Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance

666 P.2d 1144, 105 Idaho 133, 1983 Ida. LEXIS 498

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: July 14, 1983
• Docket: 99034
• Status: Published

Opinions

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

This proceeding is in this Court pursuant to the certification procedure set forth in I.A.R. 12.1¹ (adopted April 3, 1981; effective July 1, 1981). The United States District Court for the District of Idaho has certified five questions to the Idaho Supreme Court as presenting controlling questions of Idaho law with respect to a pending federal case, Sunshine Mining Company v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Company, Civ. No. 80-1276. The District Court also certified that “immediate determination of Idaho law with respect to these questions will materially advance the orderly resolution of the action in the United States District Court.”

As allowed by I.A.R. 12.1(b), a brief was filed in this Court by defendants in opposition to certification which was followed by briefs filed in support of certification by Sunshine Mining Company. The Court held a hearing on the issue presented by the briefs — whether I.A.R. 12.1 is constitutional under the Idaho Constitution. Thus, we consider in this opinion whether this Court has constitutional jurisdiction to entertain questions certified from federal courts pursuant to I.A.R. 12.1. For reasons set forth below, we conclude that I.A.R. 12.1 is constitutional and that the certification procedure established therein is valid.

The highest courts of several states have considered the constitutional ramifications of the certification process² under their respective state constitutions. Certification processes established by statute or court rule have been expressly held valid under various state constitutions, Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961); In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966); Irion v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 154 Mont. 156, 461 P.2d 199, 203 (Mont. 1969); In re Elliott, 74 Wash.2d 600, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash.1968), and held invalid under one state constitution,³ Holden v. N L Industries, Inc., 629 P.2d 428 (Utah 1981) (court adopted rule held unconstitutional and withdrawn).

The defendants argue that I.A.R. 12.1 is unconstitutional in light of this Court’s decision in Neil v. Public Utilities Commission, 32 Idaho 44, 178 P. 271 (1919). Neil involved an original proceeding brought to procure a writ of review directed to the Public Utilities Commission. Under § 63(a) of the Public Utilities Act, plaintiffs sought review of a Public Utilities Commission decision and order. Section 63(a) provided that the plaintiffs could apply to this Court for a writ of certiorari or review. The Neil Court considered the constitutional issue whether the legislature could broaden and extend the original and appellate jurisdiction of this Court provided by article 5, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution.⁴ The Court held that the legislature had no such powers under the constitution. The Neil opinion did not address the inherent judicial power of this Court. See In re Petition of Idaho State Federation of Labor (AFL), 75 Idaho 367, 382, 272 P.2d 707, 716 (1954) (Taylor, J., dissenting).

The defendants argue that if this Court has jurisdiction, it has to be based upon article 5, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution. Section 9 now provides:

“§ 9. Original and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court. — The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district courts, or the judges thereof, and any order of the public utilities commission, and any order of the industrial accident board: the legislature may provide conditions of appeal, scope of appeal, and procedure on appeal from orders of the public utilities commission and of the industrial accident board. On appeal from orders of the industrial accident board the court shall be limited to a review of questions of law. The Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.”

The defendants further argue that this Court should follow the example of the Utah Supreme Court which recently held unconstitutional its certification rule in Holden v. N L Industries, Inc., 629 P.2d 428 (Utah 1981). The Holden court examined the Utah constitutional provision, article 8, section 4⁵ which is comparable to our article 5, section 9, and found that it expressly limited the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court. The critical language of the Utah provision is “[i]n other cases the [Utah] Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only....” Utah Const, art. 8, § 4 (emphasis added). Such a limitation is absent from article 5, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution. Thus, the Holden rationale does not persuade us that I.A.R. 12.1 is unconstitutional. We may therefore construe our constitution in a manner similar to the construction placed by the Washington Supreme Court upon their constitution. See In re Elliott, 74 Wash.2d 600, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash.1968). Such a construction would allow this Court to entertain certified questions by exercise of its judicial power. See ID. Const, art. 5, § 2; In re Elliott, supra; see also Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 742-43 (Fla.1961) (“in the absence of a constitutional provision expressly or by necessary implication limiting the jurisdiction of the [Florida] Supreme Court to those matters expressly conferred upon it ... [or] expressly conferring upon another court jurisdiction to exercise the judicial power [with respect to certification] ..., such power may be granted to this court... ”) (emphasis deleted).

We consider article 5, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution as limiting and not as granting our jurisdiction. See Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 637, 10 P.2d 307, 314 (1932) (“It is a fundamental rule of constitutional law that a state Constitution is an instrument of limitation and not of grant, that all powers are retained to the state not expressly withheld, and the decisions in this state are bottomed squarely upon that rule”); Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, supra; In re Elliott, supra. The Washington Supreme Court has stated that:

“So patent is the power of a court to render an opinion in response to a certified question that New Hampshire has adopted the practice by court rule, not waiting for an expression of legislative approval of the idea....

“This [Washington] court, under its rulemaking power ... [citation omitted] could do as the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has done. It could also accept a certified question and respond to it even if there were no implementing statute or rule. It is within the inherent power of the court as the judicial body authorized by the constitution to render decisions reflecting the law of this state.”

In re Elliott, supra 446 P.2d at 358. We hold that this Court has inherent power to render decisions regarding Idaho law. See ID. Const, art. 5, § 2.

We have inherent power under article 5, section 2⁶ which vests the judicial power of the state in this Court. See Eismann v. Miller, 101 Idaho 692, 619 P.2d 1145 (1980); State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 539 P.2d 604 (1975).

“The grant of the judicial power to the courts carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration of justice under the Constitution.” Burton v. Mayer, [274 Ky. 263] 118 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Ky.1938) (quoted approvingly in R.E.W. Construction v. District Court of Third Judicial District, 88 Idaho 426, 435, 400 P.2d 390, 396 (1965) (recognizing inherent rule-making power of this Court)).

We exercised this inherent power in adopting I.A.R. 12.1.

We anticipate and expect that the courts which certify questions to this Court pursuant to I.A.R. 12.1 will accept our answers to such questions as determinative of the law of Idaho.⁷ With such expectation, we endorse as constitutional the certification procedure as embodied by I.A.R. 12.1.

Upon this opinion becoming final, an order will be entered setting forth the procedure to be followed in the adjudication. I.A.R. 12.1(c).

SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur. BAKES, J., concurs in result.

1 . In its entirety I.A.R. 12.1 provides:

“Rule 12.1. Certification of a question of law from a United States court. — (a) Certification of a Question of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States or a United States District Court may certify in writing to the Idaho Supreme Court a question of law asking for a declaratory judgment or decree adjudicating the Idaho law on such question if such court, on the court’s own motion or upon the motion of any party, finds in a pending action that:

“(1) The question of law certified is a controlling question of law in the pending action in the United States court as to which there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, and “(2) An immediate determination of the Idaho law with regard to the certified question would materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation in the United States court.

“(b) Filing with Idaho Supreme Court. Upon the certification of a question of law to the Idaho Supreme Court under this rule, the United States court or any party in the action pending in that court, may file a certified copy of its order of certification with the Idaho Supreme Court without the payment of any filing fee. Any party to the action pending in the United States court may file a statement or brief in support of, or in opposition to, the certification of the question of law to the Idaho Supreme Court within fourteen (14) days from the date of filing of the Order of Certification.

“(c) Acceptance by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court may in its discretion accept the question of law certified by the United States court under this rule unless it finds that it appears that there is another ground for determination of the case pending in the United States court, or that the question certified for adjudication under this rule is not clearly defined in the Order of Certification, or that there is not an adequate showing that the question of law qualifies for determination under subsection (a) of this rule. The Idaho Supreme Court will enter an order either accepting or rejecting the question certified to it by the United States court and serve copies of such order upon the United States court and all parties to that pending action. If the Idaho Supreme Court accepts the certified question of law for adjudication, the Idaho Supreme Court will, in its order of acceptance, set forth the procedure to be followed in the adjudication proceeding including the sequence and time for the filing of briefs by the parties to the pending action in the United States court. The Idaho Supreme Court may, in its discretion, also require copies of all or any portion of the clerk’s record or reporter’s transcript before the United States court to be filed with the Court, if in the opinion of the Court such documents are necessary in the determination of the question certified.

“(d) Argument on Certified Question Before the Idaho Supreme Court. Upon acceptance of a question of law for adjudication under this rule, the Idaho Supreme Court will at that time, or at such later time as the Court deems appropriate, determine whether oral argument is required on the certified question of law and will advise the parties to the pending action in the United States court as to the time, place and procedure for presenting oral arguments to the Court.

“(e) Adjudication of Certified Question of Law. Upon adjudication of a question of law certified under this rule, the Idaho Supreme Court will issue a written opinion in the same manner as an opinion in an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and such opinion shall be distributed, published and reported in the same manner as an opinion in an appeal.”

2 . For information on the history and development of certification see 1A, Pt. 2 Moore, Taggart, Vestal & Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.203[5] (2d ed. 1982); 17 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4248 (1978); Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 888 (1971); McCree, Foreword, 23 Wayne L.Rev. 255, 259-67 (1977).

3 . Commentators have suggested that certification may not be possible under particular state constitutions. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 2 at 526 and n. 33; Lillich & Mundy, supra note 2 at 897 n. 71, 899-900 n. 81.

4 .Article 5, § 9 as considered by the Neil Court provided:

“The supreme court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district courts, or the judges thereof. The supreme court shall also have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus; and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.”

It was subsequently amended to provide specifically for appeals from orders of the Public Utilities Commission and Industrial Accident Board. See infra.

5 . Utah Const, art. 8, § 4 provides:

“The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus. Each of the justices shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, to any part of the State, upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself or the Supreme Court or before any district court or judge thereof in the State. In other cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the exercise of that jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.)

6 . ID. Const, art. 5, § 2 provides:

“§ 2. Judicial power — Where vested.— The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as established by the legislature. The courts shall constitute a unified and integrated judicial system for administration and supervision by the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of such inferior courts shall be as prescribed by the legislature. Until provided by law, no changes shall be made in the jurisdiction or in the manner of the selection of judges of existing inferior courts.”

7 . “Certification would be a pointless exercise unless the state court’s answers are regarded as an authorative and binding statement of state law---- [I]t is now accepted that state answers are binding.” Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 2, at 532; see also Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1976); National Ed. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lee County Bd. of Public Instruction, 467 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir.1972); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 657 (5th Cir.1968) (“It is not just a bright clear light showing the Erie -way, or a sign post pointing in an Erie direction. Not only is it all of those things, it is much more. For it is what the law actually is on the precise point presented to us and certified for answer. It is the Florida law binding on us as we perform our Erie role”); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Newell, 329 F.Supp. 172, 174 (D.Mont.1971) (follows Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 154 Mont. 156, 461 P.2d 199 (Mont.1969)); Brown, Fifth Circuit: Certification — Federalism in Action, 7 Cum.L.Rev. 455 passim (1977); Lillich & Mundy, supra note 2, at 906-08; McCree, supra note 2, at 256 (“Concepts of federalism established by the Constitution have been held to require that state court rulings be considered determinative of state law”).

Lillich & Mundy, supra note 2, suggests another alternative reason for binding effect — full faith and credit. Id. at 907-08.