In re NVIDIA Corporation Securities Litigation

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 2, 2021
Docket4:18-cv-07669
StatusUnknown

This text of In re NVIDIA Corporation Securities Litigation (In re NVIDIA Corporation Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re NVIDIA Corporation Securities Litigation, (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 IRON WORKERS LOCAL 580 JOINT Case No. 18-cv-07669-HSG FUNDS, et al., 8 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiffs, DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO 9 STRIKE v. 10 Re: Dkt. Nos. 152, 154 NVIDIA CORPORATION, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 This is a consolidated securities class action brought by Plaintiffs E. Öhman J:or Fonder 14 and Stichting Pensionenonds PGB (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Defendant NVIDIA 15 Corporation (“NVIDIA” or “the Company”) and Jensen Huang, co-founder and Chief Executive 16 Officer, Colette Kress, Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President, and Jeff Fisher, 17 Senior Vice President (collectively with NVIDIA, “Defendants”). In their initial complaint, 18 Plaintiffs alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 19 (the “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Dkt. No. 113 (Consolidated Class 20 Action Complaint or “CCAC”) ¶¶ 147–48. The Court dismissed the CCAC with leave to amend. 21 Iron Workers Local 580 Joint Funds v. NVIDIA Corp., 2020 WL 1244936 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 22 2020) (“Order”). Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that reasserts the same claims. Dkt. No. 23 149 (First Amended Complaint or “FAC”). 24 Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. Nos. 152 25 (“Mot.”), 159 (“Opp.”), 163 (“Reply”). Also pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to 26 strike allegations in the FAC. Dkt. Nos. 154, 161, 165. For the following reasons, the Court 27 GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike. I. BACKGROUND 1 Plaintiffs bring this securities action individually and “on behalf of all others who 2 purchased or otherwise acquired common stock of NVIDIA Corporation” between May 10, 2017, 3 and November 14, 2018, inclusive (the “Class Period”). FAC at 1. The following facts are taken 4 from the FAC and judicially noticeable documents. 5 A. Graphic Processing Units 6 NVIDIA “is a multinational technology company” that produces graphic processing units 7 (“GPUs”), types of processors that are used in rendering computer graphics. FAC ¶ 1. NVIDIA’s 8 GPU business is reported by market platforms, two of which are at issue in this case. Id. ¶ 39. 9 The first platform is chips designed for videogames—the Gaming platform—comprised primarily 10 of the “GeForce” GPU product line. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. Original Equipment Manufacturer & IP 11 (“OEM”) is a second platform for chips designed for devices such as tablets and phones. Id. The 12 gaming platform is NVIDIA’s largest market: “[i]n every quarter of the Class Period, [g]aming 13 revenues exceeded those of the four other segments combined.” Id. ¶ 40. Generally, NVIDIA 14 does not sell GPUs directly to the end users, but rather to device manufacturers, referred to as 15 “partners,” that incorporate the GPUs into graphic or video cards. Id. ¶ 42. 16 Beginning in 2017, prices in the cryptocurrency market began to climb, creating a demand 17 for GPUs processing power. Id. ¶¶ 52, 62. Generally, cryptocurrencies refer to digital tokens 18 exchanged peer-to-peer through transactions facilitated by the Internet. Id. ¶¶ 44, 47. These 19 transactions are secured by modern cryptology and are reported on a “decentralized, immutable 20 ledger.” Id. ¶ 45. To maintain the integrity of this ledger, transactions must be verified by 21 network participants “by first consolidating and encrypting the data of a group of transactions 22 using a cryptographic technique of ‘hashing’—applying an algorithm to convert a string of text 23 into an inscrutable, random sequence of numbers and letters.” Id. ¶ 46. Users then compete to 24 solve a “mathematical puzzle through laborious trial-and-error work performed by their 25 computers” in order to verify transactions and receive a prize of the network’s token—a process 26 referred to as “crypto-mining,” or simply “mining.” Id. ¶¶ 46–47. This verification process 27 requires significant processing power. Because the mining process has essentially become a 1 computational race, miners turned to “GPUs, which could execute the computationally intensive 2 work of crypto-mining hundreds of times faster” than CPUs in home computers. Id. ¶ 52. Due to 3 the significant hardware costs, as well as electricity costs to run and cool the machines, crypto- 4 mining is only profitable when prices for cryptocurrencies are above a certain level. Id. ¶¶ 54–55. 5 Thus, “[b]ecause cryptocurrency prices have swung wildly over their short history,” this has also 6 led to a relatively volatile demand market for mining hardware, including GPUs. Id. ¶ 55. 7 In 2013, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (“AMD”), NVIDIA’s primary GPU competitor, 8 experienced this volatility when prices for Bitcoin, used on the most popular cryptocurrency 9 network, skyrocketed. Id. ¶¶ 57–58. AMD’s GPUs were in heavy demand during this time, “with 10 processors that usually sold for $200-300 per unit selling for $600-800 at the height of the 11 bubble.” Id. ¶ 57. However, when prices for Bitcoin later dropped more than 70%, so too did 12 demand for AMD GPUs—“a problem compounded by miners dumping their AMD GPUs on the 13 secondary market at steep discounts.” Id. ¶ 58. “AMD revenues suffered as its crypto-related 14 sales evaporated.” Id. 15 In 2016, the price of Bitcoin again rallied, and many new currencies entered the market. 16 Although Bitcoin miners moved away from GPUs to application specific integrated circuits 17 (“ASICs”), miners for these new currencies still relied on GPUs. Id. ¶¶ 56 n.4, 59. The Ethereum 18 network, “[t]he most significant” of the new cryptocurrency networks, also saw its cryptocurrency, 19 Ether, rise in price: it “temporarily peaked at over $400 per token in June [2017] . . . [and s]everal 20 months later, in January 2018, Ether topped $1,400 per token, an increase of more than 13,000% 21 in a single year.” Id. ¶ 60. “During this run up in GPU-mined cryptocurrency prices, miners 22 turned to NVIDIA— specifically, its enormously popular line of GeForce Gaming GPUs—and 23 began to purchase GeForce GPUs in droves.” Id. ¶ 61. In May 2017, NVIDIA launched a special 24 GPU designed specifically for cryptocurrency mining (“Crypto SKU”). Id. ¶ 6. Revenues from 25 Crypto SKU sales were reported in NVIDIA’s OEM segment, not the Gaming segment. Id. 26 Plaintiffs allege that “[l]aunching the Crypto SKU and reporting its sales in the OEM segment thus 27 allowed Defendants to claim that any mining-related revenues were cordoned off in OEM, 1 related volatility (and the crash in demand that would follow the cryptocurrency markets’ 2 inevitable bust).” Id. 3 B. Summary of Alleged False and Misleading Statements 4 “Throughout the Class Period, NVIDIA reported skyrocketing revenues in its core Gaming 5 segment.” Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiffs allege that “investors and analysts alike questioned whether those 6 revenues truly derived from GeForce GPU sales to gamers or, rather, were from sales of GeForce 7 GPUs to cryptocurrency miners, whose demand was at risk of disappearing if the economics of 8 mining turned negative.” Id. ¶ 64. Plaintiffs allege that three general representations in 9 Defendants’ responses to these questions were materially false and misleading “and concealed 10 from investors the enormous risk to NVIDIA’s financial results posed by the Company’s outsized 11 exposure to crypto-mining:” 12 First, Defendants represented to investors that revenues from sales of its products to cryptocurrency miners were insignificant overall. 13 Second, Defendants asserted that NVIDIA’s soaring Gaming revenues indeed resulted from sales “for gaming”—not 14 cryptocurrency mining.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
519 F.3d 1025 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.
552 F.3d 981 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Mendiondo v. Centinela Hospital Medical Center
521 F.3d 1097 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
In Re Gilead Sciences Securities Litigation
536 F.3d 1049 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
South Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger
542 F.3d 776 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Claude Reese v. Robert Malone
747 F.3d 557 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Karim Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.
899 F.3d 988 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Vicky Nguyen v. Endologix, Inc.
962 F.3d 405 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Union Asset Management Holding AG v. Sandisk LLC
227 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (N.D. California, 2017)
Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp.
380 F.3d 1226 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
In re NVIDIA Corporation Securities Litigation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-nvidia-corporation-securities-litigation-cand-2021.