Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Shoshone County
This text of 116 P.2d 221 (Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Shoshone County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
— Four actions separately brought by the respective appellants, consolidated in the trial court and here, sought the return of taxes levied and paid under Section 61-806 b., I. C. A., 1939 S. L. Ch. 124, page 221. 1
Appellants’ first contention is that in the phrase “in those counties within the State of Idaho where property assessed at more than 67 °/o of the total assessed valuation of such counties is situate outside of the boundaries of school districts,...” the words “school districts,” mean all the school districts in the county, or second, at least *40 all “organized school districts,” while respondents and evidently the trial court, considered the words “school districts” to mean any one or more school districts, organized or unorganized.
Appellants urge the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer, citing People v. Moore, 1 Ida. 662, and 25 Ruling Case Law, 1092, Sec. 307. See also, Cooley, Taxation, Sec. 503. Even if such rule of construction be not negatived by Sec. 70-102 I. C. A., it is unnecessary to pass upon the point because of the compulsion of other pertinent rules of statutory construction.
Legislative intent is the main lode star of construction. Empire Copper Co. v. Henderson, 15 Ida. 635, 99 P. 127; Swain v. Fritchman, 21 Ida. 783, 125 P. 319; Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Pfost, 53 Ida. 559, 27 P. (2) 877; Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 32 Ida. 91, 177 P. 843; Turner v. Roseberry Irr. Dist. 33 Ida. 746, 198 P. 465; State v. Armstrong, 38 Ida. 493, 225 P. 491; Gallafent v. Tucker, 48 Ida. 240, 281 P. 375; State v. Holder, 49 Ida. 514, 290 P. 387, 82 A. L. R. 348n.
A statute should be so construed as to give it effect. Hartman v. Meier, 39 Ida. 261, 227 P. 25; State v. Brassfield, 40 Ida. 203, 232 P. 1; Ryan v. Old Veteran Mining Co., 35 Ida. 637, 207 P. 1076; Sharp v. Brown, 38 Ida. 136, 221 P. 139; Hunt v. City of St. Maries, 44 Ida. 700, 260 P. 155; Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Ida. 619, 10 P. (2) 307, 97 A. L. R. 1489n.
If appellants’ first interpretation were adopted the statute would be wholly ineffective because there is no county where any taxable property lies outside of all school districts, because all the property in a county is in organized 2 or unorganized 3 school districts, hence there *41 never could be 67 per cent or any other per cent of the total assessed valuation of such counties outside the boundaries of school districts.
The plural includes the singular. Sec. 70-114 I. C. A.
Since the phrase clearly does not mean all school districts it perforce means any number less than all, which may therefore be one or more which contain 51 per cent plus of the school population in the county and less than 67 per cent of the assessed valuation, and there is nothing to indicate the legislature intended to differentiate between all “organized districts” or any number thereof less than all. That no limitation was made clearly evidences the intention to make the determination rest on any number having sufficient school population and less than 67 per cent of the assessed valuation.
Appellants’ second point is that the record does not disclose the county commissioners and the county superintendent of schools took the claimed necessary preliminary and asserted jurisdictional steps enumerated in Sec. 61-806 c, 1939 S. L. 222. 4
*42 The statute does not require such steps be made a matter of record, and if the underlying facts justifying such steps exist the mere performance of the steps would be directory, not mandatory. In re Overland Co. v. Utter, 44 Ida. 385, 257 P. 480; Standolind Pipe Line Co. v. Tulsa County Excise Board (Okl.) 80 P. (2) 316; School Board etc. v. Rupp, (Kan) 106 P. (2) 669. It is the existence of such jurisdictional facts which controls. Standolind Pipe Line Co. v. Excise Board of Lincoln County, (Okl) 93 P. (2) 1085. The complaints do not allege, (except as to the contention as to the words “school districts,” disposed of supra) that the facts did not exist, but merely that the county commissioners and the county school superintendent did not make the determination and give the notifications specified in the statute. Appellants do not show in regard to the recovery of this tax how the failure to perform these acts has injured them.
The cases cited by appellants are all distinguishable; thus Bramwell v. Guheen, 3 Ida. 347, 29 P. 110, required an election, which the court determined was not held. In Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Minidoka County, 31 Ida. 719, 175 P. 962, there was a lack of statutory authority; Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Gooding County, 33 Ida. 452, 196 *43 P. 196, lack of supporting factual premise, not failure to show such had not been preliminarily determined. Petrie v. Common School Dist. No. 5, 38 Ida. 583, 223 P. 535, the essential steps which were lacking involved substantive participative action by members of the school district, not procedural as herein.
Judgment affirmed.
Costs to respondents.
Sec. 61-806 b., 1939 S. L. Ch. 124, p. 221: “Upon the same property designated in Section 61-801, and for the same year, in those counties within the State of Idaho where property assessed at more than 67% of the total assessed valuation of such counties is situated outside of the boundaries of school districts, the school population of which districts, as determined by the average daily attendance in all schools of such county, exceeds 51% of the total school population of the county, in addition to the levy provided in Section 61-806, Idaho Code Annotated, as amended by Section 8 of Chapter 205, Idaho Session Laws of 1935, as amended by Section 3 of Chapter 205, Idaho Session Laws of 1937, the board may levy a tax sufficient to provide a county equalization program not in excess of 35 per cent of the state minimum educational program, the proceeds of such tax to be collected and paid into the county school equalization fund which is hereby created; provided, the tax levied under the provisions of this section plus the levy provided in Sections 61-806 Idaho Code Annotated, as amended, shall not exceed ten (10) mills. This section shall not be interpreted to amend or in any way affect the operation of Section 61-806, Idaho Code Annotated, as amended.
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116 P.2d 221, 63 Idaho 36, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/northern-pacific-railway-co-v-shoshone-county-idaho-1941.