Williams, J.
This attorney disciplinary proceeding is before the court pursuant to the Discipline Rules for Attorneys. Prior to the institution of this action, respondent Robert J: Salvesen's attorney and the Washington State Bar Association entered into a stipulation of facts which formed the basis of a formal complaint filed on August 8, 1978. In his answer respondent admitted the allegations of the complaint, and the facts in the case are substantially undisputed. Respondent's only resistance to the proceeding is to the severity of the sanctions recommended by the Disciplinary Board of the bar.
The findings of fact establish the following:
[75]*75From October 1976 to early December 1977, respondent engaged in a series of transactions involving the misuse of client funds which had been or should have been held in his attorney's trust account.
With one exception, the transactions involved respondent's transfer of client funds into and out of his own personal checking account. During the period the funds were supposedly in respondent's trust account the balance in the account was at times insufficient to disburse the funds to clients had they so requested. Moreover, several checks drawn by respondent on the trust account were drawn on insufficient funds, and respondent found it necessary to transfer funds from his personal checking account into the trust account in order to cover them.
In the remaining transaction, respondent received a cashier's check for $7,250 payable to Warren Slaughter, a client. At the time respondent received the check Slaughter was living in California. Without first contacting Slaughter or forwarding the check to him, respondent endorsed Slaughter's name on the check and deposited it into his attorney's trust account. He thereafter held the funds in the trust account, not disbursing them until Slaughter demanded the funds.
Throughout the period October 1976 through December 1977, respondent made a regular practice of withdrawing funds from his attorney's trust account on checks made payable to Robert Salvesen or, on two occasions, to Virginia Salvesen, his wife. Although he considered those withdrawals to be fees for legal services, he did not maintain sufficient records to establish that fact.
In December 1977, after receiving several complaints from clients and from respondent's law partner, the Washington State Bar Association began an investigation. After filing of the formal complaint, a hearing was held on December 13, 1978. The hearing officer submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law concluding that respondent had violated (CPR) DR 9-102(a) and (b) and (CPR) DR 1-[76]*76102(A)(1) and (4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and DRA 1.1(a) and (i). All of these violations were attributable to respondent's handling of his trust account as described above. The Disciplinary Board adopted the findings and conclusions and recommended disbarment, with one member of the board filing a dissent recommending a 3-month suspension.
Attorney discipline does not have as its object the imposition of punishment of the offending lawyer. In re Nelson, 87 Wn.2d 77, 81, 549 P.2d 21 (1976). Rather, the primary purpose of disciplinary actions is to protect the public and to preserve confidence in the legal profession and the judicial system. In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 663, 521 P.2d 212 (1974).
When lawyers use clients' funds for their own personal use or mishandle trust funds, disbarment is the usual result. In re Kumbera, 91 Wn.2d 401, 403, 588 P.2d 1167 (1979); In re Deschane, 84 Wn.2d 514, 517, 527 P.2d 683 (1974) ; In re Batali, 85 Wn.2d 246, 251-52, 533 P.2d 843 (1975) . It is not the inevitable result, however, and the appropriate sanction should be determined on a case-by-case basis after consideration of all the circumstances. Kumbera, at 404; In re Gibson, 90 Wn.2d 440, 442, 583 P.2d 633 (1978).
There is no question, and indeed respondent concedes, that his violations are extremely serious. They are serious not only in nature but in number. That fact alone does not necessarily resolve the matter, however, and in accordance with our previous cases we must consider aggravating and mitigating factors before we decide whether to impose on respondent the sanction which will end his legal career.
The hearing examiner found, and justifiably so, that respondent's conduct was aggravated not only by its serious nature and potential consequences but by the extended period over which it occurred. Moreover, respondent knew that his conduct was improper, yet did not desist until the bar commenced its investigation. Such behavior standing [77]*77alone could call for disbarment. However, there are several factors which we think mitigate the severity of the discipline we should impose.
First, respondent was admitted to the practice of law in 195Q, and in all the years since he has never been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding. For 18 years he was the City Attorney for Stevenson, Washington, and for 12 years the elected Prosecuting Attorney for Skamania County. For 25 years he successfully operated a title company in addition to his law practice and was director of a local bank. His background, career in the law, and reputation in the community where he lives and works are wholly inconsistent with the conduct that has led to his present predicament.
Second, respondent's clients have suffered no financial loss. Indeed, he was always able to pay when called upon. Checks presented for payment at the bank were never returned to a client because of insufficient funds in the account. All but one client received the funds due them prior to commencement of the investigation by the bar, and respondent paid the remaining client on demand shortly thereafter. Respondent explained, and there is no finding to the contrary, that the lapse of time between receipt of the funds and payment to clients resulted from either procrastination on his part or the nature of the transaction and not from an inability to pay the sum due.
Third, respondent has fully and completely cooperated with the bar in its investigation. He stipulated to all acts of misconduct and voluntarily provided the documents to support the findings. Following commencement of this investigation, he asked that he be allowed to continue to practice law and sought assistance from the bar in setting up a proper accounting system in his office for his trust accounts, which throughout his years of practice had never been managed in accordance with acceptable standards. The bar permitted him to continue practice pending a decision by this court and provided the requested service. Twice monthly the bar checked his accounts and found them to be in complete compliance with good business [78]*78practice. Indeed, bar
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Williams, J.
This attorney disciplinary proceeding is before the court pursuant to the Discipline Rules for Attorneys. Prior to the institution of this action, respondent Robert J: Salvesen's attorney and the Washington State Bar Association entered into a stipulation of facts which formed the basis of a formal complaint filed on August 8, 1978. In his answer respondent admitted the allegations of the complaint, and the facts in the case are substantially undisputed. Respondent's only resistance to the proceeding is to the severity of the sanctions recommended by the Disciplinary Board of the bar.
The findings of fact establish the following:
[75]*75From October 1976 to early December 1977, respondent engaged in a series of transactions involving the misuse of client funds which had been or should have been held in his attorney's trust account.
With one exception, the transactions involved respondent's transfer of client funds into and out of his own personal checking account. During the period the funds were supposedly in respondent's trust account the balance in the account was at times insufficient to disburse the funds to clients had they so requested. Moreover, several checks drawn by respondent on the trust account were drawn on insufficient funds, and respondent found it necessary to transfer funds from his personal checking account into the trust account in order to cover them.
In the remaining transaction, respondent received a cashier's check for $7,250 payable to Warren Slaughter, a client. At the time respondent received the check Slaughter was living in California. Without first contacting Slaughter or forwarding the check to him, respondent endorsed Slaughter's name on the check and deposited it into his attorney's trust account. He thereafter held the funds in the trust account, not disbursing them until Slaughter demanded the funds.
Throughout the period October 1976 through December 1977, respondent made a regular practice of withdrawing funds from his attorney's trust account on checks made payable to Robert Salvesen or, on two occasions, to Virginia Salvesen, his wife. Although he considered those withdrawals to be fees for legal services, he did not maintain sufficient records to establish that fact.
In December 1977, after receiving several complaints from clients and from respondent's law partner, the Washington State Bar Association began an investigation. After filing of the formal complaint, a hearing was held on December 13, 1978. The hearing officer submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law concluding that respondent had violated (CPR) DR 9-102(a) and (b) and (CPR) DR 1-[76]*76102(A)(1) and (4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and DRA 1.1(a) and (i). All of these violations were attributable to respondent's handling of his trust account as described above. The Disciplinary Board adopted the findings and conclusions and recommended disbarment, with one member of the board filing a dissent recommending a 3-month suspension.
Attorney discipline does not have as its object the imposition of punishment of the offending lawyer. In re Nelson, 87 Wn.2d 77, 81, 549 P.2d 21 (1976). Rather, the primary purpose of disciplinary actions is to protect the public and to preserve confidence in the legal profession and the judicial system. In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 663, 521 P.2d 212 (1974).
When lawyers use clients' funds for their own personal use or mishandle trust funds, disbarment is the usual result. In re Kumbera, 91 Wn.2d 401, 403, 588 P.2d 1167 (1979); In re Deschane, 84 Wn.2d 514, 517, 527 P.2d 683 (1974) ; In re Batali, 85 Wn.2d 246, 251-52, 533 P.2d 843 (1975) . It is not the inevitable result, however, and the appropriate sanction should be determined on a case-by-case basis after consideration of all the circumstances. Kumbera, at 404; In re Gibson, 90 Wn.2d 440, 442, 583 P.2d 633 (1978).
There is no question, and indeed respondent concedes, that his violations are extremely serious. They are serious not only in nature but in number. That fact alone does not necessarily resolve the matter, however, and in accordance with our previous cases we must consider aggravating and mitigating factors before we decide whether to impose on respondent the sanction which will end his legal career.
The hearing examiner found, and justifiably so, that respondent's conduct was aggravated not only by its serious nature and potential consequences but by the extended period over which it occurred. Moreover, respondent knew that his conduct was improper, yet did not desist until the bar commenced its investigation. Such behavior standing [77]*77alone could call for disbarment. However, there are several factors which we think mitigate the severity of the discipline we should impose.
First, respondent was admitted to the practice of law in 195Q, and in all the years since he has never been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding. For 18 years he was the City Attorney for Stevenson, Washington, and for 12 years the elected Prosecuting Attorney for Skamania County. For 25 years he successfully operated a title company in addition to his law practice and was director of a local bank. His background, career in the law, and reputation in the community where he lives and works are wholly inconsistent with the conduct that has led to his present predicament.
Second, respondent's clients have suffered no financial loss. Indeed, he was always able to pay when called upon. Checks presented for payment at the bank were never returned to a client because of insufficient funds in the account. All but one client received the funds due them prior to commencement of the investigation by the bar, and respondent paid the remaining client on demand shortly thereafter. Respondent explained, and there is no finding to the contrary, that the lapse of time between receipt of the funds and payment to clients resulted from either procrastination on his part or the nature of the transaction and not from an inability to pay the sum due.
Third, respondent has fully and completely cooperated with the bar in its investigation. He stipulated to all acts of misconduct and voluntarily provided the documents to support the findings. Following commencement of this investigation, he asked that he be allowed to continue to practice law and sought assistance from the bar in setting up a proper accounting system in his office for his trust accounts, which throughout his years of practice had never been managed in accordance with acceptable standards. The bar permitted him to continue practice pending a decision by this court and provided the requested service. Twice monthly the bar checked his accounts and found them to be in complete compliance with good business [78]*78practice. Indeed, bar counsel stated to the examiner at the opening of the disciplinary hearing:
As state bar counsel who investigated this case I do want to say that during my investigation Mr. Salvesen has been at all times very cooperative. He has complied with each and every request and shortly after the first contact I had asked Bob to produce and supply to me twice a month the records of his trust account, copies of his bank statements and copies of all cancelled checks. Since that request Bob has complied faithfully in each and every case; has twice a month at least provided me at the bar office copies of all his trust account activities. Those records on their face disclose proper conduct with respect to his trust account.
In contrast, we have suggested that lack of cooperation with a disciplinary investigation is a factor which may aggravate the discipline imposed. Deschane, at 515-16.
At no time has respondent attempted to excuse or defend his conduct. He candidly admits his wrongdoing, has expressed remorse, and exhibits a sincere desire to be given another chance to prove he can practice law according to acceptable standards. His demonstrated ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the profession, along with his expressions of contrition, are certainly factors we must take into account. Rumbera, at 405.
Fourth, soon after the commencement of the bar's investigation, the allegations of mishandling of trust funds became widely known in respondent's community, which is by now fully aware of respondent's shortcomings. In spite of that, he still seems to enjoy support and confidence from his community. In June 1977, at a time when respondent was issuing checks on his overdrawn trust account, he resigned from the board of directors of the bank. Three of his clients, each of whom was aware of his improper conduct, sent expressions of confidence in his integrity to the bar and in fact still employ him as their attorney. Moreover, at the time of the hearing the bank for which he had been a director still retained him as legal counsel.
[79]*79Finally, prior to the hearing before this court, the Disciplinary Board appeared to qualify its recommendation of disbarment. Through its chairman it sent a letter to this court expressing the board's uncertainty about the sanctions required under our previous cases involving trust account violations. The board apparently understands our cases to hold that such violations require disbarment as the only appropriate sanction which can preserve the public's confidence in the legal profession and judicial system. The board went on to say, however, that if less severe discipline could be imposed in this case, Mr. Salvesen merited such consideration.
We do not now nor have we ever held that trust account violations per se result in disbarment. Gibson, at 442; In re Robinson, 89 Wn.2d 519, 520-21, 573 P.2d 784 (1978); Deschane, at 516. Our recent cases reveal that disbarments for such violations have always been accompanied by other kinds of misconduct and the absence of mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., In re Zderic, 92 Wn.2d 777, 600 P.2d 1297 (1979). If the rule were otherwise, then disbarment might be appropriate in this case. But if disbarment inevitably followed trust account violations, then there would be no need for a hearing where, as here, the lawyer admits the violations. As we have previously stated, sanctions must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Disbarment is the harshest discipline, the ultimate sanction which we can impose. To order it in this case would give insufficient weight to the mitigating factors we have discussed and treat respondent as the ultimate offender. This is not appropriate. The sanction we propose is severe and adequately fulfills the purposes of attorney discipline. Accordingly, we order respondent suspended from the practice of law for a period of 2 years from the date of the filing of this opinion.
Utter, C.J., and Rosellini, Dolliver, and Hicks, JJ., concur.