ORDER DEFINING FURTHER DUTIES OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
PER CURIAM.
On October 21, 1993, counsel for former President Ronald W. Reagan filed with this Court the “Suggestion that the Court Exercise its Power to Terminate the Office of Independent Counsel;” and,
On November 2, 1993, having considered the Suggestion of former President Reagan, the Court entered its order directing the Independent Counsel to show cause why the Court should not order that his office be terminated except for the performance of the “ministerial” function contemplated in 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2), and upon the performance of that said function the office be terminated entirely; and,
On November 9, 1993, the Independent Counsel filed his response to the show cause order, inclusive of “the request of the Independent Counsel for direction as to the scope of his residual noninvestigative and nonpro-secutorial authority and duties relating to the Final Report after he has terminated his investigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(1).”
For the reasons more fully set forth in the opinion filed contemporaneously herewith, it is
(1) ORDERED that the Independent Counsel, subject to further order of this Court, continue his office only to the extent necessary or appropriate to fulfill his duties relating to his Final Report, specifically the final submission of such Report inclusive of the statutory appendix consisting of the comments authorized by this Court in accordance with provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2).
(2) To the extent necessary or appropriate to the purposes of this order, this Independent Counsel shall perform the noninvestiga-tive and nonprosecutorial tasks remaining of his statutory duties as required to conclude the functions of his office as set forth in decretal paragraph (l).
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Senior Circuit Judge BUTZNER.
PER CURIAM:
On November 2, 1993, we issued a show cause order directing the Independent Counsel in this matter to show cause why the Court should not order his office “terminated except for the performance of the ministerial function contemplated in 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2), and upon performance of that function, the office be terminated entirely.” That order was prompted by the suggestion of former President Ronald W. Reagan, filed October 21, 1993, that the Court terminate the Independent Counsel’s Office pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2). Upon review of applicable law, we determined that the suggestion was not without merit and therefore entered the show cause order. This opinion will, of necessity, in part republish the contents of the memorandum accompanying the show cause order.
As we noted in that memorandum, the Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) provides that the Court may terminate the office
at any time, on the ground that the investigation of all matters within the prosecuto-rial jurisdiction of such independent counsel or accepted by such independent counsel ... and any resulting prosecutions, have been completed or so substantially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such investigation and prosecutions.
Thus we determined that the question for the Court was whether those conditions for termination had been met, that is “that the investigation of all matters within the prose-cutorial jurisdiction of [the] Independent Counsel ... and any resulting prosecutions, have been completed or so substantially completed, that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete” them. Id. In the preliminary analysis underlying the show cause order, we noted that in September of 1992, the Independent Counsel [833]*833reported to this Court that the investigation was complete “barring unforeseen developments at the upcoming trials of Weinberger and Claridge.” In December of that same year, President Bush pardoned Weinberger and Claridge thus eliminating the possibility of “unforeseen developments” at trials that would not further proceed.
The Independent Counsel unexpectedly learned on December 11 that President Bush had not produced to the Independent Counsel previously requested diaries allegedly relevant to the matters under investigation. However, thereafter the Independent Counsel reported to the Court that he had obtained the diaries by January 1993 and that “they did not justify reopening the investigation.”
We subjected those facts to the light of applicable law providing that:
An office of independent counsel shall terminate when—
(A) the independent counsel notifies the Attorney General that the investigation of all matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel or accepted by such independent counsel under section 594(e), and any resulting prosecutions, have been completed or so substantially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such investigations and prosecutions; and
(B) the independent counsel files a final report in compliance with section 594(h)(1)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(1). We therefore determined that it appeared, at least for purposes of the show cause stage that the office had reached self-termination except for the remaining acts, which we styled “ministerial,” of notifying the Attorney General of the completion of the investigation and prosecution and any further required filing of the Final Report. We further determined that filing is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) providing that:
An independent counsel shall
(B) before the termination of the independent counsel’s office under section 596(b), file a final report with the division of the court, setting forth fully and completely a description of the work of the independent counsel, including the disposition of all cases brought and the reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecu-torial jurisdiction of such independent counsel.
We also noted that the filing of the Final Report appeared at first review to be complete as the Independent Counsel had filed with the Court a two volume document together with a classified appendix entitled “Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters.” However, we concluded that subdivision (2) of § 594(h) made it appear to the Court that the statute contemplated a further filing of the Final Report inclusive of an appendix consisting of comments entered pursuant to that subdivision. The relevant provision states:
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ORDER DEFINING FURTHER DUTIES OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
PER CURIAM.
On October 21, 1993, counsel for former President Ronald W. Reagan filed with this Court the “Suggestion that the Court Exercise its Power to Terminate the Office of Independent Counsel;” and,
On November 2, 1993, having considered the Suggestion of former President Reagan, the Court entered its order directing the Independent Counsel to show cause why the Court should not order that his office be terminated except for the performance of the “ministerial” function contemplated in 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2), and upon the performance of that said function the office be terminated entirely; and,
On November 9, 1993, the Independent Counsel filed his response to the show cause order, inclusive of “the request of the Independent Counsel for direction as to the scope of his residual noninvestigative and nonpro-secutorial authority and duties relating to the Final Report after he has terminated his investigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(1).”
For the reasons more fully set forth in the opinion filed contemporaneously herewith, it is
(1) ORDERED that the Independent Counsel, subject to further order of this Court, continue his office only to the extent necessary or appropriate to fulfill his duties relating to his Final Report, specifically the final submission of such Report inclusive of the statutory appendix consisting of the comments authorized by this Court in accordance with provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2).
(2) To the extent necessary or appropriate to the purposes of this order, this Independent Counsel shall perform the noninvestiga-tive and nonprosecutorial tasks remaining of his statutory duties as required to conclude the functions of his office as set forth in decretal paragraph (l).
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Senior Circuit Judge BUTZNER.
PER CURIAM:
On November 2, 1993, we issued a show cause order directing the Independent Counsel in this matter to show cause why the Court should not order his office “terminated except for the performance of the ministerial function contemplated in 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2), and upon performance of that function, the office be terminated entirely.” That order was prompted by the suggestion of former President Ronald W. Reagan, filed October 21, 1993, that the Court terminate the Independent Counsel’s Office pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2). Upon review of applicable law, we determined that the suggestion was not without merit and therefore entered the show cause order. This opinion will, of necessity, in part republish the contents of the memorandum accompanying the show cause order.
As we noted in that memorandum, the Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) provides that the Court may terminate the office
at any time, on the ground that the investigation of all matters within the prosecuto-rial jurisdiction of such independent counsel or accepted by such independent counsel ... and any resulting prosecutions, have been completed or so substantially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such investigation and prosecutions.
Thus we determined that the question for the Court was whether those conditions for termination had been met, that is “that the investigation of all matters within the prose-cutorial jurisdiction of [the] Independent Counsel ... and any resulting prosecutions, have been completed or so substantially completed, that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete” them. Id. In the preliminary analysis underlying the show cause order, we noted that in September of 1992, the Independent Counsel [833]*833reported to this Court that the investigation was complete “barring unforeseen developments at the upcoming trials of Weinberger and Claridge.” In December of that same year, President Bush pardoned Weinberger and Claridge thus eliminating the possibility of “unforeseen developments” at trials that would not further proceed.
The Independent Counsel unexpectedly learned on December 11 that President Bush had not produced to the Independent Counsel previously requested diaries allegedly relevant to the matters under investigation. However, thereafter the Independent Counsel reported to the Court that he had obtained the diaries by January 1993 and that “they did not justify reopening the investigation.”
We subjected those facts to the light of applicable law providing that:
An office of independent counsel shall terminate when—
(A) the independent counsel notifies the Attorney General that the investigation of all matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel or accepted by such independent counsel under section 594(e), and any resulting prosecutions, have been completed or so substantially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such investigations and prosecutions; and
(B) the independent counsel files a final report in compliance with section 594(h)(1)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(1). We therefore determined that it appeared, at least for purposes of the show cause stage that the office had reached self-termination except for the remaining acts, which we styled “ministerial,” of notifying the Attorney General of the completion of the investigation and prosecution and any further required filing of the Final Report. We further determined that filing is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) providing that:
An independent counsel shall
(B) before the termination of the independent counsel’s office under section 596(b), file a final report with the division of the court, setting forth fully and completely a description of the work of the independent counsel, including the disposition of all cases brought and the reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecu-torial jurisdiction of such independent counsel.
We also noted that the filing of the Final Report appeared at first review to be complete as the Independent Counsel had filed with the Court a two volume document together with a classified appendix entitled “Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters.” However, we concluded that subdivision (2) of § 594(h) made it appear to the Court that the statute contemplated a further filing of the Final Report inclusive of an appendix consisting of comments entered pursuant to that subdivision. The relevant provision states:
The division of the court may make any portion of a final report filed under paragraph (1)(B) available to any individual named in such report for purposes of receiving within a time limit set by the division of the court any comments or factual information that such individual may submit. Such comments and factual information, in whole or in part, may, in the discretion of the division of the court, be included as an appendix to the final report.
28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2). We thus concluded, absent cause shown to the contrary, that a further “ministerial” duty remained as to the filing of the appendix to the Final Report.
We therefore directed that the Independent Counsel should show cause as to why his office should not be terminated save for and upon the occurrence of the ministerial duties of the filing of the Final Report inclusive of the appendix described in subsection (h)(2).
Thereafter, on November 9, 1993, the Independent Counsel filed a response to the show cause order, which in many ways agreed with the conclusions expressed by the Court in the memorandum accompanying the original order, but which essentially requested the Court not to issue an order of termination presently. Rather the Independent [834]*834Counsel requested that the Com’t (1) allow the Independent Counsel to continue with the duties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2) and that those be characterized as residual noninvestigative and nonprosecutorial authority duties relating to the filing of the Final Report, eschewing the term “ministerial” in order to avoid possible controversy over the meaning of that adjective; and, (2) enter an order providing direction as to the scope of his residual noninvestigative and nonprosecutorial authority and duties relating to that Final Report after he has terminated his investigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(1).
In his response to our show cause order, and in support of his request for the order providing direction as to the scope of his residual duties, the Independent Counsel informed us that he had sent notice to the Attorney General on November 12, 1993, “that his investigation and all related prosecutions pursuant to the [relevant] appointments have been completed.” Shortly put, the Independent Counsel agrees with the Court that his remaining duties arise from a statutory obligation to make a further filing of his Report, specifically by filing it inclusive of an appendix of comments of those named therein, as contemplated by section 594(h)(2). He proposes that we, instead of issuing an order of termination, issue an order limiting the further scope of his official activities to duties relating to that specific task. This we do by order of even date herewith.
However, we do not include in our order the delineation of this scope. First, the Independent Counsel has proposed a description of his duties broader than those outlined by us. We have not accepted the invitation to include a broader description, because it appears to the Court that the current order encompasses all remaining duties under the statute, and, should other action by the Independent Counsel be necessary to the fulfillment of the statutory duty, the second decre-tal paragraph of our order is sufficiently broad to encompass such action. Specifically, the Independent Counsel has asked for the authority to respond to further inquiries from the Court. If that becomes necessary, paragraph 2 provides room for that necessity, without expanding the ongoing operation to include responses to anyone other than the Court as prayed by the Independent Counsel.
Second, both counsel for President Reagan and Independent Counsel may be engaging in a circumlocution of what really concerns them. It appears to the Court that President Reagan is concerned that the Independent Counsel may intend to file further comments in response to the comments of the persons mentioned in the Report. Our reading of section 594(h) does not include any authority for the Independent Counsel to amend the Report during or after the time set by the division for “comments or factual information” by the individual named. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2). Nor do we assume that the Independent Counsel reads the statute any differently than we. Indeed, it would seem that if the Independent Counsel could amend the Report or add comments of his own thereto, then the individuals named would have a further round of reply before the rights created by section 594(h)(2) would be fully vindicated.
It is the purpose of the Court in omitting the broader language requested by the Independent Counsel to make plain that we do not understand him to be seeking a determination by us that his remaining duties have sufficient scope to include the making of revisions or additions to his prior report, but in what is probably an excess of caution, we wish to make it plain by this opinion that we do not contemplate the scope as being inclusive of that authority so that we do not invite further controversy over that detail.
Similarly, we have not employed the term “ministerial” used in our prior filing. The Independent Counsel fears that this would invoke further exchange of petitions or motions, and this we do not intend to do.
Finally, the Independent Counsel included in his requested order a paragraph providing that the “Independent Counsel shall, as appropriate, continue to seek assistance of other agencies, to seek continuance of security clearances, to contract with private persons, and to expend funds from appropriations heretofore available to him.” Again, this request would at least potentially take the con[835]*835tinuing scope of the Independent Counsel outside what we perceive to be the statutory limitations. It may be apparent that the Independent Counsel can expend those funds, where it is necessary to complete the tasks remaining in the completed filing, and if so, our order should be sufficient to recognize that necessity. It is not apparent that the language concerning security clearances and dealing with other agencies states a necessity for that duty; but if it does, it would again appear that the Independent Counsel can do it. If there is doubt as to a specific item, he can raise with us that specific item.
We are particularly reluctant to speak directly to the appropriations question, as that is not a matter within the purview of the controversy now before us, nor one upon which we possess a particular expertise to speak. If there are controversies to be resolved concerning the expenditure of funds, or for that matter, the service of the Independent Counsel as an unpaid volunteer, those can be resolved by appropriate agencies at an appropriate time, and if any action in that regard by this Court is necessary, we can then take that action on a more fulsome record.
So ordered.