[Cite as In re T.E., 2026-Ohio-2598.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: T.E. : APPEAL NO. C-250698 TRIAL NO. F/25/0075-01 X :
: JUDGMENT ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 7/8/2026 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as In re T.E., 2026-Ohio-2598.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
: OPINION
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 8, 2026
The Bonecutter Firm, LLC, and Brenda L. Bonecutter, for Appellant Mother,
R. Aaron Maus, Esq., for Appellee Father. [Cite as In re T.E., 2026-Ohio-2598.]
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant Mother appeals the juvenile court’s judgment awarding
appellee Father legal custody of their child, T.E. In eight assignments of error, Mother
challenges the juvenile court’s interim custody award, denial of her motion to remove
the guardian ad litem (“GAL”), and award of legal custody to Father.
{¶2} First, Mother’s assignments of error involving the interim-custody
order are moot and we do not consider them. Next, we hold that the juvenile court
acted within its discretion when it denied Mother’s motion to replace the GAL. Mother
relies on evidence outside of the record and has not demonstrated an abuse of
discretion. Finally, we hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding Father legal custody of T.E. The juvenile court considered the relevant
statutory best-interest factors, and its findings are supported by the record.
{¶3} We overrule Mother’s eight assignments of error and affirm the juvenile
court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History A. After Mother’s and Father’s relationship deteriorated, Father sought custody of T.E.
{¶4} Mother and Father welcomed T.E. in 2017 and the family lived together
in Loveland, Ohio. When Mother and Father’s relationship ended, Mother assumed
the primary caregiver role. For years, Mother and Father managed their coparenting
relationship and ensured that T.E. had parenting time with Father without court
involvement.
{¶5} But their peaceful coparenting ended in 2024 after Mother and Father’s
relationship soured and Mother restricted Father’s parenting time. In 2025, Father
filed a pro se petition for custody, shared parenting, or parenting time with then-
seven-year-old T.E. Months later, the magistrate appointed a GAL for T.E. and set an OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
August 1, 2025 pretrial hearing and an October 2025 trial on Father’s custody petition.
At a June 2025 hearing, Father’s counsel orally requested interim custody due to
Mother’s planned move to Georgetown, Kentucky, which would cause T.E.’s school
placement for the 2025-2026 school year to change from Loveland City School District
(“Loveland Schools”) to a school near Mother’s new home.
{¶6} Days before the scheduled pretrial hearing, the GAL filed her report and
recommended granting Father legal custody of T.E. and ordering Mother parenting
time. The GAL’s report discussed T.E.’s autism diagnosis, his need for stability, and
his adjustment to his community and school in Loveland; his positive relationships
with Father and Paternal Grandfather; Mother’s cohabitating with her paramour
(H.W.) soon after they met; Mother’s ending T.E.’s cello lessons despite evidence that
T.E. loved, and benefited from, the cello; and Mother’s restricting, and then ending,
T.E.’s time with Father and Paternal Grandfather. The GAL believed H.W. heavily
influenced Mother’s decisions and that T.E. struggled as a result.
{¶7} The magistrate declined to address Father’s oral motion for interim
custody at the August 1 hearing.
B. Interim custody
1. The juvenile court awarded Father interim custody of T.E. without an evidentiary hearing
{¶8} Immediately after the August 1 hearing, Father filed a written motion
for interim custody. The magistrate scheduled an evidentiary hearing to address the
motion on August 26, 2025, and ordered bi-weekly parenting time for Father from
Friday night to Sunday night. But on August 7, 2025, the “matter [wa]s . . . transferred
to the Judicial docket for all further hearings” and the juvenile court scheduled an in-
person counsel-only pretrial hearing on August 14, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. The night before
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the hearing, however, after the close of business, Mother moved to continue the
interim custody hearing, citing her counsel’s unavailability. The juvenile court denied
Mother’s request for a continuance because her counsel had failed to respond to emails
from court staff and to propose alternative dates and times for the hearing.
{¶9} After a non-evidentiary hearing with the GAL and Father’s counsel,
based on Father’s motion and accompanying affidavit, the juvenile court awarded
Father interim custody of T.E.
2. The juvenile court granted Mother’s new-trial motion
{¶10} The next day, Mother filed motions for a new trial under Civ.R. 59, for
relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60, and for a stay of the proceedings under Civ.R.
62(A). Weeks later, she moved for a new GAL because the GAL “argued alongside
presumably counsel for Father” and “argue[d] with counsel on scheduling matters.”
{¶11} At the hearing on Mother’s motions, Mother argued that the interim-
custody matter was “improperly heard” because the court’s scheduling orders failed to
give her notice of the hearing and because Father’s motion was insufficient to warrant
an emergency order. The juvenile court informed Mother that its interim-custody
order was based on “the writing that had been submitted by the parties,” and while
Father and the GAL “placed things on the record,” there was no “sworn testimony in
any way.” The juvenile court did “not believe that there was an error in the proceedings
or that the parties were subject to prejudice.” It explained upon a party’s written
request and affidavit seeking temporary custody, R.C. 3109.043 authorized it to issue,
without an oral hearing, temporary orders allocating parenting rights and
responsibilities during the pendency of a custody action. Nevertheless, it granted
Mother’s new-trial motion and heard testimony that day regarding the interim orders.
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
3. Evidentiary hearing on Father’s motion for interim custody
{¶12} Mother and Father testified at the hearing on Father’s interim-custody
motion. The GAL questioned both parties but offered no witnesses or testimony.
{¶13} In May 2025, Mother and T.E. moved into H.W.’s house in Georgetown,
Kentucky. In the fall, T.E. attended third grade at his new Kentucky school for three
days before the juvenile court’s original interim custody order returned T.E. to
Loveland with Father. T.E. returned to Loveland Schools. Mother gave conflicting
testimony about the transfer of T.E.’s Individualized Education Plan1 (“I.E.P.”) from
Loveland Schools to his Kentucky school. Mother thought T.E. had missed school or
been tardy since being in Father’s care. She also believed the Loveland Schools isolated
T.E. due to his autism diagnosis, that T.E. was behind his peers, and that his move to
a new building with new teachers denied T.E. consistency. Further, Mother explained
that Father had denied or limited Mother’s unsupervised parenting time and had kept
Mother in the dark about T.E.’s school, insurance, and medical care.
{¶14} Father testified that T.E. was doing well in the Loveland Schools. Father
admitted he instructed Paternal Grandfather to supervise Mother’s parenting time out
of fear that Mother would take T.E. back to Kentucky and never return. Apparently,
Mother and H.W. had tried to retrieve T.E. from Paternal Grandfather’s house one day
and from school the next day. Father had enrolled T.E. in therapy, but he failed to
inform Mother.
{¶15} The juvenile court denied Mother’s motions for relief from judgment, a
stay of the proceeding, and a new GAL. It reinstated Father’s interim custody award
under R.C 3109.043 and Juv.R. 13(A), ordered that T.E. attend school in Loveland,
1 See 20 U.S.C. 1401(14) and 20 U.S.C. 1414(d).
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and awarded Mother parenting time. The juvenile court encouraged the parties to
work cooperatively over parenting-time issues, explaining that “grandpa seems great,
mom seems great, dad seems great,” and that “everybody is on equal footing.”
C. Hearing on Father’s custody motion
{¶16} The juvenile court held hearings in September and October 2025. The
evidence involved T.E.’s education, relationships with Mother, H.W., Father, and
Paternal Grandfather, and cello lessons. The juvenile court interviewed T.E. in camera.
1. T.E.’s life in Loveland, Ohio until 2024
{¶17} T.E. lived in and around Loveland, Ohio until May 2025. After Mother
and Father split up in 2021, T.E. lived with Mother and spent weekends with Father.
Mother and Father co-parented amicably until late 2024. Both Mother and Father
worked, so Paternal Grandfather watched T.E. after school. Maternal Grandmother
and Maternal Aunt also provided childcare for T.E.
{¶18} When T.E. was three years old, Paternal Grandfather signed him up for
cello lessons. T.E.’s cello instructor testified that through his lessons, T.E. improved
his fine-motor skills and his ability to follow directions, read rhythm, and reproduce
music. By late 2024, T.E. could play a 30-minute-long recital from memory, an
accomplishment that the instructor attributed to discipline, practice, and dedication.
T.E.’s first-and-second-grade intervention specialist arranged for T.E. to perform his
cello for his first-grade classmates, an experience that she described as “really
positive.” The intervention specialist recalled T.E.’s classmates applauding T.E., who
was “smiling from ear to ear.”
{¶19} Father worked night shifts and lived in Paternal Aunt’s house with
Paternal Aunt and her hypoallergenic dog. Paternal Aunt watched T.E. while Father
worked. One night in December 2023 while Father was at work, T.E. awoke and
7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
wandered outside to look for Father. The police found T.E. outside at night in his
pajamas, notified Mother, and eventually returned T.E. to Paternal Aunt’s house.
Father testified that this was an isolated incident and he subsequently installed
deadbolt locks and alarms to prevent T.E. from wandering outside again. Mother did
not restrict Father’s time with T.E. after this incident.
2. Changes to T.E.’s life in 2024
{¶20} T.E. experienced several changes in 2024. In May 2024, Mother met
H.W. In late June 2024, Mother brought T.E. to a short-term rental near Loveland to
meet H.W. in person for the first time. About two weeks later, Mother and T.E. moved
into an apartment near Loveland with H.W.
{¶21} H.W. testified and described his influence on Mother and her ability to
parent T.E. as positive. H.W. explained that he is “well versed with being able to teach
stuff” because he tutored his peers in high school and has autistic relatives. Yet, H.W.
has no formal autism or education training.
{¶22} According to H.W., T.E.’s “ability to function” had improved, in part,
because of H.W. In H.W.’s view, a person meeting T.E. for the first time “wouldn’t even
know that [T.E.] was autistic.” H.W. also saw improvements in T.E.’s emotional
regulation. H.W. viewed himself as T.E.’s disciplinarian and believed in strict,
consistent discipline. While H.W. characterized T.E. as poorly behaved previously,
T.E. was “extremely well behaved and well mannered” because of H.W.’s influence.
{¶23} T.E. attended Loveland Primary School for first and second grade. T.E.’s
second-grade teacher and his intervention specialist have a combined 49 years of
teaching experience. Both testified that T.E. is a “great kid,” a hard worker, “high
functioning,” and a good communicator. T.E. receives support for his autism under his
I.E.P. But T.E. was in a general-education classroom, did not require a modified
8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
curriculum, and was “on grade level.” According to the two educators, T.E. enjoyed
positive relationships with his peers and classmates. His second-grade teacher
testified that T.E., like other children with autism, thrives with “schedules and
routines.” Disruptions to T.E.’s routine would cause “anxiety” and “excitement.”
{¶24} At the start of the 2024-2025 school year, Parental Grandfather
watched T.E. after school. They played, practiced cello, and spent quality time
together. But when Mother lost her job that fall, she began caring for T.E. after school.
H.W. and Mother imposed a stricter schedule with a greater emphasis “on school
work.” H.W. found it “unacceptable” that Father did not demand better handwriting
from T.E., so H.W. often erased T.E.’s work that he found unsatisfactory.
{¶25} After a tense phone call between Mother and Father in the fall of 2024,
Mother reduced Father’s parenting time from weekends to Saturdays only. In late
October, H.W. and Mother prohibited T.E. from visiting Father to celebrate Halloween
as a punishment for “not listening.”
{¶26} Around that time, Mother ended T.E.’s cello lessons. T.E.’s cello
instructor testified that T.E. had been “pulled out of cello lessons . . . against his will.”
Paternal Grandfather tried to contact Mother, but she ignored his attempts. Mother
told the GAL that she ended cello lessons because T.E. was no longer interested in the
instrument. But at the hearing, Mother testified that she ended lessons because T.E.
was no longer going to Paternal Grandfather’s house after school. She explained that
T.E.’s interest in music was not limited to cello and she was receptive to T.E. resuming
cello lessons in Kentucky or learning a different instrument altogether. Yet, T.E. asked
to take drum lessons and Mother made no attempt to find him lessons. H.W. testified
that T.E. started having bedwetting issues around this time.
9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶27} T.E.’s second-grade teacher and intervention specialist both saw
behavioral changes at school around this time. T.E.’s teachers saw an increase in
“anxiety and stress about his change in where he was going after school.” T.E.’s
second-grade teacher recalled him “crying in the hallway waiting when he was lined
up.” In the classroom, T.E. needed greater sensory input and started disrupting the
classroom by “making these loud [] repetitive [] words or phrases,” like “‘mistake’ in
[] sort of a robot voice.” His intervention specialist testified that T.E. “couldn’t stop”
and “couldn’t help himself.” His second-grade teacher described T.E. as “emotionally
down,” agitated, “crying a little bit more often,” and impolite at times. Both educators
reached out to Mother and Father, who were generally responsive to teacher
communications. Mother “didn’t know of any changes at the time” and wondered if it
was “a school problem.”
3. Mother ended Father’s parenting time and moved to Kentucky in 2025
{¶28} In early 2025, around the time that Father petitioned for custody,
Father and Paternal Grandfather started visiting T.E. at school during lunchtime. T.E.
had commented to his teacher that he “miss[ed] his grandpa and his dad,” so the
school helped facilitate the visits to help to “relieve that anxiety for him.” T.E.’s second-
grade teacher recalled T.E. being “excited” and “run[ing] down the hall and jump[ing]
into their arms and hav[ing] fun with them at lunch.” The intervention specialist
testified that, while T.E.’s behavior at school had improved, the visits “didn’t solve []
everything” and T.E. still exhibited “more anxiety-driven behavior.” The principal of
Loveland Primary School testified that Mother contacted him to end Father’s and
Paternal Grandfather’s lunchtime visits. At Mother’s request, the principal observed a
few visits but saw nothing of concern.
10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶29} At a February 2025 I.E.P. meeting, T.E.’s second-grade teacher and
intervention specialist met H.W. for the first time. There, they learned about the
changes to T.E.’s life. In the meeting, H.W. “was kind of speaking for [Mother], and he
would say things and she would just agree.” H.W. expressed “concerns about things
that [T.E.’s teachers] weren’t even concerned about.”
{¶30} Weeks later, Father took T.E. to a wake for a family member and
returned him to Mother later than usual, sometime around 8:30 p.m. Mother
threatened to call the police. Shortly after that incident, Mother ended Father’s
parenting time altogether. Mother testified that she ended Father’s parenting time
because Father was often “late” to exchanges and Mother “did not know when or what
was going on.” She claimed to be amenable to restarting Father’s parenting time if he
asked. Yet, she agreed that there were times that she had denied Father’s requests for
extended parenting time in the past. She also denied Paternal Grandfather’s attempts
to see T.E. And when Paternal Grandfather’s partner of four years tried to talk to
Mother about visits, Mother directed her to speak to Mother’s attorney.
{¶31} Around this time, Mother told H.W. that T.E. had attempted to
masturbate. While Mother’s family assured her it was “normal,” H.W. warned her that
this behavior was consistent with child sexual abuse. So, Mother began suspecting
Father’s family members of sexually abusing T.E. Following an April 2025 interview
of T.E., the Mayerson Center deemed the allegations “inconclusive.”
{¶32} In May 2025, on his last day of second grade, Mother moved T.E. to live
with H.W. in Georgetown, Kentucky. Mother enrolled T.E. in Southern Elementary
School before the juvenile court awarded Father interim custody. T.E. attended school
in Georgetown for just three days and, according to Mother, “was very happy” there.
11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
4. T.E. returned to Loveland and cello lessons
{¶33} After the juvenile court awarded Father interim custody, Father
completed school paperwork and returned T.E. to Loveland Schools. While T.E.
attended third grade in a new building, Loveland Schools had procedures in place to
help students like T.E. successfully transition from one building to the next. T.E.’s
intervention specialist and principal testified that T.E. appeared to be “happy” in third
grade at Loveland Elementary School.
{¶34} Father and Paternal Grandfather testified that T.E. seemed comfortable
in his old routine. T.E. returned to cello lessons and his instructor described him as
“very excited.” Paternal Grandfather and Paternal Aunt provide childcare for T.E.
when Father worked nights. T.E. spent time after school with Paternal Grandfather,
and Paternal Grandfather’s partner testified that T.E. was in “a good mood, happy,
[and] the old [T.E.]” after returning to his old schedule.
{¶35} Father wants T.E. to remain in the Loveland Schools, citing its rank
among Ohio schools. Father also wished for T.E. to have a relationship with his
Mother, though he agreed that he “communicated nothing” to her about T.E.’s school,
therapy, and health when he first got custody. Paternal Grandfather testified that
Father has a great relationship with T.E.
{¶36} According to Mother, T.E. was “doing horrible” at Loveland Schools and
lacked the necessary school supplies. Mother also testified that Father failed to
communicate with her about T.E.’s allergies, healthcare, health insurance, and an
October 2025 I.E.P. meeting. H.W., Maternal Aunt, and Maternal Grandmother
described Mother as a loving and dedicated parent.
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
D. The juvenile court awarded Father legal custody of T.E.
{¶37} The juvenile court made numerous best-interest findings under R.C.
3109.04(F)(1). Because it concluded that awarding legal custody of T.E. to Father was
in T.E.’s best interest, the juvenile court granted Father’s motion, awarded him
custody of T.E., and granted Mother parenting time.
II. Analysis
{¶38} In eight assignments of error, Mother raises issues with the juvenile
court’s awards of interim custody and legal custody to Father, and denial of her motion
for a new GAL. For ease of analysis, we address her assignments of error out of order.
{¶39} But we begin by noting that several of Mother’s assignments of error
lack a standard of review as required by Loc.R. 16.1(A)(4)(c) and lack citations to the
relevant legal authority as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). And citations to the record,
which are required by App.R. 16(A)(6), are missing in both Mother’s and Father’s
statements of fact.
{¶40} To carry their burden on appeal, appellants must demonstrate that “the
relevant case law, applied to the facts of this case, justifies a decision in [their] favor.”
Util. Serv. Partners v. PUC, 2009-Ohio-6764, ¶ 53. These rules are not mere
suggestions, and “[f]ailing to marshal an ‘authority-based argument’ often carries dire
consequences.” Twang, LLC v. City of Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio-6077, ¶ 36 (1st Dist.),
quoting Ohiotelnet.com, Inc. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc., 2013-Ohio-4721, ¶ 17. Indeed,
“[i]t is not the job of this court to develop or root through the record and relevant
authorities to find support for a party’s position.” Guthrie v. Guthrie, 2024-Ohio-5581,
¶ 12 (1st Dist.).
{¶41} Citations to the record are particularly critical for fact-intensive
assignments of errors like Mother’s. See id. at ¶ 13 (“Jill is advancing several record-
13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
intensive arguments in this appeal, and the lone record citation fails to provide us with
an adequate guide as to where in the record any potential error occurred.”). And
parties must support their arguments with citations to the law because “‘facts dumped
into a brief do not make a legal argument.’” Edje v. Holmes, 2024-Ohio-1663, ¶ 65 (1st
Dist.), quoting SYNY Logistics, Inc. v. Great Lakes Ins. SE, 696 F.Supp.3d 504, 513
(N.D.Ill. 2023). A brief consisting of “impenetrable arguments and unsupported
assertions . . . organized in ways that escape our understanding” ultimately frustrates
appellate review. McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir.
2019). We have warned parties that, “[t]he failure to cite to the record, to cite and
discuss the relevant authority, and to cite the standard of review . . . serves as an
independent basis for us to overrule [an] assignment[] of error.” Guthrie at ¶ 12.
{¶42} While Mother’s brief is disjointed and difficult to follow, the law and
parties are better served when a case is decided on the merits. See Twang at ¶ 36. With
that in mind, we turn to Mother’s assignments of error.
A. Mother’s interim-custody arguments are moot
{¶43} In her first, second, and third assignments of error, Mother argues that
the juvenile court erred when it granted Father interim custody of T.E. following an ex
parte hearing and then denied her request for relief from judgment. In her sixth
assignment of error, she argues that the juvenile court erred when it placed Paternal
Grandfather on equal footing with Mother in a remark at the hearing on her motions.
In her seventh assignment of error, she appears to argue that the juvenile court erred
as a matter of law because she was allegedly unable to defend against Father’s interim-
custody motion. And in her eighth assignment of error, Mother claims that the juvenile
court abused its discretion and reraises issues surrounding the interim-custody order.
14 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶44} The juvenile court may issue “temporary orders concerning the custody
or care of a child who is subject of a complaint as the child’s interest and welfare may
require.” Juv.R. 13(A). An order entered under Juv.R. 13 is “temporary and within the
juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2).” In re J.L.,
2026-Ohio-1216, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing Rowell v. Smith, 2012-Ohio-4313, ¶ 19, 22.
{¶45} But because interim-custody orders “last[] only during the pendency of
the underlying complaint,” a final custody order supersedes the juvenile court’s
interim-custody order entered under Juv.R. 13. Id. at ¶ 22. When “the juvenile court
has entered a final custody determination, any issue challenging the—now
superseded—temporary order is moot.” Id., citing C.T.F. v. A.B.M., 2024-Ohio-1998,
¶ 33-36 (10th Dist.); see Ryan v. Ryan, 2007-Ohio-6568, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.); see also In
re J.L.R., 2009-Ohio-5812, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.); Long v. Long, 2010-Ohio-4817, ¶ 16 (3d
Dist.); Barry v. Rolfe, 2008-Ohio-3131, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.). And “when an issue raised on
appeal is moot, we need not address its merits because a justiciable controversy no
longer exists.” C.T.F. at ¶ 35.
{¶46} The juvenile court entered a final custody order, which supersedes the
interim-custody orders and renders any challenges to the interim-custody hearing and
orders moot. We dismiss Mother’s first, second, and third assignments of error and
decline to address any issues raised in her sixth, seventh, and eighth assignments of
error involving the interim-custody hearing and order because they are moot.
B. We affirm the denial of Mother’s motion to replace the GAL
{¶47} In her fourth assignment of error, Mother challenges the juvenile
court’s decision to deny her motion for a new GAL. Mother does not identify a standard
of review, but we review juvenile courts’ decisions regarding GAL appointments for an
abuse of discretion. See In re S.M.K., 2008-Ohio-6733, ¶ 44 (2d Dist.). A juvenile court
15 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
abuses its discretion when it “exercise[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in
regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah,
2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
{¶48} Mother contends that the GAL “was argumentative with counsel,
inappropriate with counsel in scheduling matters” and failed to fulfill her duties under
Sup.R. 8.03(A)(2). Under Sup.R. 8.03(A)(2), the GAL must maintain “independence,
objectivity, and fairness, as well as the appearance of fairness, in dealings with parties
and professionals, both in and out of the courtroom.”
{¶49} On appeal, Mother cites “the argument presented at the counsel only
pretrial” hearing as proof of the GAL’s misconduct. And at the hearing on Mother’s
motion to replace the GAL, Mother cited the GAL’s misconduct during “some of the
Zoom pretrials and everything else, including communication with [the juvenile court]
and [the juvenile court’s] assistant, and saying, you know, here’s what was said and
here’s what we’re doing and screenshotting things back to me and arguing.”
{¶50} Mother failed to file a transcript of the ex parte hearing. Nor did she
attempt to supplement the record with a statement under App.R. 9(C), which allows
an appellant to “prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best
available means” when no transcript is available.
{¶51} As we have explained, when the resolution of an assignment of error
depends on “facts shown in a transcript of proceedings, the duty to provide that
transcript necessarily falls upon the appellant.” State v. Bumu, 2017-Ohio-6901, ¶ 14
(1st Dist.). Indeed, App.R. 9(B) requires an appellant to “order a transcript of any
‘proceedings [she] considers necessary for inclusion in the record’” and ensure that
the transcripts are both properly transcribed and filed with the clerk. Id. at ¶ 15,
quoting App.R. 9(B)(1). Without a transcript, we “must presume the regularity of the
16 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
lower court’s proceedings and affirm the judgment of the court below.” Id. at ¶ 16,
citing Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980).
{¶52} We therefore must presume the regularity of the ex parte proceeding.
Mother has not carried her burden to prove the juvenile court abused its discretion by
denying her motion to replace the GAL. We overrule the fourth assignment of error.
C. We affirm the juvenile court’s award of legal custody to Father
{¶53} In her fifth assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile court’s
decision to grant legal custody of T.E. to Father was contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence. Mother’s sixth assignment of error appears to argue that the juvenile
court erred by failing to consider that, in her view, Father abdicated his parental
responsibilities and foisted them on Paternal Grandfather. Mother’s seventh
assignment of error claims that the juvenile court erred as a matter of law because
“this is not a school case where there is a hearing on who has a better school district.”
Similarly, her eighth assignment of error asserts that several of the juvenile court’s
findings amounted to an abuse of its discretion.
1. Legal-custody decisions on appeal
{¶54} Mother fails to identify the legal test for legal-custody decisions and
fails to cite statutes or case law in support of her arguments. That said, Ohio courts
have long recognized that “[c]hild-custody decisions ‘are some of the most difficult
and agonizing decisions a trial judge must make.’” Ijakoli v. Alungbe, 2024-Ohio-
5287, ¶ 46 (1st Dist.), quoting Davis v. Flickinger, 1997-Ohio-260, ¶ 12. As a result, we
review the juvenile “court’s decision on legal custody of a child under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.” In re J.L., 2026-Ohio-1216, at ¶ 29 (1st Dist.). Reversal is proper
“if competent, credible evidence does not support the juvenile court’s decision
regarding [the child]’s best interest.” In re J.M., 2022-Ohio-2400, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.).
17 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶55} The juvenile court is better positioned to assess a child’s best interests,
so we afford considerable deference to the juvenile court’s credibility determinations
and weighing of the evidence. Id., quoting Davis at ¶ 22, quoting Pater v. Pater, 63
Ohio St.3d 393, 403 (1992) (Resnick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). So,
we “‘accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by [] competent,
credible evidence.’” In re E.H., 2023-Ohio-470, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.), quoting State v.
Ruberg, 2013-Ohio-4144, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.).
{¶56} Under R.C. 3109.04(B)(1), a court allocating custodial rights “in an
original proceeding . . . shall take into account that which would be in the best interest
of the children.” The best interest of a child “‘“is a fluid concept, as it involves the
child’s continually-changing need for appropriate care.”’” In re D.V., 2022-Ohio-1024,
¶ 12 (1st Dist.), quoting In re D.M., 2020-Ohio-3273, ¶ 47 (1st Dist.), quoting In re
G.L.S., 2018-Ohio-1606, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).
{¶57} When determining a child’s best interest, the juvenile court must
consider all relevant best-interest factors, including the non-exhaustive list of
statutory factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Of course, the juvenile court “‘has
discretion in determining which factors are relevant’” and “each factor may not
necessarily carry the same weight or have the same relevance, depending upon the
facts before the trial court.” Brammer v. Brammer, 2013-Ohio-2843, ¶ 41 (3d Dist.),
quoting Hammond v. Harm, 2008-Ohio-2310, ¶ 51 (9th Dist.); see Davidson v.
Hodge, 2023-Ohio-1638, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).
{¶58} The juvenile court found the following best-interest factors relevant to
Father’s complaint and made detailed findings for each of those factors:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;
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(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers . . . the wishes and
concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;
(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
best interest;
(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community;
...
(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved
parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to
establish a residence, outside this state.
R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).
{¶59} Mother argues that the juvenile court’s decision was against the weight
of the evidence and an abuse of discretion. Though her arguments are somewhat
unclear, it appears Mother takes issue with the juvenile court’s findings under R.C.
3109.04(F)(1)(c), (d), (f), and (i). We address each finding accordingly.
2. T.E.’s interactions and interrelationships with his parents and others
{¶60} R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c) directs a court to consider “[t]he child’s
interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest.”
{¶61} The juvenile court found that T.E. had positive relationships with
Mother, Father, Paternal Grandfather, Paternal Grandfather’s partner, Maternal
Aunt, and Maternal Grandmother. But the juvenile court was “greatly concerned by
[H.W.’s] role in [T.E.]’s life and his relationship with the child.” It pointed out that
19 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
H.W. overestimated his expertise in parenting a child with autism despite his having
no children and no qualifications or training outside of extracurricular tutoring in high
school. The juvenile court had significant concerns about H.W.’s role in disciplining
T.E., noting that his disciplinary measures were overly restrictive and reflected H.W.’s
demand that T.E. live up to H.W.’s personal standards.
{¶62} Mother argues that the juvenile court misconstrued H.W.’s testimony
when it found that he “pontificated that he is qualified to work with children with
Autism.” But H.W. testified he was qualified to help T.E. with schoolwork because he
had tutored classmates in high school and “actually dealt with autistic kids that were
falling behind in math. So I’m very well versed with being able to teach stuff like that.”
Later, he agreed that he educated Mother about T.E.’s behaviors citing his experience
with his nieces and nephews, who have autism. While H.W. agreed he lacks formal
training and insisted he was supporting Mother’s parenting, we defer to the juvenile
court’s findings as it is better positioned to assess witness credibility and resolve
evidentiary conflicts. See In re A.C., 2019-Ohio-2891, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.).
{¶63} Mother also contends that the juvenile court “erred in treating
[Paternal] Grandfather like a party and giving him more rights than Mother” because
Paternal Grandfather testified about his involvement in T.E.’s life. But T.E.’s
relationship and interactions with Paternal Grandfather, someone who “significantly
affect[s] [T.E.]’s best interest,” is relevant to the juvenile court’s custody determination
under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).
{¶64} Next, Mother maintains that the juvenile court failed to mention “how
strong or important the child’s bond is with Mother, who was the sole custodial parent
for almost 8 years.” Ohio courts recognize that “the role of the child’s primary
caretaker is a factor warranting consideration in evaluating the child’s interactions and
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interrelationships with parents, as well as the child’s adjustment to the child’s home,
school, and community.” Thompson v. Thompson, 2011-Ohio-158, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.).
But that is only one consideration relevant to a child’s best interest and “does not
create a presumption that the parent found to be the child’s primary caretaker should
be named the child’s residential parent and legal custodian.” Id. Critically, the juvenile
court determined that Mother had a “positive relationship” and was bonded with T.E.
The juvenile court discussed Mother’s role in T.E.’s life before turning its attention to
Mother’s more recent parenting decisions that it found to be concerning. The juvenile
court’s findings are supported by the evidence in the record.
3. T.E.’s adjustment to his home, school, and community
{¶65} Under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(d), the juvenile court must consider “[t]he
child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community.” The juvenile court
found that T.E. was adjusted to his school, Father’s home, and his community. While
it recognized that T.E.’s routine fluctuated due to Father’s working overnight shifts
and the resulting sleep schedule, it had “concerns that Mother’s relocation to Kentucky
would be more disruptive to the child’s routine.” And “Mother’s move to Kentucky
inevitably led to less direct contact between the child and Father, Paternal
Grandfather, Maternal Aunt, Maternal Grandmother, his school, and the cello.”
{¶66} Mother argues in her seventh assignment of error that the “fact that
Mother, as sole custodian for seven and half [sic] years moved to Kentucky and the
child would no longer go to Loveland schools, is not a reason under law to change
custody.” This is simply incorrect. The Ohio legislature has identified a child’s
adjustment to school and home as a factor bearing on a child’s best interest. See R.C.
3109.04(F)(1)(d). As the juvenile court recognized, the evidence clearly demonstrated
21 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that T.E. “thrives on structure, routine, and consistency.” So, T.E.’s school placement
is relevant to T.E.’s best interest.
4. The parent more likely to honor and facilitate parenting time
{¶67} Finally, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f) instructs the juvenile court to consider
which parent is more likely to facilitate parenting-time rights or companionship rights.
In its order, the juvenile court questioned both Mother’s and Father’s “ability and
willingness to honor the other’s parenting time.” It cited Mother’s decisions to reduce,
then eliminate, Father’s parenting time in late 2024 and early 2025. It also pointed to
Father’s unilateral decision to minimize Mother’s parenting time after he received
temporary custody of T.E. in August 2025.
{¶68} According to Mother, the evidence demonstrated that she is more
likely to facilitate and honor Father’s parenting-time rights. She explains that she
involved Father in T.E.’s education decisions and testified that she would have allowed
Father extra parenting time. But Mother also testified that she decided, with H.W.’s
input, to reduce Father’s parenting time with T.E. after Mother and Father argued.
And despite T.E. exhibiting signs of distress that coincided with that reduction,
Mother wholly eliminated Father’s parenting time and interfered with Paternal
Grandfather’s companionship time with T.E. When she learned that Father and
Paternal Grandfather visited T.E. at school during lunch, Mother contacted the school
principal in an effort “to not have grandfather and father at lunch.” This evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother, like Father, did not demonstrate a
willingness to honor the other parent’s parenting time.
{¶69} In sum, the juvenile court considered the relevant factors bearing on
T.E.’s best interests under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), and its findings are supported by
competent and credible evidence. Therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its
22 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
discretion when it awarded Father legal custody of T.E. We overrule Mother’s fifth,
sixth, seventh, and eighth assignments of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶70} We overrule the eight assignments of error and affirm the juvenile
Judgment affirmed.
KINSLEY, P.J., and NESTOR, J., concur.