Claude Reese v. Robert Malone

747 F.3d 557, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20028, 2014 WL 555911, 77 ERC (BNA) 2057, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2747
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 13, 2014
Docket12-35260
StatusPublished
Cited by77 cases

This text of 747 F.3d 557 (Claude Reese v. Robert Malone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Claude Reese v. Robert Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20028, 2014 WL 555911, 77 ERC (BNA) 2057, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2747 (9th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

*563 OPINION

DEARIE, Senior District Judge:

In March of 2006, an oil leak in one of BP’s Alaskan pipelines spilled approximately 200,000 gallons of oil onto the Alaskan tundra. Despite BP’s public statements suggesting that the spill was an anomaly, a second leak was discovered five months later in a different BP oil transit line in the region. As a result, the company temporarily shut down regional operations.

This class action complaint was filed by BP shareholders, who allege that the company knowingly, or with deliberate recklessness, made false and misleading statements about the condition of the pipelines and BP’s pipeline maintenance and leak detection practices prior to and in the wake of the first spill. They seek relief under Sections 10(b), 18(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5, for investment losses incurred when the second spill and shutdown allegedly caused a four percent decline in BP’s share price.

The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. Although the court found that some of the statements were actionably false or misleading, it dismissed the claims because plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient to show that the challenged statements gave rise to a strong inference of scienter. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse in part and affirm in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

Plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter “plaintiffs”) in this class action are purchasers of BP’s common stock and American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) between June 30, 2005, and August 4, 2006. 1 Defendants-appellees (hereinafter “defendants”) in this case are: (1) BP, the largest oil and gas producer in the United States; (2) BP Exploration Alaska (“BPXA”) (hereinafter “BP-Alaska”), a Delaware corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary of BP based in Anchorage, Alaska; (3) John Browne, BP’s CEO during the class period; and (4) Maureen Johnson, BP-Alaska’s Senior Vice President and Greater Prudhoe Bay Performance Unit Leader during the class period.

B. BP’s Corrosion Monitoring Practices and the Prudhoe Bay Spills

Prudhoe Bay, the area where the spills took place, is located on the Northern Slope of Alaska and contains more than sixteen miles of oil transit lines (“OTLs”). BP-Alaska operates “three similar low-stress pipelines” at Prudhoe Bay — the Western Operating Area (“WOA”), the Eastern Operating Area (“EOA”), and the Lisburne lines. There are a variety of methods of maintaining pipelines, but the principal process is called “pigging.” “Maintenance pigging” consists of inserting a mechanical tool to clean the inside of the pipeline and remove debris and undesirable material. “Smart pigging” is used *564 to detect the presence of cracks, corrosion, and pitting within the pipeline. According to media coverage and the company’s eventual admissions, BP “pigged” the Pru-dhoe Bay OTLs infrequently and at a rate that fell significantly below industry standards for this type of pipeline. Instead, BP monitored for internal corrosion using less accurate methods, including an ultrasonic device used to measure the thickness of pipeline wall and “corrosion coupons,” small metal plates placed inside the pipeline every ninety days to inspect for corrosion.

On March 2, 2006, an oil spill was discovered in the WOA pipeline. Estimates suggest the leak went undetected for at least five days, spilling approximately 4,800 barrels of oil (about 200,000 gallons) onto the Alaskan tundra. Subsequent investigation found that the leak was the result of a quarter-inch wide hole in a pipeline caused by internal corrosion. The second spill was discovered five months later on August 5 and 6, 2006. This leak occurred in a different corroded pipeline in the EOA, on the opposite side of Prudhoe Bay, spilling another twenty-five barrels of oil (about 1,000 gallons). Following the second spill, BP temporarily shut down the Prudhoe Bay oil field, which accounts for more than eight percent of total U.S. oil production.

The complaint alleges that BP had ample notice of, and disregarded, corrosion monitoring deficiencies at Prudhoe Bay. In 2001, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation hired Coffman Engineers, Inc. (“Coffman”) to evaluate a report BP submitted on its corrosion prevention efforts. Coffman raised many questions about BP-Alaska’s pigging practices and ultimately concluded that “the reporting style makes it difficult to develop a qualitative understanding of the basis for [BP’s] corrosion strategy.” 2 Plaintiffs also claim that BP’s Board of Directors was warned about the severe corrosion problems at Prudhoe Bay in 2004, when Chuck Hamel, an advocate for BP workers in Alaska, voiced concerns about corrosion and environmental threats at Prudhoe Bay. The warnings are documented in a letter from Hamel to Walter Massey, the chairman of the environmental committee of BP’s non-executive board of directors, advising Massey of “serious corrosion” and predicting a “major catastrophic event.” 3

C. Government Intervention

The first spill on March 2, 2006, received significant publicity and sparked immediate government intervention. It quickly came to light that BP had not tested the integrity of the WOA with a smart pig since 1998.

On March 15, 2006, the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) issued a Corrective Action Order (“CAO”) to BP-Alaska, addressed to defendant Maureen Johnson, Greater Pru-dhoe Bay Performance Unit Leader. The CAO preliminary findings identified six additional “anomalies” of internal corrosion, including one area with ninety percent corrosion and only 0.04 inches of wall remaining. It also noted the similarities between the three Prudhoe Bay Lines:

The PBWOA [WOA line] is one of three similar low-stress pipelines operated by Respondent that feed into PS-1 ... All *565 three pipelines were constructed around the same time, operate in similar environmental conditions, transport ■ the same quality crude oil that contributed to the cause of the internal corrosion in PBWOA, and are operated and maintained in a similar manner by Respondent.

The order concluded that “continued operation of [BP’s] WOA, EOA and Lisburne hazardous liquid pipelines without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property and the environment.” . It mandated several specific corrective actions, including the requirement that BP inspect all three lines with smart pigs within certain deadlines.

Under the terms of the Corrective Action Order, BP had three months to smart pig the EOA line by June 15, 2006. It failed to do so. The FS2-FS1 segment of the EOA line was not inspected until July 22, 2006, more than a month after the deadline.

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747 F.3d 557, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20028, 2014 WL 555911, 77 ERC (BNA) 2057, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/claude-reese-v-robert-malone-ca9-2014.