EICH, C. J.
Karl Weberg appeals from a judgment of divorce. He raises two issues: (1) whether his disability benefits are available for payment of maintenance to his former wife, Mary Ann Weberg; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to limit the maintenance to a specific term of years. Mary Ann Weberg cross-appeals, challenging the court's ruling that a worker's compensation settlement received by Karl [543]*543should be excluded from the marital estate. We affirm the judgment in all respects.
The Webergs were married for twenty-one years. At the time of the divorce, Karl Weberg was forty-four years old and Mary Ann Weberg was forty years old. They have two children, both of whom are adults. Prior to the marriage, Karl Weberg was severely wounded in Vietnam. He was discharged from the army with a physical disability rating of seventy percent. In spite of this disability, he worked for the Chrysler Corporation for ten years during the marriage. After he ended his employment at Chrysler in 1979, his physical status was re-evaluated by the Veterans' Administration as 100 percent permanently disabled. His current income is derived solely from disability payments. He receives Veterans' Administration benefits of $1,469 per month, social security disability, benefits of $854 per month, and a disability benefit from Chrysler of $221 per month.
Mary Ann Weberg enjoys good physical and emotional health. She has been employed outside the home since 1980 and presently works forty hours per week at a clinic, earning $5.86 per hour ($234 per week).
The trial court awarded Mary Ann Weberg maintenance of $746 per month for an indefinite period. The maintenance payment, when combined with her employment income, gives her approximately forty-five percent of the parties' total combined income. The marital assets were divided fifty-fifty, each party receiving assets valued at $14,649. Karl Weberg retained as separate property the sum of $10,737, representing the remainder of a lump-sum worker's compensation settlement he had received for injuries incurred during his employment at Chrysler.
Karl Weberg argues first that his federal military disability payments and social security disability pay[544]*544ments should not be considered by the court in awarding maintenance. He points out that his military disability payments may be assigned only if specifically permitted by statute, relying on several federal cases and 38 U.S.C. sec. 3101, which provides that veterans' benefits are only assignable to the extent authorized by law.1 He makes the same point with respect to his social security disability benefits, referring us to 42 U.S.C. 1383(d) and 42 U.S.C. 407 which he claims prohibit the benefits from being attached by creditors, including former spouses.2 We are not persuaded. We believe that Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978), controls the issue and requires rejection of Weberg's argument.
Leighton held that a veteran's disability pension is income to be considered in allowing maintenance rather than property to be divided at divorce. Id. at 637, 261 N.W.2d at 465; see also Richardson v. Richardson, 139 Wis. 2d 778, 783-84 n.2, 407 N.W.2d 231, 234 (1987). The Leighton court stated that a military disability pension "is a federally-provided replacement for earning [545]*545capacity lost.... It is analogous to a disability benefit paid under the Social Security Act to a disabled or handicapped worker . . .. [The payments are] income to the defendant, material only to his ability to pay alimony, if alimony were awarded." Id. at 636-37, 261 N.W.2d at 465.
We also reject Weberg's assertion that Leighton is no longer persuasive because of McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), and its progeny, notably Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989), on which he places principal reliance. The issue in Mansell, however, was whether "military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits" could be treated as property to be divided between divorcing parties under the language of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. sec. 1408. The Court concluded that the waived retirement pay could not be treated as divisible property upon divorce.
In this case we are not asked to divide Weberg's benefits or award any portion thereof to his wife. We are to decide only whether the payments Weberg is presently receiving may be considered by the court as a factor in assessing his ability to pay spousal maintenance. We thus consider Mansell to be distinguishable on the facts and reject Weberg's claim that it mandates reversal.
Weberg next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding maintenance to Mary Ann Weberg without considering her needs, his ability to pay, and the effects of the property division. He also maintains that the award disregarded the fairness objectives of LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736, 740 (1987), because it did not take into account the source of his income (disability payments) and was not limited in time.
[546]*546Whether to award maintenance — and the duration and amount thereof if an award is to be made — are matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 77, 318 N.W.2d 391, 395 (1982). Generally, we look for reasons to sustain the trial court's discretionary decision, Loomans v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 2d 656, 662, 158 N.W.2d 318, 320 (1968), and we need not agree with the decision to sustain it. Independent Milk Producers Co-op v. Stoffel, 102 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 298 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Ct. App. 1980). Because the exercise of discretion "is not the equivalent of unfettered decision-making," in order to sustain a discretionary determination we must be able to see that the court made a "reasoned application of . . . the appropriate legal standard[s] to the relevant facts in the case." Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 326 N.W.2d 727, 732 (1982), quoting Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16, 20 (1981). Thus, "if the record shows that discretion was in fact exercised and we can perceive a reasonáble basis for the court's decision," we will affirm. Prahl v. Brosamle, 142 Wis. 2d 658, 667, 420 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Ct. App. 1987).
When fixing maintenance, the starting point is sec.
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EICH, C. J.
Karl Weberg appeals from a judgment of divorce. He raises two issues: (1) whether his disability benefits are available for payment of maintenance to his former wife, Mary Ann Weberg; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to limit the maintenance to a specific term of years. Mary Ann Weberg cross-appeals, challenging the court's ruling that a worker's compensation settlement received by Karl [543]*543should be excluded from the marital estate. We affirm the judgment in all respects.
The Webergs were married for twenty-one years. At the time of the divorce, Karl Weberg was forty-four years old and Mary Ann Weberg was forty years old. They have two children, both of whom are adults. Prior to the marriage, Karl Weberg was severely wounded in Vietnam. He was discharged from the army with a physical disability rating of seventy percent. In spite of this disability, he worked for the Chrysler Corporation for ten years during the marriage. After he ended his employment at Chrysler in 1979, his physical status was re-evaluated by the Veterans' Administration as 100 percent permanently disabled. His current income is derived solely from disability payments. He receives Veterans' Administration benefits of $1,469 per month, social security disability, benefits of $854 per month, and a disability benefit from Chrysler of $221 per month.
Mary Ann Weberg enjoys good physical and emotional health. She has been employed outside the home since 1980 and presently works forty hours per week at a clinic, earning $5.86 per hour ($234 per week).
The trial court awarded Mary Ann Weberg maintenance of $746 per month for an indefinite period. The maintenance payment, when combined with her employment income, gives her approximately forty-five percent of the parties' total combined income. The marital assets were divided fifty-fifty, each party receiving assets valued at $14,649. Karl Weberg retained as separate property the sum of $10,737, representing the remainder of a lump-sum worker's compensation settlement he had received for injuries incurred during his employment at Chrysler.
Karl Weberg argues first that his federal military disability payments and social security disability pay[544]*544ments should not be considered by the court in awarding maintenance. He points out that his military disability payments may be assigned only if specifically permitted by statute, relying on several federal cases and 38 U.S.C. sec. 3101, which provides that veterans' benefits are only assignable to the extent authorized by law.1 He makes the same point with respect to his social security disability benefits, referring us to 42 U.S.C. 1383(d) and 42 U.S.C. 407 which he claims prohibit the benefits from being attached by creditors, including former spouses.2 We are not persuaded. We believe that Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978), controls the issue and requires rejection of Weberg's argument.
Leighton held that a veteran's disability pension is income to be considered in allowing maintenance rather than property to be divided at divorce. Id. at 637, 261 N.W.2d at 465; see also Richardson v. Richardson, 139 Wis. 2d 778, 783-84 n.2, 407 N.W.2d 231, 234 (1987). The Leighton court stated that a military disability pension "is a federally-provided replacement for earning [545]*545capacity lost.... It is analogous to a disability benefit paid under the Social Security Act to a disabled or handicapped worker . . .. [The payments are] income to the defendant, material only to his ability to pay alimony, if alimony were awarded." Id. at 636-37, 261 N.W.2d at 465.
We also reject Weberg's assertion that Leighton is no longer persuasive because of McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), and its progeny, notably Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989), on which he places principal reliance. The issue in Mansell, however, was whether "military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits" could be treated as property to be divided between divorcing parties under the language of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. sec. 1408. The Court concluded that the waived retirement pay could not be treated as divisible property upon divorce.
In this case we are not asked to divide Weberg's benefits or award any portion thereof to his wife. We are to decide only whether the payments Weberg is presently receiving may be considered by the court as a factor in assessing his ability to pay spousal maintenance. We thus consider Mansell to be distinguishable on the facts and reject Weberg's claim that it mandates reversal.
Weberg next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding maintenance to Mary Ann Weberg without considering her needs, his ability to pay, and the effects of the property division. He also maintains that the award disregarded the fairness objectives of LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736, 740 (1987), because it did not take into account the source of his income (disability payments) and was not limited in time.
[546]*546Whether to award maintenance — and the duration and amount thereof if an award is to be made — are matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 77, 318 N.W.2d 391, 395 (1982). Generally, we look for reasons to sustain the trial court's discretionary decision, Loomans v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 2d 656, 662, 158 N.W.2d 318, 320 (1968), and we need not agree with the decision to sustain it. Independent Milk Producers Co-op v. Stoffel, 102 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 298 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Ct. App. 1980). Because the exercise of discretion "is not the equivalent of unfettered decision-making," in order to sustain a discretionary determination we must be able to see that the court made a "reasoned application of . . . the appropriate legal standard[s] to the relevant facts in the case." Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 326 N.W.2d 727, 732 (1982), quoting Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16, 20 (1981). Thus, "if the record shows that discretion was in fact exercised and we can perceive a reasonáble basis for the court's decision," we will affirm. Prahl v. Brosamle, 142 Wis. 2d 658, 667, 420 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Ct. App. 1987).
When fixing maintenance, the starting point is sec. 767.26, Stats., which sets forth several specific factors to be considered by the court and concludes with a "catchall" provision allowing the court to consider any other factors it may deem relevant. Parrett v. Parrett, 146 Wis. 2d 830, 837, 432 N.W.2d 664, 667 (1988). The enumerated factors are designed to further the general objectives of maintenance, which are "to support the recipient spouse in accordance with the needs and earning capacities of the parties (the support objective) and to ensure a fair and equitable financial arrangement between the [547]*547parties in each individual case (the fairness objective)." LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 33, 406 N.W.2d at 740.
The record satisfies us that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. The court gave careful and extensive consideration to each of the statutory factors in light of the facts of the case and reached a reasoned and reasonable result. Although the court did not make a specific finding of Mary Ann Weberg's needs, it considered those needs as reflected in her budget in arriving at its decision. And despite Weberg's contrary assertion, the trial court repeatedly referred to the property agreement in its findings.
We also believe that the fairness objective of LaRoc-que was met by the court's award. The court did not mechanically apply a fifty-fifty formula to determine maintenance. It considered whether each party was likely to attain a pre-divorce standard of living in the future, taking into account the nature and the sources of their incomes, their future earning potential, and the taxes each must pay. The court then awarded Mary Ann Weberg forty-five percent of their total combined income, stating that the less-than-equal award would give her "an incentive to apply herself . . . [and] utilize the talents that. . . she has." The court also stated that, because of Karl Weberg's disability, "it is fair and equitable to give him a larger share of the total income of the parties." The court's discretionary determination was thus the "product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon [were] stated and . . . considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination." LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 27, 406 N.W.2d at 737. There was no abuse of discretion.
[548]*548As we have noted, the trial court denied Mary Ann Weberg's request that a bank account containing the remainder of a worker's compensation settlement for job-related injuries suffered by Karl several years prior to the divorce be treated as marital property and divided equally between them. We reject her challenge to that ruling.
Decisions relating to the division of marital property are reviewed for abuse of the trial court's discretion under the standards we have discussed earlier in this opinion. Asbeck v. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 293, 342 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 1983).
Section 767.255, Stats., provides that all property of the parties to a divorce — other than that acquired by one of them through gift, bequest, devise or inheritance — is subject to division. Thus, we have held that "since [a personal injury] settlement was not a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance, it must be a divisible asset." Mack v. Mack, 108 Wis. 2d 604, 608, 323 N.W-2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1982).
Karl Weberg suggests, however, that the supreme court in Richardson and Krebs created a presumption that personal injury settlements remain the property of the injured spouse. Richardson did establish such a presumption; but the language of the opinion limited its application to inchoate claims — those which, at the time of the divorce "[have] not resulted in either a judgment or a settlement . . .." Id., 139 Wis. 2d at 785, 407 N.W.2d at 234. Krebs applied the "logic of Richardson" to payments to be made in the future to one spouse under a structured settlement of a personal injury claim. Krebs at 57, 435 N.W.2d at 243.
In this case, we believe the logic of Richardson and Krebs would make the presumption equally applicable to [549]*549a situation where the claim is not inchoate or payable at some future time but already has been made. The Richardson court outlined its reasoning as follows:
[C]ompensation for loss of bodily function, for pain and suffering and for future earnings replaces what was lost due to a personal injury. Just as each spouse is entitled to leave the marriage with his or her body, so the presumption should be that each spouse is entitled to leave the marriage with that which is designed to replace or compensate for a healthy body. We therefore conclude that the statutory presumption of equal division should be altered . . .. Instead of presuming equal distribution of a personal injury claim, the court should presume that the injured party is entitled to all of the compensation for pain, suffering, bodily injury and future earnings. Richardson, 139 Wis. 2d at 786, 407 N.W.2d at 234-35.3
[550]*550The trial court, of course, must still consider the factors set out in sec. 767.255, Stats. Thus, "the court may alter the presumed distribution [retention of the settlement by the injured spouse] after considering the special circumstances of the personal injury claim . . . and of the parties under the statutory factors listed in sec. 767.255." Krebs at 58, 435 N.W.2d at 244, quoting Richardson, 139 Wis. 2d at 786, 407 N.W.2d at 235.
Here, Mary Ann Weberg contends that the settlement funds are marital property because they were co-mingled with marital funds when they were transferred to a joint account and used, in part at least, "for joint and family purposes."
The trial court, rejecting that argument, found that: (1) the funds with which the account was opened were the proceeds of Weberg's worker's compensation settlement; (2) while they were placed in a joint account, these funds "were not co-mingled" with marital assets; and (3) although some monies withdrawn from the account were used for alleged "family" purposes, the account was held jointly only "for the purpose of protecting [Mary Ann Weberg] in the event of [Karl's] death."
Karl. Weberg testified that the settlement funds were placed in a joint account with his wife so that she would be the beneficiary of the account in case something happened to him. There also was evidence that occasional withdrawals from the account were used to pay the couple's debts.
There was no evidence that the funds were co-mingled with other marital assets. Nor do we believe that the fact that Weberg may have used some of the interest generated by the account, and some of the principal, to pay marital debts invalidates the court's findings. [551]*551Weberg is not seeking a credit for the withdrawals from the account nor does the trial court's decision allow such a credit. It awarded him the balance of the funds, and we think that was appropriate.
In In re Popp, 146 Wis. 2d 778, 432 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1988), a divorcing wife attempted to have her husband's interest in a corporation — he had received several shares of stock as a gift — declared a marital asset available for division. While gifted property is exempt from division by statute, and a personal injury settlement is presumptively exempt by court decision, we see little difference in principle between the two when the issue is whether the exemption is lost by reason of co-mingling or, in the words of Popp, "[transmutation of non-marital property to marital property." Popp at 788, 432 N.W.2d at 603.
In Popp, the wife sought access to the stock on grounds that certain assets of the corporation had been used by the husband for marital purposes, and the trial court found in her favor. We overruled, holding that while the corporate assets used for marital purposes and to purchase "marital items" were lost to the husband, the remaining shares had retained their identity as gifted property and could not be considered part of the marital estate. Id. at 788-89, 432 N.W.2d at 603. In reaching that conclusion, we also noted the absence of any "dona-tive intent (actual or constructive) on [the husband's] part" which would support a finding that he "expressly or impliedly indicated that he wished or intended to . . . convert [the shares] to marital property." Id. at 789, 432 N.W.2d at 603.4
[552]*552The trial court's findings that Weberg's settlement funds were not co-mingled so as to change their identity to marital property are not clearly erroneous, and the court's resolution of this issue evidences a rational process based on and consistent with the applicable law as developed in Richardson, Krebs and Popp. Given that, and because the result was one a reasonable court could reach, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the challenged account from the marital estate.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.