OPINION OF THE COURT
PANELLA, Judge.
Before the Court is the Amended Omnibus Pretrial Motion of the Respondent, former Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen. An en banc argument was held on May 27, 1998.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case has a complicated and beleaguered history. Proceedings against the Respondent were instituted by the Judicial Conduct Board on March 10, 1994, when the Board filed an Application with this Court which requested that we suspend the Respondent with pay.1 The Application, which was docketed to Number 3 JD 94, was primarily based on the filing of a criminal information, which included 27 felony counts, against Respondent.2 A hearing was initially held on March 24, 1994, after which we denied the Application without opinion.
On April 9, 1994, the Respondent was found guilty, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, at No. CC9313844, of two counts of Criminal Conspiracy, 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 903; he was acquitted of 12 counts under Section 13 of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 Pa.Stat. § 780-113(a)(12). The Board then filed a second Application, on April 18, 1994, which requested suspension without pay based on the information and jury verdict. A hearing was held on May 25, 1994. On June 3, 1994, we granted the petition and the Respondent was suspended without pay effective immediately. In re Justice Rolf Larsen, 655 A.2d 239 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc.1994).
Following Larsen’s conviction, the Board filed a Complaint with this Court on June 5, 1994, docketed to Number 4 JD 94. The Complaint consists of 27 Counts divided into six separate parts. Part A requests disciplinary action because of the aforesaid felony convictions (Counts 1-5); Part B alleges the underlying facts which support the convictions, i.e., that Respondent conspired with others to unlawfully obtain a Schedule IV controlled substance (Counts 6-9); Part C contains charges that Larsen made knowingly false material statements before a Grand Jury (Counts 10-14); Part D requests disciplinary action because the Respondent filed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court documents containing averments which were knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for the truth (Counts 15-18); Part E charges the Respondent with failing to re-cuse in matters involving potential claims of bias and partiality because of his prior relationship, both personal and professional, with an attorney (Counts 19-23); and Part F alleges that Larsen had ex-parte conversations with an attorney regarding two petitions for allowance of appeal pending before the Supreme Court (Counts 24-27).
On May 24, 1994, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives adopted seven articles of impeachment against Larsen, accusing him of “misbehavior in office” pursuant to Article 6, § 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The articles of impeachment were exhibited to [41]*41the Senate on June 6, 1994, and were incorporated in the Senate’s Writ of Impeachment Summons. Larsen sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Senate and Senate impeachment trial committee from conducting the impeachment trial. The application was denied by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania, et al., 166 Pa.Commw. 472, 646 A.2d 694 (1994).
On June 13, 1994, the Respondent was sentenced by the Honorable W. Terrence O’Brien to one year probation for each of the two counts of Criminal Conspiracy. In addition, Judge O’Brien, upon finding that Larsen had committed an “infamous crime” under Article 2, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution3, entered an Order'removing the Respondent from office.4
The sentence was vacated and remanded by the Superior Court on August 5, 1996, Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (1996), alloc. denied, 547 Pa. 752, 692 A.2d 564 (1997), which held the Respondent “should have been sentenced on only a single charge of criminal conspiracy.” 452 Pa.Super. at 537, 682 A.2d at 798. On May 27, 1997, Judge O’Brien resentenced the Respondent to similar conditions including the removal from office.
On July 5, 1994, the Respondent filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion in this case, requesting that the Complaint be dismissed for several reasons. In Section I, the Respondent argued that this Court lacked jurisdiction because he was no longer a judicial officer by way of Judge O’Brien’s removal Order of June 13, 1994 in the criminal case. In Section II, Larsen contended that he was exposed to “triple jeopardy” because of the concurrent criminal case, pending Senate impeachment trial, and judicial disciplinary proceeding; therefore, Larsen requested the Complaint be “dismissed on triple jeopardy grounds.” Section III challenged the sufficiency of the violations brought by the Board, Section IV was for discovery, and Section V included a request for defense attorney fees. Section VI requested recusal of any Court members who were closely affiliated with any witnesses intended to be called by the Board.
By way of an Order issued on July 25, 1994, per the Honorable Joseph F. McCloskey, Conference Judge, we denied Section III of the motion; denied Section IV without prejudice to file specific discovery requests; denied Section V; and denied Section VI, without prejudice because it was premature. The Court ordered the parties to file briefs with respect to Sections I and II.
On October 4, 1994, following an impeachment trial before the Senate, the Respondent was found guilty of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment. As a result, the Senate adopted Senate Resolution No. 163, which again removed the Respondent from office and declared him ineligible to hold public office in the future. The Resolution, in pertinent part, states:
Adjudging Respondent Rolf Larsen removed from office and disqualified from holding any public office.
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania having tried Rolf Larsen, Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upon seven Articles of Impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senators present having found him guilty of the charges contained in Article II: It is therefore,
ORDERED
And now, THIS 4TH DAY OF October, 1994, the Senate of Pennsylvania does hereby order and decree and it is hereby adjudged that the Respondent Rolf Larsen, Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania be, and he is hereby, removed from office; and that he be and is hereby forever disqualified to hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and be it further
[42]*42RESOLVED, That the President and Secretary be directed to communicate to the Governor of this Commonwealth, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Treasurer of the Commonwealth, the House of Representatives, Respondent Rolf Larsen and the Secretary of the Commonwealth the foregoing order and judgment of the Senate and transmit a certified copy of the same to each.
The Respondent filed an Amended Omnibus Pretrial Motion in this case on November 10, 1994. A reply was filed by the Board on November 23, 1994. Briefs were filed by the Respondent and the Board on November 30, 1994 and December 12, 1994, respectively. In accordance with an Order issued on December 16, 1994, per Judge McCloskey, the Court scheduled argument on the following issues:
1) Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and former jeopardy;
2) Respondent’s Motion to Limit this Court’s jurisdiction to affect the Respondent’s license to practice law in this Commonwealth; and
3) Respondent’s assertion that this case is moot.
The Court did not address the amended motion because the parties presented a joint motion for continuance on January 25, 1995. Based upon the joint motion, this Court, with Burns, Donohue and Johnson dissenting, continued all matters pending disposition of the direct appeal in the criminal case which was pending before the Superior Court. Additionally, the Court ordered that the continuance was to be automatically vacated in the event that Larsen filed notice with the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts to reinstate the active status of his law license. The Court’s interim Order of suspension without pay was continued.
In September 1995, Larsen filed a Complaint, at No. 95-CV-01540 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, against the Senate, as well as the Supreme Court and this Court, among others, requesting, inter alia, that his impeachment be set aside and all disciplinary action be stayed. The case is currently in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, at Nos. 97-7153, 97-7296 and 97-7451, on review of orders of the District Court granting and denying numerous motions to dismiss.
On March 25, 1998, the Board filed a motion to dispose of the amended omnibus pretrial motion. Basically, the Board contended that the original reason for the general continuance, i.e., awaiting disposition of the pending appeal of Larsen’s criminal conviction, no longer existed in light of the exhaustion of direct appeals. Larsen’s answer to the motion was filed on April 13, 1998. In the answer, Larsen denied that the criminal conviction is final, “(t)o the contrary, Respondent is preparing and intends to file before July 1998 -a petition under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act in the Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.” Thus, Larsen argued that the lack of finality of the underlying criminal conviction continues to exist in light of the “soon-to-be filed PCRA petition.” Respondent’s Answer, paras. 2 & 3. On April 22, 1998, we ordered that the stay entered on June 24, 1994 was vacated, and the parties were granted an opportunity to supplement their briefs in relation to the Amended Omnibus Pretrial Motion. Agument was heard before the Court en banc on May 27, 1998.
On June 11, 1998, the Board filed a motion to withdraw, without prejudice, parts B through F of the Complaint. Athough the Board requested that the judicial disciplinary proceeding continue with respect to part A of the Board’s Complaint, the Board concluded that this ease be limited in scope because “the removal Order entered by Judge O’Brien, the verdict in the impeachment trial, and Senate Resolution No. 163, are in full force and effect.” Disposition of this motion is still pending.
II. DISCUSSION
In his Amended Omnibus Pretrial Motion Respondent contends that the Complaint of the Judicial Conduct Board should be dismissed for three reasons:
1. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction since Respondent is no longer a judicial officer having been removed [43]*43from his judicial office (a) by the sentence imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, and (b) by the Senate which impeached him .5
2. This Court lacks authority to enter an • order affecting Respondent’s practice of law, the jurisdiction over which resides with the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court.
3. The question of Respondent’s removal and ineligibility to hold public office in the future is moot.6
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction.7 Our ruling is based on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Judicial Inquiry and Review Board v. Snyder, 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294 (1987) and Matter of Glancey, 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988). In Snyder, the Supreme Court recognized that the “responsibility for maintaining the integrity of judicial administration so as to uphold public respect for the rule of law” required continuing jurisdiction over disciplinary matters although the jurist in question had left office. Id. at 151, 523 A.2d at 298-99. In In re Cicchetti, 697 A.2d 297 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc.1997), we stated:
It has been contended in other cases, that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to discipline a judge ends when the judge’s judicial service ends. See, Matter of Glancey, 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988); Judicial Inquiry and Review Board v. Snyder, 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294 (1987). The Supreme Court rejected this argument in both eases for the reason that “once instituted, our jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings is thus only at an end when we issue a final order”. Snyder, 523 A.2d at 299.
697 A.2d at 301, n. 1. See also, In re Chesna, 659 A.2d 1091 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc.1995) (resignation of judge before institution of disciplinary proceedings would not deprive court of jurisdiction).
Disbarment
Turning to the second issue,8 we conclude that the Court of Judicial Discipline has exclusive jurisdiction to consider and deal with Respondent’s fitness to practice law because all of the misconduct with which he is charged took place while he held judicial office. Support for this decision is found in Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorneys, 528 Pa. 83, 595 A.2d 42 (1991). In that case the question presented was couched as follows:
(W)hether the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (JIRB) has exclusive jurisdiction to discipline Judicial officers for misconduct; so as to preclude action by the Disciplinary Board against those same Judicial officers who are also attorneys registered to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Id at 85-86, 595 A.2d at 43 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court held that exclusive jurisdiction vested with JIRB to handle disciplinary proceedings regarding a judicial officer, and it was for JIRB to determine whether sanctions of (1) removal or suspension from judicial office or (2) limitations against the judicial officer’s right to practice law, should be imposed. Id. at 98, 595 A.2d at 49.
The 1993 Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution changed the existing system of [44]*44judicial discipline. Under the framework in place in 1991, JIRB investigated complaints and made recommendations to the Supreme Court. Under the new dual system, the investigation and prosecution responsibilities lie with the Judicial Conduct Board while the adjudication proceedings are before the Court of Judicial Discipline. Although the Anonymous Attorneys case was decided under the pre-1993 system, the Supreme Court’s analysis is equally applicable to the current system.
In Anonymous Attorneys, the Supreme Court found that the sole jurisdiction for the discipline of all Commonwealth Justices, Judges and District Justices rested in the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board and the Supreme Court. Id. at 92, 595 A.2d at 46. By virtue of the 1993 Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, the “sole jurisdiction” now resides in this Court, with review by the Supreme Court.9 Pa. Const., Art. V, § 18(b), (c) and (d). The Supreme Court also looked to the type of conduct which compels judicial discipline proceedings:
Section 18(d) sets forth six specific types of conduct which would trigger a JIRB proceeding. The very first type of activity prohibited is a “violation of section seventeen of this article.” Section 17 of the Constitution, entitled Prohibited Activities, expressly provides in subsection (b): “Justices and judges shall not engage in any activity prohibited by law and shall not violate any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the Supreme Court.” (emphasis in original)
Id. at 93, 595 A.2d at 47. Under the 1993 Amendment to the Constitution the prohibited conduct is set out in Article V, § 18(d)(1) and a “violation of section 17 of this article” continues to hold its place as conduct which can trigger disciplinary proceedings in this Court. Section 17(b) was not amended in 1993, so it continues to proscribe, for justices and judges, conduct which violates “any canon of legal or judicial ethics.”
The Supreme Court described the broad authority granted to JIRB under the Constitution:
This Constitutional scheme empowers only JIRB to bring actions against judicial officers for any allegations of misconduct which arise during that officer’s tenure in the judiciary.
Id. The Court concluded that the scope of review by JIRB covered not only the conduct of a judge in official capacity, but “all conduct of a judge ....” Id. See also, Matter of Dalessandro, 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743 (1979).
The constitutional scheme was not altered by the 1993 Amendment; what was changed was the identity of the investigative and prosecutorial agency, now the Judicial Conduct Board, and the adjudicatory body, now this Court. The 1993 Amendment accomplished a separation of these functions, all of which formerly resided in JIRB. Thus, we hold that the Judicial Conduct Board, and not the Disciplinary Board, has the constitutional prerogative to bring actions against judicial officers upon allegations of misconduct which arise during that officer’s tenure in the judiciary.
We are aware that the 1993 Amendment changed the review to be exercised by the Supreme Court in judicial disciplinary matters; whereas its review of JIRB’s determinations 10 formerly was de novo,11 under the 1993 Amendment to the Constitution the Supreme Court’s review of this Court’s decisions has been refined and now is as follows: “on the law, the scope of review is plenary; on the facts, the scope of review is clearly erroneous; and, as to sanctions, the scope of review is whether the sanctions imposed were lawful.” Pa. Const., Art. V, § 18(c)(2). The Supreme Court clarified this review process in In re Hasay, 546 Pa. 481, 686 A.2d 809 (1996):
In an appeal by a judicial officer from an order imposing discipline, the standard of [45]*45review for factual questions is the clearly erroneous standard. Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(c)(2). In an appeal by the board from the dismissal of a complaint, there is no standard of review for factual questions, because issues of fact are beyond our scope of review, which “shall be limited to questions of law.” Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(c)(3).
Id. at 485-86, 686 A.2d at 812 (footnote omitted) 12.
The 1993 Amendment does not change our obligation to follow Anonymous Attorneys. Although the Supreme Court’s review of judicial disciplinary matters was modified, the Supreme Court’s decision in Anonymous Attorneys is not the product of such a narrow focus. We do not believe that the sine qua non of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Anonymous Attorneys was its de novo review of JIRB’s recommendations, rather the opinion is primarily reliant on the broad constitutional scheme for the discipline of judicial officers. The Supreme Court stated that the investigation and prosecution of judicial officers for conduct alleged to have occurred during their tenure as judicial officers was within the exclusive province of JIRB, and not with the Disciplinary Board. As noted, that system has not significantly changed with the replacement of JIRB with JCB. Therefore, we are inclined to follow the directive of our Supreme Court absent forceful justification for a contrary course.
The Supreme Court itself has provided us with an indication that the framework established in Anonymous Attorneys survives the 1993 Amendment. In In re Jules C. Melograne, No. 0096 M.D.Misc.Dkt.1996 (Pa. filed September 27, 1996), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed an application filed in that Court by the Judicial Conduct Board requesting, inter alia, that the judicial officer in issue be disbarred.13 The Board averred that the respondent had violated various Rules of Professional Conduct and requested that the Court “enter an Order disbarring respondent, temporarily suspending his right to practice law, or granting such other relief as may be appropriate.” The Board also requested that the Supreme Court declare that respondent had forfeited his judicial office. On September 27, 1996, without explanation, the Supreme Court referred the matter to the Court of Judicial Discipline. We regard this action by the Supreme Court as a reliable statement that the holding of Anonymous Attorneys still governs the discipline of judicial officers, that disciplinary action rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Judicial Conduct Board and this Court, and that an available sanction specifically includes disbarment from the practice of law.
Lastly, a further indication that disbarment of a judicial officer from the practice of law is properly the function of this Court is found in Article V, § 18(d)(3) which provides:
(3) A justice, judge or justice of the peace convicted of misbehavior in office by a court, disbarred as a member of the bar of the Supreme Court or removed under this section shall forfeit automatically his judicial office and thereafter be ineligible for judicial office.14
[46]*46This language is identical to that of former Article V, § 18(d) of the Constitution, before the 1993 Amendment and which was in effect when the Supreme Court decided Anonymous Attorneys. The Supreme Court, in Anonymous Attorneys stated:
Article V, Section 18(d) of the Constitution provides for removal of a judicial officer upon disbarment, thus, impliedly conferring authority to JIRB to recommend such a sanction to this Court when appropriate.
Anonymous Attorneys, supra at 97, n. 14, 595 A.2d at 48, n. 14. By lifting the language of former Section 18(d) in toto and placing it unmodified in the 1993 Amendment, the drafters were making disbarment a disciplinary option under Section 18(d)(1) which provides that:
(1) A justice, judge or justice of the peace may be suspended, removed from office or otherwise disciplined. ... (emphasis added)
For these reasons we hold that the Judicial Conduct Board has exclusive authority to seek disciplinary action, including disbarment from the practice of law, against judicial officers for misconduct occurring during their judicial service and that discipline can only be imposed by this Court subject to review as provided by the Constitution in Article V, § 18(c).
Mootness
We must now consider the Respondent’s last contention, whether the Board’s Complaint should be dismissed as moot inasmuch as Respondent has been removed from office and is ineligible to hold public office. The issue is therefore a question of whether any useful purpose is served by continuing the disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent, recognizing that he has been removed from the bench as a result of both the criminal prosecution and the Senate proceedings, and permanently disqualified from holding public office by way of Senate Resolution No. 13, as well as his conviction of an “infamous crime.”15
Initially, we note that any mootness argument is applicable to the imposition of sanctions only. The question of whether the conduct charged by the Board subjects the Respondent to discipline under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article V, § 18(d)(1)(2) or (3) is not moot.16
The 1993 Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article V, § 18, specified certain conduct of judicial officers which would subject them to discipline, and created the Judicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline to implement its provisions.
A justice, judge or justice of the peace may be suspended, removed from office or otherwise disciplined for conviction of a felony; violation of section 17 of this article; misconduct in office; neglect or failure to perform the duties of office or conduct which prejudices the proper administration of justice or brings the judicial office into disrepute, whether or not the conduct occurred while acting in a judicial capacity or is prohibited by law; or conduct in violation of a canon or rule prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(d)(1).
The judicial disciplinary system is sui generis and operates entirely indepen[47]*47dent of the criminal justice system or the legislative impeachment process. Disciplinary cases are civil proceedings, though “the severe sanctions which may be imposed have led to the observation that ... [they] are ‘quasi-criminal in nature.’ ” In re Hasay, supra at 492, 686 A.2d at 815 (1996). This is not to say, however, that the full panoply of constitutional rights are granted to a respondent in a disciplinary action. In re Dandridge, 462 Pa. 67, 74, n. 4, 337 A.2d 885, 888, n. 4 (1975).
A meaningful approach to the determination of the character of these proceedings is that taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616 (1975) and In re Berlant, 458 Pa. 439, 328 A.2d 471 (1974). In Campbell, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349-50 (7th Cir.1970), and quoted from the Circuit Court’s opinion:
(D)isbarment and suspension proceedings are neither civil nor criminal in nature but are special proceedings, sui generis, ... they are not for the purpose of punishment, but rather ... to protect the courts and the public from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice.
463 Pa. at 478-79, 345 A.2d at 619-20. In Berlant, the Supreme Court similarly observed:
Disciplinary proceedings are not criminal in nature; hence, the reasonable doubt standard need not apply. Moreover, the sanctions arising from such proceedings— censure, suspension, or disbarment — are not primarily designed for their punitive effects, but for their positive effect of protecting the public and the integrity of the courts ....
458 Pa. at 441, 328 A.2d at 473. Campbell and Berlant highlight what is obvious: that it is necessary to have more than one system dealing with the same type of conduct, one to punish the offender, and the other to remedy the injury to the integrity of the judicial system caused by the conduct. These observations by our Supreme Court apply with equal, if not heightened, poignancy to judicial disciplinary proceedings.
The responsibility of the Judicial Conduct Board is constitutionally mandated:
The board shall receive and investigate complaints regarding judicial conduct filed by individuals or initiated by the board; issue subpoenas to compel testimony under oath of witnesses, including the subject of the investigation, and to compel the production of documents, books, accounts and other records relevant to the investigation; determine whether there is probable cause to file formal charges against a justice, judge or justice of the peace for conduct proscribed by this section; and present the ease in support of the charges before the Court of Judicial Discipline.
Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(a)(7). See also, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 2105.
Thus, the Judicial Conduct Board has a constitutional obligation, without exception, to seek discipline if, in its judgment, the conduct is constitutionally proscribed. Upon the filing of formal charges, the Court of Judicial Discipline must “determine whether a sanction should be imposed_” Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(b)(5). A prior criminal prosecution does not bar a later disciplinary action sought by the Board,17 nor does an impeachment proceeding usurp jurisdiction of the Board or this Court.18 Therefore, we hold that these proceedings are not moot, even though Respondent was the subject of a prior criminal prosecution and impeachment proceeding.
Moreover, if the sanctions available to this Court were limited to removal and prohibition from office, the question of whether we should, in the sanction phase, consider these penalties would necessitate close scrutiny of [48]*48the mootness doctrine. See, e.g., Judicial Inquiry and Review Board v. Snyder, supra at 151, 523 A.2d at 298. However, the question of disbarment, and the Respondent’s continued ability to practice law, are issues which currently remain unanswered. In light of the Board’s current position to preserve disbarment as an available form of discipline in the sanction phase,19 we cannot find that the judicial disciplinary proceeding is moot at the present time.
We hold these proceedings are not moot for the additional reason that, although Respondent’s service has already been terminated, he currently seeks collateral attacks on both the criminal sentence and his impeachment. The underlying theory behind Respondent’s argument in this regard is the notion that because he has been removed by other processes, he is no longer subject to disciplinary action. As eloquently argued by his attorney, William C. Costopoulos, Esq., on May 27, 1998:
But let’s assume that this Court wants to set the precedent that no matter how a jurist is removed, even if he’s dead, that we want to bring the coffin up from the ground. And that’s exactly what we’re doing in this case, and we’re opening it and firing shots into the corpse ....
We are guided by the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Matter of Carrillo, 542 S.W.2d 105 (1976), in which the court was faced with a case in which a lower court judge had been convicted in a trial of impeachment and removed by the state Senate. The judge sought to dismiss the disciplinary proceedings as moot. The Texas Supreme Court, however, noted that in view of a pending lawsuit challenging the validity of the impeachment and removal by the legislature, the ease was not moot.
Here, the Respondent has stated he intends to file a collateral attack upon his criminal conviction, and resulting removal from office, through a post-conviction petition. He has also instituted a federal action challenging the validity of his impeachment contending, inter alia, that he was deprived of constitutional due process rights during the Senate proceedings. Without regard to the merits of these actions, they stand as an attack upon the validity of his removal from office. As long as they are pending, the proceeding before this Court is not moot. Indeed, the Respondent has not surrendered any of his positions, but instead is very much alive and litigating. At this time, it is best to recall the words of our Supreme Court:
What we seek to do is to maintain the integrity of the office of judge to the end that that office, and through it the administration of justice, will deserve and receive the support not only of litigants and lawyers but of the public as well.
Anonymous Attorneys, supra at 93, 595 A.2d at 47.
Based upon the reasons stated herein, we find that this ease must continue.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
AND NOW, this 4th day of August, 1998, it is hereby ORDERED and DIRECTED that the Respondent’s Amended Omnibus Pretrial Motion is DENIED AND DISMISSED. Within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, the Respondent may file an Answer to the Complaint in accordance with C.J.D.R.P. No. 413.
BYER, J., files an opinion concurring in the result.
McEWEN, President Judge, and WEINBERG, J., did not participate in the consideration or disposition of this case.