Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp.

20 A.2d 743, 26 Del. Ch. 1, 1941 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedJune 26, 1941
StatusPublished
Cited by38 cases

This text of 20 A.2d 743 (Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 20 A.2d 743, 26 Del. Ch. 1, 1941 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 (Del. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

The Vice-Chancellor:

The petitioners charge that the purported election of directors at the stockholders’ meeting of 1940 was invalid because a quorum was not present at the meeting. To support this they would show that proxies were obtained by fraud, revocations of proxies were not recognized, proxies which were invalid were voted, and shareholders counted as present in person did not attend the meeting.

The petitioners, Boudinot Atterbury and Philip L. Garret, are shareholders and were formerly president and vice-[5]*5president, respectively, of the corporation. In March, 1940, they made a report to the directors' concerning certain employees of the company at a mine operated by it, and made charges against these employees. The board of directors appointed a special committee to investigate the charges and to inform the directors of the committee’s findings. On May 3, 1940, the committee made a report to the board which, in substance, exonerated the employees in question and criticized the petitioners for their action in the matter. On May 6, the day preceding the annual meeting of stockholders, the directors granted to the petitioners leaves of absence with pay pending the expiration of their terms of office, and temporarily vested the powers of president in I. W. Burnham, II, a director of the corporation, as vice-president and acting president.

On March 15, 1940, at the same meeting at which the special investigating committee was appointed, the board of directors, by the unanimous vote of its fifteen members, including the petitioners herein, adopted a resolution authorizing “the Executive Officers” of the.corporation (consisting of the petitioners herein, and E. J. MacDonald, secretary and treasurer) to prepare a notice of the annual meeting of stockholders to be held on May 7,1940, and also to prepare “on behalf of the Management” a proxy and proxy statement to be forwarded with the notice to all stockholders of record as of the close of business on April 16, 1940. The resolution further appointed a proxy committee consisting of the petitioner Atterbury and two other directors, namely, Edwin L. Derby, Jr., and Duncan M. Spencer, and instructed such committee “to vote such proxies as may run to them for the election as Directors of this Corporation of such candidates for that office as are designated by this Board of Directors.”

At the same meeting, the directors also adopted a resolution naming I. W. Burnham, II, Philip L. Garret (one of the petitioners herein), Norman E. LaMond, Claude F. Lea-. [6]*6man and John A. Payne as “the Management’s nominees as' candidates for directors to hold office for three years.” These persons were incumbent directors. Their nomination for re-election was approved unanimously by the ten disinterested directors, including the petitioner Atterbury.

The executive officers caused the notice, proxy statement, and form of proxy to be mailed to stockholders.

Some days prior to the annual meeting, petitioners sought to obtain revocations of proxies in order to prevent the attendance of a quorum at the scheduled meeting, their position being that they wished to delay the meeting until they might have an opportunity to inform the shareholders concerning the affair at the company’s mine. Petitioners communicated with numerous stockholders requesting them to revoke their proxies previously sent to the proxy committee. Many proxies were revoked.

On May 7 at 1 P. M. the annual meeting was called to order by respondent, Burnham, as acting president. Spencer and Derby, comprising a majority of the members of the proxy committee, were in attendance at the meeting. After recesses, the meeting was adjourned to the morning of May 8 when the inspectors reported that a quorum was not present on the preceding day. The meeting was then adjourned, pursuant to Article 1, Section 4 of the by-laws, the second paragraph of which provides:

“If the holders of the amount of stock necessary to constitute a quorum shall fail to attend in person or by proxy at the time and place fixed by these By-Laws for an annual meeting, or fixed by notice as above provided for a special meeting, a majority in interest of the stockholders present in person or by proxy may adjourn, from time to time, without notice other than by announcement at the meeting, until holders of . the amount of stock requisite to constitute a quorum shall attend. At any such adjourned meeting at which a quorum shall be present, any business may be transacted which might have been transacted at the meeting as originally notified.”

When the meeting reassembled in the afternoon, the inspectors presented an amended report in which they stated [7]*7that a quorum was, in fact, present on May 7. They then further reported that there was a quorum present at the afternoon session on May 8, and the meeting proceeded to the election of five directors. The present proceeding challenges the office of the directors so elected. Many questions are raised, and the more important of them will, for the sake of clarity, be dealt with separately.

1. Fraud in the solicitation or use made of proxies.

The petitioners urge that certain statements contained in the solicitation of proxies for the annual meeting were false and misleading, and omitted to state material facts. The first such statement is the following:

“The attached proxy is solicited by the management”.

Petitioners say that the solicitation was, in effect, a representation that the same officers would be retained; whereas the proxies were employed to bring about a radical change in the management. They urge that the term “management” was used in the proxy solicitations to mean “directors and officers,” pointing out that the solicitation was in compliance with the Rules and Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and that Rule X-14A-8 (h) of the Commission provides:

“The phrase ‘the persons making the solicitation,’ used in relation to a solicitation by the management of the issuer, means the directors and officers of the issuer, exclusive of any directors or officers who are opposed to the solicitation.”

It seems plain that the solicitation was for proxies to be voted for five designated directors; that the solicitation itself, as well as the choice of candidates, were approved by the directors and officers when the solicitations were made; and further that the proxies were actually used to vote for these very candidates. In my view, the facts do not warrant an inference, as charged by the petitioners, that any of the directors knew, when the proxies were solicited, that the petitioners would be removed from office or would not be [8]*8re-elected. In addition, I do not find from the language of the regulations quoted, nor from the surrounding circumstances, any representation which would justify the shareholders in expecting that the directors would either continue the same persons as officers, or choose others in their stead.

Another statement contained in the proxy solicitations which petitioners consider misleading is the following:

“The only business which the management intends to present, or knows that others may present, is the election of directors”.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
20 A.2d 743, 26 Del. Ch. 1, 1941 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atterbury-v-consolidated-coppermines-corp-delch-1941.