In re Shell Oil Refinery

125 F.R.D. 132, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3580, 1989 WL 32093
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 15, 1989
DocketCiv. A. No. 88-1935
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 125 F.R.D. 132 (In re Shell Oil Refinery) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Shell Oil Refinery, 125 F.R.D. 132, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3580, 1989 WL 32093 (E.D. La. 1989).

Opinion

ORDER AND REASONS

MENTZ, District Judge.

In this class action involving approximately 12,000 claimants, Shell produced approximately 660,000 documents in response to plaintiffs’ request for production of documents. By agreement of the parties, the majority of the documents were placed in a building located on Shell’s property in Nor-co, Louisiana, and the remaining documents were placed in the offices of Shell’s counsel. The PLC, accompanied by a Shell representative, has had access to these documents for reviewing but not copying.

Before the Court is the plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Magistrate’s January 9, 1989 Denial of the Motion for a Protective Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. The Court has determined that the matter can be decided on briefs without oral argument and, accordingly, the hearing set for Wednesday, February 8, 1989 is CANCELLED.

The plaintiffs’ motion for protective order sought (1) authority to make copies of all documents selected from the documents produced by Shell without disclosing the identity of the documents on the ground that the selection process constitutes attorney opinion work product; and (2) an order that Shell preserve the documents intact through the conclusion of this litigation.

The Magistrate denied the plaintiffs’ motion for protective order finding that the selection of approximately 65,000 documents out of approximately 660,000 documents was not protected by the work product doctrine. The Magistrate did not provide reasons for denying plaintiffs’ request for preservation of the document production.

This matter comes before the Court under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) which provides a “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law” standard of review on reconsideration of the Magistrate’s ruling. After considering the plaintiffs’ objections, the record and the applicable law, the Court AFFIRMS IN PART the Magistrate’s order of January 9, 1989.

Plaintiffs have suggested that a neutral location and party be designated for copying the documents in order to preserve the secrecy of the selection process. Also, due to the numerosity of the documents involved, there is a substantial need for measures to ensure the integrity of the documents.

Under the circumstances of this case, the selection process is ordinary work product, not opinion work product. The Court views the production and selection of documents in this case as similar to other types of discovery which inevitably reveal certain aspects of an attorney’s thought processes, i.e., interrogatories, requests for admissions, and preparation of witness lists and a pre-trial order. As such, there is no justifiable expectation that the mental impressions revealed will remain private. The fact that the PLC has selected certain documents will ultimately be revealed either in depositions, interrogatories, or exhibit lists. See In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir.1988). To that extent, this case is distinguishable from Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903, 106 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed.2d 230 (1985), upon which the PLC relies for the [134]*134proposition that “the selection and compilation of documents by counsel ... in preparation for pretrial discovery falls within the highly-protected category of opinion work product.” Id. at 316. Sporck involved a request for inspection of documents selected by an attorney to prepare his client for his deposition. As stated in In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire, 859 F.2d at 1018, “the lawyer’s selection process [in Sporck ] was never designed to see the light of day,----” Moreover, it is highly unlikely that Shell will be able to discern the PLC’s “theory of the case” or thought processes simply by knowing which 65,000 documents out of 660,000 documents have been selected for copying. Thus, there is no legitimate concern for secrecy in the selection process.

Even assuming that a legitimate privacy concern is at stake, it does not outweigh the interests of convenience and economy of resources (including time, money, and judicial intervention). As a practical matter, the expense and inconvenience of a neutral depository is not justified where the majority of interests, including the interest of preserving the integrity of the document production, can be protected by allowing each side to maintain its own depository and to monitor the copying of its documents.

Continuing access to the documents is necessary in this complex case involving hundreds of thousands of documents. It is likely that the inspection needs of both parties will evolve as the case is developed through discovery. See Board of Education of Evanston Township High School District 202 v. Admiral Heating and Ventilating, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 23, 35 (N.D.Ill. 1984) (“Continuing access Is often granted in antitrust cases, usually through the use of a central document depository.”) .Disruption to Shell’s business will be minimal with the depository located near the original files, but separate from Shell’s day-today business operations.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Documents produced by Shell pursuant to formal or informal request shall be produced at its current on-site depository to be maintained at Shell’s expense.

(2) The PLC shall agree upon a location for production of any documents produced by plaintiffs pursuant to formal or informal request, said document depository to be maintained at the expense of the PLC;

(3) Each depository shall contain a copying machine with an appropriate mechanism for separately counting the copies that are made by each party.

(4) Access to the documents shall be governed by the prior Joint Motion and Order of Confidentiality dated May 24, 1988.1 A representative from each side shall be present during inspection and/or copying. The parties shall agree upon reasonable access to the depositories. A log shall be kept of all persons who leave and enter each depository. Only duplicate documents may be removed, except by leave of court.

(5) After the initial deposit of documents in a depository, notice shall be given to liaison counsel of all subsequent deposits.

ATTACHMENT A

United States District Court

Eastern District of Louisiana

Thyne Smith and Tracey Barney

Versus

Shell Refining and Marketing Company

Civil Action No. 88-1970 Section “I” (6)

May 24, 1988

JOINT MOTION AND ORDER OF CONFIDENTIALITY

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come the Interim Plaintiffs’ Committee and Shell Oil Company, who herewith jointly move this Honorable Court for a protective order whereby that all documents produced by Shell Oil Company would be subject to the following confidentiality order.

[135]

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Bluebook (online)
125 F.R.D. 132, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3580, 1989 WL 32093, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-shell-oil-refinery-laed-1989.