In re Investment Technology Group, Inc. Securities Litigation

251 F. Supp. 3d 596, 2017 WL 1498055, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64401
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 26, 2017
DocketNo. 15 Civ. 6369 (JFK)
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 251 F. Supp. 3d 596 (In re Investment Technology Group, Inc. Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Investment Technology Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, 251 F. Supp. 3d 596, 2017 WL 1498055, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64401 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

JOHN F. KEENAN, United States District Judge:

This is a putative securities class action brought on behalf of all persons and entities who purchased or acquired the publicly traded common stock of Investment Technology Group, Inc. (“ITG”) between February 28, 2011 and August 3, 2015 (the “Class Period”). The defendants are ITG and three current and former executives who, according to the 122-page amended complaint, allegedly made dozens of statements between 2010 and 2015 that were materially false or misleading in light of the company’s failure to disclose Project Omega, a proprietary trading program that improperly used or had access to confidential customer trading information, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) investigation that ensued. As a result of Project Omega’s violation of several securities regulations, ITG ultimately agreed to pay a $20.3 million fine. After disclosing Project Omega and its settlement with the SEC, the company’s stock price dropped substantially.

The amended complaint alleges that the defendants are liable under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The defendants move to dismiss the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims on the grounds that the amended complaint fails to plead any actionable material misstatement or omission, or a strong inference of scienter. The defendants also argue that the amended complaint fails to establish control person liability under Section 20(a). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint.

BACKGROUND

The following facts, which are drawn from the amended complaint (the “Complaint”) and documents incorporated by reference, are accepted as true for the purposes of the motions to dismiss filed by Robert Gasser, Steven Vigliotti, and Mats Goebels (the “Individual Defendants”), and ITG (collectively, the “Defendants”).

[602]*602I. The Parties

Lead Plaintiff Metzler Investment GmbH (“Plaintiff’) is a German capital investment company, (Am. Compl. ¶73 [hereinafter Compl.].) Plaintiffs investment funds purchased approximately 100,-000 shares of ITG stock during the Class Period. (Id.) ITG is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its principal executive offices in New York City. (Id. ¶ 74.) Gasser was the company’s • CEO and president from October 2006 until August 1, 2015. (Id. ¶ 75.) Vigliotti was the company’s CFO throughout the Class Period and still holds that position. (Id. ¶ 76.) Gasser and Vigliot-ti both signed ITG’s Form 10-K filed annually with the SEC from 2010 to 2014 and the company’s quarterly report for the first quarter of 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 75-76.) Goe-bels joined ITG in 1998 and was the company’s General Counsel and a managing director until August 1, 2015. (Id. ¶ 77.) During the Class Period, Goebels was re-, sponsible for all legal and regulatory matters and signed the company’s Form ATS1 filed with the SEC on December 13, 2013 and later published on the company’s website. (Id.) , ...

ITG acts primarily as an agency securities broker, matching customer orders to buy (or sell) a security with orders to sell (or buy) that security. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 17.) The company also provides investment research and analytics products, (See, e.g., id ¶ 60.) The company’s flagship product is an alternative trading system, or “dark pool,” known as POSIT, (Id ¶¶ 2, 12.) When ITG launched POSIT in 1987, it was one of the first .dark pools in existence. (Id ¶ 2.) As of the spring of 2015, POSIT was the ninth largest dark pool, facilitating approximately $109 billion in trades per quarter, (Id. ¶ 11.)

Dark pools allow customers to trade securities outside the traditional exchanges making up the National Market System, such as the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. (Id. ¶ 13.) Dark pools provide anonymity, allowing investors to trade without immediately revealing their identity or the size of the trade. (Id.) This prevents large trades from immediately moving the stock price and provides liquidity’ that might not otherwise exist. (Id.)

POSIT executes.trades at or within, the National Best Bid and Offer (“NBBO”). (Id, ¶¶ 31-32.) Under the NBBO, the “bid-ask spread” is the difference between the highest bid price and the lowest offer price. (Id. ¶ 31.) In other words, it is the difference between the highest price an investor is willing to pay for a security and the lowest price at which a person holding the security is willing to sell it. The information constituting the NBBO is supplied by a subscription program that consolidates and sells data from all exchanges. (⅛)

Customers in POSIT have three possible “pegs” that are linked to the NBBO: “passive,” “midpoint,” or “aggressive,” (Id. ¶ 32.) A “passive” customer will only buy at the lowest NBBO price or sell at the highest NBBO price. (Id.) Conversely, if a customer chooses to be “aggressive,” the customer is willing to buy at the highest NBBO priee or sell at the lowest NBBO price. (Id.) A midpoint customer is willing to buy or sell in the middle of the spread, (Id. ¶ 33.)

Through POSIT, ITG built a brand as an independent agency broker, (Id. ¶ 15.) In other words, according to the Complaint, the company was' known for facilitating trades rather than making trades [603]*603for its own account. ITG made several statements between 1999 and 2010 that Plaintiff contends highlighted this reputation. For example, ITG’s 1999 Form 10-K stated: “We do not act as a market-maker with respect to any securities or otherwise act as a principal in any securities transactions; . we act only on an agency basis. Therefore, we do not have exposure to credit risks in the way that traditional broker-dealers have such exposure.” (Id.) The company also highlighted EOSIT’s confidentiality, stating in .the same filing that POSIT allowed clients “to trade single stocks and portfolios of equity securities among themselves in a confidential environment,” and explained that “[cjonfiden-tial matching of buy and sell orders, eliminates market impact;” (Id. ¶ 14.)

II. Project Omega.

In light of falling revenues during the economic crisis, in 2009, ITG’s senior managers recommended that the company explore trading on its own account using algorithmic high frequency trading. (Id. ¶20.) Algorithmic trading uses computer programs to generate and execute orders in markets with electronic access. (Id.) High frequency trading refers to algorithmic trading executed at very high speeds. (Id.)

In or around early 2010, ITG’s board and Gasser approved Project Omega, a limited scope proprietary trading desk. (Id. 1121.) ITG ran Project Omega through AlterNet Securities, Inc., a broker-dealer subsidiary. (Id.) Gasser chose Hitesh Mit-tal—ITG’s global head of liquidity management—to head Project Omega, (id. ¶¶ 24-25.)

After engaging in simulated trading in January 2010, Project Omega started live trading for two weeks in April 2010 and then continued live trading again in June 2010. (Id. ¶ 27.) At the beginning of both live trading sessions, ITG’s compliance department informed Mittal of certain limits on Project Omega’s scope and access to information. (Id. ¶28.) Specifically, the compliance department instructed Mittal that Project Omega would not have access to information regarding POSIT’s order flow and that the project would be prohibited from coordinating trading strategies or sharing execution information with non-Project Omega employees. (Id.)

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Bluebook (online)
251 F. Supp. 3d 596, 2017 WL 1498055, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64401, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-investment-technology-group-inc-securities-litigation-nysd-2017.