Rosellini, J.
Egil Krogh, Jr., was admitted by this court to the practice of law in the state of Washington on September 20,1968. On February 4,1974, he was suspended as a result of his having been convicted of a felony, and on [463]*463February 19, 1974, a formal complaint was filed by the president of the Washington State Bar Association containing a single item.
It alleged that on November 30, 1973, an information was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Criminal No. 857-73) charging the respondent with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against rights of citizens), a felony. According to the.allegations, the respondent attorney thereafter pleaded guilty to the information and on January 25, 1974, a judgment and commitment order was entered, finding the respondent attorney guilty of the crime charged in the information. The respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 2 to 6 years, provided, however, that he would be committed for a period of 6 months, with the execution of the remainder of the sentence suspended and the respondent attorney placed on unsupervised probation for a period of 2 years.
The complaint charged that the acts and omissions of the respondent constituted violations of rule 1.1(a) and rule 1.1 (c) of the Rules for Discipline for Attorneys.
DRA 1.1 (a) provides that an attorney may be censured, reprimanded, suspended, or disbarred for the commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether it be committed in the course of his relations as an attorney, or otherwise, and whether it constitutes a felony or misdemeanor. It provides that his conviction shall be conclusive evidence, at the disciplinary hearing, of his guilt of the crime described in the indictment or information and of his violation of the statute upon which it is based.
The rule further provides for a disciplinary hearing, according to the provisions of DRA 3.2, to determine whether moral turpitude was in fact an element of the crime committed by the attorney, and the disciplinary action recommended to result therefrom. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the hearing panel are subject to adoption, modification or reversal by the disciplinary board, [464]*464upon its review of the record. If suspension or disbarment is recommended, the matter must be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. DRA 5.6 (h).
Rule 1.1 (c) makes violation of an attorney’s oath or duties grounds for disbarment.
It was also alleged that the respondent’s conduct constituted a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-102 (misconduct), providing in pertinent part that “(A) A lawyer shall not: . . . [ejngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.” Later the complaint was amended to charge in addition a violation of (CPR) DR 1-102 (A) (5), which provides, in part, that a lawyer shall not “[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
The information referred to in the complaint charged that while the respondent was an officer and employee of the United States Government, first as Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs to the President of the United States and later as Undersecretary of Transportation, and acting in his official capacity, in conjunction with others who were officials and employees of the United States Government, the defendant unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree with his coconspirators to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, a citizen of the United States, in the free exercise and enjoyment of a right and privilege secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to conceal such activities. It further charged that the coconspirators did, without legal process, probable cause, search warrant or other lawful authority, enter the offices of Dr. Fielding in Los Angeles County, California, with the intent to search for, examine and photograph documents and records containing confidential information concerning Daniel Ellsberg, and thereby injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Dr. Fielding in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege secured to him by the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to be secure [465]*465in his person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The information alleged that the actual entry was made by coconspirators with the knowledge, consent, approval and assistance of the respondent. Various overt acts were alleged. To all of these allegations, the respondent had pleaded guilty.
In response to the filing of the complaint by the president of the bar association, a hearing panel was convened. The respondent, represented by counsel, appeared before it and explained that his admitted participation in the conspiracy came about in the following manner:
In 1968, when the respondent graduated from law school, he went to work for the firm of Hullin, Ehrlichman, Roberts and Hodge in Seattle. He practiced there about 3 months and was offered a job at the White House in Washington, D.C., which he accepted. He spent 4% years in Washington. Upon returning from a trip to Vietnam in 1971 he was asked to be one of the directors of a White House “special intelligence unit,” which became known as the “plumbers.” The respondent was told that the President wanted him to undertake an assignment in connection with the unauthorized disclosure of the Pentagon Papers. He was told that the President wanted him to pursue the investigation with utmost zeal and he was instructed to read the first chapter of the President’s book “My Six Crises,” dealing with his investigation and pursuit of Alger Hiss. The respondent understood that his work was to be kept secret and that he was to apply the maximum effort and utilize whatever means the government had at its disposal to terminate any leaks in what the President termed “national security” information.
The respondent acted in accordance with his instructions.
It was suggested to him that it would be well to obtain a psychiatric profile of Daniel Ellsberg. Such a profile was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, but this profile was deemed unsatisfactory, since it did not show Ells-berg to be an untrustworthy person.
[466]*466The respondent and his codirector adopted a plan suggested by E. Howard Hunt, who was also a member of the investigative unit, to break into the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist and photograph whatever materials could be found in the files regarding Dr. Ellsberg. The respondent was told that both the CIA and the FBI had engaged in similar clandestine activities, the one abroad and the other at home, prior to 1966.1 Insofar as his testimony revealed, he voiced no objection to the legality of the break-in, although he understood the FBI would ordinarily have been the proper agency to conduct domestic investigations, whether legal or illegal. The FBI was not asked to conduct this clandestine investigation, according to the respondent, because it was feared that it would give the director a position of advantage over the White House.
The respondent received assurance from Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy that the persons they would employ to conduct the entry into Dr. Fielding’s office would effect the procedure in such a manner as to leave no evidence that a break-in had occurred. However, after the deed was perpetrated, he was shown pictures of the interior of Dr. Fielding’s office which revealed that it had been left in great disorder.2 Respondent was much distressed by this fact, not, [467]*467it appears, because of concern for Dr. Fielding’s property but rather because of the fear that an investigation of the burglary might lead to a discovery of the identity of the perpetrators.
Shortly after this incident the special investigative unit ceased to function as such. The respondent testified that he had never participated in any other enterprise of this nature.
When the break-in of the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel became a subject of investigation by the Senate, inquiries made by the investigating committee revealed the existence of the special investigative unit and the clandestine nature of its mission, as well as the identities of its directors and at least some of its members. It was during this investigation that Daniel Ellsberg was being tried for alleged violations of federal law in disclosing the Pentagon Papers. In April 1973 the respondent was informed that a memorandum describing the break-in in California had been presented to the President and that the President “as a matter of principle” decided that this memorandum should go to the judge presiding in the Ellsberg case. The memorandum was turned over to the defense, and public disclosure immediately followed. Judge Byrne, the judge conducting the Ellsberg case, had asked for affidavits from all individuals who had any knowledge about the break-in.
After some days of deliberation and after discussing his problem with Elliott Richardson, the Attorney-General designate, and with John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, the respondent concluded that he should disclose what he knew about the break-in by way of affidavit. He asked Ehrlichman to ask the President to relieve him from all “executive privilege” and “national security” requirements. Ehrlichman told him on May 2 that the President had relieved him of the executive privilege restriction to the extent that he could describe the meeting [468]*468with the President at which he had asked for the investigation of Ellsberg.
The respondent immediately took a leave of absence from the Department of Transportation and began to compose his affidavit. Two days later before it was completed, he was told that the President’s restrictions had been reinstated; nevertheless, he completed his affidavit and submitted it to Judge Byrne and to the Watergate prosecutor. A few days later he resigned from his position as Undersecretary of Transportation.
The respondent was indicted upon several counts including one of making false declarations in September of 1973. He at first and for a period of time asserted a defense of national security. Later, becoming convinced that this was not a valid defense, his attorney effected an agreement with the prosecution whereby he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and the other charges were dismissed. In describing the change of attitude which induced him to change his plea to guilty, the respondent said:
In November I took a trip with my wife and children to Williamsburg for the Thanksgiving vacation. As I said, I had been vigorously defending up until just a few days before we left, both in motions to the court in Washington, D.C. and motions to the court in California and in all public statements to that time. However, in Williamsburg I can’t quite explain what took place for me. I suppose it was a combination of things. First, I had a chance to sit back and sort of look at where I was. I was under indictment in both California and Washington and yet I was a person that was at large, free to travel, free to associate with whomever I wished. I could say what I wanted to and if I said it to certain individuals it would get reported. I could attend any church of my choice. There were a number of things I was enjoying as a defendant, potential defendant in a criminal trial and yet here I was defending conduct when I was a government servant which had stripped another individual of his Fourth Amendment rights to be secure from an illegal search, and I suppose it was that I felt that if I had continued to defend that, I would in a sense be attacking the very rights which [469]*469I was enjoying at that time as a potential defendant. And it then became very clear that the only way that I could really affirm my own belief in what at that time had been evolving — it hadn’t been something that came as a blaze of light; it came over a period of months — the only way I could affirm what I believed the government to be resting upon, which was the rule of law, would be to enter a plea of guilty to the substantive charge of conspiracy to deprive civil rights, and that weekend, as I say, it all came together, and four days later I entered a plea before Judge Gesell.
Describing his state of mind after making the decision, he said:
I felt very free in thought and I have never had a moment’s doubt that it was the right decision. My only regret was that it took so long to come to it, but there was a combination of being very much afraid of the consequences, both jail and prison, loss of occupation, perhaps deprivation of profession, what have you, and a number of consequences which were almost — were staring me in the face. There were a number of things I had to face. Once I was able to come to grips with the underlying violation that I had been involved in, no matter what the motivations had been, no matter how sincere they had been, no matter how honestly we proceeded, it still didn’t justify it, and I feel that way today.
(Italics ours.)
Questions by a panel member elicited the following responses during the course of the respondent’s testimony:
Q. Is it fair to summarize by saying that in order to get the medical records of Dr. Ellsberg you basically had three opportunities or three ways of getting it. One, you had to get a release from the patient — and I presume Dr. Ellsberg would not have been willing to sign a waiver or release — or you had to break in to copy the records or bribe somebody who was a custodian of the records. A. Or you could get a court order. Q. Or you could get a court order? A. On the grounds there was probably cause to suspect that some crime had been committed. Q. You did not have the probable cause in this case to get a court order? A. No. Q. You were limited to the [470]*470other three alternatives, were you not? A. Yes sir. Q. So, when the covert operation was discussed it was fairly clear to everybody it was an illegal act you were about to perform? A. In a sense that a break-in by people, say, citizens, is illegal, you would have to say yes. I do say yes to that, but that government itself had been engaged in these types of activities for reasons which seemed to transcend normal reasons for entry operations. In this case we felt this operation was essential to acquire and that there was a justification for the act in the President’s inherent power to investigate and we felt very much an extension of his — I would say of his power or his authority at this point, erroneously I might add.
The respondent admitted that he had made no investigation to determine the legality of either CIA, FBI or Presidential “covert operations.” He also admitted that the motivation for secrecy was the knowledge that such operations constituted a “rough-tough” way to handle the “national security” issue, and the feeling that something of that nature should not become publicly known “because government wouldn’t — shouldn’t have it known and they hadn’t in the past.” The respondent said:
I think there was a very strong sense that time that the authority under which we were operating and the circumstances as they were presented to us would justify practically whatever was done at that point, that the interest of this country necessitated it.
The respondent admitted upon questioning that, when interviewed by the special prosecutor in 1972, he had not told the truth about the special investigative unit, the participation of Messrs. Hunt and Liddy, and its operations. He stated that he continued to maintain silence for a period of more than 2 years after the break-in upon the justification that the “national security” was involved. Finally, after the Watergate indictments were underway, his codirector Young had obtained immunity in exchange for his testimony, and others were engaging in plea bargaining, he came to realize that the term “national security” might have [471]*471been used in a sense much broader than its legitimate meaning and that his activities as White House investigator did not fall within it.
The respondent’s statements evaluating his own conduct showed that he did eventually, after indictment, realize that he had made a serious mistake in letting expediency be his guide in carrying out the purposes of the special investigative unit. He expressed sincere regret and earnest hope that he would not in the future be guided by such considerations. He indicated that he had been blinded, perhaps, by the power of the Presidency or what he conceived to be its power. A number of men who submitted letters attesting to his good character expressed the concern that they in the same circumstances might have behaved in much the same manner.
Before the panel and before this court, to his credit, the respondent has not taken the position that he should be exonerated because of the circumstances under which his crime was committed or exempted from disciplinary action because of his subsequent remorse. He has asked, however, that the disciplinary action taken be something less than disbarment. The hearing panel recommended a suspension of 9 months’ duration. Upon reviewing the record the disciplinary board recommended to this court that the respondent be disbarred.
Both the hearing panel and the disciplinary board found that moral turpitude was an element of the crime of which respondent was convicted. The panel found that he has a spotless record except for the incident involved in these proceedings; that he is outstanding in character and ability; that his reputation is beyond reproach; that he acted, although mistakenly, out of a misguided loyalty to the President of the United States; that the event was an isolated one, and that in all probability there would be no repetition of any such error on his part. The panel further found that the respondent had accepted responsibility and had made amends to the best of his ability; that he testified fully and [472]*472candidly and that his attitude in the proceeding was excellent. The panel concluded that in this case which it found to be distinguishable from all other cases, the respondent apparently followed the order of a “somewhat distraught President of the United States” under the guise of national security to stop by all means further security leaks. The panel further concluded that the evidence showed and it was admitted by the respondent that his conscience at that time and for some time thereafter’was not alert enough to refuse participation in the unlawful activities involving Dr. Fielding and Daniel Ellsberg and to recognize that national security was not a lawful justification for such an operation.
In recommending that the respondent be disbarred, the disciplinary board points out that in the three cases in which this court has been called upon to discipline attorneys convicted of conspiracy violations, the punishment imposed has been disbarment. These are the cases of In re Wells, 121 Wash. 68, 208 P. 25 (1922) (conspiracy to oppose and delay by force the authority of the President in executing a resolution of Congress declaring war against Germany); In re Finch, 156 Wash. 609, 287 P. 677 (1930) (conspiracy to violate the several prohibition laws); and In re Barnett, 35 Wn.2d 191, 211 P.2d 714 (1949) (conspiracy to barter and exchange narcotics).
The disciplinary board also cites a recent California case, Toll v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 3d 824, 831, 117 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432, 528 P.2d 35 (1974), wherein the court said:
Although the committee’s as opposed to the Board’s factual findings are entitled to the greater weight, it is the Board’s recommendation in matters of the discipline to be imposed which is to be accorded the greater weight. The final word as to discipline, of course, rests with this court . . .
We recently summarized the guiding principles to be considered in disciplinary actions in the case of In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 663, 521 P.2d 212 (1974). There we said:
[473]*473We have frequently stated that serious consideration will be given by this court to the recommendations of the Disciplinary Board in disciplinary matters. The ultimate responsibility for determining the measure of discipline, nevertheless, rests with and upon this court. In re Espedal, 82 Wn.2d 834, 514 P.2d 518 (1973); In re Kennedy, 80 Wn.2d 222, 492 P.2d 1364 (1972). We have likewise reiterated the proposition that the basic and underlying purpose of all attorney disciplinary action — be it censure, reprimand, suspension, or disbarment — is for the protection of the public and to preserve confidence in the legal profession as well as the judicial system. In re Greenlee, 82 Wn.2d 390, 510 P.2d 1120 (1973); In re Hawkins, 81 Wn.2d 504, 503 P.2d 95 (1972); In re Steinberg, 44 Wn.2d 707, 269 P.2d 970 (1954).
In making the ultimate determination as to the measure of disciplinary action, we give consideration to: (a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, (b) avoidance of repetition, (c) deterrent effect upon others, (d) maintenance of respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession, and (e) assurance that those who seek legal services will be insulated from unprofessional conduct. In re Espedal, supra; In re Greenlee, supra; In re Kennedy, supra; In re Pennington, 73 Wn.2d 601, 440 P.2d 175 (1968).
In In re Finch, supra, this court said that when one conspires with others to violate and set at naught the laws of the United States, such an act violates the commonly accepted standard of good morals, honesty and justice, and necessarily involves moral turpitude. Here, the conspiracy in which the respondent was involved was undertaken in flagrant disregard not only of the laws of the United States but of the rights of the citizens guaranteed by the fundamental law itself — the Constitution of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States has expressed quite eloquently the gravity of such an offense when it is committed by an attorney at law, an officer of the court. In Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 27 L. Ed. 552, 2 S. Ct. 569 (1882), the court upheld the summary action of a district judge of the United States District Court for the Southern [474]*474District of Florida, in disbarring an attorney who had participated and in fact acted as a leader in the lynching of a prisoner in the county jail. The victim was hung within sight of the courthouse.
Noting the circumstances under which the name of an attorney would be struck from the roll, the court said that if regularly convicted of a felony an attorney would be struck off the roll as of course, whatever the felony may be, because he is rendered infamous. It found that under the circumstances of that case, although the attorney was guilty of an infamous crime, there was, because of popular feeling, grave doubt that he would be brought to trial. It concluded that under such circumstances it was not necessary for the judge to await the attorney’s trial and conviction before striking his name from the roll. Upon the question whether the acts of the attorney were of a kind which would justify disbarment, the court said, at pages 273-74:
Now, what is the offence with which the petitioner stands charged? It is not a mere crime against the law; it is much more than that. It is the prostration of all law and government; a defiance of the laws; a resort to the methods of vengeance of those who recognize no law, no society, no government. Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot, and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. It manifests a want of fidelity to the system of lawful government which he has sworn to uphold and preserve.
The rule stated by the court in Ex parte Wall, supra, that the name of an attorney is stricken from the rolls as a matter of course if he is convicted of a felony, was the prevailing rule at the time that case was decided. (See E. Weeks, Attorneys at Law 166 (2d ed. C. Boone 1892); see also E. Thornton on Attorneys at Law §§ 856-58 (1914).)
[475]*475That rule still governs the disposition of such disciplinary proceedings in a number of jurisdictions. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 21 (1937), 81 A.L.R. 1196-99 (1932). However, under our disciplinary rules, some flexibility is permitted, and the court retains its discretionary power to determine whether, on the facts of the particular case, the attorney should be disbarred. This approach appears to be in harmony with the views of Mr. Drinker, who was chairman of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association at the time he wrote his book entitled Legal Ethics (Columbia University Press) (1953).
However, counsel has called to our attention no case in which we have found that an attorney convicted of a felony should not be disbarred. Among the cases in which this court has, in recent years, ordered the disbarment of felons are: In re Anderson, 73 Wn.2d 587, 439 P.2d 981 (1968) (grand larceny); In re Hett, 70 Wn.2d 435, 423 P.2d 629 (1967) (formation of a fictitious corporation for unlawful purposes to meet the entry requirements of a foreign country, and aiding in falsification of a passport for his client) ; In re Wallis, 63 Wn.2d 833, 389 P.2d 421 (1964) (grand larceny); In re Dalton, 60 Wn.2d 726, 375 P.2d 258 (1962) (grand larceny); In re Timothy, 58 Wn.2d 153, 361 P.2d 642 (1961) (grand larceny); In re Seijas, 52 Wn.2d 1, 318 P.2d 961 (1957) (filing fraudulent income tax returns); In re Dillard, 48 Wn.2d 376, 293 P.2d 761 (1956) (misappropriation of funds), and In re Bixby, 31 Wn.2d 620, 198 P.2d 672 (1948) (subornation of perjury — we remarked in that case that we knew of no case in which the court had refused to disbar an attorney who had been convicted of a crime and cited numerous cases in which this discipline had been imposed).
The question before us then, is: Should the respondent, who has been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, be disbarred?
[476]*476We think that what was said in Ex parte Wall, supra, is particularly appropriate and applicable in the case of the respondent. His testimony reveals that when it was suggested that he violate not only the laws but the constitutional rights of his fellow citizens, he accepted the proposition without any misgivings as to its legality, accepting as a tenable proposition the notion that whatever was ordered by his superiors should be done. Such an attitude on the part of an attorney, particularly one who has accepted a position of responsibility in the office of the President of the United States, manifests at once a fundamental unfitness to serve as an officer of the courts.
Nevertheless, the respondent’s attorney suggests that the findings of the hearing panel establish beyond dispute his fitness to continue in the practice of law.
The panel’s findings were, of course, based upon the evidence offered before it. The bar association confined its case to the presentation of evidence of the felony conviction and to cross-examination of witnesses, including the respondent. Aside from the respondent’s testimony, most of the evidence consisted of character witness testimony. Many letters were written to the panel praising the respondent’s character and his humanitarian endeavors. These accounts of such activities showed the respondent to be a warm and compassionate human being. New of the witnesses seemed to consider the respondent’s crime a serious one or to contemplate that it might indicate the presence in his character of qualities inappropriate in a member of the bar.
The record supports the panel’s findings to the extent that those who testified in his behalf asserted that his reputation is very good indeed. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the vast majority of the people do not have the advantage of this intimate knowledge of the respondent and his character. They know only his crime and the role that he played as director of the White House “plumbers,” an organization the full extent of whose surreptitious activities has not yet been revealed. We cannot rightly assume [477]*477that with them, his reputation is “beyond reproach.” We are not prepared to agree with the panel that the respondent’s reputation was established beyond cavil by the testimony of the witnesses who appeared in his behalf.3
Nor do we agree that there was sufficient evidence to show that “in all probability there will be no repetition of any such error on his part.” There was no evidence to support this finding, unless it was the respondent’s recognition of his mistake (as he termed it) and his evident remorse. We would be more inclined to share this view of the panel if his recognition and remorse had not come so late —only, it seems, after it became evident that in spite of all the efforts of the administration to conceal them, the investigative activities conducted in and by the White House were going to be exposed.
The respondent testified that he was so overawed by the prestige and power of the Presidency that his conscience was lulled to rest during the time he served as director of the special investigative unit. He assumed that whatever had been done in the past by the CIA and the FBI, he could also do with impunity. In effect, he acknowledged that he considered the President and his staff, including himself, above the law. At the same time he was very concerned that the investigative activities be kept secret. In fact, his testimony reveals that he came to consider the Fielding break-in a mistake not because it was unlawful but because it was not done in such a way as to leave no evidence that it had occurred.
We find it difficult to believe that the respondent was not aware that the activities in which he was engaging were at least questionable under the law. Certainly they were extraordinary enough that the average law school graduate, recently admitted to the bar — even one who had practiced only a few months as had the respondent — would be ex[478]*478pected to do some investigative research to determine their legality. Apparently it did not occur to the respondent to look at the constitution, the statutes, or the case law to ascertain whether his project was unlawful. Had he advised a client to engage in such an activity, he would surely have been aware that he was violating his oath as an attorney if he did not make certain that the conduct suggested was permitted by law. See (CPR) DR 7-102.
The respondent’s able counsel, whose diligence in his client’s behalf is manifested in his brief and argument before this court, has revealed no authority which would justify the respondent’s actions and we feel safe in stating that had the respondent looked for such authority before he acted, he would have ascertained at once that the contemplated venture was unlawful.
If every citizen is presumed to know the law, even though his opportunities to acquire such knowledge are extremely limited, how much greater is the presumption in the case of the attorney, who has been found to have the knowledge and the skill necessary to enable him to detect the presence of a legal problem and to find the answer. The respondent’s conduct cannot be excused on the ground of ignorance. Here, not only did the respondent fail to question the propriety of his own acts at the time they were committed; for 2 years thereafter his mind and conscience remained at rest. His interest in the quality of his acts was not aroused until it appeared that his conduct could no longer be kept secret.
Should the respondent’s participation in the illegal entry be excused — because he was overawed by the power and prestige of his superiors and his perception and analytical powers thereby lulled to rest? Again, were he a layman, much could be said for a policy of tolerance of such human frailty — a frailty evidently so common that a number of the respondent’s witnesses, regrettably including lawyers, declared unabashedly that had they been in his position they would probably have acted as he did.
[479]*479We cannot accept the assumption that attorneys, who have been schooled in the Constitution of the United States and of the State and who have dedicated themselves to the concept of the rule of law, can ordinarily be expected to abandon the principles which they have sworn to uphold, when asked to do so by a person who holds a constitutional office. Rather than being overawed by the authority of one who holds such an office, including the highest office, the attorney who is employed by such an officer should be the most keenly aware of the constitution and all of its provisions, the most alert to discourage the abuse of power. In such a position those powers of discernment and reason, which he holds himself out as possessing, perform their most important function. If, when given a position of power himself, he forgets his oath to uphold the constitution and laws of the land and instead flaunts the constitutional rights of other citizens and holds himself above the law, can we say to the public that a person so weak in his dedication to constitutional principles is qualified to practice law?
It is maintained that the punishment which has been suffered by the respondent is sufficient to guarantee that he will not again forget his oath. We do not find this argument convincing, for we have searched the testimony of the respondent in vain, seeking to find some indication that he truly understands the nature and seriousness of his default. All we can gather from his testimony is that he still regards his offense as merely a mistake. He recognizes that the invasion of Dr. Fielding’s office was offensive to the psychiatrist and that the right to be free from unlawful search and seizure is a valuable right. But when his testimony is read as a whole, the conclusion is inescapable that he still believes that he acted with proper motives, with sincerity and with honesty — and that he was simply misguided. If, as the panel said, he displayed complete candor in his testimony, it must be concluded that he does not comprehend his duty as an attorney — the duty to analyze, [480]*480to inquire, to investígate and to examine the law — and above all, the duty to uphold the constitution not only when it is easy to do so but also, especially, when it is easier to ignore it; and how gravely he breached that duty when he ordered the commission of a felony involving a violation of the constitutional rights of a fellow citizen.
In re Morrison, 45 S.D. 123, 186 N.W. 556 (1922), was a case in which an attorney, disbarred upon a showing that he had committed perjury, sought reinstatement. As in this case, many witnesses appeared in his behalf, asserting his good character and urging that his petition be granted. Of them the court said, at page 130:
Many urge that the punishment he has suffered will deter him from future wrongdoing, forgetting that it is not fear as to the consequences of wrongdoing that qualifies one for admission to the bar, but rather an innate desire and intent to follow the right course.
It is that desire and intent, so fundamental in the attitude of the principled attorney, which is shown to have been so little evident in the case of the respondent, as well as other attorneys whom the President of the United States gathered about him and who, in their zeal to serve their leader, forgot that their highest duty is to the law.
That the reputation and honor of the bar have suffered severe damage as a result is now a matter of common knowledge. We find it difficult to believe that the respondent was not aware, when he authorized the burglary of Dr. Fielding’s office, that if his conduct became known, it would reflect discredit upon his profession.
The fact that we find the respondent unfit to continue in the practice of law does not mean that we ignore his fine qualities of personality, temperament and mind, his concern for his fellow human beings and his many generous and thoughtful acts. A person may be of the highest character and yet not be a proper person to practice in the profession of law. The reason for this, of course, is that the lawyer dedicates himself to a system of values which im[481]*481poses upon him the duty of knowing, understanding and supporting the constitution and laws of the land. Those laws may contain many provisions which are offensive to him, but he accepts the premise that change must come through the orderly processes provided in the constitution and the statutes.
If he does not accept and dedicate himself to this commitment and rather places himself or his masters or his convictions above the law and flaunts it in the excess of his zeal, he does a great disservice to that which he has sworn to serve — the constitution and the rule of law.
The case of In re Brooks, 57 Wn.2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), provides an example of the difficult judgments which the court must sometimes make in determining that a person of the greatest ethical sensitivity and humanitarian commitment is not qualified to practice law. The petitioner in that case, subject to the draft, had been granted noncombatant status as a conscientious objector, but had been ordered to report to a public service camp to perform other work of national importance not involving combat duties. Such substitute services being also objectionable, according to his principles, he refused to report. As a consequence, he was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced under section 311 of the Appendix to Title 50 U.S.C.A., making such refusal a felony. He served 22 months of a 3-year sentence in a federal penitentiary. Some 15 years after World War II had ended, he applied for admission to the bar of this state. The Board of Governors found him otherwise qualified, but concluded that he was not a person of good moral character because he had committed acts which were “unjustifiably defiant of the laws of the United States.” A majority of this court approved the recommendation of the Board of Governors that his petition be denied. The majority opinion states, at page 69:
A loyal and discerning citizen is aware of his great heritage of liberty and acknowledges his duty to do his share in preserving it. Without a sense of duty, the applicant [482]*482does not measure up to the standard of citizenship rightly expected of an attorney at law.
It will be seen that the offense of the petitioner in that case did not nearly approach in gravity the offense of the respondent here. He was not in a position to exercise power over his fellow citizens, and he did not use his power to violate a constitutional right of one of them, as did the respondent. His conduct was not surreptitious but was open and candid. His conduct was motivated by principle, a principle which he placed above the duty to serve his country. The conduct of the respondent, on the other hand, appears upon fair appraisal to have been motivated by expediency. The petitioner in Brooks was not indifferent to the law but rather was gravely aware of and concerned with it. Finding that it imposed upon him a duty which he could not, according to the dictates of his own conscience, perform, he disobeyed the law and accepted the consequences. His character, if judged by divine law, was undoubtedly exemplary; but judged by the law of the land, it contained a flaw so intimately related to the concept of the duty of an attorney that he was found unfit to practice law.
The preamble to the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only through such law does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection. Without it, individual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.
Judge Gerhard A. Gesell, before whom the respondent pleaded guilty to the charge upon which this proceeding is based, had these principles in mind when he said, in pronouncing sentence:
A wholly, improper, illegal task was assigned to you by higher authorities and you carried it out because of the [483]*483combination of loyalty and I believe a degree of vanity, thereby compromising your obligations as a lawyer and as a public servant.
. . . Justice Brandéis once said: If the Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law. It invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy. I think this is true. Because you are a lawyer, because you held high responsibility when the offense occurred, because you have had many of the advantages which our society offers, because you committed perjury when properly questioned by law enforcement officials, and thus concealed your breach of the public trust, any punishment short of jail would, in the court’s view, be inadequate.
For the reasons set forth herein, we must conclude that the respondent, in spite of his many commendable qualities and achievements, has shown himself to be unfit to practice law. His attorney draws our attention to the principle, set forth in In re Little, 40 Wn.2d 421, 244 P.2d 255 (1952), that, in a disciplinary proceeding, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the attorney. However, if the statement is read in context, it will be seen that it refers to doubts concerning the commission of the acts charged against the attorney. Here, no such doubt exists. The only question concerns the gravity of the offense and what it indicates about the attorney’s fitness to practice law, as measured by the criteria set forth in In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 521 P.2d 212 (1974). Applying those criteria to the circumstances of this case, we find that (a) the crime is one of great seriousness, performed as it was by an attorney in a position of public responsibility and invading as it did the fundamental rights of citizens, (b) it has not been demonstrated that there is no danger of repetition if the respondent is again placed in circumstances where such conduct is solicited or encouraged (we acknowledge that such a contingency is indeed difficult of proof and it is not the controlling consideration here), (c) there is a manifest need for discipline sufficiently severe to deter others, since it is apparent [484]*484that many attorneys have found, it relatively easy to forget their obligations, under the intoxication of governmental power, (d) the ultimate discipline is required in a case of this kind, for the reasons heretofore stated, if respect for the honor and dignity of the profession is to be maintained. With all of these considerations indicating the correctness of the recommendation of the Board of Governors, we need not inquire into the question whether the need to insulate clients from unprofessional conduct likewise compels this conclusion and will assume that it does not.
The recommendation of the disciplinary board is approved, and the respondent’s name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys in this state.
Stafford, C.J., and Hunter, Hamilton, Wright, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur.