SCHULTZ, Justice.
The controlling issue in this appeal is whether the district court, sitting in probate, may direct the guardian to provide the child access to a grandparent. The district court directed the guardian to provide the child visitation with the grandmother after finding that the best interest of the child would be served by such visita[735]*735tion. We hold the probate court has authority to direct the guardian’s action and, under the limited facts of this case, properly exercised such authority. We affirm.
The minor ward, Randal Ankeney, was born in 1971. A Nebraska court dissolved the marriage of his parents, David and Carolyn Ankeney, and awarded Randal’s custody to Carolyn. Carolyn and Randal moved to Baxter, Iowa, near the residence of Carolyn’s mother, Lillian McWhirter. Randal lived in Baxter for approximately two years until Carolyn died on July 4, 1980, as a result of an automobile accident. David, who had remarried and had become a resident of Colorado, applied to the Jasper County Court to become Randal’s guardian and conservator and was appointed to serve in those capacities on July 8, 1980. At that time Randal moved to Colorado with his father and stepmother, Mary Lou.
Randal has a close relationship with his maternal grandmother, Lillian, and his mother’s family. Lillian, a widow, has two sons, five daughters, and several grandchildren. Randal maintained a close relationship with his family, including his two maternal great-grandmothers. After Randal moved to Colorado, David maintained a cooperative relationship with the McWhirters, allowing Randal to visit on a regular basis on special occasions, like Christmas, and during the summer for two or three weeks. The grandmother paid his airfare for these trips. During these periods there were extensive family visitations, and Randal was given the opportunity to visit with his former schoolmates from Baxter. David terminated these visitations when Randal’s maternal uncle challenged David’s actions as conservator.
As conservator, David received in excess of $74,000 in insurance money. There is an indication that more funds may be forthcoming for Randal from a wrongful death action in Iowa on behalf of his mother’s estate and an inheritance from his maternal grandfather’s estate. In October of 1982, David filed a conservator’s report which alerted the McWhirters that Randal’s insurance proceeds had been spent to purchase a new home for the Ankeney family. Although title was originally conveyed to David and Mary Lou Ankeney, they later conveyed a “.649%” interest in the home to Randal by warranty deed. David, as conservator, had not sought the court’s permission to make such an investment. Randal’s uncle, Robert McWhirter, filed a petition to remove David as conservator, alleging an unauthorized use of the insurance proceeds. It appears that the visitation problems were an outgrowth of this action by Randal’s uncle. The petition for removal of the conservator was amended to add a request for visitation by the maternal grandmother, Lillian.
A hearing was set on the matter of visitation; although David did not appear in person, he was represented by his attorney. After hearing the testimony of several members of the McWhirter family on the issue of visitation, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction of the matter by virtue of the guardianship and “that it is in the best interest of the child that the previous visitation be continued.” The court ordered that the guardian provide visitation between the ward and his grandmother, Lillian, and required that the guardian file a proposed visitation schedule within a time period. When that proposed visitation schedule was not filed, the court held a further hearing. At that hearing the guardian, through his attorney, declined to provide a visitation schedule; and the attorney made a professional statement that the stepmother, Mary Lou, had adopted Randal in a Colorado proceeding. The court then specified the visitation and ordered that the grandmother be responsible for all costs of transportation. This appeal followed.
I. We first address a procedural issue raised by the appellee. The order granting visitation was filed on August 1, 1983. On August 8, an order was entered to set up a schedule for the visitation which had been ordered earlier; this order is the one to which the notice of appeal was addressed. The notice of appeal stated that the appellant “hereby appeals to the Su[736]*736preme Court of Iowa from the order entered in this matter on the 8th day of August, 1983, and from each and every order and ruling inhering therein.”
The appellee grandmother argues that, since the order actually granting visitation was one other than that to which the notice of appeal was addressed, the notice of appeal was fatally defective. She does not claim she was misled or prejudiced by the notice of appeal.
We believe the August 1 order “inhered” in the order of August 8 and was included by a literal reading of the notice of appeal. Moreover, we have held that substantial compliance with the form requirements of Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6 is sufficient. In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Iowa 1980); Blink v. McNabb, 287 N.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Iowa 1980); Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972). The notice substantially complied with the rule and was sufficient to confer jurisdiction in this court.
II. David challenges the authority of the district court, sitting in probate, to enter these orders in two respects. First, he claims there is no statutory or inherent authority to order visitation between the ward and the maternal grandmother. Secondly, he claims any such authority was terminated when Randal was adopted by his stepmother. Under the limited facts of this appeal, we cannot agree with these assertions.
In the written briefs and oral arguments, both parties have supplied us with material and facts that have arisen subsequent to the orders appealed from. These matters concern the hearing to remove the conservator, subsequent contempt proceedings and the agreement for visitation pending the appeal. We shall only consider those matters in the record at the time the appeal was taken, however.
A. David points out that the district court cited Iowa Code section 598.35(3) in its ruling and urges that this subsection does not authorize a petition for visitation in the probate court. This subsection allows a grandparent to petition for visitation rights with a grandchild when “[t]he parent of the child, who is the child of the grandparents, has died.” § 598.35(3). We agree that this subsection is not controlling. The real issue is not a question of a grandparent’s right to visitation; rather, this case concerns the authority of the district court sitting in probate to enter orders directing the guardian’s actions in matters involving the best interest of the ward.
Initially, when the guardian secured his appointment and qualified, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court making the appointment and agreed to be subject to the orders entered by the court. Iowa Code § 633.71 (1983).
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SCHULTZ, Justice.
The controlling issue in this appeal is whether the district court, sitting in probate, may direct the guardian to provide the child access to a grandparent. The district court directed the guardian to provide the child visitation with the grandmother after finding that the best interest of the child would be served by such visita[735]*735tion. We hold the probate court has authority to direct the guardian’s action and, under the limited facts of this case, properly exercised such authority. We affirm.
The minor ward, Randal Ankeney, was born in 1971. A Nebraska court dissolved the marriage of his parents, David and Carolyn Ankeney, and awarded Randal’s custody to Carolyn. Carolyn and Randal moved to Baxter, Iowa, near the residence of Carolyn’s mother, Lillian McWhirter. Randal lived in Baxter for approximately two years until Carolyn died on July 4, 1980, as a result of an automobile accident. David, who had remarried and had become a resident of Colorado, applied to the Jasper County Court to become Randal’s guardian and conservator and was appointed to serve in those capacities on July 8, 1980. At that time Randal moved to Colorado with his father and stepmother, Mary Lou.
Randal has a close relationship with his maternal grandmother, Lillian, and his mother’s family. Lillian, a widow, has two sons, five daughters, and several grandchildren. Randal maintained a close relationship with his family, including his two maternal great-grandmothers. After Randal moved to Colorado, David maintained a cooperative relationship with the McWhirters, allowing Randal to visit on a regular basis on special occasions, like Christmas, and during the summer for two or three weeks. The grandmother paid his airfare for these trips. During these periods there were extensive family visitations, and Randal was given the opportunity to visit with his former schoolmates from Baxter. David terminated these visitations when Randal’s maternal uncle challenged David’s actions as conservator.
As conservator, David received in excess of $74,000 in insurance money. There is an indication that more funds may be forthcoming for Randal from a wrongful death action in Iowa on behalf of his mother’s estate and an inheritance from his maternal grandfather’s estate. In October of 1982, David filed a conservator’s report which alerted the McWhirters that Randal’s insurance proceeds had been spent to purchase a new home for the Ankeney family. Although title was originally conveyed to David and Mary Lou Ankeney, they later conveyed a “.649%” interest in the home to Randal by warranty deed. David, as conservator, had not sought the court’s permission to make such an investment. Randal’s uncle, Robert McWhirter, filed a petition to remove David as conservator, alleging an unauthorized use of the insurance proceeds. It appears that the visitation problems were an outgrowth of this action by Randal’s uncle. The petition for removal of the conservator was amended to add a request for visitation by the maternal grandmother, Lillian.
A hearing was set on the matter of visitation; although David did not appear in person, he was represented by his attorney. After hearing the testimony of several members of the McWhirter family on the issue of visitation, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction of the matter by virtue of the guardianship and “that it is in the best interest of the child that the previous visitation be continued.” The court ordered that the guardian provide visitation between the ward and his grandmother, Lillian, and required that the guardian file a proposed visitation schedule within a time period. When that proposed visitation schedule was not filed, the court held a further hearing. At that hearing the guardian, through his attorney, declined to provide a visitation schedule; and the attorney made a professional statement that the stepmother, Mary Lou, had adopted Randal in a Colorado proceeding. The court then specified the visitation and ordered that the grandmother be responsible for all costs of transportation. This appeal followed.
I. We first address a procedural issue raised by the appellee. The order granting visitation was filed on August 1, 1983. On August 8, an order was entered to set up a schedule for the visitation which had been ordered earlier; this order is the one to which the notice of appeal was addressed. The notice of appeal stated that the appellant “hereby appeals to the Su[736]*736preme Court of Iowa from the order entered in this matter on the 8th day of August, 1983, and from each and every order and ruling inhering therein.”
The appellee grandmother argues that, since the order actually granting visitation was one other than that to which the notice of appeal was addressed, the notice of appeal was fatally defective. She does not claim she was misled or prejudiced by the notice of appeal.
We believe the August 1 order “inhered” in the order of August 8 and was included by a literal reading of the notice of appeal. Moreover, we have held that substantial compliance with the form requirements of Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6 is sufficient. In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Iowa 1980); Blink v. McNabb, 287 N.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Iowa 1980); Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972). The notice substantially complied with the rule and was sufficient to confer jurisdiction in this court.
II. David challenges the authority of the district court, sitting in probate, to enter these orders in two respects. First, he claims there is no statutory or inherent authority to order visitation between the ward and the maternal grandmother. Secondly, he claims any such authority was terminated when Randal was adopted by his stepmother. Under the limited facts of this appeal, we cannot agree with these assertions.
In the written briefs and oral arguments, both parties have supplied us with material and facts that have arisen subsequent to the orders appealed from. These matters concern the hearing to remove the conservator, subsequent contempt proceedings and the agreement for visitation pending the appeal. We shall only consider those matters in the record at the time the appeal was taken, however.
A. David points out that the district court cited Iowa Code section 598.35(3) in its ruling and urges that this subsection does not authorize a petition for visitation in the probate court. This subsection allows a grandparent to petition for visitation rights with a grandchild when “[t]he parent of the child, who is the child of the grandparents, has died.” § 598.35(3). We agree that this subsection is not controlling. The real issue is not a question of a grandparent’s right to visitation; rather, this case concerns the authority of the district court sitting in probate to enter orders directing the guardian’s actions in matters involving the best interest of the ward.
Initially, when the guardian secured his appointment and qualified, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court making the appointment and agreed to be subject to the orders entered by the court. Iowa Code § 633.71 (1983). The court having jurisdiction of a guardianship is the superior guardian, and the guardian is an officer of the court. 39 Am.Jur.2d Guardian and Ward § 1 (1968). Thus, one who procures and accepts an appointment as guardian is subject to the control and supervision of the court. .39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward § 7 (1976). Such a guardian is estopped from denying the jurisdiction of the appointing court. 39 Am. Jur.2d Guardian and Ward § 24 (1968).
Our statutory scheme and. case authority grant a preference to parents who seek to act as guardian and custodian, subject, however, to the overriding concern of the best interest of the child. The guardian shall have custody of a minor ward. Iowa Code § 633.635 (1983); In re Guardianship of Carrick, 250 Iowa 1181, 1186, 98 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1959). “The parents of a minor ... if qualified and suitable, shall be preferred over all others for appointment as guardian.” Iowa Code § 633.559 (1983). This rebuttable preference accorded the natural parents gives way to the welfare and best interests of the child, however; and we have refused custody to the natural parent. Patten v. Patrick, 276 N.W.2d 390, 397 (Iowa 1979) (when grandmother appointed guardian of child on mother’s petition, we denied father’s petition to remove guardian and place custody with him on the basis that the best interest of the [737]*737child overcame the preference granted the natural parent); Carrere v. Prunty, 257 Iowa 525, 531-32, 133 N.W.2d 692, 696 (1965) (when mother originally had custody of child by divorce decree, we denied natural father custody of the child in an action against maternal grandmother who was appointed the child’s guardian after the death of the mother); Finken v. Porter, 246 Iowa 1345, 1348, 72 N.W.2d 445, 446 (1955) (father, who lost custody of child to mother in divorce proceeding, unsuccessful in proceeding to remove stepfather as guardian of child and regain custody of child from maternal grandparents, following death of mother).
The power of the probate court is not limited to custody decisions. In a contested proceeding concerning guardianship of a minor, we have established the child’s grandmother as guardian and custodian and granted visitation rights to a natural parent. Patten, 276 N.W.2d at 398. The one undisputed principle is that the best interest of the child is the supreme consideration. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(15). Recently, we addressed the rights of grandparents in Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Iowa 1984), and held that grandparents do not possess a common law right of visitation with grandchildren. The authority of the probate court to grant access of the ward to a grandparent arises from the child’s best interest rather than from a statutory or common law right possessed by the grandparent.
We recognize that the guardian is responsible for the day-to-day decisions that are made for the child’s welfare. The courts normally will not interfere with such decisions except when the evidence clearly shows that the best interest of the child dictates such interference. When the guardian has sought the aid of the court to be declared the guardian and custodian of a child, the guardian’s custody and control of the ward is subject to the regulation and control of the court. 39 Am.Jur.2d Guardian and Ward § 65 (1968). Such regulation and control includes the matter of visitation. Patten, 276 N.W.2d at 398-99.
The guardian’s rights with respect to custody and control of the person of the infant extend to refusing to permit other persons to have access to the ward, but this power also is subject to the control of the court which may require the guardian to permit certain persons to have such access.
39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward § 59 (1976). If the best interest of the child dictates visitation, we hold that there is no logical reason to prevent visitation merely because the party seeking visitation is not entitled to it of right.
B. David’s second challenge to the probate court’s authority is that, even if the court had authority to order visitation, the adoption of the child by the stepmother severed the court’s authority. The evidence of adoption was presented to the probate court after the contested hearing and the court’s decision that the best interest of the child required contact with the grandparent. Assuming that the evidence was properly before the court, this evidence is of no aid to David under the facts of this case.
The rights acquired by the stepmother through adoption do not terminate summarily the jurisdiction of the probate court or the guardianship. The grounds for termination of a guardianship are provided in Iowa Code § 633.675 and include the minor’s attainment of majority, the minor’s death and a “determination by the court that the conservatorship or guardianship is no longer necessary for any other reason.” Randal is alive and is still a minor, and the court has not determined that the guardianship is no longer necessary.
David further asserts that In re Adoption of Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1980), indicates that an adoption terminates a grandparent’s visitation rights. Gardiner merely holds that the adoption of a child cuts off the grandparent visitation rights created in chapter 598. 287 N.W.2d at 558. There was no guardianship in Gardiner. Assuming, without deciding, that the stepmother’s adoption in Colorado [738]*738was valid, it does not terminate the guardianship proceedings in Iowa or the authority of the court to insure that the child’s best interests are served.
Our review of these matters is de novo. Patten, 276 N.W,.2d at 397. When we consider the facts, we find ample support for the decision of the trial court. The child has maintained a close relationship with his maternal grandmother and his maternal family. Although no separate counsel or guardian ad litem has been appointed for the child, he has indicated by telephone and in writing his desire to continue visiting his mother’s family. The father obtained the guardianship and custody of the child only after the unfortunate death of the mother. He was also appointed conservator of funds the child received as a result of the mother’s death. For several years the father allowed visitation with . the grandmother at her expense. It was only when the child’s maternal uncle alerted the court that the father, acting as conservator of the child, had improperly used conserva-torship funds of over $74,000 to purchase a home in Colorado initially titled in the father and stepmother, that the father terminated visitation. The father admitted that the visitations were terminated due to problems which resulted when the uncle sought an accounting of the conservatorship funds. It would be ironic to sanction the father’s punitive action terminating visitation in this situation when the uncle merely was protecting the minor’s sizable inheritance. The grandmother and aunt have indicated that the problems the adults have experienced should not be discussed with Randal. The child has a close relationship with his maternal relatives which should be allowed to continue.
The trial court found it was in the best interest of the child that the previous visitation be continued and the child be permitted to have visitations with the grandmother in Iowa. Following a de novo review, we make the same finding.
AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur except LARSON, HARRIS, McGIVERIN, JJ., who dissent.