In the Matter of the Estate of Dennis R. Peterson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-1472
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1472 Filed November 13, 2025

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DENNIS R. PETERSON,

ESTATE OF DENNIS R. PETERSON, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, Myron Gookin,

Judge.

The executor of an estate appeals the probate court ruling setting priority

over estate funds in favor of a beneficiary. AFFIRMED.

Paul A. Miller of Miller Law Office, Fairfield, for appellant.

John G. Daufeldt and Colin W. Smyka of John C. Wagner Law Offices, P.C.,

Amana, for appellee Joseph Parcell.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ. 2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

Was it proper to pay the estate beneficiary, Joe Parcell, the funds remaining

in the estate? The probate court said yes, but the executor, Donna Peterson,

argues that the estate is insolvent as any leftover funds must be paid towards a

probate claim for medical expenses. We find that the probate court properly

resolved the issue of Parcell’s claim based upon the record provided at the

hearing. We affirm.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

Dennis Peterson died on February 20, 2020, and his estate was opened the

next month so that his August 27, 2018 will (the “Will”) could be probated. The

decedent’s daughter, Donna Peterson, was appointed as executor. Important to

this matter, the Will provided in Article I, involving the grant of a life estate: “I hereby

give to Joe Parcell lifetime use of the 2nd and 3rd bays at [the Collins Street

property] so long as he pays 35% of overhead.” Additionally, Article II of the Will

provided the “rest, residue and remainder of my property” is to be distributed to

Donna. Unfortunately, before Dennis died he incurred medical bills. The Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) filed a claim in probate in the

amount of $138,086.27, on behalf of the medical assistance program pursuant to

Iowa Code section 249A.53(2) (2020).

To pay debts of the estate, Donna applied for authority to sell the real estate

that involved Parcell’s life estate interest. Parcell objected to the sale, noting the

estate had other properties that could be sold to satisfy claims and pay the estate

expenses. In response the executor argued the estate was insolvent to the amount 3

of $68,996.89 so Parcell’s life estate interest should be “adeemed” and that the

HHS billing would still have to be negotiated.

A hearing was set on the application to sell real estate on December 21,

2020, but neither Donna nor the estate attorney appeared. The probate court

rejected the ademption theory and refused to extinguish Parcell’s life estate

interest. Undeterred by the earlier ruling, the executor filed another application to

sell the real estate and the executor now pointed to Iowa Code sections 633.425

and 633.436, which related to the classification of debts and charges and order of

abatement of devisees’ interests for the payment of debts and charges. An

attorney for HHS also appeared at the hearing set on the second application. The

probate court addressed the arguments made at the hearing, ordering that the real

estate should be sold because under section 633.436, “the debts and charges of

the estate exceed the assets, the specific devise of the life estate in two bays of a

storage building to Joe Parcell abates for payment of the estate’s debts and

charges. Effectively, this abatement extinguishes Parcell’s life estate interest.”

Parcell appealed this ruling. A panel of our court considered the issues over

the second application to sell, finding that the probate court correctly determined

that abatement was necessary given the lack of funds to pay debts, but that the

estate had to follow the order of abatement as outlined in section 633.436. It

directed that the “order of abatement should be as follows: residuary bequest to

Donna Peterson and then the specific bequest to Joseph Parcell.” In re Est. of

Peterson, No. 21-0218, 2022 WL 1487126, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2022)

(considering Parcell’s life estate a specific bequest under the Will and finding

abatement was necessary to pay the debts and expenses of the estate). 4

Once back before the probate court, in July 2022, the court entered an order

confirming that Donna’s residuary bequest abate for payment of debts and estate

expenses before Parcell’s specific bequest of a life estate. The estate moved

forward with completion of the court’s requirements and ultimately an April 2023

hearing was set to determine if the life estate property would be sold. But at the

hearing, the executor and Parcell presented a settlement agreement reached

between them. Their agreement would allow the sale of the life estate property

but reserve Parcell’s right to present his claim for reimbursement of the value of

his life estate interest.

Subsequently, Donna filed the final report on January 15, 2024, which

stated that payment had been made of all debts and claims, with the attached

“accounting” reflecting that HHS had been paid $77,918.45, leaving a $60,167.82

“deficiency to Estate Recovery Program.” That same month, HHS filed a release

and satisfaction of its claim in probate noting a payment amount of $77,918.45.

The body of the filing specifically stated: “Comes now Iowa HHS, and does hereby

acknowledge receipt of the below amount in satisfaction of the claim for Title XIX

medical assistance pursuant to Iowa Code Section 249A.53(2).” (Emphasis

added.) The next day, counsel for HHS filed a withdrawal of appearance from the

estate proceedings. From the court file, it appears that the matters remaining were

approval of the final report to allow distribution of assets and payment of the estate

expenses.

To that end, the probate court set a hearing on the final report, which

included consideration of Parcell’s objections and request for a determination

related to the distribution to him. No representative from HHS attended the 5

hearing. Parcell took issue with the attorney fees charged, accused the executor

of selling property below market rate and demanded a full accounting of sums in

the estate attorney’s trust account.

After a hearing where both Parcell and Donna testified,1 each side filed

post-hearing briefs, and on June 19, the probate court entered its findings of fact,

conclusions of law, analysis, and ruling. The probate court found there was no

dispute that $64,428.212 represented the value of Parcell’s life estate interest.

Noting that the accounting provided by the estate was “not exactly an outstanding

model of an accounting,” the court stated it could not “crunch the numbers to know

exactly how much may be left for distribution” as it had reduced the attorney fees

claimed in the accounting from $39,128.12 to $9680. The probate court entered

judgment setting out the order of the specific obligations to be paid and that to the

extent there remained funds available, those funds would be paid to Parcell.

Additionally, the probate court ordered the executor to calculate the final balance

of funds available and file a detailed explanation on or before July 31 because the

accounting provided did not list the funds held in the estate attorney’s trust

account.3

Before the supplemental accounting was filed, HHS filed an appearance

and moved to modify the probate court’s order, arguing that it was still owed part

of the $138,086.27 incurred for medical expenses and had not “settled for

1 A realtor, familiar with the decedent and his real estate holdings, also testified. 2 As the probate court noted in the ruling, “[t]his value is not credibly disputed by

the estate.” 3 No accounting with this required information was filed by the estate on or before

July 31, 2024. 6

$77,918.45” as the probate court found. And to the extent that the court identified

the release as a settlement agreement, HHS maintained there was a mutual

mistake of fact. As an alternative argument, HHS contended that because it did

not engage in the hearing, the court “may” have entered its ruling against HHS in

default and so the order was entered due to mistake pursuant to Iowa R. Civ.

P. 1.977.4 Parcell resisted the motion, asserting HHS had no authority to file its

motion. HHS also filed an amended release of claim that indicated it filed the

previous release of claim because it allegedly received all the remaining funds in

the estate but now believed there were “approximately $28,000 of further estate

assets to distribute.” (Emphasis added.)

In a ruling on the motion to modify, the probate court rejected all arguments

asserted by HHS. Both the executor and HHS appealed this ruling.

II. Standard of Review.

Except for some specified probate issues that are “triable in probate as law

actions, . . . all other matters triable in probate shall be tried by the probate court

as a proceeding in equity.” Iowa Code § 633.33 (2024). In equity cases review is

de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.

III. Discussion.

Jurisdiction. We start with a jurisdictional discussion. Both the estate and

HHS appealed the probate court’s rulings in this matter. In an appellate motion

filed by HHS, it contends that it is “not properly an appellee in this matter,” the court

4 Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977 provides “[o]n motion and for good cause . . .

the court may set aside a default or the judgment thereon, for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty.” 7

should “redesignate the parties” and that because the estate is not adverse to

HHS, it may be “dismissed from this matter entirely.” Three months later after a

briefing schedule was filed by the appellate clerk of court, HHS filed a formal

“voluntary dismissal.” Thus, we are left with the estate’s appeal of the issues

presented here. And because the estate only appeals from the order denying

HHS’s motion to modify, we focus on only on that issue.

With HHS no longer a party to the appeal, our focus is on the estate’s claims

and the process related to it. As to the estate’s appeal of the underlying decision

of the probate court, Iowa Code section 633.36 provides that “[a]ll orders and

decrees of the court sitting in probate are final decrees as to the parties having

notice and those who have appeared without notice.” So Parcell argues that we

do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the executor did not timely

appeal from the June 19 findings of fact, conclusions of law, analysis and ruling.

Only HHS moved to modify that ruling as their counsel and “the Iowa Department

of Health and Human Services” had withdrawn from the probate matter before

June 19. And, the estate did not join in that HHS motion to modify. So, the

question is whether the HHS motion to modify extends the estate’s time to appeal.

We find that it does.

The pertinent rule provides that “[o]n motion joined with or filed within the

time allowed for a motion for new trial, the findings and conclusions may be

reconsidered, enlarged, or amended and the judgment or decree modified

accordingly or a different judgment or decree substituted.” Iowa R. Civ.

P. 1.904(2). Parcell argues that HHS is not a party and thus cannot avail itself of

this rule. But this section of the rule does not reference “party,” and in any event, 8

a claimant to an estate is an “interested party” under our caselaw. See In re Est.

of Pearson, 319 N.W.2d 248, 249–50 (Iowa 1982) (noting that in the analysis of

those persons with standing to contest a will, a judgment creditor was an interested

party by virtue of its beneficial interest). Likewise, a rule 1.977 motion is not the

sole method to raise an issue that a court overlooked, and so HHS as a claimant

could ask the court to address a legal issue related to the ruling on Parcell’s

beneficial interest. See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Iowa 2012)

(observing “[w]e said that rule 179(b) (now rule 1.904(2)) is one means, but not the

only means, for requesting such a ruling” on an overlooked issue and other

motions requesting a ruling can preserve error). Thus, we find that HHS could file

the motion to address its concern over the medical claim. The estate’s appeal

deadline did not begin until that timely motion to consider was resolved by the

probate court.5

New Evidence. Next, Parcell argues that the probate court could not

consider the new evidence and arguments that HHS brought to the table post-

hearing—specifically that their claim in probate was not fully satisfied even though

they filed a release and satisfaction of claim. It is generally improper for a party to

submit new evidence for the court’s consideration at the motion-to-reconsider

5 Parcell also argues that the estate’s notice of appeal “unequivocally indicates

[Donna] is only appealing the District Court’s Order Denying the HHS Motion,” so she cannot challenge the court’s earlier ruling that set out the order of the specific obligations to be paid. We disagree and find the notice of appeal encompasses both rulings. See, e.g., In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Ankeney, 360 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Iowa 1985) (finding a notice of appeal “substantially complied” with our appellate rules and “was sufficient to confer jurisdiction in this court,” even though the notice only referred to a later order because the earlier order “inhered” in that order). 9

stage. Anderson v. State, 2 N.W.3d 807, 820 (Iowa 2024) (denying the additional

medical record information included in the motion to reconsider or modify that was

not part of the hearing on the motion to dismiss). A rule 1.904(2) motion is

permitted so that courts may enlarge findings based on the evidence presented in

the record. Id. We agree that new evidence cannot be considered, but we still find

that the legal arguments involving the effect of the release and satisfaction filed by

HHS were addressed by the district court.

Legal Considerations Involving the Release and Satisfaction and Waiver.

In its appellate brief, the estate addresses the statutory requirements

related to the payment of debts and charges of an estate, citing authority related

to those concerns. But the narrow issue presented is: did the district court properly

find that the HHS release and satisfaction fully released its claim for any additional

monies over and above the $77,918.45 it received as referenced in the document?

On that issue, the estate briefly notes there was a “mutual mistake” but offers no

authority in support of this position. Thus, the estate has waived its argument on

this core issue. Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in

support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”). Likewise, a party

forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to make more than a perfunctory

argument in support of the issue. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311

(Iowa 2024) (listing ways a party may forfeit an issue on appeal). Such is the case

here. Finding the issue presented on this appeal waived, we affirm the decision of

the district court.

AFFIRMED.