SABERS, Justice.
Department of Revenue assessed taxpayer for delinquent sales taxes, penalty, and interest based upon the retroactive application of a statute of limitations or, alternatively, a finding of fraud. Taxpayer appeals. We affirm on fraud.
FACTS
As a result of a routine canvass of Winner, South Dakota, by the Department of Revenue (Department) on December 28th and 29th, 1988, the Department determined that John J. Simpson (Simpson) failed to obtain a sales tax license in 1965 when [625] attorney’s fees became subject to sales tax. After an audit of Simpson’s books and records for the years 1969 through February, 1989, Simpson was assessed tax, penalty and interest totaling $58,342.1 Under SDCL 10-59-9, Simpson requested and received a hearing before the Secretary of Revenue (Secretary) in order to contest the audit. Except for adjustments for recalculation of penalty, credit of reimbursable expenses, and credit for payments made by Simpson prior to the hearing, the audit was affirmed. The Secretary ordered Simpson to pay $45,479 in taxes, penalty, and interest. The circuit court affirmed.2
On appeal, Simpson raises five issues.3
1. Whether SDCL 15-2-13(2)4 is tolled because of fraud or because Simpson fraudulently concealed a cause of action.
The Hearing Examiner held, in the alternative, that the statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13(2) did not bar the assessment because Simpson committed fraud. Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the Department discovered the fraud, The circuit court affirmed the Department’s findings of fraud.
2. Whether SDCL 10-59-165 can be applied retroactively from its effective date of July 1, 1986, thereby reviving actions outside the statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13(2).
The Hearing Examiner held that SDCL 10-59-16 is a remedial statute intended to be applied retroactively.
3. Whether the application of SDCL 10-59-16 to bar claims against Simpson violates Article XI § 2 and Article III § 24 of the South Dakota Constitution.
The circuit court held that Article III § 24 of the South Dakota Constitution prohibits the legislature from enacting any statute which would extinguish Simpson’s indebtedness to the State. Since legislation is to be interpreted in a manner which will survive constitutional scrutiny, SDCL 15-2-13 and 10-59-16 cannot be construed as placing limitations upon actions involving debts arising to the State.
4. Whether SDCL 10-45-4 and the exemption statutes classified thereunder are arbitrary and unreasonable and vi'olate Article VI, §§ 17 and 18 and Article XI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution and Article XIV of the United States Constitution as a denial of equal protection and due process.
A review of Simpson’s brief and supplemental brief to the circuit court fails to reveal that this issue was raised below. This court has consistently held that failure to raise an issue below prevents this court from reviewing the issue on appeal. See [626] Sharp v. Sharp, 422 N.W.2d 443 (S.D. 1988) (constitutional issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal).
5. Whether interest at the rate of 1⅜% per month on a sales tax judgment is usurious and violates equal protection; Whether payment of judgment or filing a supersedes bond as a condition precedent to appeal is also violative of equal protection; Whether SDCL 10-59-16 can be applied retroactively; Whether the Department had actual and constructive knowledge of Simpson’s practice of law; Whether Conclusions of Law 4, 6, and 7 are contrary to law.
Simpson’s brief violates SDCL 15-26A-60(6). He has failed to cite the authorities relied upon for his proposition, to present his issues separately, and to avoid needless repetition. See Ashker v. Solem, 457 N.W.2d 473, 478 (S.D.1990) (citations omitted). Additionally, most of these issues were not raised below. See Issue 4.
Because we hold that Simpson committed fraud under Issue 1, Issues 2 and 3 will not be reached. The claims within Issues 4 and 5 were either not raised below and will not be reached on appeal, or are without merit and are affirmed without further discussion.6
The standard of review of an administrative appeal is governed by SDCL 1-26-36. “[Tjhis court makes the same review of the agency’s decision as did the trial court, and we are unaided by any presumption that [the] trial court’s decision was correct.” In re K.O. Lee Co., 489 N.W.2d 606, 608 (S.D.1992) (citing In re Templeton, 403 N.W.2d 398, 399 (S.D.1987)). The findings of fact are given deference and reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. The conclusions of law, however, are fully reviewable. Id. (citations omitted); Oberle v. City of Aberdeen, 470 N.W.2d 238, 241 (S.D.1991) (citations omitted).
Commission of Fraud Tolls the Statute of Limitations
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SABERS, Justice.
Department of Revenue assessed taxpayer for delinquent sales taxes, penalty, and interest based upon the retroactive application of a statute of limitations or, alternatively, a finding of fraud. Taxpayer appeals. We affirm on fraud.
FACTS
As a result of a routine canvass of Winner, South Dakota, by the Department of Revenue (Department) on December 28th and 29th, 1988, the Department determined that John J. Simpson (Simpson) failed to obtain a sales tax license in 1965 when [625] attorney’s fees became subject to sales tax. After an audit of Simpson’s books and records for the years 1969 through February, 1989, Simpson was assessed tax, penalty and interest totaling $58,342.1 Under SDCL 10-59-9, Simpson requested and received a hearing before the Secretary of Revenue (Secretary) in order to contest the audit. Except for adjustments for recalculation of penalty, credit of reimbursable expenses, and credit for payments made by Simpson prior to the hearing, the audit was affirmed. The Secretary ordered Simpson to pay $45,479 in taxes, penalty, and interest. The circuit court affirmed.2
On appeal, Simpson raises five issues.3
1. Whether SDCL 15-2-13(2)4 is tolled because of fraud or because Simpson fraudulently concealed a cause of action.
The Hearing Examiner held, in the alternative, that the statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13(2) did not bar the assessment because Simpson committed fraud. Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the Department discovered the fraud, The circuit court affirmed the Department’s findings of fraud.
2. Whether SDCL 10-59-165 can be applied retroactively from its effective date of July 1, 1986, thereby reviving actions outside the statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13(2).
The Hearing Examiner held that SDCL 10-59-16 is a remedial statute intended to be applied retroactively.
3. Whether the application of SDCL 10-59-16 to bar claims against Simpson violates Article XI § 2 and Article III § 24 of the South Dakota Constitution.
The circuit court held that Article III § 24 of the South Dakota Constitution prohibits the legislature from enacting any statute which would extinguish Simpson’s indebtedness to the State. Since legislation is to be interpreted in a manner which will survive constitutional scrutiny, SDCL 15-2-13 and 10-59-16 cannot be construed as placing limitations upon actions involving debts arising to the State.
4. Whether SDCL 10-45-4 and the exemption statutes classified thereunder are arbitrary and unreasonable and vi'olate Article VI, §§ 17 and 18 and Article XI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution and Article XIV of the United States Constitution as a denial of equal protection and due process.
A review of Simpson’s brief and supplemental brief to the circuit court fails to reveal that this issue was raised below. This court has consistently held that failure to raise an issue below prevents this court from reviewing the issue on appeal. See [626] Sharp v. Sharp, 422 N.W.2d 443 (S.D. 1988) (constitutional issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal).
5. Whether interest at the rate of 1⅜% per month on a sales tax judgment is usurious and violates equal protection; Whether payment of judgment or filing a supersedes bond as a condition precedent to appeal is also violative of equal protection; Whether SDCL 10-59-16 can be applied retroactively; Whether the Department had actual and constructive knowledge of Simpson’s practice of law; Whether Conclusions of Law 4, 6, and 7 are contrary to law.
Simpson’s brief violates SDCL 15-26A-60(6). He has failed to cite the authorities relied upon for his proposition, to present his issues separately, and to avoid needless repetition. See Ashker v. Solem, 457 N.W.2d 473, 478 (S.D.1990) (citations omitted). Additionally, most of these issues were not raised below. See Issue 4.
Because we hold that Simpson committed fraud under Issue 1, Issues 2 and 3 will not be reached. The claims within Issues 4 and 5 were either not raised below and will not be reached on appeal, or are without merit and are affirmed without further discussion.6
The standard of review of an administrative appeal is governed by SDCL 1-26-36. “[Tjhis court makes the same review of the agency’s decision as did the trial court, and we are unaided by any presumption that [the] trial court’s decision was correct.” In re K.O. Lee Co., 489 N.W.2d 606, 608 (S.D.1992) (citing In re Templeton, 403 N.W.2d 398, 399 (S.D.1987)). The findings of fact are given deference and reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. The conclusions of law, however, are fully reviewable. Id. (citations omitted); Oberle v. City of Aberdeen, 470 N.W.2d 238, 241 (S.D.1991) (citations omitted).
Commission of Fraud Tolls the Statute of Limitations
“A claim for fraud and deceit is generally a question of fact for the fact finder.” Tri-State Refining and Investment Co. v. Apaloosa Co., 431 N.W.2d 311, 314 (S.D.1988) (citation omitted). The Department, as finder of fact in this case, found that Simpson perpetrated fraud on the State of South Dakota. These findings were affirmed by the circuit court.
The Department found that Simpson practiced law from 1965 through January 22, 1989 without applying for a sales tax license. And yet, he collected sales tax from some of his clients, particularly when he completed written customer billing statements. Specifically, on at least three occasions, Simpson charged sales tax on probate files. Prior to February 16, 1989, however, Simpson never filed any sales tax returns or remitted any sales tax to the State on the gross receipts he received, nor did he remit to the State any of the sales tax he collected. “The basic ingredient of fraud involves a state of mind. It means an actual evil motive or intent to evade taxes due to the government or willfully acting contrary to the truth within the taxpayer’s knowledge.” Balter, Tax Fraud and Evasion, (5th ed. 1983) para. 8.03[9]. (Emphasis added.) We hold that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings by the Department that Simpson committed fraud.
Karras v. State, Dept. of Rev., 441 N.W.2d 678 (S.D.1989) notes that if there is no express statute of limitations [627] regarding sales taxes, SDCL 15-2-13(2) is applied. Id. at 681. According to SDCL 15-2-13(2), “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute” must be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues.7 SDCL 15-2-3 provides, however, that “[i]n an action for relief on the ground of fraud the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the aggrieved party discovers, or has actual or constructive notice of, the facts constituting the fraud.” As noted above, the Department did not discover, or have actual or constructive notice of, Simpson’s fraud until December 29, 1988 when the Department canvassed Simpson’s office. Therefore, because the State commenced this action within six years from the time it discovered Simpson’s fraud, the assessment is not barred. Id. See also K.O. Lee, 489 N.W.2d at 609 (citing Karras for the proposition that a showing of fraud suspends the statute of limitations for sales tax collection).
We affirm.
MILLER, C.J., and WUEST and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs with a writing.