In Re the Estate of Larson

694 P.2d 1051, 103 Wash. 2d 517, 1985 Wash. LEXIS 1063
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 11, 1985
Docket50257-9
StatusPublished
Cited by85 cases

This text of 694 P.2d 1051 (In Re the Estate of Larson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Estate of Larson, 694 P.2d 1051, 103 Wash. 2d 517, 1985 Wash. LEXIS 1063 (Wash. 1985).

Opinions

Dore, J.

This case concerns a dispute over attorney fees incurred in the probate of an estate. We hold that, in establishing the reasonableness of an attorney fee based on hours multiplied by an hourly rate, probate attorneys must offer evidence not only that the hourly rate was reasonable [519]*519but also that the hours spent were necessary in processing the estate. Further, attorneys in probate are not entitled to an additional fee out of the estate in proving the reasonableness of their fees.

Proceedings Below

Carl Larson died intestate on January 27, 1979 in Pierce County. The decedent's cousin, Ivan O. Swanson agreed to act as personal representative. Swanson engaged his own attorney, Michael Manza, of Manza, Moceri, Gustafson & Messina, P.S., to probate the estate. Throughout the course of the probate proceedings, Mr. Manza was assisted by his son, Patrick Manza, first in the capacity of a legal intern and later as an attorney associate.

In the subject case, 45 relatives in the United States and Sweden were determined to be entitled to inherit under the Washington descent and distribution statute. Administration of the estate required identification and genealogical classification of the heirs, liquidation of the estate assets, filing of federal and state tax returns, and distribution of assets to heirs. The proceeds from the sale of the estate assets, primarily timberlands, totaled $463,672.36.

When the estate was ready to close, 33 of the 34 heirs in Sweden, through their attorney in fact, objected to the personal representative's final report and petition for distribution on three bases: (1) too much federal estate tax was paid; (2) the real estate was valued inconsistently in the federal and state tax returns, and (3) the attorney fees requested were excessive. Prior to the hearing, the first two objections were abandoned, leaving only the reasonableness of the attorney fee at issue. At the hearing held before a superior court commissioner, both the personal representative and the objectors presented expert testimony on the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees of $23,145. The commissioner found the requested fees were reasonable and entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order approving the final report. He also ordered the objectors' share of the estate to pay $10,000 additional attorney [520]*520fees and $2,010.85 costs incurred by the Manza firm in proving a reasonable attorney fee in the final report.

The objectors sought review of the court commissioner's order by a superior court judge, pursuant to RCW 2.24.050. The judge reviewed the record, heard oral argument, and denied the motion. His order directed payment of $23,145 to the estate's attorneys and approved the commissioner's assessment of $12,010.85 in additional attorney fees and costs. In addition, the judge allowed an additional attorney fee of $4,030 and costs of $350 for resisting the motion for revision and assessed these items against the objectors' share of the estate.1

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the $23,145 fee was reasonable, and held additional fees could be assessed against the estate for proving the reasonableness of contested attorney fees. The court held, however, that the additional fees should not have been assessed against the objectors' share of the estate but rather treated as expenses of the administrator. In re Estate of Larson, 36 Wn. App. 196, 674 P.2d 669 (1983). This court accepted review on the issues of (1) the reasonableness of the $23,145 fee, and (2) the propriety of assessing additional fees against the estate to prove the reasonableness of challenged attorney fees.

Fiduciary Relationship

In any dispute over attorney fees, our analysis must be premised on fundamental principles regarding the attorney-client relationship. A fiduciary relationship exists as a matter of law between an attorney and client, and the attorney owes the highest duty of fidelity and good faith to the client. Perez v. Pappas, 98 Wn.2d 835, 659 P.2d 475 (1983). In probate, the attorney-client relationship exists [521]*521between the attorney and the personal representative of the estate. In re Estate of Peterson, 12 Wn.2d 686, 123 P.2d 733 (1942). The personal representative stands in a fiduciary relationship to those beneficially interested in the estate. He is obligated to exercise the utmost good faith and diligence in administering the estate in the best interests of the heirs. Hesthagen v. Harby, 78 Wn.2d 934, 481 P.2d 438 (1971). The personal representative employs an attorney to assist him in the proper administration of the estate. Thus, the fiduciary duties of the attorney run not only to the personal representative but also to the heirs.

The Code of Professional Responsibility speaks directly to a lawyer's fiduciary responsibilities to his client with respect to fee arrangements. CPR EC 2-17 provides:

The determination of a proper fee requires consideration of the interests of both client and lawyer. A lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable fee, for excessive cost of legal service would deter laymen from utilizing the legal system in protection of their rights. Furthermore, an excessive charge abuses the professional relationship between lawyer and client. On the other hand, adequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and independence of the profession.

We analyze the reasonableness of the fee charged by the Manza firm in the context of those fiduciary obligations arising out of the attorney-client relationship.

Reasonableness of Fees

Generally, this court will not interfere with an allowance of attorney fees in probate matters unless there are facts and circumstances clearly showing an abuse of the trial court's discretion. In re Estate of Belknap, 12 Wn.2d 643, 123 P.2d 358 (1942); In re Estate of Fetterman, 183 Wash. 410, 48 P.2d 638 (1935). The record before us in the present case is the same as the record before the superior court judge in his review of the court commissioner's decision. We are, therefore, in the same position as the superior court [522]*522judge in determining the reasonableness of fees. In re Estate of Thompson, 133 Wash. 481, 485, 233 P. 941 (1925). In re Estate of Fetterman, supra.

In re Estate of Peterson, 12 Wn.2d 686, 728, 123 P.2d 733 (1942) sets forth the criteria to be considered in evaluating attorney fee requests in probate proceedings:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re The Estate Of Darrell Bryant
Court of Appeals of Washington, 2025
Vaughn v. Cohen
W.D. Washington, 2025
In Re The Estate Of Darrel R. Bryant
Court of Appeals of Washington, 2025
In re Estate of Nugent
2023 Ohio 700 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2023)
In Re: Estate of McAleer Apl of: W. McAleer
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2021
Burrows v. 3M Company
W.D. Washington, 2020
In Re The Estate Of: Denny Douglas Titus
Court of Appeals of Washington, 2020
In Re The Estate Of Robert Carlton Gilkey
Court of Appeals of Washington, 2020
Jennifer Young Luna v. Neal Harold Luna
Court of Appeals of Washington, 2016

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
694 P.2d 1051, 103 Wash. 2d 517, 1985 Wash. LEXIS 1063, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-larson-wash-1985.