Vaughn v. Cohen

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 2, 2025
Docket3:23-cv-06142
StatusUnknown

This text of Vaughn v. Cohen (Vaughn v. Cohen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vaughn v. Cohen, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 CAROL S VAUGHN, et al., in her Case No. 3:23-cv-06142-TMC 8 representative capacity as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE 9 MICHAEL COHEN,

10 Plaintiff Counter Defendant 11 Third Party Defendant Cross Defendant, 12

v. 13

LOREN COHEN, et al., 14

Defendants 15 Counter Plaintiffs

16 ***

17 WILLIAM NEWCOMER,

18 Plaintiff Counter Defendant, 19

v. 20

LOREN COHEN, et al., 21

Defendants 22 Counter Plaintiffs Third Party Plaintiffs, 23

v. 24 1 AMARA COHEN, individually, and SUSAN 2 COHEN, Trustee of the Michael Arthur Cohen Spousal Equivalent Access Trust, 3 CAROL VAUGHN, individually, and in her representative capacity as Personal 4 Representative of the ESTATE OF MICHAEL COHEN, UNITED STATES OF 5 AMERICA (DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE), and BR 6 NEWCOMER, LLC

7 Third Party Defendants Counter Defendants 8 Counter Plaintiffs.

10 I. INTRODUCTION 11 Before the Court is Defendant Loren Cohen’s motion to strike the first, second, and third 12 causes of action in the Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 109). Plaintiff Carol Vaughn, in her 13 capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Cohen, responded (Dkt. 121), and 14 Loren1 replied (Dkt. 152). Having reviewed the parties’ briefing and the balance of the record, 15 the Court DENIES the motion. 16 II. BACKGROUND 17 On November 25, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part Loren’s motion to 18 strike the Estate’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC). Dkt. 102. The Court allowed the Estate to 19 include revisions in the SAC relevant to the Estate’s actual fraud claim and Exhibits 18 and 19. 20 Id. at 8. The Court, however, struck any other amendments made in the SAC and ordered the 21 Estate to file a new version of the complaint that complied with the order within seven days. Id. 22 at 8–9. On December 2, 2024, the Estate filed a motion for reconsideration, Dkt. 105, that the 23 1 Because multiple parties have the last name “Cohen,” the Court refers to Michael and Loren 24 Cohen by their first names. 1 Court denied, Dkt. 106. In its order denying the Estate’s request for reconsideration, the Court 2 explained that it had not struck any allegations that were part of the First Amended Complaint 3 (FAC) but never challenged. Id. at 3. Therefore, the Estate was permitted to continue asserting

4 causes of action in the FAC that were not dismissed by the Court’s previous order on Loren’s 5 motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. 73. On December 4, 2024, the Estate filed the 6 Third Amended Complaint (TAC). Dkt. 108. Loren now moves to strike the first, second, and 7 third causes of action in the TAC. Dkt. 109. 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 A. Legal Standard Under Rule 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any 10 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” sua sponte or on motion by a party. 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The function of a [Rule] 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure 12 of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues 13 prior to trial[.]” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 14 Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 15 517 (1994)). 16 Under Rule 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to 17 which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot 18 reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The moving party must specify, “the 19 defects complained of and the details desired.” Id. In adjudicating Rule 12(e) motions, courts 20 evaluate the complaint based on Rule 8, which requires a complaint to contain: (1) a short and 21 plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a short and plain statement of the 22 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 8(a). 24 1 B. Loren’s Motion to Strike 2 1. The Estate properly pled causes of action seeking declaratory judgment in the Third Amended Complaint. 3 Loren argues that the Court should strike the first, second, and third causes of action 4 because the claims are untimely. Dkt. 109 at 6. Loren asserts, “Vaughn purposely abandoned the 5 Estate’s undue influence claims when she filed the Second Amended Complaint [and she] should 6 not be permitted to replead the claims that she abandoned nearly two months ago.” Id. at 7. This 7 argument is unpersuasive. 8 In its most recent order, the Court explained that the FAC was the logical starting point 9 for the Estate to draft its amended complaint. Dkt. 106 at 3. The Court instructed the Estate that 10 it could include amendments related to the actual fraud claim and allegations that were not 11 dismissed in its previous order on Loren’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. The Court 12 had dismissed the Estate’s undue influence claims because it sought damages—a remedy 13 unavailable as a matter of law. See Dkt. 73 at 13. The Court did not, however, dismiss wholesale 14 the Estate’s claims seeking declaratory judgment that the changes to the 2014 sale were a 15 product of undue influence and that the 2020 transfer of Michael’s 49.9% business interest to 16 Loren was a product of undue influence. See id. at 13–14; see also Dkt. 2-1 at 25–27. The Estate 17 followed the Court’s order and struck portions of the complaint that sought money damages. See 18 Dkt. 108 ¶¶ 165, 172, 173, 175, 176. Since the remaining sections of the first and second causes 19 of action were pleaded in the Estate’s FAC and not dismissed in any subsequent order, the Estate 20 properly pleaded those claims in the TAC. 21 Loren next argues that the first cause of action should be struck because it seeks a remedy 22 unavailable for undue influence. Dkt. 109 at 7. Specifically, Loren argues that the Estate’s 23 request that the Court declare it is entitled to $8,485,000 for the 50.1% of Michael’s interest 24 1 transferred to Loren in 2014 impermissibly seeks damages. Id.; see Dkt. 108 ¶¶ 50, 163. This 2 argument is also unpersuasive. 3 The Estate is seeking declaratory judgment that the modification of the 2014 Sale is void

4 because of undue influence, not requesting that the Court issue a money judgment against Loren. 5 See Dkt. 108 ¶¶ 158–166. This is consistent with the Court’s discussion, in its order on Loren’s 6 motion for judgment on the pleadings, that the proper remedy for undue influence is to void the 7 relevant transfer of property—here, the modifications to the 2014 Sale. See Dkt. 73 at 13–14. 8 While Loren points to the Estate’s request for declaratory judgment that it is entitled to 9 $8,485,000 to assert that the Estate is in fact seeking damages, the $8,485,000 is just the amount 10 the Estate alleges would be due under the 2014 Sale if the modification at issue was ruled void. 11 See id ¶ 163. It is not a separate request that the Court order Loren to pay $8,485,000 as 12 compensatory damages. Because the Estate complied with the Court’s order in removing

13 portions of the complaint that sought damages as a remedy, it properly raised claims for 14 declaratory relief in the TAC. 15 2.

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Related

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co.
618 F.3d 970 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty
984 F.2d 1524 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)

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Vaughn v. Cohen, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaughn-v-cohen-wawd-2025.