In Re the Appeals of Andrews

851 P.2d 1027, 18 Kan. App. 2d 311, 1993 Kan. App. LEXIS 50
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
DecidedMay 7, 1993
Docket68,643
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 851 P.2d 1027 (In Re the Appeals of Andrews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Appeals of Andrews, 851 P.2d 1027, 18 Kan. App. 2d 311, 1993 Kan. App. LEXIS 50 (kanctapp 1993).

Opinion

Lewis, J.:

This appeal involves the valuation of property for tax purposes. Charles Andrews, Jr., and Randy Baird are the owners of the properties in question and are aggrieved with the values placed on their properties by Shawnee County. The appellants will be referred to in this opinion as “Taxpayers.” The governmental taxing unit involved is Shawnee County, the appellee, which will be referred to as “County.”

The Taxpayers each own one-half of an office building located at the comer of Huntoon Street and Topeka Boulevard in the City of Topeka. This building is divided into two identical office suites. Each office suite contains 2,866 square feet, and one is the mirror image of the other. In this opinion, Suite A will refer to the office owned by Andrews and Suite B to the office owned by Baird.

The property is not owned by the Taxpayers in undivided interests. The property has been divided along the center line of the office building. Andrews has a deed to Suite A and owns it along with 4,050 square feet of real estate on which Suite A is located. Baird has a deed to Suite B and owns that suite along with the 9,750 square feet of real estate on which it is located. The parking lot as well as ingress and egress to the building is part of the real estate on which Suite B is located and is owned by Baird. Andrews has a joint use agreement with Baird so that Suite A has equal use of the parking lot and ingress and egress over the property owned by Baird.

In 1990, the County valued both of these properties for tax purposes at identical values of $110,300. K.S.A. 79-412 requires the assessor to “separately value the land and improvements.” In assessing the properties and complying with K.S.A. 79-412, the County assessment is as follows:

SUITE A: Land $24,300 (4,050 sq. ft.)

Building 86.000 (2,866 sq. ft.)

TOTAL $110,300

SUITE B: Land $41,400 (9,750 sq. ft.)

Building 68.900 (2,866 sq. ft.)

*313 TOTAL $110,300

The Taxpayers challenged the valuation on these properties. They pursued that challenge through various administrative channels until they arrived at the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA). BOTA concluded that the properties were appropriately valued. The Taxpayers next sought judicial review under the Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions. This review was conducted by the district court, which affirmed the decision of BOTA and upheld the valuation of the Taxpayers’ properties.

The Taxpayers have now invoked the jurisdiction of this court, and the resolution of the issues presented is properly before us. We operate under a slight handicap because, as we view it, neither BOTA nor the district court dealt with the Taxpayers’ principal issue in their challenge to the valuation.

The Taxpayers point out that they are entitled by Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution to a “uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation.” They do not argue that the rate of taxation in Shawnee County is not uniform and equal. The argument is that their properties have not been valued and assessed on a uniform and equal basis. The Taxpayers argue and the evidence shows that Suite A and Suite B are identical in virtually every aspect. Despite this fact, the County has listed the value of Suite A at $86,000 and Suite B at $68,900. The Taxpayers suggest that one of two identical office suites cannot be worth $17,100 more than the other. The fact that these office suites are valued in such a manner is, the Taxpayers argue, proof that their properties have not been valued on a uniform and equal basis. On the surface, this argument has considerable merit. The resolution of this issue is much more complex than it might appear.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal is from the decision of the district court affirming the decision of BOTA. The issue before the district court was to review BOTA’s decision in the manner required by law. Under these circumstances:

“The scope of appellate review of an agency’s action is to determine if the district court reviewed the action in accordance with the Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions, K.S.A. 77-601 .et seq. The party asserting invalidity of the action has the burden of proving the *314 invalidity. Vakas v. Kansas Board of Healing Arts, 248 Kan. 589, Syl. ¶ 4.” Kaufman v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 248 Kan. 951, 959, 811 P.2d 876 (1991).

The scope of review for the district court is set out at K.S.A. 77-621(c) as follows:

“The court shall grant relief only if it determines any one or more of the following:
“(1) The agency action, or the statute or rule and regulation on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
“(2) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any provision of law;
“(3) the agency has not decided an issue requiring resolution;
“(4) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
“(5) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
“(6) the persons taking the agency action were improperly constituted as a decision-making body or subject to disqualification;
“(7) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole, which includes the agency record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court under this act; or
“(8) the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.”

As we view this appeal, the focus is on subparagraphs (7) and (8) as set forth above. The Taxpayers argue in their brief that the action of the County in valuing their properties is “so far wide of the mark as to be outside the realm of fair debate.” At another point, the Taxpayers characterized the action of the County appraiser and of BOTA as “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” It appears to us the Taxpayers are contending that the action of BOTA was “otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious” or was not supported by substantial competent evidence. The district court found that the action of BOTA was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and that the valuation was supported by substantial competent evidence.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
851 P.2d 1027, 18 Kan. App. 2d 311, 1993 Kan. App. LEXIS 50, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-appeals-of-andrews-kanctapp-1993.