In Re Seminole Oil & Gas Corporation

150 A.2d 20
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedMarch 3, 1959
DocketCivil Action Nos. 986, 1013
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 150 A.2d 20 (In Re Seminole Oil & Gas Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Seminole Oil & Gas Corporation, 150 A.2d 20 (Del. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

150 A.2d 20 (1959)

In the Matter of SEMINOLE OIL & GAS CORPORATION.
Leah SACHS, Plaintiff,
v.
SEMINOLE OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Milestone Drilling Company, a corporation, John Addison, Geraldine L. Doran, Herschel Greenbaum, Harry D. Mencher, Susan A. Shotwell, Hugh P. Mullen, Herbert Williams, James H. R. Cromwell and Robert K. Berry, Defendants.

Civil Action Nos. 986, 1013.

Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle.

February 27, 1959.
On Motion for Stay March 3, 1959.

*23 Arthur G. Logan and Aubrey B. Lank (of Logan, Marvel, Boggs & Theisen), Wilmington, for plaintiff and petitioner.

Alexander L. Nichols and William S. Megonigal (of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell), Wilmington, for appearing defendants other than Milestone Drilling Co.

William H. Foulk, Wilmington, for defendant Milestone Drilling Co.

SEITZ, Chancellor.

I first consider the exceptions of Management and of the Opposition to the Master's conclusion that the proxies solicited by both groups should be counted. Both Management and Opposition renew their contention that in soliciting proxies the opposing group was guilty of material misrepresentations.

The Master's report outlines the more important "misrepresentations" relied upon by the opposing factions. The Master then goes on to say that he assumes without deciding that the identified material employed on both sides was false and misleading in the respects charged. Thereafter he apparently deviated from the assumption and actually concluded that there were misstatements and deceptive innuendos on both sides. Having examined the pertinent evidence I am of the conclusion that both sides were guilty of material misstatements in their proxy material.

The Master concluded that the false and misleading statements of one faction were washed out or cured because of those of the other. The court prefers not to so evaluate the situation. However, my basic reason for agreeing with the Master's conclusion arises from the fact, which the Master also emphasizes, that both sides sent out numerous letters to the stockholders over a period of several weeks and made charges against and answers to one another which were spelled out at length. While management suggests that the opposition's material of August 28, went out too late for the management to counteract it, I am not satisfied that that document contained material so different from that which had gone before as to work any particular hardship.

It is my view that the court may exercise discretion in determining whether even material misrepresentations made during a proxy solicitation campaign warrant the ordering of a new election. Where, as *24 here, the conflicting claims and answers were presented to the stockholders at length, I think that is a factor which militates against the ordering of a complete resolicitation. This is particularly true since the alleged misrepresentations were pointed out to the solicited stockholders. The economic loss involved in ordering a new election for this comparatively "small" corporation is also entitled to weight. I do not suggest that such an approach is always sound but in a contest where both are guilty and where the issues primarily relate to the fitness of the candidates and thus involve a problem of personal evaluation, it seems to the court that the approach adopted is appropriate.

I therefore conclude that the exceptions of both parties to the Master's decision to count the proxies in question must be overruled.

I now come to the exceptions of the defendant Seminole Oil & Gas Corporation ("corporation") and Milestone Drilling Company ("Milestone") to the Master's conclusion that the stock issued by the corporation to Milestone pursuant to the terms of the so-called Milestone Drilling contract of July 1958 should not be counted insofar as Civil Action 986 is concerned and should be cancelled insofar as Civil Action 1013 is concerned.

The Master concluded that the shares of stock of defendant corporation were not issued for consideration which is legally recognizable under our Constitution and Statute.

Defendant corporation and Milestone suggest that the stock was issued for valid consideration. As I read their brief, they say that it is found in the continuation of the existing relationship between defendant corporation and Milestone; the fact that the contract replaced and superseded the unperformed obligations of the parties under an earlier agreement, citing Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation, 30 Del.Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581, 598; the obtaining of a financial commitment by Milestone for defendant; and two other unimportant factors.

I think it clear that the mere fact of the continuation of the relationship between defendant corporation and Milestone in and of itself is not legal consideration for the stock under the Delaware law. As to the second ground asserted by defendant, I conclude that the shares were issued at a time when defendant was not confronted with a claim or demand by Milestone under any prior contract which could be said to justify the issuance of stock in lieu thereof at that time. Nor was the stock issued for past services. These factors distinguish the Blish case. The other so-called considerations were not sufficient to support the issuance of the stock, if in fact they were consideration at all.

I conclude that the fair inference from the admissible evidence is that these shares were issued, and Milestone understood that they were being issued, solely for future services.

I therefore conclude that the shares were issued without consideration.

This brings me to the corporation's and Milestone's contention that even if it be found that the shares were issued without compliance with Delaware law as to the type of consideration required, nevertheless, the shares should not be cancelled but Milestone should be entitled to a credit for services subsequently performed.

Prior to the execution of the present agreement, Milestone was well aware that a fight for control of Seminole was in the offing. I am equally sure that Milestone was aware at that time of the fact that the arrangement as finally worked out was motivated at least in part by management's desire to assure itself of control of the corporation. It is a mockery, in the face of this record, to suggest that the "control" effect of this agreement was merely incidental to its primary business objective.

*25 I recognize that I have discretion in determining the form of relief here and I am also satisfied that the appropriate relief here is to order the shares cancelled. I say this because Milestone does not stand in the position of an innocent third party involved in an arm's length transaction. It is suggested that Milestone has performed in part under the new agreement and is therefore entitled to have such "equities" recognized. The briefing on this point is too sketchy to permit the recognition of such a claim. I will keep the cancellation action open to give Milestone an opportunity to assert such a claim if it desires. If such claims are asserted the court will determine whether Milestone is entitled to a lien.

Since the shares were improperly issued the Master properly refused to count them.

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Bluebook (online)
150 A.2d 20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-seminole-oil-gas-corporation-delch-1959.