet current economic conditions.” The district court then considered wife’s
“probable earnings level based on employment potential, recent work history, and
occupational qualifications in light of the substantial job opportunities and earning levels
in the community,” and imputed “gross annual income to [wife] in the amount of $100,000
or gross monthly income potential of $8,333.00.”
Wife argues that the district court improperly imputed income to her “because she
was not underemployed in bad faith.” To support her position, she relies on Maurer v.
Maurer, 607 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. App. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 623 N.W.2d 604
(Minn. 2001), and Carrick v. Carrick, 560 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. App. 1997). In each of
those two cases, this court held that the district court had erred by imputing income to a
longtime homemaker without a finding of bad-faith underemployment. Maurer, 607
N.W.2d at 181; Carrick, 560 N.W.2d at 410. This court reasoned that, when a spouse is
the homemaker and primary caretaker of the children, imputing income to that spouse
without a finding of bad faith would ignore the spouse’s contributions as a homemaker in
the marriage and punish her for maintaining the homemaker lifestyle. Carrick, 560 N.W.2d
at 410; see also Maurer, 607 N.W.2d at 181.
6 Wife’s reliance on Carrick and Maurer is misguided because she reads those cases
to require the district court to find that she is underemployed in bad faith before attributing
income to her for the period of time after judgment is entered. But in Passolt v. Passolt,
this court rejected that reading of Carrick and Maurer, concluding that, “[b]ecause Carrick
addressed only the period between the parties’ separation and the dissolution judgment, the
district court read Carrick too broadly to apply to the post-judgment period at issue in this
case. Similarly, because Maurer simply applies Carrick in a factually similar situation,
our analysis of Carrick also addresses Maurer.” 804 N.W.2d 18, 24 (Minn. App. 2011)
(citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011). And more recently, this court held
that a district court need not find bad faith in order to find that an obligee is able to become
fully or partially self-supporting after dissolution. Backman v. Backman, 990 N.W.2d 478,
488 n.5 (Minn. App. 2023). Thus, under the circumstances, the district court did not
improperly impute income to wife without a finding of bad faith. See id.
Wife also contends that, even if the district court “could impute income to [her], it
was error to do so immediately” because the vocational expert “offered no opinion on how
long it would take [w]ife” to begin earning $100,000 to $150,000 annually. 3 And wife
claims that the vocational expert was “unclear about whether the estimated $100,000 to
$150,000 was before or after business expenses.”
We are not persuaded. Despite wife’s claim to the contrary, the vocational expert
testified that her $100,000-to-$150,000 estimate constitutes the “total earnings after you
3 At oral argument, wife’s counsel emphasized that it would take some time for wife to build a book of business.
7 take out the cost of supplies and renting a space and all of that.” Moreover, the vocational
expert’s opinion was based, in part, by reviewing “current job postings in the Minneapolis
– St. Paul area.” The vocational expert testified that, after COVID, there are “a lot of job
opportunities” for qualified workers in wife’s field. (Emphasis added.) The vocational
expert also testified that some of the job opportunities she reviewed were part-time, which
could supplement wife’s current self-employment earnings. The fact that the vocational
expert’s opinion was based heavily upon the “current job postings” indicates that she
believed wife could immediately earn $100,000 to $150,000 annually. The district court
found the vocational expert’s opinion to be credible, and we defer to that determination.
See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). And, notably, the district
court’s imputation of income to wife was the lowest amount on the range estimated by the
vocational expert. Therefore, wife is unable to show that the district court clearly erred in
finding that wife could immediately begin earning $100,000 annually.
Next, wife argues that, in denying her request for spousal maintenance, the district
court “impermissibly relied on assets awarded to [her] in the dissolution as available to
meet her immediate needs.” To support her position, wife refers to the following finding
made by the district court in discussing wife’s financial resources: “[Wife] will also receive
her share of equity in the marital home when the home is sold.” Wife contends that, based
on this finding, it “appears the [district] court anticipated [w]ife would use the funds from
the sale of the marital home to meet her monthly expenses at least temporarily until she
can increase her income,” which was “error.” We disagree.
8 Our supreme court has recognized that “a district court cannot require a
maintenance-seeking spouse to invade the principal of the property awarded to a spouse
seeking maintenance to pay living expenses.” Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 254
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). But wife’s argument misconstrues the district court’s
findings. The district court found that wife can “immediately increase her income” which
will allow her to “comfortably meet her needs” in the “near future.” This finding indicates
that her increased income will allow her to meet her needs without invading her property
award. And immediately after finding that wife will “receive her share of the equity in the
marital home when the home is sold,” the district court found that the parties’ agreed-upon
asset distribution is “fair and equitable,” which “will allow each party to provide a down
payment on a new home or meet other financial needs.” This finding indicates that the
district court’s reference to the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ marital home would
be used to meet needs other than wife’s living expenses. We therefore conclude that the
district court did not impermissibly rely on assets awarded to wife in the dissolution as
available to meet her immediate needs.
Wife further challenges several of the district court’s reductions to her monthly
budget. But the district court has discretion to determine the marital standard of living and
to determine reasonable post-dissolution expenses according to that standard of living.
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d 221, 230 (Minn. App. 2021). Here, the district court
eliminated from wife’s claimed monthly living expenses $52 for life insurance and $300
for a 401K retirement fund, finding that there was “no evidence” that these expenses were
part of the parties’ standard of living during the marriage. Although wife claims that she
9 presented evidence of such expenses during the marriage, the district court apparently
determined that this evidence was insufficient to show that the parties consistently incurred
these expenses throughout the marriage. In light of the discretion afforded the district
court, wife is unable to show that these findings are clearly erroneous. See id.
Wife contends that the district court erroneously eliminated from wife’s claimed
monthly budget $52 for appliance repair/maintenance and $93 for household
cleaning/laundry supplies. We disagree. The district court found that these expenses were
“duplicative” of wife’s claimed monthly expense of $104 for home repair/maintenance,
which the district court allowed. Appliance repair/maintenance could certainly be
construed as duplicative of home repair/maintenance. And although cleaning and laundry
supplies could be construed as different from home repairs, it was reasonable for the district
court to consider it duplicative of home repair/maintenance since cleaning and laundry are
relatively synonymous with maintaining the family home. See id.
Wife argues that the district court erroneously eliminated vacations from her budget
because both she and husband “testified that they agreed they had taken three to four
vacations per year during their marriage.” But the weight to be given witness testimony is
a function of the fact-finder. See State v. King, 990 N.W.2d 406, 420 (Minn.
2023) (“[Appellate courts] accord great deference to the [district] court’s determination on
credibility because credibility and the weight to be given to a witness’s testimony are
determinations for the factfinder.” (quotations omitted)). The district court found the
parties’ testimony related to the number and frequency of vacations the family took during
the marriage to be less than credible, and this court defers to that credibility determination.
10 See id. As such, it was within the district court’s discretion to eliminate vacations from
wife’s monthly budget. See Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d at 230. We therefore conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that wife presently has sufficient
income to meet her reasonable monthly expenses.
B. Spousal-maintenance factors contained in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2
Wife argues that the spousal-maintenance factors contained in section 518.552,
subdivision 2, support an award of maintenance. But these factors need be considered only
if wife made a showing of her need for maintenance. See Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252
(stating that “[o]nce a spouse has made a sufficient showing of need, only then will a court
consider the amount and duration of a maintenance award by weighing the factors
enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2” (emphasis added)). Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that wife failed to establish a need for
maintenance, we need not consider wife’s argument related to the factors set forth in
section 518.552, subdivision 2.
C. District court’s statement that it does not believe in long spousal- maintenance periods
Wife argues that the district court’s “candid admission that it did not ‘believe in’ the
[spousal-maintenance] statute casts serious doubt on whether it evaluated the spousal-
maintenance issue fairly.” But the record reflects that, along with stating that it does not
“believe in long, spousal maintenance periods,” the district court acknowledged that, “until
I hear testimony, I can’t make a commitment.” The district court also noted that, “as it
comes to spousal maintenance, I am going to have to hear from the vocational person” and
11 “from [wife’s] witnesses to determine what amount of income, if any, [to] impute to [wife]
and for what length.” And the district court added that spousal maintenance “could be as
short as six months. It could be for up to three years.” The district court’s statements on
the record indicate that it would fairly consider the spousal-maintenance issue after hearing
all the evidence and testimony. As such, appellant cannot show that the district court
abused its discretion in denying wife’s request for spousal maintenance.
II.
Wife argues that, because the district court “erred in finding that [w]ife’s gross
income could immediately be increased to $100,000,” the court’s calculation of husband’s
child-support obligation is erroneous. But, as we determined above, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that wife’s net income could be increased to
$100,000. Therefore, wife’s contention that the district court abused its discretion in
calculating husband’s child-support obligation fails.
III.
Wife challenges the district court’s denial of her request to change her name. We
review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a name change for abuse of discretion.
In re Welfare of C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. App. 1994). But the interpretation
of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748
N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn. 2008).
Minnesota law provides that:
Except as provided in section 259.13, in the final decree of dissolution or legal separation the court shall, if requested by a party, change the name of that party to another name as
12 the party requests. The court shall grant a request unless it finds that there is an intent to defraud or mislead, unless the name change is subject to section 259.13, in which case the requirements of that section apply.
Minn. Stat. § 518.27 (2024). Minnesota Statutes section 259.13 (2024) relates to name
changes concerning persons with felony convictions.
In denying wife’s request to change her name, the district court found that it did not
have the relevant information necessary to grant the request. Wife argues that this decision
is erroneous because, under section 518.27, the district court was obligated to change her
name in the dissolution judgment. We agree.
This court has recognized that “a verified complaint is the functional equivalent of
an affidavit.” Metro. Transp. Network, Inc. v. Collaborative Student Transp. of Minn.,
LLC, 6 N.W.3d 771, 781 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. July 23, 2024). Here, wife
asserted in her answer and counter-petition that she
has not been convicted of a felony; [she] has not been a party to a bankruptcy proceeding; [she] has no judgments against her; [she] is not involved in any lawsuits, as either Plaintiff or Defendant; [she] is not attempting to avoid or defraud creditors; and [she] is not attempting to evade any civil or criminal prosecution.
The answer and counter-petition were accompanied by a signed verification stating that
she
being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that she is [wife] named in the foregoing, within-entitled proceeding; that she has read the attached Answer and Counter-Petition and that the same is true of her own knowledge, except those statements based on information and belief, which statements she believes to be true.
13 Because wife’s answer and counter-petition is akin to an affidavit, the district court
was presented with information that wife was never convicted of a felony, was not a party
to a bankruptcy proceeding, had no judgments against her, was not involved in any
lawsuits, was not attempting to avoid or defraud creditors, and was not attempting to evade
any civil or criminal prosecutions. And, as wife points out, none of these allegations were
contested. As such, the district court’s finding that it did not have the relevant information
related to wife’s name-change request is clearly erroneous.
Moreover, section 518.27 states that the district court “shall” grant a request for a
name change unless the requesting party is subject to the requirements of section 259.13,
or the court finds “an intent to defraud or mislead.” Minn. Stat. § 518.27; see Minn. Stat.
§ 645.44, subd. 16 (2024) (stating that “‘[s]hall’ is mandatory”). The district court never
found an intent to defraud, and wife attested that she has never been convicted of a felony.
Nor was there any evidence submitted demonstrating that wife has been convicted of a
felony. Accordingly, the district court was required to grant wife’s request to change her
name under section 518.27. Because the district court was required to grant wife’s request
to change her name under section 518.27, we reverse in part and remand with instructions
to change wife’s name.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.