[370]*370GIVENS,'Justice.
April 10, 1954, proponents filed with the Secretary of State, a petition for an initiative measure, pursuant to Section 34-1801, I.C., signed by twenty residents of Blackfoot and Idaho Falls. (Copy of proposed initiative appended hereto.)
Compliant with Section 34-1809, I.C., the Attorney General provided and returned to the Secretary of State as a distinctive short title, “The Right to Work Initiative Proposal” and a long title which, as amended, is not questioned.
Patently “Initiative measure for or to” or other appropriate concluding preposition, is no more a part of the restrictive ten-word short title than “An Act” preceding a regular legislative statute is, though both are equally necessary for identification.
Thereafter, under Section 34 — 1809, I.C., petitioners herein, May 4, filed their petition, amended May 7, challenging said short title mainly because it lacked reference to membership or lack of membership in a labor union or organization, with further elaboration thereof, as the sine qua non of the proposed measure.
Section 34 — 1809, I.C., outlines no procedure or process for hearing such so-called appeal by this Court.
The principles announced in Roche v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App. 255, 157 P. 830, 832, relative to Section 187, CaLCode "of Civil Procedure, identical with Section 1-1622, I.C., in connection with an election cont.est, as analogous, are applicable. The Court therein stated: ! : : .
“Under section 187, Code of Civil Procedure, it devolves upon the court in such a case to adopt a suitable procedure which will furnish an opportunity for any interested person to appear - at the hearing.”
Section 7-208, I.C., authorizes shortening of the return time specified therein; hence, due to the exigencies of the situation, by minute entry May 10, Record Book 10, page 164, we ordered' petitioners to serve the Attorney General and Secretary of State with, and notify proponents of, the petition; fixing successive return days for traverses and briefs and service thereof, authorizing appearances and argument at the hearing, set for June 2, 1954.
May 14 petitioners filed proof of proper service.
May 18 the Attorney General filed his response to the effect he had no adversary interest herein, individually or officially; that he entitled the act in accordance with the statute; waived reply brief or argument, and stood ready to assist the Court.
Proponents, through their attorney, May 19 filed a petition as by the “Peoples Right to Work Committee, Inc.,” a non-profit cor[371]*371poration organized by: Vern E. Walquist, C. W. Burke, Craig W. Johnson, Keith H. Johnson and Ivan W. Johnson, who had signed the original initiative proposal and asked, as of June 2, an order allowing it to intervene, which order was issued at the subsequent hearing. Said Committee and representatives of proponents also filed a motion to dismiss on various grounds, challenging so far as material here, the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this proceeding and the procedure; also a motion tó strike páragraph 8 of Petitioners’ petition, which is the one challenging the sufficiency of the short title, on various grounds; and paragraphs 10 and 11, which were suggestions by the Petitioners as to both short and long titles, the latter as amended not criticised now, so not considered. Also a demurrer raising the same points; all supported by an elaborate and pertinent brief approbating the short title drawn by the Attorney General.
Hearing was had June 2 as set.
We must give effect to Section 34— 1809, I.C., so far as we may consistently do so, to obtain substantial justice. Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 261 P. 244; Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, at page 701 et seq., 78 P.2d 105; State ex rel. Graham v. Enking, 59 Idaho 321, 82 P.2d 649; State ex rel. Anderson v. Rayner, 60 Idaho 706, 96 P.2d 244; Bel v. Benewah County, 60 Idaho 791, 97 P.2d 397; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 36, 116 P.2d 221; Scandrett v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 46, 116 P.2d 225; State ex rel. Wright v. Headrick, 65 Idaho 148, 139 P.2d 761; State v. Groseclose, 67 Idaho 71, 171 P.2d 863; Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662.
Article V, Section 2 of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the State—
“ * * * in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts, probate courts, courts of justices of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law for any incorporated city or town.”
Section 9 of the same Article confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court—
“ * * * to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district courts, or the judges thereof, and any order of the public utilities commission, and any order of the industrial accident board: the legislature may provide conditions of appeal, scope of appeal, and procedure on appeal from orders of the public utilities commission and of the industrial accident board. * * * The Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.”
Obviously this is not an appeal from a district judge or a district court, public [372]*372utility commission order or order of the Industrial accident board, nor any proceeding in aid of our appellate jurisdiction as such.
Section 7-202,1.C., provides:
“A writ of review may be granted by any court except a probate or justice’s court, when an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”
Section 7-208, I.C., thus limits the scope of the writ:
“The review upon this writ can not be extended further than to determine whether the. inferior tribunal, board or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board or officer.”
In Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, at page 575, 107 P. 493, at page 495, prohibition issued to determine whether the State Land Board had jurisdiction, i. e., authority, under the Constitution and statutes, to relinquish preferential rights to selected lands granted in our State Admission Bill, the Court stated:
“It is obvious that if the contemplated action of the Board of Land Commissioners involves the exercise of a judgment or discretion vested in them by law, then this court cannot and will not attempt to control that discretion, or in any manner interfere with or direct the action of the board. If, on the other hand, the action proposed is without authority of law, or has no legal sanction or authority, or is an attempt to act, not upon the discretion and judgment of the board, but upon a substituted judgment or discretion, or upon the judgment, discretion, and direction of some other board or body, then and in such cases this court may interrupt them and declare the law on the subject, and point out to them the-legal scope within which their judgment and, discretion must be exercised"
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[370]*370GIVENS,'Justice.
April 10, 1954, proponents filed with the Secretary of State, a petition for an initiative measure, pursuant to Section 34-1801, I.C., signed by twenty residents of Blackfoot and Idaho Falls. (Copy of proposed initiative appended hereto.)
Compliant with Section 34-1809, I.C., the Attorney General provided and returned to the Secretary of State as a distinctive short title, “The Right to Work Initiative Proposal” and a long title which, as amended, is not questioned.
Patently “Initiative measure for or to” or other appropriate concluding preposition, is no more a part of the restrictive ten-word short title than “An Act” preceding a regular legislative statute is, though both are equally necessary for identification.
Thereafter, under Section 34 — 1809, I.C., petitioners herein, May 4, filed their petition, amended May 7, challenging said short title mainly because it lacked reference to membership or lack of membership in a labor union or organization, with further elaboration thereof, as the sine qua non of the proposed measure.
Section 34 — 1809, I.C., outlines no procedure or process for hearing such so-called appeal by this Court.
The principles announced in Roche v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App. 255, 157 P. 830, 832, relative to Section 187, CaLCode "of Civil Procedure, identical with Section 1-1622, I.C., in connection with an election cont.est, as analogous, are applicable. The Court therein stated: ! : : .
“Under section 187, Code of Civil Procedure, it devolves upon the court in such a case to adopt a suitable procedure which will furnish an opportunity for any interested person to appear - at the hearing.”
Section 7-208, I.C., authorizes shortening of the return time specified therein; hence, due to the exigencies of the situation, by minute entry May 10, Record Book 10, page 164, we ordered' petitioners to serve the Attorney General and Secretary of State with, and notify proponents of, the petition; fixing successive return days for traverses and briefs and service thereof, authorizing appearances and argument at the hearing, set for June 2, 1954.
May 14 petitioners filed proof of proper service.
May 18 the Attorney General filed his response to the effect he had no adversary interest herein, individually or officially; that he entitled the act in accordance with the statute; waived reply brief or argument, and stood ready to assist the Court.
Proponents, through their attorney, May 19 filed a petition as by the “Peoples Right to Work Committee, Inc.,” a non-profit cor[371]*371poration organized by: Vern E. Walquist, C. W. Burke, Craig W. Johnson, Keith H. Johnson and Ivan W. Johnson, who had signed the original initiative proposal and asked, as of June 2, an order allowing it to intervene, which order was issued at the subsequent hearing. Said Committee and representatives of proponents also filed a motion to dismiss on various grounds, challenging so far as material here, the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this proceeding and the procedure; also a motion tó strike páragraph 8 of Petitioners’ petition, which is the one challenging the sufficiency of the short title, on various grounds; and paragraphs 10 and 11, which were suggestions by the Petitioners as to both short and long titles, the latter as amended not criticised now, so not considered. Also a demurrer raising the same points; all supported by an elaborate and pertinent brief approbating the short title drawn by the Attorney General.
Hearing was had June 2 as set.
We must give effect to Section 34— 1809, I.C., so far as we may consistently do so, to obtain substantial justice. Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 261 P. 244; Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, at page 701 et seq., 78 P.2d 105; State ex rel. Graham v. Enking, 59 Idaho 321, 82 P.2d 649; State ex rel. Anderson v. Rayner, 60 Idaho 706, 96 P.2d 244; Bel v. Benewah County, 60 Idaho 791, 97 P.2d 397; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 36, 116 P.2d 221; Scandrett v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 46, 116 P.2d 225; State ex rel. Wright v. Headrick, 65 Idaho 148, 139 P.2d 761; State v. Groseclose, 67 Idaho 71, 171 P.2d 863; Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662.
Article V, Section 2 of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the State—
“ * * * in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts, probate courts, courts of justices of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law for any incorporated city or town.”
Section 9 of the same Article confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court—
“ * * * to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district courts, or the judges thereof, and any order of the public utilities commission, and any order of the industrial accident board: the legislature may provide conditions of appeal, scope of appeal, and procedure on appeal from orders of the public utilities commission and of the industrial accident board. * * * The Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.”
Obviously this is not an appeal from a district judge or a district court, public [372]*372utility commission order or order of the Industrial accident board, nor any proceeding in aid of our appellate jurisdiction as such.
Section 7-202,1.C., provides:
“A writ of review may be granted by any court except a probate or justice’s court, when an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”
Section 7-208, I.C., thus limits the scope of the writ:
“The review upon this writ can not be extended further than to determine whether the. inferior tribunal, board or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board or officer.”
In Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, at page 575, 107 P. 493, at page 495, prohibition issued to determine whether the State Land Board had jurisdiction, i. e., authority, under the Constitution and statutes, to relinquish preferential rights to selected lands granted in our State Admission Bill, the Court stated:
“It is obvious that if the contemplated action of the Board of Land Commissioners involves the exercise of a judgment or discretion vested in them by law, then this court cannot and will not attempt to control that discretion, or in any manner interfere with or direct the action of the board. If, on the other hand, the action proposed is without authority of law, or has no legal sanction or authority, or is an attempt to act, not upon the discretion and judgment of the board, but upon a substituted judgment or discretion, or upon the judgment, discretion, and direction of some other board or body, then and in such cases this court may interrupt them and declare the law on the subject, and point out to them the-legal scope within which their judgment and, discretion must be exercised" (Emphasis added.)
In Hawley v. Bottolfsen, 61 Idaho 101, 98 P.2d 634, a writ of review determined whether the Governor had regularly pursued his authority in relieving the plaintiff from his position upon the Idaho Fish and Game Commission and appointing another in his place, and examined the charges and considered them sufficient to uphold the action of the Governor in relieving the appointee of his position, stating the purpose of review is to determine primarily the law applicable to the case, rather than the facts of the case. •
The facts in this case are the proposed initiative measure. Under the statute, the Attorney General is to draft, within ten words exclusive of the designation, “Initiative Proposal For,” a distinctive title by which the measure is commonly referred [373]*373“to or spoken of, to be printed in the footnote margin of each sheet of the petition, •i. e., the sheets to be circulated for the purpose of having them signed by the number required by Section 34-1805, I.C. Thus, this short title being printed upon these ■petitions to be circulated for names, under ■the terms of the statute, must not only be .a title by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of, but must also be ■distinctive.
“Distinctive” is thus defined in Webster’s International Dictionary, 1934 ed., page 756:
“Marking or expressing distinction; distinguishing, characteristic, peculiar. Having ability to distinguish; discriminating; distinct, separate; distinctive characteristic. Distinctive refers primarily to that which marks or distinguishes one thing regarded in its relation to other things; characteristic, that which constitutes or expresses the character or quality of the thing itself, without necessary reference to other things; * *
The Standard Dictionary, 1937 ed., p. 733, ■thus:
“ * * * indicating distinction or difference; characteristic; distinguishing; as distinctive signs, distinctive traits. Distinctively, clearly, accurately. A mark or character indicating .separation.”
March — Thesaurus, 1906, p. 294: “characteristic.”
Vol. 2, Cent.Dict.1889, p. 1694;
“1. Marking distinct, difference, or peculiarity; distinguishing from something diverse; characteristic; as, distinctive names or titles; * *
Vol. Ill, New Eng.Dict, Murray & Bradley, 1897, p. 526:
“1. Having the quality of distinction; serving or used to distinguish or discriminate; characteristic, distinguishing. * *
“3. Having a distinct character or position. * * * Bl. A distinguishing mark or quality; a characteristic.”
See, also, United States v. Forty Barrels, 241 U.S. 265, 36 S.Ct. 573, 60 L.Ed. 995, Ann.Cas.1917C, 487.
This short title must, therefore, so far as possible within ten words, set forth the characteristics which distinguish this proposed measure and expeditiously and accurately acquaint the prospective signer with what he is sponsoring. State ex rel. Gibson v. Richardson, 48 Or. 309, 85 P. 225, 229, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 362; Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 P. 946, 62 A.L.R. 1341; Evans v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 306 Mass. 296, 28 N.E.2d 241; In re Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 631, 35 N.E.2d 676; Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 327 Mass. 310, 98 N.E.2d 621, at page 631.
[374]*374In constructing and phrasing the title, the Attorney General, not as an advocate or an adversary, must perforce analyze and appraise the proposed legislation, determine what it means and its distinctive characteristics and endeavor to ascertain how it is commonly referred to or spoken of. In thus drafting and making an impartial, but comprehensive, short title, he is exercising a quasi judicial function. Horton v. Attorney General, 269 Mass. 503, 169 N.E. 552; Evans v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 306 Mass. 296, 28 N.E.2d 241, supra; Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 327 Mass. 310, 98 N.E.2d 621, supra; 7 C.J.S., Attorney General, § 5, p. 1223, notes 33, 34. Thus, his efforts are subject to review by certiorari. Section 7-202, I.C.
We may, therefore, consistent with its historical concept, consider this proceeding is in the nature of a writ of certiorari or review to declare the legal requirements and standards by which the short title is to be constructed and to determine whether or not the title as submitted by the Attorney General complies therewith.
While Howe v. Attorney General, 325 Mass. 268, 90 N.E.2d 316, did not intimate certiorari was the proper remedy, by rejecting mandamus and referring to certiorari, it inferred it was a possible method. Horton v. Attorney General, 269 Mass. 503, 169 N.E, 552, at page 554, supra; Richardson v. Neuner, 183 Or. 558, 194 P.2d 989.
The portion of Section’ 34-1809',. I.C., purportedly requiring this Court, itself; to prepare a short title of ballot title if that submitted by the Attorney General is incorrect, is beyond our power under the writ of certiorari or review. Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 107 P. 493; Northwest Light & Water Co. v. Alexander, 29 Idaho 557, 160 P. 1106; Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, 144 P.2d 194; Richardson v. Neuner, 183 Or. 558, 194 P.2d 989, supra. People v. Barbera, 78 Cal.App. 277, 248 P. 304, at page 305; Lemen v. Edmunson, 202 Cal. 760, 262 P. 735, at page 736; North Bend. Stage Line v. Department of Public Works, 170 Wash. 217, 16 P.2d 206, at page 210; Lading v. City of Duluth, 153 Minn. 464, 190 N.W. 981, at page 982; State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676, at page 684; In re Manufacturer’s Freight Forwarding Co., 294 Mich. 57, 292 N.W. 678, at pages 682-683; Foraker v. Perry Tp. Rural Sch. Dist. B. of Education, 130 Ohio St. 243, 199 N.E. 74, at page 75; Hoffman v. Knollman, 135 Ohio St. 170, 20 N.E.2d 221, at page 228; Stein & Co. v. State Tax Board, 174 Ga. 611, 163 S.E. 187; American Mills Co. v. Doyal, 174 Ga. 631, 163 S.E. 603; State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 90 A.L.R. 704, at page 710(5) ; State ex rel. Wabash R. Co. v. Shain, 341 Mo, 19, 106 S.W.2d 898, at page 899; Ward v. Public Service Commission, 341 Mo. 227, 108 S.W. 2d 136, at page 138. ...
[375]*375The chief characteristic and paramount, distinctive features of the proposed statute jare, that a person shall be allowed to seek, .■gain, obtain and retain employment regardless of whether or not he is a member of a labor union or labor organization. The measure further elaborates, but these are, as to a title, the essentials. Thus, tersely stated, this is an initiative measure for the right to work regardless of union membership or non-membership.
This phase of the proposed statute is not in any way presented or mentioned in the short title prepared and hence, it'is defective and does not comply with the appropriate statutory requirements. Dagwell v. Thornton, 199 Or. 8, 259 P.2d 125; Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 43 S.W.2d 356, 44 S.W.2d 331.
The many references in proponents’ briefs indicate that no doubt in many instances the title as prepared by the Attorney General is commonly used, but under the statute and for the purpose for which it is designed, namely, to acquaint prospective signers with the distinctive character- ■ istics of the proposed measure, such appellation — though it may be applied and used •generally and loosely — is not sufficient. The deficiency in the title, therefore, in no way reflects any discredit on the learned Attorney General.
By merely ascertaining and declar- ' ing the law and determining the title prepared by the Attorney General does not comply with the statutory requirements, we are not invading the legislative field any ■more than we did the executive field when we passed upon the acts of administrative or executive officers in numerous previous writs of review. Neither are we entering into or usurping the legislative function in passing upon this proposed'title any more than when we determine whether the title of a statute passed.by the legislature complies with Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution. We have jurisdiction, in advance of proposed action, to exercise our judicial power — as for instance, by declaratory judgments.
It is obvious there is more imperative reason, for a title for án initiative measure than for a proposed statute before the legislature. This is recognized by all -the authorities that have' considered this phase of the initiative, and someone must ..prepare the title. The statutory delegation of this duty to the Attorney General has been adopted by many states and the Attor-ney General is-not entering the legislative field in this respect any more than when he exercises the power enjoined upon him in -Section 67-1401, subd. 6, Idaho Code.
The exigencies of the exercise of the initiative right justify the making of a title by a disinterested, impartial officer and the Legislature was authorized to so delegate this quasi-judicial function to the Attorney General. Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution.
[376]*376The title as fixed by the Attorney General, therefore, is disapproved and he will, within five days after this decision becomes final, prepare a title in accordance with the views expressed herein and file the same with the Secretary of State.
PORTER, C. J., and THOMAS and KEETON, JJ., concur.
Appendix
“Be It Enacted By The People Of The State Of Idaho:
“Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of Idaho that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization.
“Section 2. Any agreement or combination between any employer and any labor union or labor organization whereby persons not members of such union or organization shall be denied the right to work for said employer, or whereby such membership is made a condition of employment or continuation of employment by such employer, or whereby any such union or organization acquired an employment monopoly in any enterprise, is hereby declared to be against public policy and an illegal combination or conspiracy.
“Section 3. No person shall be required by an employer to become or remain a member of any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.
“Section 4. No person shall be required by an employer to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.
“Section S. No employer shall require any person, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, to pay any dues, fees or other charges of any kind to' any labor union or labor organization.
“Section 6. Any persons who may be denied employment or be deprived of continuation of his employment in violation of sections three, four or five or of one or more of such sections, shall be entitled to recover from such employer and from any other person, firm, corporation or association acting in concert with him by appropriate action in the courts of this State such damages as he may have sustained by reason of such denial or deprivation of employment.
“Section 7. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any lawful contract in force on the effective date hereof but they shall apply in all respects to contracts entered into thereafter and to any renewal or extension of an existing contract.
“Section 8. The provisions of this act are declared to be severable and the unconstitutionality or invalidity of any section or provision of this act shall not affect the remainder thereof.
[377]*377“Section 9. All acts, whether general, local, special or private, or parts of such acts, in conflict with or which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.”